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He remembers Maximov’s assistant and the ques-
tion he asked: “What kind of book do you write?” 
He knows now the answer he should have given: 
“I write perversions of the truth. I choose the 
crooked road and take children into dark places. 
I follow the dance of the pen.”
J. M. Coetzee, The Master of Petersburg
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Introduction
Most of the novels of J. M. Coetzee are founded on the same struc-
tural principle: within the bounds of the narrative an empty space 
is introduced, an enigma that the narrative will try to unravel but 
by which it will be ultimately defeated. In his earlier novels, the 
confrontation between the enigma and the explanatory narrative is 
played out within the space of the colonial discourse, usually fig-
ured in the relation between a victim and a liberal representative 
of the colonial power abhorring the “everyday” methods of control 
used by the rulers. In fact, in Coetzee’s writing the inability of the 
subjugated to express themselves becomes progressively more and 
more acute: while the barbarian girl does not know how to answer 
the Magistrate because she does not know what he wants from her 
(Waiting for the Barbarians), in Michael K this inability becomes 
somehow “naturalised” as he is hare-lipped and “not clever with 
words” (Life and Times of Michael K ), and ultimately Friday (Foe) 
is not able to speak because of the paradigmatic (and metaphoric) 
colonial mutilation of the cutting out of his tongue.
Within the context of the liberal novel discourse this attitude is 
quite familiar and can be subsumed under the Levinasian approach 
promulgated by the multiculturalist discourse as a novelistic version 
of the “respect for the other.” As the victim of colonialism is disad-
vantaged in all respects, not only being the subject of naked violence 
and cultural subjugation but also having no means of expressing his 
predicament (lack of intellectual “tools” to “give voice” to himself), 
the only respectful attitude towards the victim that the liberal writ-
er can take is to try to present the unfortunate protagonist as the 
unsurpassable challenge that cannot be overcome by the discourse 
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of the novelist (ultimately the representative of colonising power). 
Thus the meaning of the victim remains inaccessible within such dis-
course, although it leaves its trace there, the trace that will always 
constitute a challenge. But this is not all, for within the context of 
such liberal attitude the irretrievable meaning of the victim does 
not only pose the inaccessible truth as the truth of pain of which 
it is impossible to speak by definition but this very impossibility 
seems to radiate a certain transcendence, a certain human universal, 
the properly existential meaning of what it is to be a human being, 
which can be summarised as “this fragile creature who can be hurt.”
In this context, after a series of “enigmatic” novels, Coetzee’s Age 
of Iron takes an unexpected step: from its narrative the central “in-
accessibility” characteristic of the earlier novels vanishes and what 
appears in its place is the split colonised other: on the one hand, the 
actual violent insurgent against apartheid, on the other, the black 
alcoholic derelict. What is more, these two incompatible attitudes 
are confronted by a proper representative of the liberal discourse 
complete with the sanction of the ideal of “harmonious” humanity 
bestowed on her by her education – a retired university lecturer on 
the classics. And although Age of Iron is in many respects artistically 
inferior to its predecessors, or perhaps because it is inferior – that 
is, because the crucial antagonism in it escapes to some extent being 
aesthetically sublimated – the truth of the inaccessible other is put 
into a sharper focus: the chiasmus appears which illustrates why 
the other’s ineffable trace is only a ruse of the colonialist discourse.
In such a confrontation both the speakable and the unspeakable 
situate themselves on each side of the split. When the other appears 
in the form of the insurgent, the “humanist” discourse knows exactly 
what is the meaning of the message of the other (violent overthrow 
of power) but such message is within the liberal paradigm utterly 
incomprehensible (how can he sacrifice all that is “human” in him 
for “death-driven male constructions”). When the other is incarnated 
by the derelict, his meaning is incomprehensible (what is his dark 
secret which makes him live like that?), while his message is per-
fectly understood: he demands pity and human heart. One should 
note that only in the second case is something akin to the kernel 
of transcendence (amenable to be novelistically developed and am-
plified) hidden (the dark secret, the cause of becoming the victim), 
while the insurgent is taken to be utterly transparent – his motiva-
tions are all too obvious and therefore not amenable to becoming a 
subject of a “humanistic” novel, which would treat them as simplistic 
propaganda lacking in “human” truth, that is, in an existential di-
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mension.1 Yet, the choice encountered here is only twofold: either the 
truth of the black alcoholic, if it exists, has to be expressed in the 
language of the struggle (e.g. as dropping out of it), or his truth will 
become installed as a fascinating enigmatic image of the irretriev-
able secret in the familiar practice of “exoticising” the other, that 
is, projecting on him one’s own images of enjoyment, the substance 
inaccessible to the colonialist subject. In this sense, the mortally ill 
Curren (the former university lecturer), who has never been a believ-
er, projects on Vercueil (the alcoholic) her clearly fantasmatic image 
of him as her guardian angel that will help her to the “other side.” 
It is a very telling image in the context of the liberal novel: Curren 
gets off on transcendence but only at second hand. In other words, 
one disavows transcendence (one is a “postmodernist”); the other, 
however, seems to have access to something substantial beyond one’s 
understanding; therefore by revering the other one reveres precisely 
the (empty because inaccessible) image of such transcendence. In ef-
fect, one ultimately enjoys one’s own reverence of the other’s tran-
scendence by means of which one appears likable to oneself, since 
this image makes one “more” than one positively (substantially) is. 
In other words, this object/image, which is, properly speaking, noth-
ing (the image of “something more/enigmatic in the other”), creates a 
lack in us (there is something in the other I cannot comprehend), yet 
this lack instantly turns into a surplus in the liberal discourse (I en-
joy my reverence for the other’s enigma as what makes me properly 
“human”). The crucial point, however, is that the secret in the other 
is what I inserted into him in the first place to make him interest-
ing for me in ways that, for example, the insurgent is not – he is 
treated as a misguided other who rather than wallowing in his sub-
stantial enigma has become thoroughly alienated from his substance 
by adopting the discourse of the master (violence) and returning it 
to him.2
A clear exposition of such obscenity of the discourse of the enigma 
is provided by Coetzee in The Master of Petersburg, which is tellingly 
taken out of the colonial space of ethnic difference and placed within 
the racially neutral discourse in which Dostoevsky has to confront 
his two “sons,” Pavel (his stepson) and Nechaev (a revolutionary who 
identifies himself with Raskolnikov before his “fall” into Orthodox 
Christianity). This time, what the stakes are behind the confronta-
 1 Of course, “propagandist” truths are not by definition excluded from the dis-
course of the novel, as the example of Brecht shows.
 2 The logic of “something enigmatic” in the other is, of course, the logic of 
Lacanian object a.
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tion of the images becomes even clearer, since Dostoevsky’s entire 
effort is spent on creating Pavel’s image as the ineffably innocent 
victim (whose ultimate identification is Christ – the paradigm of an 
enigma) – in order to dissimulate his political engagement against 
the Father (God-Tsar-Dostoevsky) represented by Nechaev. What 
is more, such manipulation by Dostoevsky is only possible because 
Pavel is already dead and only as dead can his image be maintained 
as benign.
This truth having been registered on “neutral” grounds, the next 
novel can return to the colonial context and start with what it 
found in Petersburg, that is, with the image of the jouisseur. But 
not only that: what is superimposed on such an image is precisely 
the liberal discourse so familiar from the earlier novels, but because 
of such a superimposition the obscene smile of enjoyment lurks in 
its cracks. Thus, Disgrace is Coetzee’s best novel precisely because 
it is least sentimental and least deluded. Although in Age of Iron 
the perverse enigmatising device was abandoned and the confronta-
tion between the two incompatible figures of the other was posed, 
yet as soon as they were presented they became totally sentimen-
talised by Curren’s melodramatic discourse which translated them 
into a lovable and unlovable other (the unlovable destroying and 
the lovable supporting “humane” identifications). In Disgrace, there 
is no victim on the side of the other and the moment it happens 
identification with the other becomes totally impossible for the lib-
eral Lurie. Hence we encounter the limit of the liberal novel: the 
moment the victim disappears, and with him our exultation in our 
outrage, which is the ultimate support of liberal identification, we 
become confronted with the monstrous and disgusting other who 
thoroughly traumatises our discursive space since he does not seem 
to enjoy our liberal values. When there is no victim available on 
the side of the other, suddenly all the sentimentalising assumes its 
proper place, and rather than being spent on creating the space of 
the ineffable within the discourse, it is spent by Lurie on mourning 
himself and his victimised daughter. Yet the ultimate achievement 
of the novel lies in taking a step further and presenting a white 
victim, Lurie’s daughter who has been raped by blacks, who does 
not accept the sentimentalising/aggressive discourse (two sides of 
the same coin) in which Lurie tries to explain away her reaction 
to their new place within the postcolonial space.
After what has been said above, the failure of Slow Man is not 
surprising. In it, Coetzee’s usual manner of writing is taken out of 
the context in which it had been possible to stir its “compassionate” 
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and “universalist” overtones. That is to say, when the enigma was 
played out within a space of extremity, including subjective destitu-
tion as the outcome of torture, war, etc., the refusal to “explain” 
could be taken as a (or even the) narrative incarnation of respect 
for the suffering other, even if it sometimes smacked of capitulation 
before the inevitability of suffering in the hands of one power or 
another as belonging to human condition. However, when such cir-
cumstances are absent, all the “existential” implications seem to find 
their proper place and come back with a vengeance. In Slow Man, 
which takes place in safe Australia, the central “enigma” (or one of 
the two) is Rayment’s refusal to wear a prosthesis: he “inexplicably” 
declines to behave like other people and become “able” again thanks 
to such “unnatural” means, deriding his new “reduced” life and sup-
porting his refusal in terms of saving his “honour.” Although Michael 
K could radiate a certain “grandeur” refusing to accept food offered 
to him within the space of colonial discourse and become in this way 
a sublime figure of resistance/truth for the medical officer as well as 
for the reader, this was possible only because of the very extremity 
of his situation and a careful manipulation of the allegorical and 
metaphorising context by Coetzee.3 When, however, this “estrang-
ing” framework is removed, we encounter nothing but a narcissistic 
caricature in which the underside of the “enigmatic” discourse comes 
more clearly to light – Rayment’s honourable fidelity turns out to 
be a fidelity to his idealised image of a man who lacks nothing, not 
even respect for the other. Without there being an extreme context 
of violence such identification with what is in him more than himself 
becomes nakedly ridiculous when it is incarnated in his repeated 
claims that without half of one of his legs he becomes less human 
– if one wants one more example of what the human truth stands 
for in this context, we have it here in a thoroughly indecent man-
ner: the identification with one’s “natural” image of wholeness as 
immortality.
And to fill out this teleological scenario of Coetzee’s development 
as a writer – admittedly artificial, as all narratives of this sort have 
to be – we can add that although his first two books are aesthetic 
 3 In this sense all of the novels that will be analysed in this book are aesthetic-
ally successful (apart from Age of Iron and Slow Man which fail for reasons already 
mentioned); notwithstanding the questionable (because ultimately narcissistic) “hu-
manist” attitude they represent, Coetzee uses his devices to produce “transcendence” 
very skilfully and the reader is manipulated into assuming the surplus of ineffable 
meaning.
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failures (and for that reason not included here4), it is their deficien-
cies precisely that bear witness to what Coetzee had to refine out of 
existence in order to become a “mature” liberal writer. In Dusklands, 
the respectable other does not exist because for the protagonists of 
both narratives in the book the appearance of the other within their 
discursive space constitutes the ultimate catastrophe and it inevita-
bly provokes the crisis, that is, dissolution of their identities (there 
is no benign image of the other, unless I insert in his place the 
unacknowledged image of myself). On the other hand, In the Heart 
of the Country presents us with the consciously ridiculous and ar-
tificial image of transcendence embodied by the Spanish speaking 
gods in their flying machines, for whom the whole process of writing 
by the protagonist is passionately staged and who provide her in 
turn with obscure injunctions and enigmatic truths (not surprisingly 
these “transcendent” truths are bits and pieces of the old “European” 
knowledge: Hegel, etc.). These two truths – there is no transcendence 
of discourse apart from violence, and the image of enigmatic truth 
is a stand-in for this violence – which the first two books unasham-
edly flaunted, prevented the sublimation necessary for the aesthetic 
achievement, which was the creation of the following scheme: a sta-
ble (because central) place is assigned to a signifier (of the victim), 
but the inclusion of it within the chain of other signifiers (which 
would provide it with meaning within the context of a given novel) is 
repeatedly denied, yet with simultaneous insistence that the ultimate 
meaning of the narrative is hidden precisely in this “withdrawn” sig-
nifier. It is clear that what we encounter here is precisely the logic 
of the master signifier whose truth is the enjoyment of some version 
of the Father, a père-version of liberal discourse.
 4 One of the reasons of the failure seemed to be Coetzee’s as-yet “unsublimated” 
fascination with Beckett – which is especially noticeable in In the Heart of the 
Country. Beckett’s discourse is not very amenable to the inevitably political confron-
tations of the colonial-cum-familial discursive space.
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Waiting for the Barbarians (1980)
This most allegorical of Coetzee’s novels commences with the famil-
iar confrontation of two faces of power, in this case two types of func-
tionaries in the service of an Empire, the state of which we shall not 
learn anything about in the course of the book. The unnamed narra-
tor bears the position of Magistrate, the highest authority in a fort 
on the southern outskirts of the Empire beyond whose dominions lie 
wasteland territories populated by nomadic tribes called the barbar-
ians. He is a patrician from an old family, supposedly living a quiet 
and satisfying life at his post. He conscientiously fulfils his duties, 
which are not many: “There is not much crime here and the penalty 
is usually a fine or compulsory labour”1 – and spends the rest of his 
time pursuing hobbies appropriate to his patrician status: hunting, 
reading the classics, drawing maps of the unknown territories, exca-
vating the ruins of past civilisations (earlier in his life philandering 
was also included). This man, who stands for the good old ways, is 
confronted by the newly arrived Colonel Joll of the Third Bureau, 
which “is the most important division of the Civil Guard” (2), that 
is, the officer of the security forces of the state. The reason for his 
arrival is rumours of preparations for war among the barbarians 
and he appropriately comes from the capital since, as the Magistrate 
remembers: “Last year stories began to reach us from the capital of 
unrest among the barbarians. […] The barbarian tribes were arming, 
the rumour went; the Empire should take precautionary measures, 
for there would certainly be war” (8). Joll is supposed to investigate 
 1 J. M. Coetzee, Waiting for the Barbarians (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), 2; 
further references in the body of the text.
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the situation and he immediately sits down to torture two prison-
ers who are in all probability innocent. Such crudity arouses the 
Magistrate’s disgust as his educated belief is that the barbarian 
threat is just a fantasy of a satiated community:
Of this unrest I myself saw nothing. In private I observed that once 
in every generation, without fail, there is an episode of hysteria 
about the barbarians. There is no woman living along the frontier 
who has not dreamed of a dark barbarian hand coming from under 
the bed to grip her ankle, no man who has not frightened him-
self with visions of the barbarians carousing in his home, breaking 
the plates, setting fire to the curtains, raping his daughters. These 
dreams are the consequence of too much ease. Show me a barbar-
ian army and I will believe. (8)
During the course of the novel, we do not learn much about the 
barbarians, who are no doubt “mainly destitute tribespeople with 
tiny flocks living along the river” (4), as the Magistrate maintains, 
so they do not constitute any danger for the Empire, yet the ques-
tion remains why once every generation there is a panic about the 
barbarian invasion if the main preoccupation of those people is how 
to survive in the wasteland they inhabit. Is it really the outcome of 
too much leisure in the happy crimeless community?
The answer to this question is provided by the Magistrate him-
self who, after having led an expedition to return a barbarian girl 
mutilated by Joll to her tribe, is accused by Warrant Officer Mandel 
(another figure from the Third Bureau, and to some extent inter-
changeable with Joll) of “treasonously consorting with the enemy” 
(77). He answers this charge by saying, “We are at peace here, […] 
we have no enemies. […] Unless I make a mistake […]. Unless we 
are the enemy” (77). Rather than translating this ironic remark into 
a standard accusation of the security forces of having broken the just 
and lenient imperial law, whose representative the Magistrate is, 
for their own vile purposes and therefore of being the real enemy of 
the people, we can follow the Magistrate’s further comments on his 
persecutors where he calls them “the new barbarians usurping my 
desk and pawing my papers” (78; emphasis added) and later muses 
on Mandel’s “strange” behaviour:
The careful reorganisation of my office from clutter and dustiness 
to this vacuous neatness, the slow swagger with which he uses to 
cross the room, the measured insolence with which he examines 
me, are all meant to say something: not only that he is now in 
~ 17  ~
charge […] but that he knows how to comport himself in an office, 
knows even how to introduce a note of functional elegance. Why 
does he think me worth the trouble of this display? Because despite 
my smelly clothes and my wild beard I am still from an old family, 
however contemptibly decayed out here in the back of beyond? (82)
The struggle we witness here seems to be the struggle of the 
Empire with itself and the antagonism inside it is described with 
precision (though rather deprecatingly) by the Magistrate himself: 
“The road to the top must be hard for young men without money, 
without patronage, with the barest of schooling, men who might 
as easily go into lives of crime as into the service of the Empire” 
(84). Joll and Mandel are seen as representatives of the dominated 
classes who no longer want to stay low and whom the ossified hier-
archy of the Empire (the old families) cannot contain; the hierarchy 
either forces them into taking the road of “crime” (that is, activi-
ties directed against the status quo) or attempts to contain them 
by turning them into the security police – to maintain the security 
of the old families against “crime,” yet at the same time making 
them “untouchable,” since the measures that have to be taken to 
maintain security include those that the law in principle does not 
allow and which are revolting to the liberal consciousness of the 
old families, who want to see themselves as enlightened, indulgent, 
pleasure-loving paternal figures. Hence the clash we witness: on the 
one hand, the Magistrate, as a liberal beautiful soul, is indignant 
at the practices his happy satiated world supposedly does not need 
(“We are at peace here”); on the other, the security officers are 
trained to protect the world of the old families but disavowed as 
not belonging to this world, or even dangerous to it, yet necessary 
for its maintenance.
This configuration can explain the mysterious panic that is raised 
against the barbarians once in a generation: each generation of “un-
touchables” needs such unrest to overcome the inherent divide within 
the imperial society and dominate (that is, force their way into) the 
old families. In other words, what we witness in the supposed war 
against the barbarians is the outside projection of the antagonism 
within the imperial society: the war with the real but insignificant 
barbarians is an instrument used by the new “imperial” barbarians 
(who lack money, patronage, and education) to gain a position among 
the rulers by denouncing the old aesthetic (“liberal”) habits as dan-
gerous to the Empire – the Empire they represent as its most faith-
ful servants.
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In this light, it is interesting that the book starts precisely with 
something that, within the bounds of the Magistrate’s world, is tan-
tamount to the entrance of Satan into the Garden of Eden, that is, 
with the arrival of Joll and his committing the sin of torture – which 
is conceived as a sin against humanity (“We are the great miracle 
of creation!” shouts the Magistrate later in the novel (107)). Until 
this moment the Magistrate’s life has supposedly been happy and 
satisfying, which he explicitly says at the beginning of the memoir 
he writes in the last pages of the novel: “No one who paid a visit 
to this oasis […] failed to be struck by the charm of life here. We 
lived in the time of the seasons, of the harvest, of the migrations of 
the waterbirds. We lived with nothing between us and the stars. We 
would have made any concession, had we only known what, to go on 
living here. This was paradise on earth” (154). Although he explicitly 
qualifies what he has written as “equivocal” (“a message as devious, 
as equivocal, as reprehensible as this” (154)), all of his retrospections 
of the life “before Joll” bear precisely this melancholic stamp of the 
lost fullness and happiness of existence in the organic community 
which is at peace with itself and content with living the cyclical time 
of seasons, while the arrival of Joll is retrospectively summarised as 
the disaster by which “time has broken” (43); that is, the timeless 
paradise of the repetitive happy progression of the seasons was lost.2
 2 One can even discern a humorous counterplot which parallels the story of 
life in the Garden of Eden (but since all of Coetzee’s books are singularly devoid of 
humour, we can assume that this specimen is unintentional): while, until the arrival 
of Joll, the Magistrate was in full control of his penis, distributing it liberally among 
the attractive female inhabitants of the fort, and with age sublimating part of this 
power into cultural activities (“For years I wore the well-fed look of the prize boar. 
Later that promiscuity modulated into more discreet relations with housekeepers 
and girls lodged sometimes upstairs in my rooms but more often downstairs with 
the kitchen help, and into the liaisons with girls at the inn. I found that I needed 
women less frequently; I spent more time on my work, my hobbies, my antiquarian-
ism, my cartography” (45)), the break in time coincides with the loss of control over 
this part of the body as witnessed by his helplessness in front of the barbarian girl 
(“It seems appropriate that a man who does not know what to do with the woman 
in his bed should not know what to write” (58)) and later by random and uncontrol-
lable erections that plague him. As it is well known, man’s lack of control over his 
penis is for Augustine the sign of the Fall, of the expulsion from paradise.
This failure of the organ can also be linked to an altered symbolic organisation 
of the body which the encounter with Joll (as the master of the body in torture) and 
later the barbarian girl (Joll’s “work”) evoke in the Magistrate: “When I look at her 
naked body and my own, I find it impossible to believe that once upon a time I imag-
ined a human form as a flower radiating from a kernel in the loins. These bodies of 
her and mine are diffuse, gaseous, centreless, at one moment spinning about a vortex 
here, at another curdling, thickening elsewhere; but often also flat, blank” (34). The 
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Therefore, perhaps, there is some reason for the strange lack of 
any factual information about the Empire, a power about which we 
never learn anything. Perhaps what we witness in Waiting for the 
Barbarians is not a story about some upstarts from the capital, cor-
rupted by power and wreaking havoc in the idyllic (organic) frontier 
society ruled by a wise and liberal Magistrate, but an allegory about 
the nature of imperial power itself presented in the microcosm of 
the frontier fort, a power which always has two faces (the benevo-
lent symbolic father and the obscene enjoyer of torture) and which 
tells itself stories about the milk-and-honey past to dissimulate the 
antagonisms within it and project them as a contingent danger in-
vading from the outside. On this reading, there is nothing but truth 
in Joll’s retort to the Magistrate’s outraged cry: “You are the enemy, 
you have made the war, and you have given them all the martyrs 
they need – starting not now but a year ago when you committed 
your first filthy barbarities here! History will bear me out!” (114); 
Joll’s answer is: “Nonsense. There will be no history, the affair is 
too trivial.” Or rather: your plea will not be included in the history 
of the Empire because the war with the barbarians is precisely the 
way the antagonism of our society (the antagonism between the old 
families and the young upstart jackals) is being narrativised in order 
to dissimulate it.
Of course, the Magistrate in his more sober moments is conscious 
of the link that connects him to the security officers as the other 
face of the Empire: “For I was not, as I liked to think, the indul-
gent pleasure-loving opposite of the cold rigid Colonel. I was the lie 
that Empire tells itself when times are easy, he the truth that the 
Empire tells when harsh winds blow. Two sides of imperial rule, no 
more no less” (135). But there is a further step one should take here 
– one may ask: the lie the Empire believes when times are easy for 
whom? Precisely for those who can feel they live in paradise because 
of wealth, patronage and plenty of education – for others the indul-
gent pleasure-loving life is simply inaccessible, and the truth of the 
Empire for them, regardless of times, is the rigid rule of the Colonel.
Although the Magistrate’s relation to himself has to be negoti-
ated by means of his relation to the security officers, the “object” 
through which this relation is mediated is the barbarian girl who 
confrontation with the girl can be said to dissolve in the Magistrate the genital or-
ganisation of the drives, that is, the hierarchy of the drives (incarnated in the genital 
organisation of erogenous zones) based on the successful introduction of the paternal 
metaphor (the master signifier) and returns him to polymorphous sexuality of oral 
and anal stages in which the genitals (the penis) lose the privileged role.
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is tortured and mutilated by Joll and whom the Magistrate takes 
into his care when the security forces have gone back to the capi-
tal. Why does he do it? He insists that he is not able to explain 
himself in this respect, but one can surmise that his reason (or at 
least one of them) is guilt: as he allowed torture to happen under 
his jurisdiction, his liberal conscience seeks now for some kind of 
expiation for his having lacked the will to prevent the atrocities. 
Yet the Magistrate’s attachment to the girl is much more ambigu-
ous – he becomes fascinated by her, but this fascination has noth-
ing to do with her being the cultural other, that is, with her being 
as she used to be before she was brought to the fort; he is not 
interested in her as a barbarian (the barbarians are “primitives” 
who are uninteresting to a cultured patrician, they are “destitute 
tribespeople” (4) and when he parts with the girl he realises that 
he has not even tried to learn her language (72)), but as a “work” 
of Joll – what draws him to her is her “altered” state. What, how-
ever, is so fascinating about a deformed and mutilated body3 for 
the Magistrate whose attitude to life is markedly aesthetic in his 
melancholy pursuit of beauty and harmony in the world?
He finds a message inscribed in the body of the girl, a message 
whose meaning he has to decipher: “It has been growing more and 
more clear to me that until the marks on the girl’s body are deci-
phered and understood I cannot let go of her” (31). For the Magistrate, 
there is a truth inscribed in her body, which demands to be uncov-
ered and understood and whose master is Joll who, at the beginning 
of the novel, is introduced by the Magistrate precisely in such terms: 
“This gentleman is visiting us from the capital. […] His work is to 
find out the truth. That is all he does” (3). And Joll is quite explicit 
about it himself: “First I get lies […] then pressure, then more lies, 
then more pressure, then the break, then more pressure, then the 
truth. This is how you get the truth” (5).
The Magistrate attempts to find out this truth, which he conceives 
as the truth of the victim, by asking the barbarian girl questions 
about what exactly happened to her behind the closed doors of the 
torture chamber and, even more importantly, about how such an ex-
perience influenced her self (“What do you feel towards the men who 
did this?” (41)). In other words, he tries to penetrate through the ob-
scure surface of the body marked with enigmatic signs and find “per-
sonal” meaning for them in the interiority of the victim. This effort, 
 3 During her torture the girl’s ankles are broken and she is virtually blinded 
by hot metal brought close to her eyes.
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however, is repeatedly frustrated by the girl, which becomes a source 
of exasperation: “But with this woman it is as if there is no interior, 
only a surface across which I hunt back and forth seeking entry” 
(43). What is more, this hunting for truth does not only happen on 
the level of speech but is accompanied by a wordless everyday ritual 
that commences by the Magistrate’s taking the girl into his quarters 
to wash her and dress her wounds and later turns into massag-
ing and anointing her body, during which the Magistrate each time 
passes out and falls unconscious, only to wake up some hours later.
He does not know what to think about such a compulsive ritual, 
he does not even know what kind of relation it establishes between 
him and the girl: “There is no link I can define between her woman-
hood and my desire. I cannot even say for sure that I desire her. All 
this erotic behaviour of mine is indirect: I prowl about her, touching 
her face, caressing her body, without entering her or finding the urge 
to do so” (43). One can say that what started clearly as a ritual of 
cleansing or expiation is given an obscene twist: the act of washing 
the feet of the barbarian girl can no doubt be related to the feeling 
of guilt that the Magistrate’s weakness of will evoked in his liberal 
conscience, and hence his “intuitive” passing on to perform a ritual 
on which he earlier ironically mused in reference to Joll:
I suppose that, like the roving headsman, he is used to being 
shunned. […] I find myself wondering too whether he has a private 
ritual of purification, carried out behind closed doors, to enable him 
to return and break bread with other men. Does he wash his hands 
very carefully, perhaps, or change all his clothes; or has the Bureau 
created new men who can pass without disquiet between the clean 
and unclean?” (12)
As there is no question of the Magistrate being a new man (he comes 
from an old family), the ministrations on the body of the barbarian 
girl may look precisely like this kind of a ritual aiming at getting rid 
of guilt on the symbolic level, yet there are some features of it that 
perplex the Magistrate and disallow such a simple assignment of 
meaning to what happens to him: first, the ritual is compulsory (re-
petitive); second, it blows his conscious mind away; third, the ritual 
alternates between producing feelings of pleasure and revulsion, or 
rather mixes them up so we have pleasure in revulsion or revulsion 
in pleasure, which introduces confusion in the Magistrate’s notions 
of desire (“Never before have I had the feeling of not living my own 
life on my own terms” (40)).
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Revolting against his bondage to this ritual with the girl,4 and in 
order to shake off all the ambiguities it produces about himself and 
his desire and to become a “normal” man again, the Magistrate visits 
a “girl” at the inn (one he calls the “bird-girl”) to have “unproblem-
atic” sexual intercourse: “I have not for a moment had to interrogate 
my desire: to desire her meant to enfold her and enter her, to pierce 
her surface and stir the quiet of her interior into an ecstatic storm; 
then to retreat, to subside, to wait for desire to reconstitute itself” 
(43). So we are back with interiority, this time easily reached with 
the girl offering herself as the object of desire. However, this easy 
and supposedly natural interiority of the beautiful girl of pleasure 
(so unlike the barbarian who is stocky and shapeless) is of course 
nothing but artifice in the service of the master, even if it is reflected 
into itself as belief: “The friend who first recommended her to me 
spoke of her talents: ‘It is all playacting of course,’ he said, ‘but in 
her case the difference is that she believes in the role she plays’ ” 
(46). So what the Magistrate feels as depth here has nothing to do 
with the girl’s interiority (unless we understand interiority only in 
the anatomical sense), but with symbolic distance between them – 
although they are copulating each one remains in the place they oc-
cupy in the social (symbolic) structure of the society: he as an invad-
ing master, she as accommodating female who appropriately stages 
her submission. In other words, they enjoy but their enjoyment is 
kept within the bounds of the pleasure principle (that is, it is ulti-
mately undecidable whether it is “real” or staged enjoyment5), which 
leaves the symbolic identifications intact and allows the circulation 
of desire to be unhindered and unproblematic.
In contrast to this, while he is with the barbarian girl the 
Magistrate is confronted with his disappearance – massaging her body 
his ego temporarily disintegrates and he experiences an invasion of 
some rending substance which is definitely not what he encounters 
in pursuing his desire with the bird-girl where the pleasure he gets 
is actually something that strengthens his ego as it strengthens his 
identification with the image of a lenient pleasure-seeking master 
 4 “There are other times when I suffer fits of resentment against my bondage to 
the ritual of the oiling and rubbing, the drowsiness, the slump into oblivion. I cease 
to comprehend what pleasure I can ever have found in her obstinate, phlegmatic 
body, and even discover in myself stirrings of outrage” (41).
 5 This is also the case with the Magistrate: it is a part of the role of the “nor-
mal” man taking part in “ordinary” sexual intercourse (the intercourse in which the 
roles of a man and a woman are pre-defined) that he derives “unproblematic” sexual 
pleasure from it.
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(or even lenient because pleasure-seeking). What is this suffocating 
substance that causes his disappearance? Lacanian psychoanalysis 
calls it jouissance (the only substance that exists for psychoanaly-
sis), something that accompanies but at the same time undermines 
the subject’s imaginary and symbolic identifications out of which the 
conscious ego (which is what in psychology passes for interiority) is 
constituted and which it cannot really get rid of:
The trouble with jouissance is not that it is unattainable, that it 
always eludes our grasp, but, rather, that one can never get rid of 
it, that its stain drags along for ever – therein resides the point 
of Lacan’s concept of surplus-enjoyment: the very renunciation of 
jouissance brings about the remainder/surplus of jouissance.6
To explain the meaning of such surplus7 we have to go back to the 
Lacanian notion of the subject, which, as is well-known, is a split, 
barred subject (S│  ), that is, a subject marked with the symbolic cas-
tration in which the subject gives up jouissance (e.g. of a part-object 
like the breast, related to mother’s body) to be able to accede to lan-
guage: what bars the subject is the lack introduced by the paternal 
No! installed in the place of jouissance (of part-object). For the early 
Lacan (1950s) the outcome of such constitution of the subject is the 
coming into being of the symbolic position the subject takes (e.g. 
the Magistrate) and the evacuation of the possibility of jouissance 
reduced to small pleasures obeying the logic of desire which is funda-
mentally metonymically structured, that is, always moving forward 
to the next object because “this is not it!” (what psychoanalysis calls 
the pleasure principle). Since the pleasures are never quite satisfy-
ing, they never endanger the subject’s position, constituted by his 
imaginary and symbolic identifications, and precisely for this reason, 
from the subject’s perspective, they can be projected backward as 
fully satisfying only in the imaginary register of the lost paradise 
(that is, as absent).
However, in the later development of his theory, Lacan notices 
the shadow that accompanies such a subject and he comes to call 
it the object-cause of desire or object a. It is something that derails 
 6 Slavoj Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related 
Matters (London: Verso, 1996), 93.
 7 The status of this surplus is paradoxical since it is at the same time a lack 
– but a lack that has positive existence (as in a symbolic chain a lack of feature 
constitutes a positive determination): the lack is not a hole that can be at every 
moment filled with something.
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the smooth course of things, the leftover, the remainder of castra-
tion which cannot be included in the chain of signifiers that is the 
symbolic order: “the object that cannot be swallowed, as it were, 
which remains stuck in the gullet of the signifier.”8 In this way, 
what Lacan now calls subject is split also because it appears in two 
guises: as S1, the master signifier, with which the subject identifies, 
and a, the obscene support of his identity which has to be excluded 
from the image (ideal ego) he projects to appear likable to himself.9 
The important point here is that these two faces of the subject are 
mutually exclusive – the moment one comes to the fore, the other 
disintegrates:
Object a as a cause is an In-itself that resists subjectivisation/
symbolisation, yet far from being “independent from the subject,” 
it is sensu stricto the subject’s shadow among the objects, a kind of 
stand-in for the subject, a pure semblance lacking any consistency 
of its own. In other words, if the subject is to emerge, he must 
set himself against a paradoxical object that is real and cannot 
be subjectivised. Such an object remains an “absolute non-subject” 
whose very presence involves aphanisis, the erasure of the subject; 
yet this presence is as such the subject himself in his oppositional 
determination, the negative of the subject, a piece of flesh that the 
subject had to lose if he is to emerge as the void of distance towards 
every objectivity. This uncanny object is the subject itself in the 
mode of objectivity, the object which is the subject’s absolute other-
ness precisely insofar as it is closer to the subject than anything 
that the subject can set against itself in the domain of objectivity.10
In the Lacanian context, therefore, the cause of the Magistrate’s 
aphanisis may become clearer: in pursuing the meaning of the “signs” 
left by Joll on the body of the barbarian girl by means of words he 
always comes to nothing as the truth of these marks can only be 
found in jouissance (that is, outside of language), while the very pos-
sibility of his remaining himself (his ego-discourse) is founded on the 
dissimulation of jouissance by retaining the distance between ego and 
enjoyment which, as we have noted, constitutes interiority itself. On 
 8 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (Seminar 
XI), trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1979), 270.
 9 In other words: what becomes disavowed is surplus-jouissance that the taking 
of the symbolic position, which is the effect of castration, produces.
 10 Slavoj Žižek, “Hegel with Lacan, or the Subject and Its Cause,” in: Reading 
Seminars I and II: Lacan’s Return to Freud, eds. Richard Feldstein, Bruce Fink, 
Maire Jaanus (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 400.
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the other hand, the confrontation with the “materiality” of the girl’s 
body by means of corporeal contact forces the “truth” of the enjoying/
torturing master into the open – there is no truth here, in the sense 
of a message: to “truthfully” answer the question of the Magistrate 
(“What do you feel towards the men who did this [or even better: 
what did you feel…]”?), the answer would have to be the scream of 
pain in which the interiority (“feelings” that we have “deep down”) 
would be completely evacuated outside into the rending sound leav-
ing nothing remaining inside. In this context, the cruel joke invented 
by one of the spectators of the Magistrate’s torture later in the novel: 
“That is barbarian language you hear” (121), describing his screams 
of pain, unexpectedly hits the mark: his screaming is barbarian lan-
guage if we understand it as the medium in which the barbarian 
truth (of/about the Empire) is told.
This is precisely the lesson of Joll: all the confessions his search 
for truth produces, if we approach them on the substantial level (of 
meaning), are fabrications produced by the victims to satisfy his de-
mand. But when we take a different perspective, it will turn out 
that the appearance of truth corresponds precisely to the aphanisis 
(erasure) of the subject and the appearance of this paradoxical ob-
ject/non-object pain “which remains stuck in the gullet of the signi-
fier” as a scream. Therefore, on the one hand, we have the activity 
that the Magistrate takes up in order to expiate his guilt (with all 
its Christian connotations of washing feet, etc.), that is, to exorcise 
obscene enjoyment (of Joll) from the Law whose representative he is 
by means of sacrificing his elevated status to plug up the crack in 
the Other11 through which jouissance seeps in and undermines the 
“objectivity” of Law. Yet, on the other hand, by postulating that the 
truth has to be excavated from the signs left by Joll (the truth of 
what it is to be human, what it means to be hurt), he places himself 
precisely in the position of Joll (of which he is partly aware12), who is 
a whimsical master supposedly demanding meaning (“Tell me what 
you barbarians are planning against us”). However, what Joll really 
demands is ultimately not a message expressed in words but the 
meaning of what it is to be the master himself, that is, simply fixing 
him in the position of absolute domination (his victim will ultimately 
tell him anything he demands).
 11 The (big) Other is the Lacanian term for the symbolic order: the realm of 
signifiers and the Law.
 12 “Is this how her torturers felt hunting their secret, whatever they thought it 
was? For the first time I feel a dry pity for them: how natural a mistake to believe 
that you can burn or tear or hack your way into the secret body of the other!” (43).
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This is also the position taken by the Magistrate, although ad-
mittedly outside the extreme context of the torture chamber. As we 
learn from one of his lovers who used to work with the barbarian 
girl: “Sometimes she would cry and cry and cry. You made her very 
unhappy. […] She could not understand you. She did not know what 
you wanted from her” (152). Although the Magistrate is not com-
pletely unaware of the girl’s confusion, the way he at first speaks 
about it puts him in the position of the victim. When the barbarian 
girl is still around he muses:
I prefer not to dwell on the possibility that what a barbarian up-
bringing teaches a girl may be not to accommodate a man’s every 
whim, including the whim of neglect, but to see sexual passion, 
whether in horse or goat or man or woman, as a simple fact of life 
with the clearest of means and the clearest of ends; so that the con-
fused actions of an aging foreigner who picks her up off the streets 
and instals her in his apartment so that he can now kiss her feet, 
now browbeat her, now anoint her with exotic oils, now ignore her, 
now sleep in her arms all night, now moodily sleep apart, may 
seem nothing but evidences of impotence, indecisiveness, alienation 
from his desires (56).13
Later on in the novel, however, the Magistrate has a moment of 
clarity in which he confesses the cruelty of his position: “She is 
marked for life as the property of the stranger [Joll], and no one will 
approach her save in the spirit of lugubrious sensual pity that she 
detected and rejected in me. No wonder she fell asleep so often, no 
wonder she was happier peeling vegetables than in my bed! From 
the moment my steps paused and I stood before her at the barracks 
gate she must have felt the miasma of deceit closing about her: envy, 
pity, cruelty all masquerading as desire” (135; emphasis added).14 
In this context, the Magistrate’s repeated aphanisis may become 
clearer: in the signs Joll has left on the body of the barbarian girl 
he encounters himself in his opposite determination, that is, as ob-
 13 We may note that such doubling up of meaning when the absolute master 
presents himself as the hurt one is also characteristic of the torture chamber where 
the torturer may imply that it is all the victim’s fault: “It is you who make me do 
it; if only you confessed…”
 14 Some authors speak in this context about Coetzee’s questioning of “liberal 
fetishization of victimhood” [David Attwell, J. M. Coetzee: South Africa and the 
Politics of Writing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 80]; a similar 
point is also raised by Dovey [Teresa Dovey, The Novels of J. M. Coetzee: Lacanian 
Allegories (Johannesburg: Ad. Donker, 1988)].
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ject a, the obscene surplus-jouissance of the master, which, as we 
have noted, is incompatible with his symbolic identification as the 
Magistrate and hence in such confrontation his ego has to go, even 
if only temporarily.
Moreover, in the repeated dream the Magistrate has of the girl 
building a castle of snow she appears precisely as object a – a shape-
less smear which because it has no place in the symbolic order pro-
duces only an obscure feeling of revulsion at the object “not meant to 
live in the light” (53). In the first occurrences of the dream the face 
is simply hidden15; then, when it is encountered, it appears as some-
thing revolting: “The face I see is blank, featureless; it is the face of 
an embryo or a tiny whale; it is not a face at all but another part of 
the human body that bulges under the skin” (37). It is difficult to find 
a more pertinent image to represent object a, the part-object which 
is and at the same time is not an “organ,” a part of the body,16 the 
object that has no specular image.17 It is not difficult to explain the 
revulsion felt at this object, which is “obtuse, slick, like an internal 
organ” (53), especially if we take into consideration the Magistrate’s 
dream that follows the one in which the castle-building girl appears 
for the first time. While the first appearance of the girl is situated 
within the ambience of whiteness and cold,18 the next one consti-
tutes its “luxuriant” counterpart (golden and sweet): “I […] dream 
of a body lying spread on its back, a wealth of pubic hair glistening 
liquid black and gold across the belly, up the loins, and down like an 
arrow into the furrow of the legs. When I stretch out a hand to brush 
 15 In the novel, the yet-unrecognised girl building the snow castle appears for 
the first time in the Magistrate’s dream seemingly before the barbarian prisoners in-
cluding her and her father are brought in and tortured by Joll, which would support 
our suggestion that the Magistrate retroactively projects the past state of things, as 
with the image of the oasis as Paradise.
 16 The original part-object is the breast, yet ultimately the part-object is what 
does not allow for the subject’s illusion of completeness.
 17 Jacques Lacan, Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 
693: “A common characteristic of these objects as I formulate them is that they have 
no specular image, in other words no alterity. This is what allows them to be the 
‘stuff’ or, better put, the lining – without nevertheless being the flip side – of the 
very subject people take to be the subject of consciousness.”
 18 Dovey takes her cue from Lacan in interpreting the castle of the dream (“the 
formation of the I is symbolised in dreams by a fortress, or a stadium” – 224) and 
one may incline to this interpretation taking into consideration that the castle is 
cold and empty of life (“You must put people there!” exclaims the Magistrate (53)), 
that is, it represents the realm of the signifier from which life (jouissance) is evacu-
ated and that the girl (object a) is nevertheless the creative force behind it (she is 
building it).
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the hair it begins to writhe. It is not hair but bees clustered densely 
atop one another: honey-drenched, sticky, they crawl out of the fur-
row and fan their wings” (13). We can almost say that what we have 
here is a dream reworking of the famous painting of Courbet, “The 
Origin of the World,” the very attempt to represent the Thing itself 
(the substance of jouissance) where the “unacceptable” image of the 
aroused female genitalia is “decently” covered over with bees (and 
therefore disavowed), yet, paradoxically, this very cover itself starts 
to function as a metaphoric representation of the crawling, slimy, 
sticky, revolting (and yet “sweet”) life substance that it is supposed 
to hide – the image of the swarming honey-drenched bees.
Although the girl finally receives an imaginary face in the dream 
(“she is herself, herself as I have never seen her” (53)), this happens 
precisely at the moment the Magistrate “decides”19 to exclude her 
from his life (that is, dissimulate his object a) and from the territory 
under his jurisdiction to be able to return to his old ways of balanced 
pleasure which he finds impossible when the girl is around. Although 
his effort to return her to her tribe is presented as an act of decency 
instigated by “respect for the Other” (“Would you not like to see your 
sisters again?” (53)), even the Magistrate, later reflecting on his ac-
tions, does not delude himself that it was possible to heal the girl’s 
wounds this way: “However kindly she may be treated by her own 
people, she will never be courted and married in a normal way: she 
is marked for life as the property of a stranger” (135). There is no 
returning to the imaginary balance which once supposedly existed, 
or at least this kind of “respect” is not the way to reach it.
Here we can return to the Magistrate’s attempted reading of the 
signs left on the girl’s body by Joll. As we have noted, what makes 
the Magistrate Joll’s accomplice in jouissance is the position he takes 
in respect of the girl: he wants to penetrate her surface in order to 
find the hidden meaning of Joll’s inscription “inside” her. Moreover, 
he is infuriated and disgusted by the fact that the girl is nothing 
but surface and interprets it as her resistance in exactly the same 
way the torturer had done. Yet, as happens many times in the novel, 
the Magistrate has a presentiment of a much less obscene position 
he could have taken, although he never follows his thoughts to their 
necessary conclusion. Reflecting back on what happened to the girl 
he muses:
 19 The decision is never mentioned by him explicitly, but five pages later (58) in 
the novel they set out on the road. Therefore the imaginary “healing” of the girl’s 
image in the dream announces a decision not yet consciously taken.
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They exposed her father to her naked and made him gibber with 
pain; they hurt her and he could not stop them […]. Thereafter she 
was no longer fully human, sister to all of us. Certain sympathies 
died, certain movements of the heart became no longer possible for 
her. I too, if I live long enough in this cell with its ghosts not only 
of the father and the daughter but of the man who even by lamp-
light did not remove the black discs from his eyes and the subor-
dinate whose work it was to keep the brazier fed, will be touched 
with the contagion and turned into a creature that believes in noth-
ing. (81; emphasis added)
This is precisely the statement of the truth about the girl, the mean-
ing of the marks on her body. In other words, she had been through 
something which made her die symbolically and left her blank and 
empty of all the values she had believed in and taken for granted as 
well as of the image she had had of herself as the subject of these 
values. Therefore all her interiority is gone and what remains is only 
a blank surface, which can be re-marked by anybody with anything 
(“She yields to everything” (30)). She is void of all values but, in her 
own eyes, also lacking all value herself (“You do not want someone 
like me,” she says to the Magistrate (27)). Rather than accepting 
this as self-evident, the Magistrate becomes infatuated with what 
he conceives as the “mystery of the other,” but which ultimately has 
nothing to do with the girl but amounts to a fascination with himself 
in his opposite determination (the fascination with the jouissance of 
the other, which is in this case the imperial jouissance incarnated 
in Joll). In other words, what he conceives as the girl’s interiority is 
ultimately the fake image produced in his mind by Joll’s ministra-
tions. No wonder, then, that such prostration before the imaginary 
otherness is precisely what produces the girl’s unhappiness: in her 
own eyes she is nobody, a worthless piece of slime; therefore she 
needs somebody in whose eyes she would be able to build her sym-
bolic identifications, her beliefs, anew. Therefore, the best thing the 
Magistrate could have done would have been to treat the girl like 
an ordinary loved woman, which would have allowed her to recon-
struct her own worth by means of assuming her image reflected in 
the loving other’s eyes.20 Whereas, in the way she is treated by the 
 20 As there is obviously no “normalcy” common to the Magistrate and the girl 
(since they come from different cultures), what is meant here by “normal” is what 
this term signifies in the Magistrate’s liberal discourse. In the context of her utter 
subjective destitution, the accusation that treating the girl like an ordinary loved 
woman he would be forcing on her his own system of values, thus being a “colonial-
ist,” is meaningless. This also includes having sex with her, which would be far from 
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Magistrate, the image that is reflected back to her from his eyes is 
precisely the image she has already seen in the dark lenses of Joll: 
“ ‘That is not how you do it,’ she should have said, stopping me in 
the act. ‘If you want to learn how to do it, ask your friend with the 
black eyes.’ Then she should have continued, so as not to leave me 
without hope: ‘But if you want to love me you will have to turn your 
back on him and learn your lesson elsewhere’ ” (135).21
This confusion between the Magistrate’s liberal beliefs and his fas-
cination with imperial jouissance brings him to commit a thoroughly 
“liberal” and at the same time a thoroughly ridiculous gesture: he 
takes the barbarian girl beyond the boundaries of the Empire and 
when they meet the barbarian tribe which agrees to take her back 
to her family, he asks her to come back with him out of her own free 
will, forgetting that what could be conceived as her will had been 
destroyed by Joll in the first place (“she yields to everything”) and, 
even if it had not been, the notion of free will is precisely the product 
of his liberal discourse which may be difficult to grasp for a “tribal” 
barbarian – in order to understand the meaning of his act she would 
have had to rebuild her symbolic order modelling it on the discourse 
of the Magistrate, which is precisely what he did not allow her to 
do. Thus, even his final gesture towards the girl obeys the logic of 
his former behaviour in relation to her: by asking her to come back 
he presents her with a demand she is not able to understand and 
therefore cannot answer.
Having failed to achieve it when the girl is around, the Magistrate’s 
second attempt at expiation begins with the act in which he de-
nounces that which invalidated the purgatory attempt in his ritual 
with the girl. Although after his return from the expedition to meet 
the barbarians he is imprisoned by the functionaries of the Third 
Bureau, he is not treated very badly at first. His real ordeal com-
mences when he steps out of the crowd in order to prevent the pub-
taking advantage of his position with respect to the girl: rejection as sexual partner 
is precisely what produces her confusion and humiliation: “ ‘You visit other girls,’ 
she whispers. ‘You think I do not know? […] Do you also treat them like this?’ she 
whispers and tries to sob” (55).
 21 Joll’s spell is broken only once when it is already too late: on the way to re-
turn the girl to the barbarians the Magistrate is at long last able to make love to 
her precisely when he sees her reflected in the eye of the Other (the soldiers that 
accompany them) as an ordinary spirited woman, which finally (or temporarily?) 
erases her image as an ineffable mystery: “The banter goes on in the pidgin of the 
frontier, and she is at no loss for words. I am surprised by her fluency, her quick-
ness, her self-possession. I even catch myself in a flush of pride: she is not just the 
old man’s slut, she is a witty, attractive young woman!” (63).
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lic festival of tormenting the barbarian prisoners that Joll organises 
and encourages people (including children) to take part in, that is, 
when he takes the position of the (dead) letter of the Law against 
the obscene enjoying master:
“No! ” I hear the first word from my throat, rusty, not loud enough. 
Then again: “No! ” This time the word rings like a bell from my 
chest. […] I am in the arena holding up my hands to still the 
crowd: “No! No! No! ”
When I turn to Colonel Joll he is standing not five paces from 
me, his arms folded. I point a finger at him. “You! ” I shout. Let it 
all be said. Let him be the one on whom the anger breaks. “You 
are depraving these people!” (106)
The consequences of this act are predictable – the Magistrate is 
taken through a series of humiliating and painful exercises which 
culminate in torture when he is hoisted into the air by a rope at-
tached to his hands which are bound behind his back (“now we will 
show you another form of flying,” says the torturing officer, Mandel 
(121)). Such public disavowal of the imperial jouissance seems to 
produce in the Magistrate the effect that the ritual with the girl was 
unable to perform, since immediately after this act of courage, the 
girl visits him in a dream in a completely different shape and offers 
him the bread of reconciliation:
She is wearing a round cap embroidered in gold. Her hair is braided 
in a heavy plait which lies over her shoulder: there is gold thread 
worked into the braid. “Why are you dressed in your best?” I want 
to say: “I have never seen you looking so lovely.” She smiles at me: 
what beautiful teeth she has, what clear jet-black eyes! Also now 
I can see that what she is holding out to me is a loaf of bread, still 
hot, with a coarse streaming broken crust. A surge of gratitude 
sweeps through me. “Where did a child like you learn to bake so 
well in the desert?” I want to say. I open my arms to embrace her, 
and come to myself with tears stinging the wound on my cheek. 
(109)22
So what the Magistrate was not able to accomplish on the level of 
interpersonal relations with the girl seems finally to be reached by 
recourse to the logic of the heroic deed by which the protagonist not 
 22 When the Magistrate muses on the psychology of the torturer his thoughts 
go precisely in this direction: “I find myself wondering too whether he has a private 
ritual of purification […] to enable him to break bread with other men” (12).
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only shows his moral superiority opposing injustice but also willingly 
takes on the just punishment for his past misdeeds and therefore 
even in his humiliation becomes victorious.
This, however, seems to be a narrative model that Coetzee wants 
to avoid, making the Magistrate repeatedly proclaim: “In my opposi-
tion there is nothing heroic – let me not for an instant forget that” 
(78), and at every turn emphasising how, by being submitted to the 
regime of Mandel, the Magistrate becomes reduced to just “a pile of 
blood, bone and meat that is unhappy” (85). What the security of-
ficers do to the Magistrate is ironically called by him “showing me 
the meaning of humanity” which includes not only demonstrations 
that the will is weak when the body is tortured but also that in 
order to live a human being will bear every degradation: “Is there 
a point at which I will lie down and say, ‘Kill me – I would rather 
die than go on’? Sometimes I think I am approaching that point, but 
I am always mistaken” (117). Therefore, the supposedly anti-heroic 
conclusion that “there is no consoling grandeur in any of this” (117) 
is carefully prepared for reasons that, as Dovey has pointed out,23 
Coetzee himself elaborates in the essay “Man’s Fate in the Novels of 
Alex la Guma”:
A favored mode among white South African writers has been trag-
edy […]. The overt content of the fable here is that love conquers 
evil through tragic suffering when such suffering is borne witness 
to in art; its covert content is the apolitical doctrine that defeat 
can turn itself, by the twist of tragedy, into victory. The tragic hero 
is the scapegoat who takes our punishment. By his suffering he 
performs a ritual of expiation, and as we watch in sympathy our 
emotions are purged, as Aristotle noted, through the operations of 
pity and terror. […] Religious tragedy reconciles us to the inscru-
table dispensation by giving a meaning to suffering and defeat. As 
tragic art it also confers immortality: Oedipus and Lear may be 
destroyed by the gods but we resurrect them ritually on our stage. 
[…] Religious tragedy is apolitical or quietistic.24
Is, however, the story of the Magistrate’s suffering taken beyond 
the space of what Coetzee calls religious tragedy? Dovey suggests 
that it is, because “suffering and defeat have no meaning here, pro-
vide no aura of transcendence, and […] the Magistrate moves from 
 23 Dovey, The Novels of J. M. Coetzee, 233–34.
 24 J. M. Coetzee, “Man’s Fate in the Novels of Alex la Guma,” in: Doubling 
the Point: Essays and Interviews, ed. David Attwell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), 346–47.
~ 33  ~
the position of ‘sight’ to a position of ‘blindness.’ ”25 One can won-
der, however, whether the very fact that at the end of the novel 
we return to its beginning does not introduce precisely such tran-
scendence through the back door and against the will of the author: 
although the fort becomes impoverished and supposedly faces hard 
times in the winter, the Magistrate, no matter how “symbolically 
impoverished,” is again in command and the inhabitants “naturally” 
fall back into the habit of obeying his rule. The outcome is that, in 
spite of his being humiliated and tortured, his symbolic authority 
survives and with it the idea of the Empire his authority repre-
sents, that is, the benevolent rule of “decent” old families. For it 
is precisely here that we can find the precious object for which he 
sacrificed himself. Although from time to time he complains about 
being unable to name the cause for which he suffers (“I walked into 
that cell a sane man sure of the rightness of my cause, however 
incompetent I continue to find myself to describe what that cause 
may be” (95)),26 on other occasions he has no problem of voicing it 
quite clearly: “I should never have allowed the gates of the town to 
be opened to people who assert there are higher considerations than 
those of decency” (81; emphasis added).
And this is precisely the “public” reason (in addition to his “pri-
vate” need for expiation) that makes it necessary for him to repeat 
his No! to Joll in front of the whole population of the fort, in other 
words for the eye of the Other.27 Knowing what the outcome of such 
public denouncement will be, he nevertheless sacrifices himself in 
order that the idea of the decent Empire should be incarnated in 
the scene and remain engraved in the minds and memory of the 
people. Thus, he sacrifices himself to show to the imperial subjects 
that rather than being nothing other than just an obscene perpetra-
tion of the jouissance of power for the exercise of the power itself (in-
carnated in functionaries of the Third Bureau who do not obey any 
rules and are named “barbarians” precisely because of that), there 
exists the pure idea of Empire which ultimately stands for Universal 
Justice and the guardians of which are the old imperial families. In 
other words, the Magistrate’s aim is to show that rather than being 
 25 Dovey, The Novels of J. M. Coetzee, 235. She is referring to the “enigmatic” 
way the Magistrate sums up the meaning of his story: “There has been something 
staring me in the face, and still I do not see it” (155).
 26 The parallel to not being able to find out what he wanted from the girl is, of 
course, not accidental.
 27 The Magistrate has already voiced his “private” No! to his oppressors, calling 
them the new barbarians and expressing his outrage to them.
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just a name for the exercise of power, the Empire does and must ex-
ist. His position in this respect is signalled by a change of register 
up to the level of universals:
Godlike strength is mine. In a minute it will pass: let me use it 
while it lasts! “Look!” I shout. I point to the four prisoners who lie 
docilely on the earth […] hoping that their punishment is at an 
end. I raise my broken hand to the sky. “Look!” I shout. “We are 
the great miracle of creation! But from some blows this miraculous 
body cannot repair itself! How –!” Words fail me. “Look at these 
men!” I recommence. “Men! ” (107)
Therefore, in his speech, the Magistrate is not only the representa-
tive of the Law (the symbolic father) who is disgusted with the exces-
sive enjoyment that its functionaries and its subjects derive from im-
plementing it (in this case, tormenting the barbarian prisoners), but 
the representative of Justice itself, which is not a set of particular 
laws dealing with the behaviour of particular men, but the transcen-
dental foundation of the law which answers to the transcendental 
idea of Man. This difference between Justice and law is explained to 
the reader by the Magistrate himself on the example of a prisoner 
who had been brought before him in the times “before Joll”:
I think of the young peasant who was once brought before me in 
the days when I had jurisdiction over the garrison. He had been 
committed to the army for three years by a magistrate in a far-off 
town for stealing chickens. After a month here he tried to desert. 
He was caught and brought before me. He wanted to see his mother 
and his sisters again, he said. “We cannot just do as we wish,” 
I lectured him. “We are all subject to the law, which is greater than 
any of us. […] You feel that it is unjust, I know, that you should be 
punished for having the feelings of a good son. You think you know 
what is just and what is not. I understand. We all think we know. 
[…] But we live in a world of laws, […] a world of the second-best. 
There is nothing we can do about that. We are fallen creatures. 
All we can do is to uphold the laws, all of us, without allowing the 
memory of justice to fade.” (138–39)
Here we can note that an idea of Justice as something in the law 
that is more than the law is yet another incarnation of the idea of 
an Empire that is more than its functionaries (who may appear to 
enjoy their functions too much) and institutions (which may appear 
as cold and “inhuman”) and whose “surplus” of meaning (this inexpli-
cable “more”) is incarnated in decent old families who are revolted by 
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the “new barbarians.” Therefore, when the Magistrate speaks about 
his (symbolic) death28 or when he insists on his subjective destitu-
tion (“There is no consoling grandeur in any of this”), we are strictly 
speaking on the aesthetic (that is, imaginary) level on which the 
humiliations the Magistrate undergoes do not make him reformulate 
who he is with respect to his torturers but only offend his good taste; 
he is ashamed because he feels nothing but hunger (“higher feelings” 
are gone) or because he does all kinds of humiliating things in order 
to survive, but these things are perceived as shameful only by the 
eye of the patrician whose whole life so far has been removed from 
the experience of necessity and deprivation familiar to other impe-
rial subjects.29 Therefore, the Magistrate is far from dying a symbolic 
death on the tree where he is taught to “fly” – although the image 
of himself he might have had as master of his life is destroyed and 
he no longer thinks he is unable to do certain shameful things which 
are necessary for survival in the conditions he finds himself, his 
symbolic identification with the position of decent authority (which 
ultimately guarantees his own decency, in spite of all humiliations) 
does not change at all and hence he himself can easily and with-
out effort slip back into his old function of exercising authority.30 
For this reason, Waiting for the Barbarians ultimately turns out to 
be a specimen of the aforementioned “religious tragedy,” since the 
very act of the Magistrate’s sacrifice creates an illusion of healing 
transcendence: if there is a functionary who in the name of neces-
sary Justice opposes the excesses of the contingent law, the idea of 
moral greatness (of Man, of the Empire, etc.) perverted by some of 
 28 “I am not a young man any more, and whatever future I had in this place is 
in ruins. […] Also I have already died one death, on that tree, only you [Mandel] 
decided to save me” (125).
 29 As usual, “theoretically speaking” the Magistrate is not unaware of this when 
he claims “a body […] can entertain notions of justice only as long as it is whole 
and well” (115).
 30 In this context, we can refer to a protagonist created by another writer fa-
mous for his propagation of the idea of good old common (and English) decency, 
a protagonist who finds himself in a similar situation to that of the Magistrate but 
who really dies his symbolic death. When Winston Smith in George’s Orwell’s 1984 
shouts in the torture chamber “Do it to Julia!” he identifies with his torturer, and 
this amounts to his subjective destitution – this act brings about the disintegration 
of his master signifier (the position in the symbolic order with which he identified 
and which endorsed the values of decency, love, etc.) and Winston is confronted with 
his own “lack of grandeur.” It is only by means of such destruction of the former 
symbolic identifications (in the case of the Magistrate it would be abandoning his 
identification with ineffable Justice) that a novel of this type can move beyond “re-
ligious tragedy.”
its corrupt servants is saved – no matter what humiliations they 
will force on the representative of this ideal, the shame in the eye 
of the Other (which is also the eye of the Reader) will ultimately be 
visited on their heads, since the (liberal) Other knows that the flesh 
is weak and that there are limits to endurance beyond which this 
fragile creature called man cannot go.
But there is one more unpleasant step finally to be taken. Because 
decency is the value by means of which the old families legitimate 
their rule, is not the Magistrate’s identification with ineffable Justice, 
a transcendence originating the fallible law, just another way of in-
troducing through the back door the shadow double that always ac-
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Life and Times of Michael K (1983)
The main protagonist of Life and Times of Michael K is a special 
case in Coetzee’s oeuvre because he is the only one who is a coloured 
South African, as his hospital charge sheet in Prince Albert seems 
to indicate: “Michael Visagie [the authorities mistake his surname] – 
CM [coloured male] – 40 – NFA – Unemployed.”1 What is more, he 
is not a “random” representative of the oppressed, because his dep-
rivation is complete: apart from his racial handicap he is also slow-
witted and hare-lipped, which makes him disabled on all possible 
fronts: social, intellectual, and physical. According to certain critics, 
this condition puts Michael K within the bounds of a tradition which 
would suggest a certain “compassionate” reading of him: “Michael 
K is the descendant of those figures who, in the context of white 
South African writing, represent the oppressed, handicapped, illiter-
ate, if not inarticulate, victims of the system; the type of figure that 
appears to offer the writer the opportunity for telling a story, for 
articulating an experience which, by virtue of the illiterate or inar-
ticulate condition of the victim, would otherwise remain untold.”2 In 
1983 when the novel was published, however – after at least twenty 
years of critical assault on the mimetic mode of writing, which con-
tested its “reality” – such a convention obviously would not do and 
the author clearly forestalls prospective accusations by introducing 
into the narrative an additional and “reverse” perspective, making 
 1 J. M. Coetzee, Life and Times of Michael K (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), 
96; further references in the body of the text.
 2 Teresa Dovey, The Novels of J. M. Coetzee: Lacanian Allegories (Johannesburg: 
Ad. Donker, 1988), 265.
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his Michael the descendant of another well-known but totally non-
realist tradition – that of Kafka’s Ks.3
Within the postcolonial critical context, the white author who at-
tempts to give voice to the oppressed can be accused of many tres-
passes, from his inability to feel what the victim, coming from a to-
tally different life-world, feels (as empathy obviously has its limits) 
to the smuggling, even if unintentionally, of the oppressive ideologi-
cal apparatus, in the form of his values, into the narrative under the 
guise of compassion. Moreover, even the very act of narrating can 
be presented as betraying the oppressed, as their suffering is made 
to fit narrative conventions – the writer has to transform the “raw 
material” of suffering and social injustice into a narration which 
should be interesting, aesthetically stimulating, etc. to the reader. 
As Dovey puts it: “Scaling down the perspective, apparently reducing 
the narrative tone to that of the protagonist, but at the same time 
organizing what is told in the sequential form of a story, which has 
a beginning, a middle, and an end, this mode of narration simulta-
neously appropriates for itself the authenticity and authority of the 
Real.”4 Coetzee, however, is too clever a writer to use this convention 
without second thoughts, that is, without showing its ugly stitching:
They want me to open my heart and tell them the story of a life 
lived in cages. They want to hear about all the cages I have lived 
in, as if I were a budgie or a white mouse or a monkey. And if 
I had learned storytelling in Huis Norenius instead of potato-peel-
ing and sums, if they had made me practice the story of my life eve-
ry day, standing over me with a cane till I could perform without 
stumbling, I might have known how to please them. I would have 
told the story of a life passed in prisons where I stood day after 
day, year after year with my forehead pressed to the wire, gazing 
into the distance, dreaming of experiences I would never have, and 
where the guards called me names and kicked my backside and 
sent me off to scrub the floor. When my story was finished, people 
would have shaken their heads and been sorry and angry and plied 
me with food and drink; women would have taken me into their 
beds and mothered me in the dark. (247)
 3 This is obviously not the only gesture. Among others, one can note setting 
the novel into the future (or rather a temporality which in 1983 was neither the 
past nor the present of South Africa, and thus indicating the future) and a strong 
allegorical, or at least metaphorical, tendency, which is often taken to be a trait of 
Kafka’s, too.
 4 Dovey, The Novels of J. M. Coetzee, 271. She discusses the “bad faith” of this 
convention in detail.
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Such a self-conscious textual gesture seems to imply that Coetzee 
knows full well what he is doing, that is, he is consciously subvert-
ing the conventions in which the story of the monkey is usually told. 
This way, according to Dovey, he seems to circumvent in advance the 
accusations that a simple-hearted reader may come up with, which 
can be exemplified by Nadine Gordimer’s reading of the book:
Your can shake your head decently over yet another evocation of 
commonplace misery; the only particular reaction, this time, a slight 
sense of impatience – did it all have to be laid on so thick? Does the 
man have to be harelipped, etc., on top of everything else?5
But, none the less, one may ask oneself if her objections are re-
ally so simple-hearted, because it is not only Michael who is “laid 
on so thick”; there is also something much more unsettling than 
characterisation bordering on caricature (which can be assigned to 
the obvious allegorising intention palpable in the narrative6), some-
thing Gordimer also complains about, that is, the ultimate value of 
inaction the main protagonist seems to represent (the book “denies 
the energy of the will to resist evil”7) and his “ecological” message: 
“Beyond all creeds and moralities, this work of art asserts, there is 
only one: to keep the earth alive, and only one salvation, the survival 
that comes from her.”8
In a world which is plunged into a veritable civil war by which 
everybody is somehow affected (the army fighting the insurgents, con-
scription, riots in towns, curfew, shortages of jobs and food, camps for 
vagrants, dysfunctional public services, etc.), Michael’s idea of garden-
ing seems to be a rather pathetic solution: “Enough men had gone 
off to war saying the time for gardening was when the war was over; 
whereas there must be men to stay behind and keep gardening alive, 
 5 Nadine Gordimer, “The Idea of Gardening,” review of Life and Times of 
Michael K, The New York Review of Books, 2 Feb. 1984, 3. Quoted in Dovey, 267.
 6 Gordimer, in saying that “the initial probably stands for Kotze or Koekemoer, 
and has no reference, nor need it have, to Kafka” (Gordimer, 3) is obviously wrong 
as, for instance, the allegorising tendency and the omnipresence of absurd violence 
are characteristic features of both Michael K and Kafka’s novels. Moreover, deny-
ing such an obvious literary allusion in the work of the writer whose other writ-
ings are often founded on intertextual references (Foe, The Master of Petersburg) 
is implausible. Even if one may claim that Coetzee’s “obviously” intertextual works 
were written after Michael K, it would be foolhardy to maintain that Waiting for 
the Barbarians (the novel written just before Michael K) has nothing to do with 
Cavafy’s famous poem of that title.
 7 Gordimer, “The Idea of Gardening,” 6.
 8 Gordimer, “The Idea of Gardening,” 6.
~ 40  ~
or at least the idea of gardening; because once that cord is broken, the 
earth would grow hard and forget her children” (150). And Michael 
is supposed to keep this idea alive by dropping out of historical time 
(history also being a kind of narration) whenever he can: “He lived by 
the rising and setting of the sun, in a pocket outside time” (82), “He 
did not know what month it was, though he guessed it was April. He 
had kept no tally of the days nor recorded the changes of the moon. 
He was not a prisoner or a castaway, his life by the dam was not 
a sentence that he had to serve out” (157–58). Michael is no Robinson 
Crusoe; his withdrawal from linear, “eschatological” history is vol-
untary. He seems to feel much more at home in the time of seasons, 
which is supposed to release him from the linear time in which the 
war is taking place. Moreover, this immersion in cyclical, repetitive 
time is, by a trick of metonymy, presented as more “natural”: since 
the time which Nature observes is the cycle of extinction and regen-
eration, such an approach to time is also presented as more “natural,” 
more in tune with human needs and therefore more liberating.
On the Visagie farm, Michael is subject to almost mystical experi-
ences: “As he moved about his field he felt a deep joy in his physi-
cal being. His step was so light that he barely touched the earth. It 
seemed possible to fly; it seemed possible to be both body and spirit” 
(139). There, for the first time in his life, he no longer feels himself 
to be a prisoner (“his life by the dam was not a sentence that he 
had to serve out”). What has been his prison so far, then? Obviously, 
the social order in which he is disabled in all possible ways, and to 
be released from it is precisely how freedom is defined in the book:
I was mute and stupid in the beginning, I will be mute and stupid 
in the end. There is nothing to be ashamed of in being simple. They 
were locking up simpletons before they locked up anyone else. Now 
they have camps for children whose parents run away, camps for 
people who kick and foam at the mouth, camps for people with big 
heads and people with little heads, camps for people with no vis-
ible means of support, camps for people chased off the land, camps 
for people they find living in storm-water drains, camps for street-
girls, camps for people who can’t add two and two, camps for people 
who forget their papers at home, camps for people who live in the 
mountains and blow up bridges in the night. Perhaps the truth is 
that it is enough to be out of the camps, out of all the camps at 
the same time. (248)
This formulation is another point about which Gordimer has reserva-
tions, saying: “Freedom is defined [only] negatively: it is to be ‘out 
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of all the camps at the same time.’ ”9 But, in fact, as we have noted, 
there is nothing negative about it, if the last sentence is read against 
Michael’s life on the farm which is for him, at least for the time 
being, precisely the place out of all the camps at the same time. In 
other words, to be free of all the camps is to leave behind the waste-
ful universe of war and adopt a balanced ecological stance living in 
accordance with nature’s cycles.
Things, however, are not that simple, because life on the farm, 
apart from all the rhetoric of happiness and abundance, does not 
seem to do Michael much good – when he is found by soldiers (who, 
taking him away, destroy the farm for good), he is so exhausted 
that he has problems with moving and even with thinking clearly, 
because he is almost dying of malnutrition. What is more, nobody 
in the novel claims that “the time for gardening [is] when the war 
[is] over,” as Michael suggests, excusing himself from this scenario 
(“whereas there must be men to stay behind and keep gardening 
alive, or at least the idea of gardening”) – virtually everybody seems 
to be of Michael’s opinion that it is best to be out of all the camps 
at the same time, including the Visagies’ grandson, who is a de-
serter from the army (“There is a war going on, there are people 
dying. Well, I am in war with no one. I have made my peace. Do 
you understand? I make my peace with everyone. There is no war 
here on the farm” (88)), as well as the army officers who run the 
camps themselves, like the medical officer and the commandant of 
Kenilworth camp, who do not believe in the war either and would 
rather return to their previous lives as pharmacist and retired of-
ficer. (Also a guard in Jakkalsdrif camp says: “The day I get orders 
to go north [to the front] I walk out. They’ll never see me again. It’s 
not my war. Let them fight it, it’s their war” (118)). The medical of-
ficer’s ruminations on the universe of history in which one remains 
in abeyance, although presented as an example of difference between 
Michael (untouched by history, living the “fullness” of time) and him-
self (a historical being living in empty time), bear an uncanny re-
semblance to Michael’s idea of cyclic universe: “War-time is a time of 
waiting, Noël [the commander of Kenilworth camp] once said. What 
was there to do in the camp but wait, going through the motions 
of living, fulfilling one’s obligations, keeping an ear turned all the 
time to the hum of the war beyond walls, listening for its pitch to 
change? […] to me, listening with one ear to the banal exchanges 
of camp life and with the other to the suprasensual spinning of the 
 9 Gordimer, “The Idea of Gardening,” 6.
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gyroscopes of the Grand Design, time has grown empty” (216–17). 
The medical officer lives like Michael from day to day, obeying the 
same schedule of repetitive activities. The difference between him 
and Michael is the lack of enjoyment in the activities (for Michael 
all repetitive activities bring satisfaction: “He liked the leisureliness 
of the work [repairing fences] and its repetitiveness” (130)) brought 
about by the officer’s redoubled perspective: he feels trapped within 
repetitive actions by history because it does not allow him freedom 
to do what he would like to do, but history itself is perceived by the 
medical officer as Nature (the Grand Design): a cosmic intelligence 
that has to run its course on its own so that the balance is brought 
back by forces beyond his grasp. And his intimations do not deceive 
him: Nature is precisely the realm of utter unfreedom: its laws are 
iron whatever the subjective attitude may be – in other words, no 
amount of enjoyment can save you from death by starvation. While it 
is precisely the realm of history in which freedom (as social relations 
and the possibility of change) takes its place. The Grand Design as 
enslaving is the same kind of fantasy as Nature as liberating.10
 10 This confusion between Nature and History is already present in the epigraph 
to the novel, taken from Heraclitus:
War is the father of all and king of all.
Some he shows as gods, others as men
Some he makes slaves, and others free.
At first glance, in the context of a novel which presents the world in its totality 
plunged into war, such a motto could be treated as a pessimistic statement on hu-
man nature as inevitably aggressive and evil: humans are fallen creatures marked 
with destructive instincts and they will never learn. In this context, Michael – being 
“poor in spirit,” unblemished by the original sin of desire (“It is difficult to be kind 
[…] to a person who wants nothing” (244), he is told) – would be understood as 
a new Adam trying to return to the original Paradise (his mother’s, mother’s moth-
er’s, mother’s mother’s mother’s… farm), that is, trying to escape war as a product 
of the excess that destroyed the original balance, yet unable to reach it because 
its existence is mythical (the product of fantasy), which is represented as infinite 
regression: mother’s mother’s mother’s… In Michael’s “pocket outside time,” time 
runs in both directions simultaneously: “I want to live here, he thought: I want to 
live here forever, where my mother and my grandmother lived” (135) – the “forever,” 
however, runs in the opposite direction than indicated: “He closed his eyes and 
tried to recover in his imagination the mud-brick and reed roof of her stories, the 
garden of prickly pear, the chickens scampering for the feed scattered by the little 
barefoot girl. And behind that child, in the doorway, her face obscured by shadow, 
he searched for a second woman, the woman from whom his mother had come into 
the world. […] I come from a line of children without end” (160–61).
However, the epigraph comes from The Cosmic Fragments and can be under-
stood as referring to Heraclitus’s cosmology which he also summarises in this way: 
“We must recognize that war is common and strife is justice, and all things happen 
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As we have already noted, this kind of “thickness” with an (eco-
logical) moral can be taken as a convention, which is from time to 
time subverted by the narrative itself, and this creates a possibility 
some critics would hold on to. This approach would be an extension 
of the “compassionate” attitude but with a twist: since, as has been 
demonstrated hundreds of times in works of criticism, giving a voice 
to the victim always results in using the victim for the author’s 
own ends (another kind of exploitation), the writer may accomplish 
a more sophisticated feat with a representative of the oppressed and 
attempt to show how the victim is an inaccessible other, at least 
concerning his meaning within the authorial narrative.
This approach seems to be suggested by Coetzee himself when, in 
the final address of the medical officer to Michael (who is already out-
side the camp), he describes his ward as having a meaning akin to the 
Derridean trace: “Your stay in the camp was merely an allegory, if you 
know the word. It was an allegory – speaking at the highest level – of 
how scandalously, how outrageously a meaning can take up residence 
in a system without becoming a term in it. Did you not notice how, 
whenever I tried to pin you down, you slipped away?” (228) The figure 
of the medical officer may therefore stand for the writer himself, the 
one who by means of his narrative constructs a contraption which 
attempts to introduce to the reader the character Michael K (heavily 
overdetermined as victim: coloured, slow-witted, hare-lipped), show 
the world in which he is victimised as well as the victim’s reaction to 
this world (rejection of food in the camp), but withhold the meaning 
of such act as not being containable within the novelistic narrative 
because it cannot be expressed by Michael himself as he is, that is, 
illiterate and simple-minded (unable to theorise about himself: “I am 
not clever with words,” he says (190)). The search for Michael’s mean-
ing can only be pursued by the medical officer, by a cultured (novel-
reading, novel-writing) representative of the white discourse who is 
according to strife and necessity” (DK22B80). Here war may stand for conflict that 
permits change, therefore war is tantamount not to death but to life itself. This 
conflict can be understood in two ways: one natural, another historical. The first 
one is usually associated with “balanced” cyclical time: everything changes in order 
to remain the same (to repeat itself). The second one with social antagonism which 
is irresolvable and which permits change – history appears here as one great social 
unrest; in other words, war is tantamount to freedom in the second understanding. 
Michael’s life as a gardener on the farm may be taken as the happy life in the 
Garden of Eden, but from this garden one important element is missing: there is 
no Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil; that is, there is no Prohibition – everything 
that he does on the farm is good (because it is satisfying), but this good cannot re-
ally be distinguished from evil (he almost dies there).
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well disposed towards the victim. Yet, because of the insurmountable 
difference between their horizons of meaning, their understandings 
can never meet and so the medical officer’s search can only perceive 
Michael’s meaning as a trace always already evacuated to some other 
place for which the officer’s metaphor is “the sacred and alluring 
garden that blooms in the heart of the desert and produces the food 
of life” (228). And as the desert is the metaphoric space of endless 
straying, of wandering without reaching one’s destination, the gar-
den is placed in the pleonastic location of “nowhere and everywhere 
except for the camps” (228), since in the novel, as we have already 
seen, there are no places which do not belong to some kind of camp, 
because society as such consists exclusively of camps (or discourses, 
since, for example charity is also a camp: “I have escaped the camps; 
perhaps if I lie low, I will escape charity too” (249)). In other words, 
“This is a snake which swallows its own tail, for the meaning of this 
text is that its meaning cannot be reduced to this meaning! That is to 
say, the meaning which this text conveys via the figure of K cannot 
be reduced to a term in the system which the novel itself inevitably 
constitutes.”11
This approach seems to be confirmed even by Coetzee’s critical 
stance towards a literary source which appears to be of particular 
importance for Michael K. In his article “Time, Tense, and Aspect 
in Kafka’s ‘The Burrow,’ ” Coetzee presents an interpretation of this 
story as a metaphor for a struggle with something unrepresentable 
(time) which nevertheless, by means of authorial effort, leaves an 
enigmatic trace (of the failed struggle with time) which seems to lack 
any meaning (or to be its own meaning), as the last sentence of the 
essay suggests:
Now that the narrator has failed time and again to domesticate 
time by using strategies of narrative (that is, strategies belonging 
to historical time), his structures of sequence, of cause and effect, 
collapsing each time at the “decisive moment” of rupture when the 
past fails to run smoothly into the present, that is, now that the 
construct of narrative time has collapsed, there is only the time of 
narration left, the shifting now within which his narrative takes 
place, leaving behind it a wake (a text) of failure, fantasy, sterile 
speculation: the ramifications of a burrow whose fatal precarious-
ness is signalled by the whistling that comes from its point(s) of 
rupture.12
 11 Dovey, The Novels of J. M. Coetzee, 315.
 12 J. M. Coetzee, Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews, ed. David Attwell 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 231–32.
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Since in our case the unrepresentable is not something so abstract 
and, in a sense, indifferent as time but the very experience of the 
victim, which by an authorial ruse seems to be presented as always 
already withdrawing from his grasp, the otherness of Michael K can 
be declared respected and the author’s construction praised as a lib-
eral achievement.
What, however, can we say about the meaning of the presence in 
Michael K of extended allusions to Kafka if we approach them head 
on, that is, unmediated by Coetzee’s critical writing? And what about 
all the other rather sinister implications (intertextual and otherwise) 
we have already noted?
As we have already tried to show, the ecological lesson often taken 
to be the message of Michael K is of dubious standing already within 
the limits of the narrative itself. But if one wants to question such 
a reading further, there is, of course, a famous literary parallel to be 
made. Because the very title of the book, Life and Times of Michael 
K, is so formulated that it brings to mind novels of the eighteenth 
century (The History of Tom Jones, a Foundling; The History of 
the Adventures of Joseph Andrews and of his friend Mr. Abraham 
Adams, etc.),13 we can relate its plot to another book of that cen-
tury in which gardening and misfortune feature strongly, namely 
Voltaire’s Candide. As is known, Candide consists of a series of most 
horrible and cruel events that the main protagonists endure, which 
are to serve the purpose of both satirising the famous dictum from 
Leibniz’s Theodicy that we live our life in the best of all possible 
words and presenting a panorama of the times. As with Michael K, 
Candide travels through a world which seems to have been taken 
over by a war of everybody against everybody else and after many 
(mis)adventures settles on an estate near Constantinople to offer the 
reader a flabbergasting solution to how to deal with the presence 
of evil in the world, much in the spirit of the ecological reading of 
Coetzee’s novel – his famous message to his friends is: “let us culti-
vate our garden.” This is the advice Candide adopts from a Turkish 
farmer who takes pride in absenting himself from historical time 
(“I never knew the name of any mufti, or vizier breathing. I am en-
tirely ignorant of the event you speak of; I presume that in general 
such as are concerned in public affairs sometimes come to a miser-
 13 In an interview with Elżbieta Oleksy, Coetzee even admits that the episode 
with the two thieves outside Cape Town was inspired by Henry Fielding (Literatura 
na Świecie, 10 (183)/1986, 191).
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able end; and that they deserve it: but I never inquire what is doing 
at Constantinople”), and takes refuge in the cycles of nature claim-
ing this to be the cure for what is wrong with the world: “I have no 
more than twenty acres of ground, […] the whole of which I cultivate 
myself with the help of my children; and our labor keeps off from 
us three great evils – idleness, vice, and want.” Yet hard work that 
saves one from desiring and thinking cannot but be a rather satiric 
answer to the omnipresence of evil, and, in fact, it is a reiteration 
of the answer the protagonists receive from “a famous dervish who 
passed for the best philosopher in Turkey” who, to their question 
what must be done to alleviate “a horrible deal of evil on the earth,” 
answers: “Be silent.”14
The intertextual light that can be thrown on Michael K, however, 
may become much grimmer than that shed by the rather frivolous, 
although sarcastic, Candide. There is a reference to another “gar-
den,” strongly present in the narrative, cultivated with one’s own 
hands (and forehead!), which saves its inhabitant from idleness, vice, 
and want. Not only is Michael named K after the protagonists of The 
Castle and The Trial, not only does he build a burrow on the farm to 
hide himself from the world there, but even the “wisdom” of his life 
and times which appears to Michael on the penultimate page of the 
novel is voiced in almost exactly the same words of the animal from 
Kafka’s “The Burrow”: “Because if there was one thing I discovered 
out in the country, it was that there is time for everything” (249). 
It is precisely such truth of a gardener (“the truth about me. I am 
a gardener” (247–48)) which Kafka’s protagonist finds underground, 
but he is more explicit in elucidating its meaning: “Inside the burrow 
I always have endless time – for everything I do there is good and 
important and satisfies me somehow.”15 This is precisely Michael’s 
situation in his garden and it is no wonder, therefore, that Michael 
finds himself underground too: “I am more like an earthworm, he 
thought. Which is also a kind of gardener. Or a mole, also a gar-
dener, that does not tell stories because he lives in silence” (248). 
And silence is precisely what Kafka’s animal finds enthralling about 
his construction: “The most beautiful thing about my burrow is the 
stillness.”16 Yet the happiness is lost (has always already been lost) 
with the appearance of the whistling noise that disturbs the beauty 
 14 Voltaire, Candide, Chapter 30: 8 July 2007 <http://oregonstate.edu/instruct 
/phl302/texts/voltaire/candide.html>.
 15 Franz Kafka, The Complete Short Stories, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer (London: 
Vintage, 1999), 342.
 16 Kafka, The Complete Short Stories, 327.
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of the burrow and sends the animal running along the corridors in 
panic.
There is, in fact, nothing benign about Kafka’s burrow. First of 
all, the author strips it of all the appealing features Michael’s eco-
logical garden may have, it is a dark and rather disgusting place 
full of putrefying flesh and similar titbits. Moreover, it is a place of 
utter exhaustion where among the plenty of stored victuals the ani-
mal goes through repeated bouts of panic – precisely the moment it 
decides to tuck itself into the safest place of the burrow, it dawns on 
it that it is just the place where it is exposed to the greatest danger, 
so it starts to rebuild the burrow and relocate the supplies over and 
over again, which makes the animal so unhappy that it wants to 
leave the burrow forever and live in the open (which of course never 
happens). Thus, the burrow is a place of wasting away: although it 
was constructed to provide refuge from the war raging outside in 
which the law of survival of the fittest rules, one can abide in the 
burrow only in a state of utter exhaustion (“And then too exhausted 
to be any longer capable of thought, my head hanging, my legs trem-
bling with fatigue, half asleep, feeling my way rather than walking, 
I approach the entrance […] Only in this state, and in this state 
alone, can I achieve my descent”17). Yet “what I felt as fatigue up 
there is no longer that here,” it is transformed instantly “into ardent 
zeal,”18 because everything in the burrow is by definition good, even 
if it may ultimately be lethal to the inhabitant.
This is precisely the situation of Michael on the farm where the 
joyful state of almost being able to fly finds its counterpart in the 
totally wasted condition the soldiers find him in. And as this state 
is caused by continuous fasting, we can refer to another story by 
Kafka, one which, to a large extent, revolves around starvation. This, 
however, will not be “A Hunger Artist,” a somehow too obvious choice 
in this context (but whose confession – “For he alone knew […] how 
easy it was to fast. It was the easiest thing in the world”19 – we can 
bear in mind), but a story in which fasting is not an art performed 
in order to be admired by others (Michael wants to be left alone, to 
be “out of all the camps at the same time”) but a way of investigat-
ing the nature of food itself.
In “Investigations of a Dog,” the investigations in question are of 
a queer nature because they are to elucidate something nobody else 
 17 Kafka, The Complete Short Stories, 341.
 18 Kafka, The Complete Short Stories, 341.
 19 Kafka, The Complete Short Stories, 270.
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perceives as problematic at all, as they consist of inquiring “into the 
question what the canine race nourish[es] itself upon.”20 This question 
seems to take us back to the matter of gardening as it concerns the 
earth:
My personal observation tells me that the earth, when it is watered 
and scratched according to the rules of science, extrudes nourish-
ment, and moreover in such quantity, in such abundance, in such 
ways, in such places, at such hours as the laws partially or completely 
established by science demand. I accept all this; my question, how-
ever, is the following: “Whence does the earth procure this food?”21
The road to achieving this kind of knowledge, however, is hard, 
long and winding because nobody seems to understand what the dog 
wants (“If you haven’t enough to eat, we’ll give you some of ours”22). 
Finally, after many different questionings and efforts, the dog decides 
to starve as long as needed for the riddle of food to solve itself, in 
a sense, of its own accord. This almost kills him, but when he is on 
the verge of dying, when he collapses and vomits blood, a wondrous 
dog appears and starts to make music without sound, which revives 
our investigator and sends him running. Moreover, this event takes 
us back to the very beginning of the investigations since a parallel 
experience lay at the origin of the dog’s inquiries: without any warn-
ing, he becomes witness to the performance of soundless music by 
seven strange dogs which make him ecstatic; the ecstasy, however, 
is experienced by our dog as utterly obscene:
They had good grounds for remaining silent, that is, assuming they 
remained silent from a sense of shame. For how were they conduct-
ing themselves? Because of all the music I had not noticed it before, 
but they had flung away all their shame, the wretched creatures 
were doing the very thing which is both most ridiculous and inde-
cent in our eyes; they were walking on their hind legs. Fie on them! 
They were uncovering their nakedness, blatantly making a show of 
their nakedness: they were doing that as though it were a meritori-
ous act, and when, obeying their better instincts for a moment, they 
happened to let their front paws fall, they were literally appalled 
as if at an error, as if Nature were an error, hastily raised their 
legs again, and their eyes seemed to be begging for forgiveness for 
having been forced to cease momentarily from their abomination.23
 20 Kafka, The Complete Short Stories, 286.
 21 Kafka, The Complete Short Stories, 288.
 22 Kafka, The Complete Short Stories, 288.
 23 Kafka, The Complete Short Stories, 284.
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It is this event which pushes the dog onto the path of investiga-
tion, but what he is looking for has only seemingly to do with the 
earth (“when I asked: ‘Whence does the earth procure this food?’ was 
I troubled, as appearances might quite well indicate, about the earth; 
was I troubled about the labour of the earth? Not in the least; that, 
as I very soon recognised, was far from my mind; all that I cared 
for was the race of dogs, that and nothing else”24) – ultimately his 
search is for something in the food that is not of nutritional value 
(product of nature) but for something that Michael – also a kind of 
starving investigator – finds on the farm even without eating, and 
what the starved dog experiences in the song which is both over-
whelming and painful.
In Kafka’s story the essence of this “something” whose nature is 
as contradictory as that of silent music turns out to be quite elusive. 
But in the context of Michael K we do not have to go through all 
the dog’s trouble to answer the question of origin – “Whence does 
the earth procure this food?” – for Michael is precisely the only one 
who knows the force which makes the food come out of the earth: 
it is his mother that makes plants grow and when he waits for his 
seeds to germinate he meditates upon how she is buried and not yet 
risen (144).
The “truth” about himself, which he enunciates in repeating the 
phrase “I am a gardener,” has a precise sense. He comes to Visagies’ 
farm, which, without taking too much trouble to investigate,25 he 
takes to be the place where his mother was born, and there he bur-
ies her ashes in the ground:
He […] set about clearing a patch a few metres square in the middle 
of the field. There, bending low so that they would not be carried 
away by the wind, he distributed the fine grey flakes over the earth, 
afterwards turning the earth over spadeful by spadeful. (80–81)
This ceremony inaugurates a new kind of life: “This was the begin-
ning of his life as a cultivator” (81). The meaning of this cultivation 
 24 Kafka, The Complete Short Stories, 289.
 25 Michael is not only “not clever with words,” he is most careless when it comes 
to the proper name, which seems to be the most important for him. When he finally 
reaches Prince Albert and asks for the farm his mother told him about (“I am look-
ing for a Mr Vosloo or a Mr Visser who is a farmer”), he accepts the first name 
starting with V that is given him as the one he is looking for (“There is no Vosloo or 
Visser who farms. Visagie – is that who you mean?” (69)). Is it because he himself 
does not have a “proper” proper name and is just K? Is it also why in Kenilworth 
Camp he is called Michaels, as if his surname really was the residual K?
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and of the farm seems to be clear – even the very site of the bur-
row suggests the return to the mother’s body: “Three hundred yards 
from the dam two low hills, like plump breasts, curved towards 
each other. Where they met, their sides formed a sloping crevice as 
deep as a man’s waist three or four yards long” (137). Therefore, the 
ecstatic food Michael misses in the camps, as he finally refuses to 
eat at all, the manna by the taste of which he was spoiled (“Is that 
why you will not eat camp food – because you have been spoiled 
forever by the taste of manna?” (206)) is the invisible milk of the 
absent mother, which cannot be found anywhere in the “real” nour-
ishment (“What food he ate meant nothing to him. It had no taste, 
or tasted like dust” (139)). The quality of food that gives it savour 
but that positively does not exist incarnates Michael’s attachment 
to his mother: “When food comes out of this earth, he told himself, 
I will recover my appetite, for it will have savour” (139). And when 
the time comes the food in fact does have savour as the ecstatic cer-
emony of eating the first pumpkin demonstrates:
The fragrance of the burning flesh rose into the sky. Speaking the 
words he had been taught, directing them no longer upward but to 
the earth on which he knelt, he prayed26: “For what we are about 
to receive make us truly thankful.” […] He lifted the first strip to 
his mouth. Beneath the crisply charred skin the flesh was soft and 
juicy. He chewed with tears of joy in his eyes. The best, he thought, 
the very best pumpkin I have tasted. For the first time since he 
had arrived in the country he found pleasure in eating. The after-
taste of the first slice left his mouth aching with sensual delight. 
[…] Such pumpkin, he thought, such pumpkin I could eat every day 
of my life and never want anything else. (155–56)
Is this ghost element of food, however, “the bread of freedom,” as the 
medical officer supposes (“Maybe he only eats the bread of freedom” 
(200))? Knowing that Michael almost starved to death when he was 
his own master we can doubt it.
The medical officer’s story is one of becoming the “disciple” of 
Michael perceived as a figure of paradoxical resistance, not even pas-
sive resistance, which implies wilful effort, but so lacking in resist-
ance that this lack becomes resistance in itself:
As time passed […] I slowly began to see the originality of the re-
sistance you offered. You were not a hero and did not pretend to be, 
 26 Not to the father “above,” but to the mother “below.”
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not even a hero of fasting. In fact you did not resist at all. When we 
told you to jump, you jumped. When we told you to jump again, you 
jumped again. When we told you to jump a third time, however, 
you did not respond but collapsed in a heap; and we could all see, 
even the most unwilling of us, that you had failed because you had 
exhausted your resources in obeying us. So we picked you up, find-
ing that you weighed no more than a sack of feathers, and set you 
down before food, and said, “Eat, build up your strength so that you 
can exhaust it again obeying us.” And you did not refuse. You tried 
sincerely, I believe, to do as you were told. You acquiesced in your 
will […] but your body baulked. That was how I saw it. Your body 
rejected the food we fed you and grew even thinner. Why? I asked 
myself: why will this man not eat when he is plainly starving? 
[…] It was not a principle, an idea that lay behind your decline. 
You did not want to die, but you were dying. […] Slowly, as your 
persistent No, day after day, gathered weight, I began to feel that 
you were more than just another patient, another casualty of the 
war […] I would stand in the doorway […] and upon me the feeling 
would grow stronger and stronger that around one bed among all 
there was a thickening of the air, a concentration of darkness […] 
I would shake my head like a man trying to shake off a dream, but 
the feeling would persist. “This is not my imagination,” I would say 
to myself. “[…] Michaels means something, and the meaning he has 
is not private to me.” (223–26)
Yet, for all his fascination with this obscurity, the medical officer 
has his moments of insight too, as when he explains Michael’s 
obliviousness to the world around him as resulting from what he 
metaphorically presents as a state of not being born: “A hard little 
stone, barely aware of its surroundings, enveloped in itself and its 
interior life. He passes through these institutions and camps and 
hospitals and God knows what else like a stone. Through the in-
testines of the war. An unbearing, unborn creature. I cannot really 
think of him as a man though he is older than me by most reckon-
ings” (185). In other words, Michael is described as one over whom 
desire has no dominion because he is “full,” not lacking anything he 
would have to look for in other people, and this is precisely what at 
first awakens the medical officer’s curiosity, which later grows into 
full-blown admiration. However, we can literalise the metaphor here 
and ask about the circumstances of the real birth of this admirably 
whole man.
Michael is born to a house-servant mother and because of his 
deformity he is constantly with her: “She took the child with her 
to work and continued to take it when it was no longer a baby. 
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Because their smiles and whispers hurt her, she kept it away from 
other children. Year after year Michael K sat on a blanket watching 
his mother polish other people’s floors, learning to be quiet” (4). The 
mother is poor, she lives in a small room adjacent to the flat of her 
employers (where air conditioning equipment was to be installed but 
never was), and there is no indication of any male presence in the 
life of Michael or his mother – until the moment he is sent to school, 
all his world is contained within the bounds of the dual relation with 
his mother who is always present. The lack of any paternal figure 
in Michael’s life as well as his later development suggests a scenario 
which may dispel some of the messianic darkness gathering over 
his bed.
For Lacanian psychoanalysis the absence of the paternal figure, 
or, rather, the paternal function leads to what it calls the foreclosure 
of the “Name-of-the-Father.”27 The act the father should perform is 
to separate the child from the mother. Because the infant’s demand 
is to become one with the mother, to be plunged into this body that 
provides food, warmth and everything necessary for enjoyment, and 
mothers often have a tendency to put the child in a privileged po-
sition and make it the centre of their lives, the paternal function 
has to intrude and “triangulate” the dual relation by introducing 
language by means of the Name-of-the-Father, which is also the No-
of-the-Father.28 The paternal function is, therefore, constituted by 
a prohibition (No!) of the mother’s body, that is, it introduces the 
Law by means of symbolic castration.29
Before the Law is introduced the child remains in an imagi-
nary relation with itself and the mother, as described by Lacan 
in his best known article “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the 
I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,”30 and refor-
 27 It is called the paternal function not because it necessarily indicates the pres-
ence of the biological father of the child but a particular element of the symbolic order 
– the paternal function can be fulfilled by any person, not even necessarily male, who 
will take the father’s place in relation to the mother in the symbolic order.
 28 In French Nom-du-Père and Non-du-Père are homophonous. The following 
discussion of psychosis is based mainly on: Bruce Fink, A Clinical Introduction 
to Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Theory and Technique (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 79–111.
 29 The Name-of-the-Father is, of course, in most cases connected with the sur-
name the child receives from its father, and it is telling that in Michael’s case it is 
just a vestige, the truncated K.
 30 Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed 
in Psychoanalytic Experience,” in: Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2006), 75–81.
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mulated in his Seminar VIII.31 The child’s original experience of 
his body as lacking in motor coordination brings anxiety, which is 
partly overcome when the child sees its image in the mirror for the 
first time, which allows it to identify with the whole it sees. Such 
imaginary identification is the beginning of the creation of the ego 
which is by definition an idealised (and therefore alienated) image 
of the child – in reality the child is not whole; it is not even in 
full control of its functions. Because in the dual mother-child rela-
tion the bodily presence of the mother is taken to be the only thing 
which the child demands and vice versa (the child being the treas-
ure just because it is my child, without any reservations), this rela-
tion also belongs to the imaginary order. Thus, the child organises 
his world and his understanding of it on the basis of his imaginary 
identifications in which the only touchstone of whether something is 
good or bad is whether it enhances or impairs the relation with the 
mother. The Name-of-the-Father, which introduces language in the 
form of prohibition, breaks down the imaginary relation by “social-
ising” the child by means of the Law – the child has to reorganise 
his imaginary world in accordance with the symbolic order, which is 
the order of language and social conventions. As the image in the 
mirror was the impulse which led to the creation of the self (ideal 
ego), the father’s “No!” (the ur-word) is the impulse which leads to 
the creation of the superego, that is, to the internalisation of social 
laws and parental ideals.
In the case of Michael the parental No! is never uttered, as not 
only is his father absent but there is also nobody to take his place. 
When the Name-of-the-Father is not introduced (when the symbolic 
castration does not occur), the imaginary order does not become re-
structured according to the demands of the symbolic and therefore 
remains the dominant order, while the symbolic becomes assimi-
lated in the mode appropriate for the dominant imaginary, that is, 
by means of imitation of other people.32 This is precisely Michael’s 
case: having problems at school (the space of the symbolic), he is 
transferred to an institution which teaches him basic skills that are 
learned by means of imitation: “Because of his disfigurement and 
because his mind was not quick, Michael was taken out of school 
after a short trial and committed to the protection of Huis Norenius 
in Faure, where at the expense of the state he spent the rest of his 
childhood in the company of other variously afflicted and unfortunate 
 31 Fink, A Clinical Introduction, 88.
 32 Fink, A Clinical Introduction, 89.
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children learning the elements of reading, writing, counting, sweep-
ing, scrubbing, bedmaking, dishwashing, basketweaving, woodwork 
and digging” (4). Michael even comments on this kind of upbringing 
himself when for the only time in the novel the name of the father 
is mentioned:
My mother was the one whose ashes I brought back […] and my fa-
ther was Huis Norenius. My father was the list of rules on the door 
of the dormitory, the twenty-one rules of which the first was “There 
will be silence in the dormitories at all times,” and the woodwork 
teacher with the missing fingers who twisted my ear when the line 
was not straight, and the Sunday mornings when we put on our 
khaki shirts and our khaki shorts and our black socks and our 
black shoes and marched two abreast to the church on Papegaai 
Street to be forgiven.” (143)
Although for Michael the father is the set of rules (the Law), his 
relation to it is utterly imaginary – the rules remain completely “ex-
ternal,” they are perceived as senseless and unjust (they have never 
been internalised as one’s own) and are only obeyed because of the 
fear of punishment. As Michael’s life is summarized at the moment 
when his imaginary organisation starts to break down: “He did not 
know what was going to happen. The story of his life had never been 
an interesting one; there had usually been someone to tell him what 
to do next; now there was no one, and the best thing seemed to be 
to wait” (92). No wonder that the first “commandment” speaks about 
silence since it was precisely silence that Michael had experienced 
instead of the paternal No!
According to Lacan, the foreclosure of the paternal function leads 
to the creation of the psychotic clinical structure in a human being, 
which means that a person can be diagnosed as psychotic even when 
he still appears to be “normal,” that is, before the symptoms char-
acteristic of psychotic breakdown appear (delusions, hallucinations, 
etc.), because the most characteristic feature of psychotics is their 
problems with language. Since the introduction of the Name-of-the-
Father creates the original metaphor in which the father’s No! takes 
the place of the mother as the source of jouissance, when it does not 
take place the metaphorical use of language is unavailable.33 As we 
have already noted, Michael is “not clever with words” and his lack 
of cleverness consists mainly in his inability to find words to describe 
his experience; when the metaphoric function is blocked, when one 
 33 Fink, A Clinical Introduction, 91.
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is unable to use old words in new metaphors, one seems to experi-
ence states of feeling that can only be described as unutterable or be 
designated with a neologism which no one would understand anyway 
(“His heart was full, he wanted to utter his thanks, but finally the 
right words would not come” (66)). But more importantly the fore-
closure of the Name-of-the-Father creates a situation in which the 
world of meaning lacks a firm foundation and therefore can easily 
collapse. The paternal metaphor, when it succeeds, brings to life the 
first meaning on which all the others will be built and even if this 
meaning (“the return to the union with the mother is bad”) is con-
tested in retrospect, it will be “too late” to eradicate it. When the 
paternal metaphor is created “a link is established between language 
and meaning (reality as socially constituted), between signifier and 
signified, that will never break.”34 If this anchor or, as Lacan calls it, 
“button tie” (point de capiton),35 is not established, there is a danger 
that the imaginary fabric of the self (the ego) may be torn apart and 
destroyed.
The foreclosure of the parental metaphor can also be helpful in 
explaining Michael’s fixation at the oral, that is, pre-genital stage of 
the organisation of the drives. As the overwriting of the imaginary 
by the symbolic leads to the inculcation of socially constituted ide-
als and laws, it also leads to “an ordering and hierarchisation of the 
drives under the dominance (or ‘tyranny’ to use Freud’s term) of the 
genital zone.”36 Without this symbolic reordering Michael’s sexual-
ity is stalled at the oral stage where his principle enjoyment is the 
enjoyment of the mother’s milk through the mouth while his genital 
sexuality is virtually non-existent: “How fortunate that I have no 
desire to father […] I am one of the fortunate ones who escape be-
ing called” (143). Or, as the medical officer puts it: “With Michaels it 
always seemed to me that someone had scuffled together a handful 
of dust, spat on it, and patted it into the shape of a rudimentary 
man, making one or two mistakes (the mouth, and without a doubt 
the contents of the head) and omitting one or two details (the sex), 
 34 Fink, A Clinical Introduction, 93.
 35 “A button tie, in the upholsterer’s vocabulary, is a type of stitch used to se-
cure a button to fabric and stuffing in a couch or chair, whereby the button and 
fabric are held together not in reference to a wooden or steel frame but simply in 
reference to one another. There is no true anchoring here, strictly speaking, since an 
anchor suggests an unmovable terra firma to which something is attached” (Fink, 
A Clinical Introduction, 93). Point de capiton is more often translated into English 
as anchoring or quilting point.
 36 Fink, A Clinical Introduction, 89.
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but coming up nevertheless in the end with a genuine little man of 
earth” (220).37
Because of the lack of the button tie, however, Michael’s oral or-
ganisation is far from stable – such an imaginary hierarchy of drives 
can be undone when the supporting imaginary order breaks down, 
which happens when Michael is for the first time confronted with 
a paternal figure in the form of the master, that is, the Visagie 
boy, the grandson of the owners of the abandoned farm. The boy, 
the representative of the “world outside,” and therefore of laws and 
symbolic obligations (even if he is a deserter), insolently disturbs 
the sanctuary of the union of Michael with his mother’s body which 
makes the plants grow, and his very appearance (the appearance 
which triangulates the relations on the farm) brings about the be-
ginning of Michael’s collapse: “He felt the old hopeless stupidity in-
vading him, which he tried to beat back” (83). And in order to save 
himself from further deterioration in obeying the master he flees up 
into the mountains where “the lances of light pierce his head” (95) 
and he becomes cured of hunger and other bodily needs because his 
body enters a state of bliss (“He wondered if he were living in what 
was known as bliss” (93)). In other words, while living in imaginary 
union with his mother, Michael unexpectedly becomes confronted 
with the Father/Master figure as the representative of the paternal 
function, which leads to the collapse of the imaginary organisation 
of drives with the effect that the body is invaded by what is at first 
called “stupidity” (displeasure in the breakdown of the hierarchy) 
but which turns out to be an invasion of bliss (when the collapse 
is total), that is, of jouissance, which is another characteristic psy-
chotic symptom: when the hierarchy of the drives collapses the body 
becomes attacked by jouissance which takes the form of overwhelm-
ing ecstasy (or pain). We can elucidate the reason for the collapse 
schematically by using Lacan’s schema L (see page 57).38
Because Michael’s world is anchored in the imaginary relation 
between himself and his mother/farm (a→a’ axis), when the father 
figure appears, and with him the symbolic order of the Other (A in 
Lacan’s schema, from the French Autre), it turns out that the sub-
ject (S) of meaning which would be able to respond to the Other – 
the subject created by the paternal metaphor – is simply not there: 
 37 The comment is condescending, even contemptuous, but the medical officer’s 
“conversion” is already there in embryonic form: the “mythical” body takes the place 
of the “medical” one.
 38 Jacques Lacan, “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter,’ ” in: Écrits, trans. Bruce 
Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 40.
~ 57  ~
a hole opens in its place and its appearance breaks down the tenta-
tive imaginary organisation.39
The ecstasy he experiences, however, is lethal, as Michael soon 
understands – after a period in the mountains during which with 
his mind empty he swims in bliss, “wanting nothing, looking forward 
to nothing” (94), “it came home to him that he might die, he or his 
body, it was the same thing, that he might lie here till the moss on 
the roof grew dark before his eyes, that his story might end with his 
bones growing white in this faroff place” (95). The ecstasy is lethal 
because the human body is not made to the measure of jouissance, it 
can bear only a small amount of it (what remains of jouissance after 
the father pronounces his No! which is a prohibition of the jouissance 
of the mother40), its unrestricted invasion inaugurates “the path to-
wards death,”41 that is, a disintegration of the self which leads to 
the inability to act and therefore extinction. So Michael crawls down 
to Prince Albert where he is intercepted by the authorities, put into 
hospital and, almost unconscious, is fed until he can physically take 
 39 Although Coetzee senses this hole inside of which Michael’s self disintegrates, 
his intuition leads him astray when he tries to make sense of it: “Always, when he 
tried to explain himself to himself, there remained a gap, a hole, a darkness before 
which his understanding baulked, into which it was useless to pour words. The 
words were eaten up, the gap remained. His was always a story with a hole in it: 
a wrong story, always wrong” (150–51). But, in fact, Michael never asks himself who 
he is, he is always sure: I am a gardener, I am a gardener, I am…
 40 The paternal metaphor divides the subject (or more precisely creates the sub-
ject as divided) by introducing the split, the lack that enables desire to appear 
which becomes a defence against jouissance. The paternal metaphor makes possible 
the situation in which rather than be the mother’s phallus (filling her lack with my 
body) I desire to have a phallus (come into possession of values that my parents 
appreciate: education, money, fame, etc.).
 41 Jacques Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis (Seminar XVII), trans. 
Russell Grigg (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 18.
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care of himself, upon which he is sent to Jakkalsdrif Camp to be 
re-educated by imitation of others and thus to regain his tentative 
“balance.” Michael notices this attempt at education himself and is 
horrified: “This is like Huis Norenius, he thought: I am back in Huis 
Norenius a second time, only now I am too old to bear it” (101). 
What is more, he notices the ravages jouissance has wrought on his 
body: “The time in the mountains has turned me into an old man” 
(111).42
This is where he meets a paternal figure, Robert, who is not 
only a family man but also lectures Michael on the political mean-
ing of their situation, the state of the country, the insurgents, etc.43 
Through his lecturing, he wants Michael to “wake up” to the mean-
ing (metaphor) of the events around him: “I have never seen anyone 
as asleep as you” (115); “You’re a baby […]. You’ve been asleep all 
your life. It’s time to wake up […] your eyes aren’t open, you don’t 
see the truth around you” (121). After all this lecturing it is not sur-
prising, especially in the case of a person who has only imaginary 
relations with others, that Michael starts thinking like Robert:
When people died they left bodies behind. Even people who died of 
starvation left bodies behind. Dead bodies could be as offensive as 
living bodies, if it was true that a living body could be offensive. If 
these people really wanted to be rid of us […] they would have to 
give us picks and spades and command us to dig; then, when we 
had exhausted ourselves digging, and had dug a great hole in the 
middle of the camp, they would have to order us to climb in and 
lay ourselves down; and when we were lying there, all of us, they 
would have to break down the huts and tents and tear down the 
fence and throw the huts and the fence and the tents as well as 
every last thing we had owned upon us, and cover us with earth, 
and flatten the earth. Then, perhaps, they might begin to forget 
about us. (129–30)
 42 The second period on the farm, after Michael escapes from Jakkalsdrif, wastes 
him even more – the relation of the medical officer starts: “There is a new patient in 
the ward, a little old man who collapsed during physical training” (177); and later: 
“Though he looks like an old man, he claims to be only 32” (178).
 43 For instance: “They don’t want a camp so near their town. They never wanted 
it. They ran a big campaign against the camp at the beginning. We breed disease, 
they said. No hygiene, no morals. A nest of vice, men and women together. […] 
What they would really like – this is my opinion – is for the camp to be miles away 
in the middle of the koup out of sight. Then we could come on tiptoe in the middle 
of the night like fairies and do their work, dig their gardens, wash their pots, and 
be gone in the morning leaving everything nice and clean” (112).
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But Michael’s reaction to such thoughts is typical for a psychotic – he 
disowns them as not his: “It seemed more like Robert than like him, 
as he knew himself, to think like that. Would he have to say that the 
thought was Robert’s and had merely found a home in him, or could 
he say that though the seed had come from Robert, the thought, 
having grown up inside him, was now his own?” (130). When the 
father’s demands to “wake up” cannot be assimilated because there 
is no subject of meaning; that is, when the symbolic relation is not 
possible, the child takes up the female position towards the apodic-
tic imaginary father, which is presented here by means of Michael’s 
passive relation to the thought and the metaphor of insemination.
Although Robert is presented as a benign figure who takes care 
of Michael, gives him practical advice and tries to make him un-
derstand the meaning of the world in which he lives, the position 
Michael takes against him can be more clearly spotted in the rela-
tion between Michael and another father representative who wants 
to wake him up and who is at first sight the reverse image of Robert. 
After Michael escapes from Kenilworth Camp, he meets a pimp (also 
a “family man”: “That one is my sister […]. The one in there […] is 
also my sister. Plenty of sisters I have. A big family” (236)), who on 
seeing Michael so thin (“When did you last eat, man?” (236)) extends 
a bottle of wine to him and says: “Come, let us give this man some-
thing to wake him up” (236). The result is predictable (Michael vom-
its up the wine), but the pimp feeds him, finds him a place to sleep 
and even tells one of the girls to make love to Michael (which is 
probably his first time). In spite of his largesse, the pimp is treated 
throughout as a fraud who wants to take Michael’s treasure away 
from him – the seeds he has carried from the mother’s farm. Like 
Robert, who, by attempting to force his meaning on Michael, tried 
to establish the paternal metaphor which would allow Michael to 
desire (to substitute something else for the mother’s body), the pimp 
(to whose ministrations Michael remains as passive as he remained 
to Robert’s lecturing), by forcing the pleasure principle on him, also 
tries to turn him into a “desiring machine”: “ ‘It is difficult to be 
kind,’ he said, ‘to a person who wants nothing. You must not be 
afraid to say what you want, then you will get it. That is my advice 
to you, my thin friend’ ” (244).44
In the final analysis both these men are presented as frauds be-
cause they want to separate Michael from his mother for good, be-
 44 Inoculated pleasure in the form of “having a good time” is perceived by Michael 
as fraudulent because it is unconnected to the lethal jouissance of the mother.
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cause both Robert’s meaning and the pimp’s pleasure are there to 
make Michael ask himself, “What do I want?” “What should I do?” 
that is, to make him into a desiring being who does not know and 
therefore can always question his acts or motivations, while Michael 
(and this is another typical feature of a psychotic) knows for sure: 
“[…] he had been brought into the world to look after his mother” 
(9). The lack of the original metaphor results in the lack of move-
ment of thoughts and interests (metorymic substitution) – what is 
just is, and there is no meaning to it: “He could lie all afternoon with 
his eyes open staring at the corrugations in the roof-iron and the 
tracings of rust: his mind would not wander, he would see nothing 
in the iron, the lines would not transform themselves into pattern 
or fantasy: he was himself, lying in his own house, the rust was 
merely rust, all that was moving was time” (159). Where there is no 
desire, nothing is enigmatic and there is no foundation allowing for 
the possibility of permanent questioning of one’s status (typical for 
“normal,” that is neurotic, subjects) – what remains is only repeti-
tion of the same phrases which replaces their explanation45: I am 
a gardener, I am a gardener, I am a gardener, … which Michael 
ceaselessly recites to himself.
The encounter with the pimp and the ministrations of his “sister” 
result in shame and disgust brought about by the attempted sepa-
ration from the mother, which cause a collapse into ecstasy again: 
“He drank from the tap […] voided himself, unable to help it, and 
drank again. So light now that he could not even be sure his feet 
were touching the ground” (245). So where else can he go from there 
and in such a state to regain his balance than back to the womb, 
the room where it all had started, “the room where his mother had 
lived” (245),46 and whom else can he find there but a fantasy of the 
“good” father to wash away the memory of all the obscene father 
figures he has encountered, a version of the father so weak and der-
elict that it would even be possible to go back to the farm with him 
without the fear of “triangulation.” But the finding of the figure of 
the father there may come as a surprise because up to this moment 
all Michael ever wanted was to be left alone with his mother. And, of 
course, on closer inspection, this father is no father at all but an im-
 45 Fink, A Clinical Introduction, 101.
 46 This Beckettian exhausted little old man returning to his mother’s room/womb 
would, of course, constitute another of the intertextual relations not mentioned so 
far. Yet another relation could be found in some Beckett plays in which characters 
who refuse to open their mouths are tortured to make them talk (as, for example, 
in Words and Music and What Where).
~ 61  ~
aginary supportive mother figure composed of images of Michael and 
his mother – lying on the absent man’s cardboard, wrapped in his 
smelly blanket, Michael imagines him as “a little old man” (the exact 
words in which the medical officer has described Michael) whom he 
will wheel from Cape Town to the farm in an abandoned barrow or 
cart as he did with his mother. What is more, the final scene of this 
fantasy (and the novel itself) takes us back to the very beginning of 
the book (“to make an end is to make a beginning,” as T. S. Eliot 
would have it?) where Michael, because of his hare lip, “could not 
suck from the breast and cried with hunger” (3), so that his mother 
had to feed him with a teaspoon:
And if the old man climbed out of the cart and stretched himself 
[…] and looked at where the pump had been that the soldiers had 
blown up so that nothing should be left standing, and complained, 
saying “What are we going to do about the water?”, he, Michael K, 
would produce a teaspoon from his pocket, a teaspoon and a long 
roll of string. He would clear the rubble from the mouth of the 
shaft, he would bend the handle of the teaspoon in a loop and tie 
the string to it, he would lower it down the shaft deep into the 
earth, and when he brought it up there would be water in the bowl 
of the spoon; and in that way, he would say, one can live. (250)
In the fantasy the old story is repeated again: Michael takes here 
the position of his own mother and feeds himself (the little old man) 
with her invisible milk on which one can live until one dies of star-
vation.47
But apart from the absence of a man who is turned into the fan-
tasy of return, Michael also finds something much more palpable 
in his mother’s room: what he sees there are the abandoned objects 
one can usually come across in gardens: “As his eyes accustomed 
themselves to the dimness he made out scores of tubular steel chairs 
stacked from floor to ceiling, huge furled beach umbrellas, white vi-
nyl tables with holes in their centres, and nearest the door three 
 47 The retreat to the mother’s womb and the fantasy which takes us back to the 
beginning of the novel as well as beyond it to a “better world” (also the mother’s 
womb) may suggest that these are Michael’s final thoughts before dying – of course, 
if we adopt the “rationalistic” perspective, which is not obligatory while discussing 
literary characters, that a man who has not eaten for months and whose intestines 
have degenerated irreparably finally has to die of exhaustion. If Michael does not 
die, however, this fact would suggest a very grim reading of the book, since the 
story of a victim who no matter what torture s/he goes through remains alive, and 
what is more becomes ever more beautiful (or, as Michael, appealing), clearly takes 
us into the space of a Sadean fantasy.
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painted plaster statues: a deer with chocolate-brown eyes, a gnome 
in a buff jerkin, knee-breeches and green tasselled cap, and, larger 
than the other two, a creature with a peg nose whom he recognized 
as Pinocchio” (246). These objects are far from “natural,” however; 
they have nothing to do with the sublime discourse of gardening that 
Michael and then the medical officer present us with. Therefore, if 
there is any meaning they shed on the final pages of the narrative 
(where the meaning is usually looked for) in their cheap artificiality 
and the dust they gather, it seems to be a rather satiric comment 
they pass on the whole interpretation of Michael as the Natural Man 
who almost starved himself to death living in a pocket outside of 
historical time and obeying his natural instincts. Can’t we even say 
that Pinocchio, this handicraft come alive, is a tongue-in-cheek im-
age of the character Michael K, also the product of craft performed 
with hands, and because of his “obscure meaning” larger than life?
However, what about the last of our father figures, the father 
turned believer, in the novel? At first the medical officer treats 
Michael condescendingly as an object of his benevolence, as somebody 
too stupid to take care of himself. Thinking that it is for Michael’s 
own good, he tries to make him eat. But as the attempts to make 
him eat are carried on simultaneously to the attempts to make him 
speak, and more specifically to speak about his mother – in other 
words, to produce a rationale, a meaning (which would have to be 
rooted in the parental metaphor) for what he did on the farm – both 
undermine Michael’s imaginary self. When he was pressed into tell-
ing his story (“Your own mother is buried on the farm, isn’t she?” 
(190)), “[the medical officer] noted how distressed he becomes when 
he has to talk about his mother” (191). The distress, however, is not 
the product of a reluctance to impart to his would-be interlocutors 
the knowledge (meaning) he possesses. Such knowledge simply does 
not exist in Michael, as he cannot put into words (into a meaningful 
story) what he did on the farm – the only thing he can and does say 
about it, as we have already noted, is to repeat the phrase “I am 
a gardener” or similar expressions: what grows is for all of us, we 
are all the children of the earth (190).48
This psychotic persistence gradually awakens the interest of the 
medical officer because he cannot understand it, so he starts observ-
ing Michael more closely and asking himself “What does he want? 
 48 What we read in the novel about Michael’s ruminations while living on 
the farm is of course free indirect speech, the product of the narrator who, un-
like Michael, discharged from school for being too slow-witted, is very “clever with 
words.”
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What is the meaning of his starvation?” On closer examination, he 
sees clearly that Michael is in the grip of something over which he has 
no control. Some force – which the medical officer cannot help but in-
terpret as natural (its insistence does not come from Michael’s mind, 
so it is taken to originate in his body) – rebels against confinement:
I had been taught that the body contains no ambivalence. The body, 
I had been taught, wants only to live. Suicide, I had understood, is 
an act not of the body against itself but of the will against the body. 
Yet here I beheld a body that was going to die rather than change 
its nature. […] It was not a principle, an idea that lay behind your 
decline. You did not want to die, but you were dying. You were 
like a bunny-rabbit sewn up in the carcase of an ox, suffocating no 
doubt, but starving too, amid all those basketfuls of meat, for the 
true food. (224–25)
The medical officer’s coming to the heady conclusion that, although he 
does not know what it is, there is something in nature (in the “natu-
ral” body) that cries out for freedom is the beginning of his trans-
formation into a disciple: “Upon me the feeling would grow stronger 
and stronger that around one bed among all there was a thickening 
of the air, a concentration of darkness, a black whirlwind, roaring in 
utter silence above your body, pointing to you, without so much as 
stirring the edge of the bedclothes” (225–26). Finding this meaning 
in Michael, he can persuade himself that his fascination is not some 
private quirk of a person who cannot find a meaning in his life and 
therefore grabs at anything that comes his way:
I would shake my head like a man trying to shake off a dream, 
but the feeling would persist. “This is not my imagination,” I would 
say to myself. “This sense of gathering meaningfulness is not some-
thing like a ray that I project to bathe this or that bed, or a robe 
in which I wrap this or that patient according to whim. Michaels 
means something, and the meaning he has is not private to me. If 
it were, if the origin of this meaning were no more than a lack in 
myself, a lack, say, of something to believe in, since we all know 
how difficult it is to satisfy a hunger for belief with the vision of 
times to come that the war, to say nothing of the camps, presents 
us with, if it were a mere craving for meaning that sent me to 
Michaels and his story, if Michaels himself were no more than what 
he seems to be […], a skin-and-bones man with a crumpled lip […], 
then I would have every justification for retiring to the toilets be-
hind the jockeys’ changing-rooms and locking myself into the last 
cubicle and putting a bullet through my head. (226)
And his conversion becomes complete when he decides to receive 
“the meaning [which] erupted into the world” (227) in the guise of 
Michael K and announces that rather than understand (metapho-
rise) Michael – which is impossible because there is no word for this 
meaning “in a system” – his intention is to follow him along the 
natural road (the road his body knows) to the “garden that blooms 
in the heart of the desert and produces the food of life. The garden 
[…] which […] is nowhere and everywhere except in the camps” 
(228). This garden which does not belong to any camp, in other 
words, the space of freedom but at the same time of certainty, the 
metadiscourse which is in no way biased, not infected by any ideol-
ogy (whether that of the army, of the insurgents, of charity, etc.), the 
discourse which is not blind to what it represses, is nowhere to be 
found in language (in the symbolic), and therefore the medical officer 
is right to look for it in the “living” body. But the “living” body that 
“knows,” which appears to him to constitute the sublime discourse 
of freedom, can only be the enjoying body of the psychotic49 – which 
is a radical example of unfreedom. At the mercy of “headless” drives 
left to their own devices such a body is subjected to the ultimate 
violence of jouissance, which leads to its destruction. What is the 
meaning of the fact that belief in such a body becomes a new faith 
of one liberal conscience?
 49 According to Lacan, as the consequence of the establishment of the pater-
nal metaphor the body becomes overwritten with signifiers (hierarchisation of the 
drives, etc.), which makes it a dead body, a body that has been socialised.
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Foe (1986)
Foe is the first book by Coetzee in which his intertextual work, so far 
only implied (although quite clearly) comes into the open.
Susan Barton, after the mutiny of the crew of a ship sailing back 
to Portugal from Brazil, or more specifically Bahia, finds herself on 
the site of one of the few modern western myths, that is, Robinson 
Cruso’s (Coetzee’s spelling) desert island. Yet the place does not bear 
much resemblance to the original that we find in Defoe’s book, with 
its high praise for the scrupulous protestant work ethic and una-
bashed propaganda for colonialism. Cruso seems to look the same 
as Defoe’s protagonist – he wears animals’ skins and a conical hat 
– but his personality appears to be very different. There is, however, 
a much more important difference here: his man Friday is not an in-
digenous Carib, as in Robinson Crusoe, but a black, and since we are 
off the South American coast, he must be a former slave. Moreover, 
although Susan relates that Cruso does not mark the passing of time 
in any permanent way, he claims to have been on the island with 
Friday for fifteen years, which, according to her, would have made 
Friday a child at the time Cruso’s ship was wrecked. That would 
mean that most probably Friday was born a slave. Cruso claims that 
Friday was captured by “the slavers, who are Moors”1 but he is an 
unreliable source – he tells Susan contradictory stories about himself 
and Friday, including ones we know from Robinson Crusoe. One of 
them, in agreement with Defoe’s version of Friday being “a cannibal 
whom [Cruso] had saved from being roasted and devoured by fellow-
 1 J. M. Coetzee, Foe (London: Penguin, 1987), 23; further references in the body 
of the text.
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cannibals” (12), does not fit Coetzee’s framework precisely because 
his Friday is black – he is not a local native of repulsive habits whom 
Cruso might have taken over and “re-educated” in western ways. 
Moreover, this version would put Cruso in an ambiguous position 
in respect of Friday’s mutilation since – and this is a second crucial 
difference from Robinson Crusoe – Friday’s tongue has been cut out. 
Cruso blames it on the slavers, but the matter remains undecidable 
as Cruso himself behaves like a slave owner using language only as 
the quickest way to subject Friday to his will (“This is not England, 
we have no need of a great stock of words” (21)) – in a sense, he de-
prives him of language, since we must understand language as first 
of all an appeal to the other in which a subject looks for recognition.
There are many hints throughout the book that it might have 
been Cruso who mutilated Friday. Moreover, what is suspicious is 
the way Friday’s muteness fits perfectly into Cruso’s imaginary order 
of things – it should, therefore, be asked what place Friday’s mutila-
tion occupies in the configuration of the island.
Cruso presents Friday’s mutilation as a primordial sign whose 
precise meaning cannot be identified (“‘Perhaps the slavers, who are 
Moors, hold the tongue to be a delicacy,’ [Cruso] said. ‘Or perhaps 
they grew weary of listening to Friday’s wails of grief, that went on 
day and night. Perhaps they wanted to prevent him from ever tell-
ing his story: who he was, where his home lay, how it came about 
that he was taken. Perhaps they cut out the tongue of every cannibal 
they took as a punishment. How will we ever know the truth?’ ” (23)) 
but its general signification is clear: it is a sign of submission. What 
we have here is the effect of what Nietzsche recognised as a (maybe 
even the) “mnemotechnic” as old as human civilisation which takes as 
its material support the flesh and blood of the human body because 
“only that which hurts incessantly is remembered.”2 Such a violent 
incision aims to inscribe the body with the law of culture, that is, 
to overcome the merely instinctual biological mechanism. The bloody 
inscription in the real of the body doubles it up and erases the realm 
where “bodies are their own signs” (157; the final fantasy of Foe), 
what signifies here is a cut in the body, that is, a wound, a lack, 
a signifyingness that enables creation of all other signifiers.
This is a wound that founds memory which is, in turn, a neces-
sary support of the law: “ ‘Nothing is forgotten,’ said [Cruso]; and 
then: ‘Nothing I have forgotten is worth the remembering’ ” (17). But 
 2 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Douglas Smith 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 42.
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of course if the law has to be established properly, it cannot recog-
nise itself in the sheer master-violence of its founding gesture, and 
therefore what has to be forgotten is the origin of the wound, if not 
the wound itself. Even if Cruso (unconvincingly) claims that “ ‘Friday 
lost his tongue before he became mine’ ” (37), the very position of 
Friday in respect to Cruso (he is “mine”) shows that their relation is 
based on such mutilation, whether it be real or symbolic (in our case 
both). With such a violent incision at the origin of their relation it is 
not surprising that “there is no call to punish Friday” (37).
Moreover, the law of the island, as Cruso presents it, although 
at first it calls to mind Defoe’s Crusoe’s protestant ethic, curiously 
does not seem to make much sense: “On the island there is no law 
except the law that we shall work for our bread, which is a com-
mandment” (36). Yet the desert island in the Caribbean is precisely 
the place where one does not have to sweat to till the land to be 
able to feed oneself, because of the abundant vegetation, some of it 
edible, available for consumption all year round. “Working for one’s 
bread” in Cruso’s version turns out to be toiling for the pure idea 
of the “future” bread – Cruso applies most of his time and strength 
to building walled terraces on the calmer side of the island where 
he clears and levels the ground to prepare it for agriculture but, 
since he has no seeds to sow, farming remains for him an almost 
messianic ideal indefinitely postponed into the future: “The planting 
is reserved for those who come after us and have the foresight to 
bring seed” (32).
Susan clearly does not find this logic convincing and calls what 
Cruso spends his time on “a stupid labour” (35), but when she be-
moans his refusal to write down the diary of his life on the island, 
he counters her with: “I will leave behind my terraces and walls” 
(18). So does he not treat his labour as a kind of writing? As he had 
done with Friday, he tries to introduce a permanent cut in nature, 
a sign incised in the very substance of the real, this time introducing 
meaning into the inert substance of the island with the pain of his 
own body: what we have here is an empty gesture (“disinterested” 
because bearing no substantial fruit) of subjugation/mastery, an in-
cision incomprehensible to Susan but nevertheless visible to the big 
Other of the eye in the sky. So, in a sense, Cruso externalises his 
memory in a writing of stone – not something that would be helpful 
in making him recollect the details of the past, but incisions in the 
very flesh of the island, the result of his attempt to inflict memory 
on it, to impose on it a new kind of “rock formation” and therefore 
incisions that add up to and surpass its geological constitution. And 
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Susan ultimately comes to understand the signification of the subdu-
ing effort when, back in England, she compares the process of writ-
ing to what Cruso and Friday under his command did: “But when 
you see me at Mr Foe’s desk making marks with the quill, think 
of each mark as a stone, and think of the paper as the island, and 
imagine I must disperse the stones over the face of the island” (87). 
Therefore Cruso is, in a sense, right when he speaks about “working 
for bread” as the law of the island, but only if we take the phrase 
“working for bread” as the arbitrary signifier for the imposition of 
the law on the island – what Cruso tries to achieve with his “fool-
ish kind of agriculture” (34) is the same that he believes himself to 
have achieved with Friday: to inscribe the real with the signifier, to 
make it remember beyond the cycle of birth and corruption, to split 
the island from itself, to give it a second body purified by the incision 
– not the telluric body of the uncanny mother who is cannibalistic/
devouring (horrifying) and yet at the same time abundant (providing 
food freely), but a subjected, “castrated” mother, even if a sterile one 
(turning wild vegetation into empty fields).
Such a foundation of order on the island, the workings of which 
she does not fully grasp, is the response to Susan’s amazement that 
nothing “extraordinary” takes place on the island: “It seemed to me 
that all things were possible on the island, all tyrannies and cruel-
ties, though in small; and if, in despite of what was possible, we 
lived at peace one with another, surely this was proof that certain 
laws unknown to us held sway” (37). In other words, Susan asks her-
self a very literate question that takes us to another crucial site of 
the western literary tradition, one which is a kind of dark obverse of 
the robust innocence of Robinson Crusoe: why did Cruso not become 
like Kurtz of Conrad’s Heart of Darkness? Although there is a shade 
of Kurtz in him, especially in his feeling that the world is riddled 
with cannibals (“exterminate all the brutes”), Cruso’s intention is 
to found a balanced system in which what is imagined as natural 
excess has to be cut out. The voice of the law is exemplified for him 
in Friday’s “singing,” which Cruso calls “the voice of man” – since 
Friday has lost his tongue, the voice of man is a humming the pri-
mary signification of which is a display of mutilation. Friday is Man: 
a cannibal turned man by means of excision/punishment (“Perhaps 
they cut out the tongue of every cannibal they took as punishment”). 
This is the price one has to pay for a balanced universe – in spite 
of appearances and the pedigree of the protestant ethic in Robinson 
Crusoe, Coetzee’s Cruso attempts to turn (and, in a sense, succeeds 
in turning) his island into an Eden, an organic community in which 
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the pleasure principle rules, and not into a capitalist utopia perme-
ated by desire.
In psychoanalytical accounts the pleasure principle, despite the 
way it is popularly imagined, does not aim for a maximum of pleas-
ure but for a steady state of balance (pleasure), that is, it is a device 
to keep excitation (unpleasure) at the lowest possible level. When 
Susan arrives on the island, she frustrates the attempted state of ho-
meostasis with her immoderate desire for the “beyond,” that is, to be 
returned to civilisation (“I have a desire to be saved which I must call 
immoderate. […] It burns in me night and day, I can think of nothing 
else” (36)). Contrary to what one might expect of a cast away, Cruso 
himself clearly feels no such desire. In fact, he gets angry when he 
hears her speak of her desires and reminds her that there are laws 
on the island, even if they at first seem to be invisible (as Friday’s 
mutilation is invisible): “Laws are made for one purpose only […] to 
hold us in check when our desires grow immoderate” (36). The law 
he speaks about more than any other is the law of excision of desire, 
which puts into clearer focus why Cruso is so adamant about the 
“unnecessary” uses of language and speech, since the only way to ar-
ticulate desire is by means of speech.3 More than that: desire does not 
pre-exist speech; in speech it is brought into existence.4
It becomes increasingly easy to believe that it was Cruso who mu-
tilated Friday because his muteness is ideal for the balanced world 
Cruso projects – with orders passed only one way from Robinson to 
Friday, desire, which is a social product of language, does not have 
a chance to articulate itself. The mutilation of Friday is an obstacle 
that prevents desire from appearing on the interpersonal stage as it 
always does in the voice of the other in the form of the enigmatic ex-
cess of the question Che vuoi? – what does the other want from me? 
This is the question that any kind of speech produces: the other is 
saying something to me but why is he doing it? There is a message 
in his words but what is he trying to achieve with that message? 
The subject cannot, of course, answer this question and the lack he 
finds in himself as a result is the propelling force of desire, or rather 
this lack is constitutive of desire as such. When the subject looks in 
 3 Jacques Lacan, Freud’s Papers on Technique (Seminar I), ed. Jacques-Alain 
Miller, trans. John Forrester (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 183.
 4 Jacques Lacan, The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of 
Psychoanalysis (Seminar II), ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 228–29. This is one of the meanings of a famous 
Lacanian dictum that “man’s desire is the desire of the Other”: there is nothing 
natural about desire, it is a product of symbolic exchange.
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himself for the cause of the other’s desire (which by nature cannot 
be found because it is pure semblance), he seems to find it already 
on the other side – in the other, in ways the other seems to be able 
to enjoy. Since this is precisely what the subject lacks (jouissance), 
the other appears as the one who stole the jouissance and begs for 
violent action/retaliation.
Friday’s mutilation accomplishes two things at once: it punishes 
his “cannibalistic” drives (but since Friday’s cannibalistic jouissance 
is precisely Cruso’s projection of his own inability to enjoy, Friday is 
punished for the theft of enjoyment) and it excises the very “mecha-
nism” of language, which would produce Cruso’s desire (the excess 
of Che vuoi? in every utterance). Of course, theoretically Friday still 
has the means to communicate to Cruso his desire (by means of 
gestures, etc.), but, as we have noted, the mutilation is precisely the 
mnemotechnic device to make him remember that this is unwanted – 
for the pleasure principle to rule, language, if it is used at all, should 
be reduced to a minimum (orders) and travel only one way. It is by 
this violent excision of what he perceives as Friday’s obscene surplus 
that Cruso tries to conceal the lack from himself. In other words, by 
cutting out a piece of flesh, he tries to excise object a, a remainder 
of the uncastrated jouissance of the Other (surplus and lack at the 
same time, depending on the perspective from which it is viewed), 
that is, he tries to remedy his symbolic castration (the lack that 
produces desire), by a violent incision in the real.
This incision (Friday’s mutilation) becomes the founding gesture 
of the new dispensation, its master signifier: from the outside of the 
order it appears as a violent act of subjugation, but from the inside it 
remains an “empty” signifier (the meaning of this mutilation, its pur-
pose, is said to be enigmatic) whose origin recedes beyond the limits 
of conceivable memory (Friday described as having appeared on the 
island already mutilated).5 With no desire of the other to confront 
him, Cruso’s desire becomes radically curtailed – since Friday is now 
silent, he is considered to be only the tool in the care of his master. 
“He has known no other master. He follows me in all things” (37), 
says Cruso, but this is obviously only the imaginary dimension of 
Cruso’s mastery since, as we know, Friday does things that remain 
beyond Cruso’s comprehension, such as the scattering of petals on 
the water that Susan witnesses.
 5 Slavoj Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder: The Essay on Schelling and Related 
Matters (London: Verso, 1996), 147.
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By “moderating” his desire (in a very immoderate way) Cruso cre-
ates an Eden, an “organic” community in which “everybody has his 
place for the good of all” and where antagonism (whose root for Cruso 
is desire) is supposedly overcome (by absolute subjugation). He offers 
the following theodicy for this best of all worlds: “ ‘If Providence were 
to watch over all of us […] who would be left to pick the cotton and 
cut the sugar-cane? […] You think I mock Providence. But perhaps it 
is the doing of Providence that Friday finds himself on an island un-
der a lenient master, rather than in Brazil, under the planter’s lash, 
or in Africa, where the forests teem with cannibals. Perhaps it is for 
the best, though we do not see it so” (23–24). But of course the truth 
of such a position is that antagonism is only dissimulated by an au-
thoritarian rule (Friday does not follow Robinson in everything) that 
perceives itself as benevolent. What is more, the creation of a model 
society brings Cruso nothing but depression – in spite of achieving 
what he perceives as balance, he is a deeply melancholic figure prone 
to dissolving himself while he observes the great emptiness of the 
horizon. We have to be careful not to take this as a kind of mysticism 
– unlike a true mystic, in his “practice of losing himself in the contem-
plation of the wastes of water and sky” (38), he is completely devoid of 
joy. If anything, this contemplation makes Cruso even more morose.
So maybe, after all, Susan is right when she says, “I used to 
think, when I saw Cruso in this evening posture, that, like me, he 
was searching the horizon for a sail” (38); if we take it together 
with Cruso’s confirmation of the fact that he is also looking out to 
see if cannibals are coming (12) – for him the whole world overflows 
with cannibals, every man being a cannibal in need of mutilation 
(Friday’s voice is the voice of Man) – we can suppose that Cruso, 
in fact, unconsciously is looking for something to come out of the 
wilderness of water and sky to save him from the suffocating atmos-
phere of his stagnant Eden which makes him drown in emptiness, 
that he longs to break out of the stagnant pool of his paradise run 
by the pleasure principle,6 but at the same time does not want to 
break out, knowing full well that being “saved” would mean leav-
ing the island and returning to the painful world of cannibals (of 
immoderate desire). Ultimately, what are his terraces if not signals 
addressed to the figure of the big Other (God) to come to his rescue, 
to break the steady diet of nothing, an impotent gesture visible only 
to the empty eye in the sky?
 6 Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile Absolute – or Why Is the Christian Legacy Worth 
Fighting For? (London: Verso, 2000), 88–89.
~ 72  ~
Therefore the deliverance can come but only from the outside – 
Cruso is too attached to the perfect utopia he has founded (stable 
submission of the death drive to the rule of the pleasure principle: is 
it not the matrix each “enlightened” utopia has tried to put forth as 
a model?) – and it comes in the shape of the woman and her “immod-
erate” desire which breaks the spell of homeostasis. Susan is from 
the beginning conscious of death (stasis as the opposite of the death 
drive) ruling the island and it is only she who notices that Friday 
does not follow Cruso in everything, that there is a side of him in 
which he is his own man. Re-finding in him the Che vuoi? of her 
own desire (How did he lose his tongue? What is his desire?), she can 
now assume what Cruso tried to excise from himself and with such 
disturbing of the balance the spell is broken; fresh air can enter the 
stifling atmosphere of the island and with it a ship can appear that 
will take them back to England. All of it, however, must turn out 
to be lethal to Cruso whose externalisation the island, in a sense, 
becomes – when he is taken off the island, he has to die since in 
the world he would have to become his own antagonist: a desiring 
cannibal, and thus no longer Cruso, an Adam chased out of paradise.
Susan visits paradise, but she is not happy there (“I had no tem-
perament to love such emptiness” (38)) – more than that, she con-
ceives of her stay there as a punishment: “We are all punished, eve-
ry day. This island is our punishment, this island and one another’s 
company, to the death” (37). From such words it would seem that 
the period on the island constitutes a traumatic experience, but it 
appears to have to her a strangely entertaining side to it: as if she 
came from the future, she keeps plaguing Cruso with injunctions to 
put his “adventures” down in writing; she even outlines the method 
he should apply, which is precisely a new “realistic” method “invent-
ed” by Defoe (Robinson Crusoe was his first “adventure” book):
The truth that makes your story yours alone, that sets you apart 
from the old mariner by the fireside spinning yarns of sea-mon-
sters and mermaids, resides in a thousand touches which today 
may seem of no importance, such as: When you made your needle 
(the needle you store in your belt), by what means did you pierce 
the eye? When you sewed your hat, what did you use for thread? 
Touches like these will one day persuade your countrymen that it is 
all true, every word, there was indeed once an island in the middle 
of the ocean where the wind blew and the gulls cried from cliffs and 
a man named Cruso paced about in his apeskin clothes, scanning 
the horizon for sail. (18)
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Moreover, she keeps repeating that “the world demands stories from 
its adventurers” (34) and that “the idea of Cruso on his island is 
a better thing than the true Cruso tight-lipped and sullen in an 
alien England” (35). The very idea of the island is from the start 
conceived by Susan in terms of narration/fabulation, and “What will 
we tell folk in England when they ask us to divert them?” (43). To 
divert may be to entertain but it can just as well be to turn aside 
from the intended course.
The “taking over” of Friday by Susan means assuming confronta-
tion with something traumatic, with a wound that is both horrifying 
(“But now I began to look on him – I could not help myself – with 
the horror we reserve for the mutilated” (24)) or, to be more precise, 
disgusting (“I covertly observed him as he ate […] with distaste” 
(24)), yet at the same time utterly fascinating since Susan hardly 
thinks of anything other than Friday and his mutilation till the end 
of the book. It is this “unhealthy” fascination which constitutes the 
obverse side of the attitude of “the white man’s burden” whose terms 
are evoked by Susan as a rationale for taking Friday on board ship: 
“Friday is a slave and a child, it is our duty to care for him in 
all things” (39). In other words, Friday presents himself to Susan 
as a task – while Cruso’s answer to the traumatic encounter with 
Friday’s desire was to abandon speech to avoid the confrontation 
with the wound (the repression which, however, returned in the real 
as the message of the terraces), Susan reacts with the attempts to 
somehow heal it in the symbolic order with knowledge: in order to 
do it one has to somehow elicit Friday’s story from him, “to build 
a bridge of words over which […] he may cross to the time before 
Cruso” (60). In other words, to heal the wound would mean to narra-
tivise Friday, to create a discursive memory for him within the west-
ern symbolic order. However, since Friday’s wound is a wound not 
only in his symbolic “texture” but in the real of his flesh, the narra-
tive would succeed only if it found a discursive way to dissimulate 
the obscenity of the wound by a story that would explain it away 
as either something he deserved (e.g. “he was punished this way for 
what he did as a cannibal”) or something that can be disowned (e.g. 
“the slavers, who are Moors, did it”).
In fact, what we encounter in the typical colonial gesture of dis-
avowal is not really an either/or alternative but a triple overdeter-
mination comparable to what can be seen in a famous illustration of 
the logic of dreams given by Freud – when one is accused of dam-
aging a kettle by a neighbour one answers: I never borrowed the 
kettle from you, I returned the kettle to you undamaged, the kettle 
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was already broken when I borrowed it, anyway. In Friday’s case 
a similar logic operates in Susan’s holding three mutually exclusive 
positions typical of the colonial discourse at the same time: we did 
not want them, they were thrust upon us by circumstances (“I do not 
love him but he is mine” (111)); we did not mutilate them, they were 
already mutilated (morally and mentally deficient according to our 
standards) when we encountered them; although we did not do it, 
they deserved to be punished, for example, for their laziness and un-
imaginable, therefore horrifying, thoughts (“I […] am turning Friday 
into a laundryman; for otherwise idleness will destroy him […] But 
surely it is better to learn useful tasks than to lie alone in a cellar 
all day, thinking I know not what thoughts?” (56)).
Susan’s attempts to get beyond the wound are also threefold and 
all of them of course misfire. Her symbolic attempt to get rid of the 
wound is to manumit Friday (she puts a written statement that he is 
a freed slave around his neck) and send him to Africa but she very 
quickly realises that the big Other does not accept her voluntarist 
intervention – when she tries to find a ship that would transport 
him there, she sees that her symbolic act does not mean anything 
because the moment she loses sight of Friday, he will be treated as 
a slave again and sold to a new owner.
Another attempt is to communicate with Friday on the level of the 
signifier which is not yet neutralised by the symbolic order (where 
its meaning is differential and arbitrary) but which is shot through 
with enjoyment. At first it has a form of “sincerity” in the voice: 
“I knew of course that Friday did not understand the words. But 
it had been my belief from early on that Friday understood tones, 
that he could hear kindness in a human voice when kindness was 
sincerely meant” (41). Such understanding of tone, although it tries 
to go beyond meaning, is of course still heavily dependent on the 
message of the words (e.g. words expressive of kindness), so the next 
logical step is to pursue tones that scrap the message altogether.
When they stay at Foe’s house, Susan finds a case of recorders 
and, remembering the melody Friday used to play on the island, tries 
to communicate with him by means of music. She thinks that by re-
peating, and therefore, in a sense, “exchanging” his melody with him, 
he will be gradually led to vary the pattern in different directions 
and by such means they will find themselves in a common space of, 
if not signification proper, then at least something that underlies 
signification, that is, the signifying intention. Yet her exertions meet 
with failure since, as she is bound finally to notice, Friday’s playing 
is not meant for anybody but himself; his melody is just a support 
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which his drive gets hold of in order to circulate around its empty 
centre. The melody is played not in order to achieve something (e.g. 
to address the other) but just for the sake of playing it, which brings 
enjoyment in itself, in other words the drive does not have a goal, or 
rather its goal is just its dumb circulation.7 What is more, a drive is 
always partial, so it sticks to its chosen support (in Friday’s case it 
is a six-note melody) not allowing it to be dialecticised – the signifier 
a drive gets attached to cannot be incorporated into the network of 
other signifiers which would allow enjoyment to disperse through-
out the network and make the exchange (not repetition) of signifiers 
enjoyable. In other words, the drive never addresses the other; it is 
totally solipsistic and since it is always partial, that is, multiple, only 
a given note or a set of notes can be libidinally invested, not “music” 
or “sound” as such.
Susan’s go at music has, however, a totally different logic – for 
her, music and its goal are already split. Music is a means to achieve 
something else, that is, communication – what is eroticised here is 
not the very stuff of music (sounds) but their exchange (“Are not 
both music and conversation like love?” (97)). In other words, Susan’s 
logic is the logic of desire which always addresses the other and is 
the answer to the other – she mistakes Friday’s melody for an en-
igmatic message (desire for recognition) addressed to her desire (or 
to the big Other/the symbolic order in general) and by repeating the 
message she responds to this desire with a desire of her own.8 In the 
logic of desire, this response should neutralise the object (desire is 
ultimately not desire for a given object but for desire of the other) 
and enable variation, that is, the exchange of other objects (other 
configurations of notes), which are only the arbitrary signifiers of 
desire, which is the proper “object” of exchange. This “object” is the 
lack itself – since desire is “desire for the Other’s desire,” it is es-
sentially empty, it is the very sliding from one object to the other, 
the exchange of one object for another, so, strictly speaking, desire 
has no object but has a cause (lack).
The exchange with Friday does not happen, however, so Susan’s 
desire for recognition is frustrated and she flies into a rage. Playing 
music “with” Friday turns out to be so traumatic for Susan (“I had 
to hold back an urge to strike him and tear the wig and robes away 
 7 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (Seminar 
XI), trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1979), 168.
 8 “The object of man’s desire […] is essentially an object desired by some-
one else” (Jacques Lacan, “Some Reflections on the Ego,” International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, vol. 34 (1953), 12).
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and thus rudely teach him he was not alone on this earth” (98)) 
precisely because what she thought would be a discourse to heal the 
wound (music) turns out to display the wound in all its obscenity – 
the flow of desire is blocked; there is nobody to exchange music with 
because there is no longer the subject. What Susan encounters is the 
horror of the void of jouissance, which the infinite repetition of the 
six notes creates and into which Friday disappears.
After the failure of a belief in the motivated nature of signs, an 
attempt to render “the real” of kindness by means of voice and the 
failure to implicate Friday in the dialectics of desire by means of 
tones as such (music), there is yet another step Susan takes towards 
grasping Friday. Along with playing his melody Friday also dances, 
or rather he plays and dances at the same time, yet when a flute is 
unavailable he performs only the dance accompanied by a humming 
sound. He puts Foe’s wig and robe on and “[if] the sun is shining 
he does his dance in a patch of sunlight, holding out his arms and 
spinning in a circle, his eyes shut, hour after hour, never growing 
fatigued or dizzy. […] In the grip of the dancing he is not himself. 
He is beyond human reach. I call his name and am ignored, I put 
out a hand and I am brushed aside. All the while he dances he 
makes a humming noise in his throat, deeper than his usual voice; 
sometimes he seems to be singing” (92).
Susan’s reaction to his dancing is not an ordinary mixture of dis-
gust and fascination but what can be described as utter panic which 
finds expression in a veritable hole in her narrative, a break that 
is the truth of a rupture that she tries to displace into the past as 
a supposed hole of the origin (the story of Friday before he lost his 
tongue) which is presented by her as the silence that prevents the 
narrative of the island to constitute itself as a totality. Towards the 
end of the book Susan reveals to Foe that in Friday’s dance “when 
he spun, the robes would stand out stiffly about him, so much so 
that one might have supposed the purpose of his dancing was to 
show forth the nakedness underneath” (118) but when she tries to 
convey what she saw (she is suspicious that Friday’s mutilation is 
double, that his docility is caused by castration), it turns out that 
she appears to have seen nothing: “What had been hidden from me 
was revealed. I saw; or, I should say, my eyes were open to what was 
present to them. I saw and believed I had seen, though afterwards 
I remembered Thomas, who also saw, but could not be brought to 
believe till he had put his hand in the wound” (119–20).
What she saw is rendered here by the purely tautological gesture 
of the narrative (I saw what I believe I had seen) used to dissimulate 
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what cannot be included in the discourse (cannot be symbolised) – 
the vortex of jouissance, the Thing itself, the pulsating, disgusting 
substance of life which no signifier can represent – and the wound 
she refers to in evoking the biblical episode of Thomas is not to be 
taken as referring to Friday’s mutilated genitals but to the wound 
of a lapse of ego (a lapse of vision) that the discourse tries unsuc-
cessfully to suture with its empty gesture. When Susan is confronted 
with the core of her fantasy that draws her to Friday (the dark se-
cret of his jouissance), she experiences a momentary lapse of ego, of 
her consistent self, which is also a lapse of memory. Susan cannot 
see whether he has or does not have the “instrument” of his jouis-
sance, because his whole body in the trance turns for her into the 
figure of jouissance and she experiences in his naked presence the 
pulsation of the Thing that is whole, that does not divide into parts 
(head, chest, genitals, etc.), and therefore lacks nothing.
The further point is, however, that what she sees/does not see 
(Friday’s jouissance) is not something that is “objectively” there – 
what happens is just Susan’s confrontation with her fundamental 
colonial fantasy of the “ethnic” (even in spite of his mutilation) pos-
sessing the treasure of how to enjoy that has been lost to the West, 
so the undecidability between presence and absence (penis and its 
lack) dissimulated by a tautological gesture of discourse is precisely 
the undecidability of Susan’s experience: seeing Friday naked and 
spinning she encounters her lack in the empty support that enables 
the colonial fantasy – Friday’s body is just a support for a fantasy 
projection, and when this projection gets too close to its real (What 
does his instrument of enjoyment looks like? Is it there at all?), it 
encounters its own nullity there in the form of subject consistency 
coming momentarily apart. To be able to overcome this undoing of 
the imaginary texture in the confrontation with the colonial real an-
other experience of nothingness is needed.
When Susan tried to speak to Friday in “sincere tones of kind-
ness” she had spoken from the position of a master/mistress; when 
she tried to involve him in a musical exchange she did it from the 
position of an equal (although the equality was only formal, the way 
subjects are formally but not really equal in liberal democracies); 
when they travel to Bristol to put Friday on a ship to Africa they 
become “really” equal in the eye of the Other, in other words, they 
are both treated as underdogs (“Aye, […] but we call them gipsies 
when they roam about with their dirty faces, men and women all 
higgledy-piggledy together, looking for mischief” (108)). In this state 
of deprivation, soaked with rain and cold to the bone, not knowing 
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what to do to warm herself, Susan starts to whirl around in Friday’s 
dance and finds that it helps – she seems to get warmer. Her first 
reaction is to put the event into an orderly providential narration of 
knowledge: “I have discovered why Friday dances in England […]. 
And I should never have made this discovery had I not been soaked 
to the skin and then set down in the dark in an empty barn. From 
which we may infer that there is after all a design in our lives, and 
if we wait long enough we are bound to see that design unfolding” 
(103).9 But this “knowledge” is only a point after which the complete 
obliteration of the subject takes place:
Thinking these thoughts, spinning around, my eyes closed, a smile 
on my lips, I fell, I believe into a kind of trance; for when next 
I knew, I was standing still, breathing heavily, with somewhere at 
my mind’s edge an intimation that I had been far away, that I had 
seen wondrous sights. Where am I? I asked myself, and crouched 
down and stroked the floor; and when it came back to me that 
I was in Berkshire, a great pang wrenched my heart; for what 
I had seen in my trance, whatever it had been – I could summon 
back nothing distinct, yet felt a glow of after-memory, if you can 
understand that – had been a message (but from whom?) to tell me 
there were other lives open to me than this one in which I trudged 
with Friday across the English countryside, a life of which I was 
already heartily sick. (103–4)
When Susan steps into Friday’s shoes, when she becomes an un-
derdog, that is, when she “identifies with her symptom,” what is 
revealed to her is not the wondrous sight of the other world (this is 
precisely what she does remember from her spinning: the passing 
vision of the “higher purpose”) but “the night of the world” (Hegel), 
a nothingness, a void, the pure negativity that the subject is; in her 
spinning she is “removed” (104), she falls out of her symbolic and 
imaginary orders and comes back with a presentiment that “other 
lives” are possible, that is, that the world they find themselves in as 
“gipsies” in hostile Berkshire is thoroughly contingent and lacking in 
purpose. This, however, is accompanied not by grief (the tragic “we 
are just helpless tools in the hands of blind forces/fate”) but by joy: if 
one can “remove” oneself, one can overcome one’s determinations and 
 9 The unvoiced companion illumination here (what on the face of it looks like 
misfortune from a higher perspective is the realisation of some good) is of course 
that the same narration embraces Friday: if we wait long enough the design will 
surface that will show us that the mutilating of Friday also aimed at some good or 
knowledge as yet unclear from our clouded perspective.
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find an “other life” for oneself. We should also note that it is prob-
ably the only moment when Susan speaks about herself and Friday 
as “ourselves”: “As long as we two are cast in each other’s company, 
I thought, perhaps it is best that we dance and spin and transport 
ourselves” (104).
One should, however, be aware that such “ourselves” must be 
distinguished from any “communal” meaning – what Friday and 
Susan have in common is nothing of substance – it is precisely this 
“nothing” that Susan just felt, the experience of the nullity of the 
big Other and one’s imaginary identifications. In other words, what 
Susan experiences (without clearly realising it) is the inability to 
build “a bridge of words into the past” to “explain” Friday, because 
in such explanation either Friday’s story will be narrated in the colo-
nising discourse which triply obfuscates what happened (the story of 
the borrowed kettle; in such discourse a perspective will always be 
found from which Friday’s mutilation will have some “deeper mean-
ing” in the workings of Providence) or he will be rendered in “mul-
ticulturalist” discourse as “altogether” other, completely reducible in 
his “ethnic” substance to his different symbolic order which the West 
cannot properly comprehend (in consequence donning a blank mask 
on which the West can project what it feels it lacks and what it 
disavows, therefore evoking both fascination and disgust).
Against such narrativisations, which are ultimately two sides of 
the same coin, Friday’s “sameness” should be emphasised, the same-
ness that has two forms. Firstly, there is no “originally ethnic” Friday 
– even if we can imagine him as the originally ethnic Thing (a clear 
impossibility, since the subject is always at least minimally free of 
his ethnic determinations), the trauma of mutilation (the western 
intervention in his “substance”) bars him forever from being “pure,” 
it retroactively “disfigures” his former experience and mediates his 
“substance” with western discourse (even, or maybe especially, if 
its incarnation is the sheer violence of inflicting pain). The point is 
therefore not that Friday cannot tell us about his wound – he clearly 
can, if he wishes – but that speaking about it to us he will always 
only ventriloquise our own discourse (our own values) which we will 
always be able to turn to our advantage.
In this context, another “substantialist” answer is also false – 
a substantial sameness found in pity: “Poor Friday is also a human 
being as ourselves, he also can suffer as we do.” Such an attitude 
towards the other is a clear example of a dissimulated colonial illu-
sion of grandeur by which we congratulate ourselves on our differ-
ent (read: higher) moral values: one can find cultures (also in the 
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European past) in which suffering is not the worst thing imaginable. 
In contrast, what makes Friday the same as Susan Barton is his 
ability to be removed, transported, to be “born again,” to suspend the 
functioning of the determining symbolic “machine” and start from 
scratch, to become his own author. In other words, his ability to 
exercise freedom.
Susan’s gaze is, however, set on a completely different kind of 
authorship – with the help of noted author Daniel Foe (the birth 
name of Defoe) she attempts to be narrated into the stuff of colo-
nial adventure discourse, which is another of her efforts to close the 
trauma of the island, this time on the imaginary level.
Her behaviour in this respect, however, is quite peculiar. As we 
have noted, on the island she has already behaved strangely – one 
of the main thoughts that preoccupy her is how to turn what is hap-
pening to her into a story to “please the reader” and she desperately 
looks for situations that may interest him in her uneventful exist-
ence. She even gives instructions to Cruso on how he should write 
a book about himself. Her narrative fixation is of course also one 
of the reasons she sticks so persistently to the enigma of Friday’s 
tongue since this is definitely a detail which promises blood, violence, 
cannibals and, in a word, adventure. After returning to England, she 
therefore does the expected – she looks up a well-known author, 
noted for writing books based on other people’s confessions and pre-
sents herself to him as his good fortune (“I am the good fortune we 
are always hoping for” (48)). Supposedly dissatisfied with her own 
cre ative effort to write down her story for Foe’s perusal (she “loses 
her substance” – she feels that in her story she is just a shadowy, 
unconvincing presence behind the body of Cruso), she begs Foe to 
remedy it with his art: “Return to me the substance I have lost, 
Mr Foe: that is my entreaty. For though my story gives the truth, 
it does not give the substance of truth” (51). Yet this is but the first 
step on a road that leads much further, because soon enough the 
shadowy presence Susan feels in her own story (supposedly caused 
by her lack of skill) spills out into her reality in the world itself – 
she pleads to be given back her life: “Will you not bear in mind, how-
ever, that my life is drearily suspended till your writing is done?” 
(63). The substance lost this time is not just “colour” of the properly 
formed character of the story; what Susan asks Foe for is ultimately 
an interpretation of the island adventure that will be able to provide 
meaning for it (and therefore for her) continuous with the texture 
of the symbolic order they both inhabit: “The waves picked me up 
and cast me ashore on an island, and a year later the same waves 
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brought a ship to rescue me, and of the true story of that year, the 
story as it should be seen in God’s great scheme of things, I remain 
as ignorant as a newborn babe. That is why I cannot rest, that is 
why I follow you to your hiding-place like a bad penny. Would I be 
here if I did not believe you to be my intended, the one alone in-
tended to tell my true story?” (126)
What we encounter here in the guise of an appeal for truth is 
a typical plea that a hysteric addresses to the big Other – in this 
case the obvious representative of the symbolic order in the guise of 
the story-teller – for domination: unless you dominate me, that is, 
unless you provide the meaning of my story by including it in the 
texture of narratives constituting the hegemonic symbolic order I no 
longer exist, I am nothing without you. But of course the hegemonic 
symbolic we are speaking about is that of (divine and earthly) patri-
archy, colonial domination, and “heroic” capitalism, so the attempt to 
include Susan’s story into it, to return her substance to her by means 
of story-telling, would paradoxically result in the book we already 
have in Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, which is unabashed propaganda 
for colonialism and protestant male individualism, and from which 
all traces of the feminine on the island are entirely erased (Susan 
has a premonition of that: “ ‘Better had there been only Cruso and 
Friday,’ you will murmur to yourself: ‘Better without the woman’ ” 
(71–72)). There is, however, another possible alternative within the 
realm of early eighteenth-century prose, something we know very 
well from Defoe too, that is, the book consisting of the confession of 
the fallen woman.
Susan’s haphazard references to her life before she is washed 
ashore on the island tell us of her leaving England for Bahia because 
of some intelligence she has that her eloped or kidnapped daugh-
ter is there. She spends some time in Bahia supporting herself as 
a “free woman” (prostitute) looking for her daughter, does not suc-
ceed in finding anything and boards a ship sailing for Portugal. This 
information is what Foe predictably latches onto in order to “return 
substance” to Susan: in order to provide meaning to the island ad-
venture one has to insert it into the story of a life in which it can 
be shown as a step on the way in a larger scheme of the divine plan 
leading on to either salvation or damnation. Since providing meaning 
for her story is what Susan begs him for, he demands more stories of 
her life off the island. Here, however, comes the properly hysterical 
turn to Susan’s plea: she wants to be dominated by Foe (by his at-
tempt to create her meaning) but only in order to test him, to make 
him prove his mettle, that is, she wants her meaning but only on 
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her own terms – she refuses to provide him with more information 
and challenges him to find her meaning within the island episode 
alone. When Foe protests that “the island is not a story in itself […]. 
We can bring it to life only by setting it within a larger story” (117), 
Susan refuses his suggestion that the meaning of the episode of the 
island (and of her life too) should be created by inserting it into the 
larger narrative of Susan’s quest for her daughter and proposes that 
the proper way to excavate the meaning of what happened on the 
island is not by pursuing the known meaning of the absent daughter 
(who she “really” is is not an enigma), but the unknown meaning of 
the present Friday: “If the story seems stupid, that is only because 
it so doggedly holds its silence. The shadow whose lack you feel is 
there: it is the loss of Friday’s tongue” (117). What, however, if Foe’s 
writerly intuition about meaning is right after all, what if there is 
yet another shadow hiding in the shadow of Friday’s lost tongue?
Susan challenges Foe to make the story speak for itself, which 
would amount, according to her, to putting Friday in its centre and 
finding some words for him. In order to do this one should start with 
the only sign Friday provides of his enigmatic symbolic universe in 
the whole story, which Susan accidentally observes on the island: 
“He crossed the shelf of rock that stretched out from the cliff-face, 
launched his log upon the water – which was deep at that place – 
and straddled it. […] After paddling out some hundred yards from 
the shelf into the thickest of the seaweed, he reached into a bag 
that hung about his neck and brought out handfuls of white flakes 
which he began to scatter over the water” (31). The flakes turn out 
to be “white petals and buds from the brambles that were at the 
time flowering on parts of the island” (31). Susan conjectures that 
the place of this strange ceremony might be the one where the ship 
with Friday and Cruso sank, but Foe’s intuition goes in a different, 
supposedly fantastic, direction: “Those great beds of seaweed are the 
home of a beast called by mariners the kraken […] which has arms 
as thick as a man’s thigh and many yards long, and a beak like 
an eagle’s” (140). When Susan remains unconvinced, he pursues his 
metaphor for a familial trauma that against our will draws us to-
ward the dead of memory: “You say he was guiding his boat to the 
place where the ship went down, which we may surmise to have 
been a slave-ship, not a merchantman, as Cruso claimed. Well, then: 
picture the hundreds of his fellow slaves – or their skeletons – still 
chained in the wreck, the gay little fish (that you spoke of) flitting 
through their eye-sockets and their hollow cases that had held their 
hearts. […] Does it not strike you, in these two accounts [metaphoric 
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relation between the kraken and the slave-ship], how Friday is beck-
oned from the deep – beckoned or menaced as the case may be?” 
(140–41). The bed of seaweed is like the eye, the dark pupil of the 
story, Foe claims, but the menace is not for Friday: “He rows across 
it and is safe. To us he leaves the task of descending into that eye” 
(141). “Or like a mouth,” counters Susan, displacing Foe’s metaphor 
significantly: “It is for us to open Friday’s mouth and hear what it 
holds: silence perhaps, or a roar of a shell held to the ear” (141–
42). Yet the point is, of course, that in Friday’s silence the master’s 
discourse will hear only the kind of roar it feels prepared to hear 
since his silence can be shaped to speak for whomever wants him to 
speak according to the other’s desire, which Susan has no choice but 
admit: “Friday has no command of words and therefore no defence 
against being re-shaped day by day in conformity with the desire 
of others. I say he is a cannibal and he becomes a cannibal; I say 
he is a laundryman and he becomes a laundryman […] what he is 
to the world is what I make of him” (121–22). But that, of course, 
includes making Friday an empty centre of the story, since the story 
is the story of Friday’s subjection, which turns out to be the story of 
the subjection of the unspeakable in the colonial discourse and this 
unspeakable is not nothing (although it might be enigmatic at first) 
but something which is withheld. So, when Susan admonishes Foe 
to distinguish Friday’s silence (powerless silence) from her own (the 
power to withhold), we must, in contrast to her, perceive the iden-
tity of these silences in her act of positing the innocent powerless 
silence as the ultimate power that refuses to be subjugated by the 
discourse of power, while in fact it is the discourse of power (hers) 
which uses helpless silence to dissimulate its strength (its power to 
withhold meaning).
What, then, if we reverse the situation? What if we treat Friday’s 
enigma as covering up for another suppressed meaning referring to 
Susan? What if it is Friday who seems to be a metaphor for some 
darker meaning in Susan’s story, in spite, or maybe because, of her 
unrelentingly sticking to the empty significance of his silence, as she 
finally (and contortedly) admits: “But who will dive into the wreck 
[the traumatic place par excellence]? On the island I told Cruso it 
should be Friday, with a rope around his middle for safety. But if 
Friday cannot tell us what he sees, is Friday in my story any more 
than a figuring (or prefiguring) of another diver?” (142). Foe makes 
no reply to this, but who will dive into the dark pupil of the story 
if not the reader himself? So we can ask ourselves what might be 
found there. In other words, if Susan so violently wants to keep the 
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island episode apart from the meaning enfolding in the metonymy of 
her life and persists in thinking that the episode has significance of 
its own, what traumatic part of this metonymic chain does the island 
episode metaphorically displace?
One can readily notice that corresponding to the lack in the 
story (the excision of Friday’s tongue) – which Susan presents as 
a hole in the narrative around which its meaning, and therefore 
her meaning too, revolves – there is a surplus that she refuses to 
have anything to do with: when she stays with Friday in Foe’s de-
serted house a child appears who claims to be her daughter, also 
called Susan Barton. She disavows her completely, saying that lit-
tle Susan does not resemble her at all and that she cannot be the 
daughter she was looking for in Brazil. Moreover, she blames Foe 
for the appearance of the child and accuses her of being a figment 
of his imagination, a trick that authorship inexplicably plays on her. 
But a reader of Defoe will notice that what we are encountering here 
is an “intrusion” from another story by this author told in his novel 
Roxana, where the main protagonist’s true name is Susan and who 
also makes her living as a “free woman.” Moreover, this Susan is 
of French Huguenot extraction (like Susan Barton) and among her 
many children there is a daughter also called Susan. The fate of this 
girl, however, is not to elope to Brazil where she conveniently disap-
pears into thin air – in Roxana her departure is staged in a radi-
cally different way: she is murdered by the protagonist’s servant 
Amy when the quest for her mother endangers “Roxana’s” profitable 
and respectable marriage (the child does not know who her mother 
is but after gathering clues she concludes correctly that it must be 
“Roxana”). Little Susan, who in Foe is accompanied by her mother’s 
servant Amy, recounts to Susan Barton the early life of her mother 
(as described in Roxana: married to a brewer who gambles, goes 
bankrupt and enlists as a grenadier in the Netherlands, leaving his 
wife and daughter destitute) but Barton denies ever having had such 
a daughter. What is more, in a dream scene she takes her deep into 
the woods to abandon her there, but before she departs she puts 
forward a theory about her parentage: “You are father-born,” she 
tells her (meaning Foe’s imagination), “You have no mother. The 
pain you feel is the pain of lack, not the pain of loss. What you 
hope to regain in my person you have in truth never had” (91). Yet 
it is the same Susan Barton who, as she progressively grows ac-
customed to her island story, finds authoring more and more easy: 
“From downstairs to upstairs, from house to island, from the girl to 
Friday: it seems necessary only to establish the poles, the here and 
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there, the now and then – after that the words of themselves do the 
journeying. I had not guessed it was so easy to be an author” (93). 
And it is the same Susan Barton who provides storytelling with its 
obverse side: “It is still in my power to guide and amend. Above all, 
to withhold. By such means do I still endeavour to be father to my 
story” (123; emphasis added). Well then, who is the father of which 
story? And is not proper fathering, as Freud taught us, a work of 
excision, of introducing the founding prohibition? And is not the aim 
of the story to dissimulate this prohibition without, however, being 
able to obfuscate it completely? In other words, is not its course that 
of transforming what should not be told into something that it is 
impossible to pronounce, in order to save oneself?
Foe’s “theory of writing” as applied to Susan’s story is as follows: 
“Have you considered […] that in your own wanderings you may, 
without knowing it, have left behind some such token for yourself; 
or, if you choose to believe you are not mistress of your life, that 
a token has been left behind on your behalf, which is a sign of blind-
ness I have spoken of; and that, for lack of better plan, your search 
for a way out of the maze – if you are indeed a-mazed or be-mazed 
– might start from that point and return to it as many times as are 
needed till you discover yourself to be saved” (136). In order to save 
oneself the speechlessness or blindness has to be somehow put into 
words: “In every story there is a silence, some sight concealed, some 
word unspoken, I believe. Till we have spoken the unspoken we have 
not come to the heart of the story” (141). And it is of course Friday 
who, as we have already mentioned, “rows his log of wood” across 
this “dead socket” or “dark pupil” (141) and saves the day. But the 
lack that he represents, and which is presented by Susan as the 
vanishing point of the story that she pursues with the help of Foe, 
after disappearing over the horizon reappears uncannily behind her 
back in the excessive figure of the daughter who pursues her mother 
beyond her own death.
Does this not explain the repeated image that is imposed on Friday, 
the victim of unimaginable mutilation? Every time identification with 
Friday goes “too far” (as in the moment of Susan’s “ecstatic” experi-
ence of the dance), every time we are about to plunge into the dark 
pupil of the story, Friday loses his aura of mute deprivation and be-
comes the obscene jousseur, a cannibal, a devourer of dead flesh. The 
more there is talk about Friday’s deprivation, the more urgently does 
little Susan plague her supposed mother with demands for recogni-
tion; the closer we get to the stories of dead children (“what if they 
took the [dead] child to be mine and laid hands on me and haled me 
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before the magistrates?”), the more does Friday become the image of 
the abject gobbler (“Had I not been there to restrain him, would he in 
his hunger have eaten the [dead] babe?” (106)).10 This logic of obscene 
incorporation is not so misguided after all: in what is set up for us as 
the story of the island, the black hole of Friday’s image incorporates 
into itself the dispersed residues of guilt and death.
What is then to be expected of Friday’s story proper, the story he 
will write after he has been instructed in writing by Susan and Foe? 
It is said that only his own story can close the gap of meaning of the 
island and that this can happen only if he can talk or write. But what 
if he has nothing to say to us? What if within his horizon of mean-
ing what we want to know from him, that is, the story of how he lost 
his tongue, is what shatters all meaning, something that makes his 
whole horizon of meaning crumble? Making him write may be viewed 
as the true completion of the trajectory of Susan’s project – only by 
providing him with the western co-ordinates of discourse might one 
achieve the full neutralisation/obfuscation of the colonial and hegem-
onic discourse’s violation put forth as a genuine point of view and 
expression of black “ethnicity.” Friday’s “confession,” in order to be 
accepted as the work of somebody who learned how to write and 
not just as confused scribbling, would have to pass the test of being 
deemed “comprehensible” by his western teachers (first of all, Susan 
and Foe) and it will be so only on condition that it develops within 
their horizon of meaning, their ways of making sense, which will nec-
essarily involve employment of the figures of higher purpose (provi-
dence, etc.) or, more neutrally, the western type of deterministic cause 
and effect logic (all, in a way, present even in the rules of grammar), 
which might be completely alien to Friday. By using such a sense-
making apparatus Friday will more or less consciously always inscribe 
himself (and therefore his mutilation) within the discourse in which 
meaning for his trauma has always already been provided and there-
fore excused – the sheer violence of imposition of such meaning will 
be relegated to figures symbolising the accidental perversions of the 
necessarily sound sense-making natural principle (like the bad Moor 
who cut out Friday’s tongue vs. the good lenient master Cruso), and 
even these figures will find their meaning/necessity in a divine and/
or rational order of things (like the ennobling role of suffering). More 
than that, Friday’s “true” story will dissimulate not only the violence 
of the colonial expansionist discourse toward the cultural other but 
 10 Susan and Friday find a dead baby on their way to put Friday on a ship to 
Africa.
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also the violence it perpetrates at home: by diverting the eye (the dark 
pupil of each story) from home to heroic or atrocious adventures in 
the faraway (is)lands it dissimulates the everyday atrocities at home 
(the same craving for money and/or recognition that propels colonial-
ism, and thus the mutilation of Friday, is the driving force behind 
the murder of daughters at home when they threaten the pursuit of 
money and/or prestige).
The beginnings of Friday’s writing can be seen as already burgeon-
ing with such discursive traces. When instructed in the new art by 
Susan, he at first scribbles some uncertain or obscure signs that she 
interprets to be imperfect letters and then he draws open eyes “each 
set upon a human foot” (147). Within the context of Robinson Crusoe 
and its obsession with providence (the eye), where the imprint of a hu-
man foot stands for the invisible menacing presence (of cannibals), can 
we not see here the sign of the discourse that is to come? And with 
the next writerly feat of Friday, “rows and rows of the letter o tightly 
packed together” (152), how can we fail to note that (again, in the 
book by Defoe) Friday’s words for prayer are “say o”?
Would it not make sense then to go even further and interpret 
the enigmatic ending of the novel along the same lines? In these 
two consecutive scenes all the figures apart from Friday are dead: 
somebody (“I”) enters Foe’s apartment passing dead little Susan on 
the landing and finding the authors, Susan and Foe, dead in bed. 
It is only Friday who is asleep but alive and when the “I” opens 
Friday’s mouth he hears the sounds of the island issuing from it. On 
the one hand, what we have here is of course the poetic scene of the 
birth of indigenous writing, a scene from which the former “authors” 
of Friday are absent (or present only as corpses, the dead husks of 
meaning), while the narrator is a pure disembodied shifter, “I,” who 
encounters Friday’s obscure bodily materiality as the positive truth 
of the island. Yet this truth, if perused closely, uncannily resembles 
the authorial truth of the supposedly dead (is the “I” their undead 
presence?) who claimed that Friday’s mouth is where the truth is 
to be found. And what we see/hear in the scene is precisely such 
truth coming out of Friday’s mouth as the truth of the island. But 
the island is as alien to Friday as it is to Cruso: if they were really 
marooned there, both of them were washed ashore as strangers to 
the land – Cruso a European, Friday an African. There is no truth of 
the island that Friday can carry in his body because he is not a na-
tive, and if there were, it would be only within the discourse which 
claims that “primitives” are closer to nature in any circumstances. 
We know where this discourse comes from.
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In the second attempt at an ending, the same disembodied “I” en-
ters the same authorial room and slipping into the written narrative 
lying there (“At last I could row no further…” – the beginning of Foe) 
plunges into the dark pupil of the kraken and the wreck: “This is 
a place where bodies are their own signs. It is the home of Friday” 
(157). Therefore what we find in the dark kernel of the island nar-
rative as the hard truth of Friday is the enchanted kingdom of the 
Adamic language buried in the primeval slime and overshadowed 
by civilised corpses floating above (Susan Barton, her captain-lover 
and all). Can we find a more obvious incarnation of the fundamental 
fantasy of the discourse of the European master? The fantasy of the 
parousia of the Other of the Other, of metadiscourse that will stop 
the infinite slippage of the signifier and bring us all back to the state 
of innocence. And this “truth” of Friday finally becomes clinched with 
the last image of the novel, which invaginates the limit of the story 
back into its middle. The last highly poetic passage – “His [Friday’s] 
mouth opens. From inside him comes a slow stream, without breath, 
without interruption. It flows up through his body and out upon me; 
it passes through the cabin, through the wreck; washing the cliffs 
and shores of the island, it runs northward and southward to the 
ends of the earth. Soft and cold, dark and unending, it beats against 
my eyelids, against the skin of my face” (157) – has an obscenely 
grinning mirror image: “Mr Foe, […] when I lived in your house 
I would sometimes lie awake upstairs listening to the pulse of blood 
in my ears and to the silence from Friday below, a silence that rose 
up the stairway like smoke, like a welling of black smoke. Before 
long I could not breathe, I would feel I was stifling in my bed. My 
lungs, my heart, my head were full of black smoke. I had to spring 
up and open the curtains and put my head outside and breathe fresh 
air and see for myself that there were stars still in the sky” (118).
The cool and somehow cleansing dark stream of the immediate 
primeval substance of truth looks very much like a gentrified version 
of the stifling black smoke of the actual presence of the other in the 
house. So perhaps we can finally propose that the two final attempts 
at the closing of the narrative are precisely samples of Friday’s writ-
ing after he thoroughly internalised the discourse of the master who 
mutilated him, the writing in which the master floats dead (he no 
longer exercises naked force) but who in spite, or maybe because, of 
that secretly poisons the expression of truth by the ethnic and, in 
doing it, mutilates him even more.
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Age of Iron (1990)
This book starts on a suspiciously high note with the sinister word: 
cancer. It is not at first spoken openly but euphemistically referred 
to as “the news.” Mrs Curren, a seventy-year-old retired classicist, 
is said by her doctor to be past recovery. So the perspective from 
which the world will be viewed is from the start set out as liminal, 
a perspective which is traditionally conceived as the space of truth 
– when one has stepped out of one’s habits and irrelevant attach-
ments to everyday matters, one can at last see things as they really 
are “from the perspective of infinity.” (“At every moment when I am 
thinking of something else, I am not thinking death, am not think-
ing the truth,” says Curren.1) This perspective seems to be reinforced 
by a fateful accident: on the day “the news” is received a coloured 
homeless derelict – also somebody beyond the pale of everyday mid-
dle class decencies – puts his cardboard shelter at the end of the al-
ley down the side of Curren’s garage. “The first of the carrion-birds,” 
she calls him with bitter irony (4), an irony known to her from the 
works of the classics; and then, unexpectedly, we are transported 
into a very different realm – the realm of melodrama:
How I longed for you to be here, to hold me, to comfort me! I begin 
to understand the true meaning of the embrace. We embrace to be 
embraced. We embrace our children to be folded in the arms of the 
future, to pass ourselves on beyond death, to be transported. […] 
How I longed to be able to go upstairs to you, to sit on your bed, 
run my fingers through your hair, whisper in your ear as I did on 
 1 J. M. Coetzee, Age of Iron (London: Penguin, 1991), 23; further references in 
the body of the text.
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school mornings, “Time to get up!” And then, when you turned over, 
your body blood-warm, your breath milky, to take you in my arms 
in what we called “giving Mommy a big hug,” the secret meaning 
of which, the meaning never spoken, was that Mommy should not 
be sad, for she would not die but live on in you. (5)
Without any warning we plunge headlong into this sentimental petit 
bourgeois arch-discourse of family values and motherly love, which 
is very much at odds with the detachment implied in the position 
of death. Can these two perspectives coexist? Do they annihilate or 
mediate each other?
The melodramatic tone of the narrative is no accident: the book is 
a descendant of a long line of sentimental confessions leading back 
to Rousseau – in this case it is presented in the form of a letter by 
a liberal mother to her daughter who has left South Africa for good 
and vowed never to come back unless “things change.” And things 
are changing quickly in the South Africa of 1986, a time of mounting 
violence, the last years of the omnipotence of the police and special 
forces2 – “From long ago,” says Thabane, one of the black characters 
of the book, about a landscape of gutted and scorched shops, “from 
last year” (92). But why write a confession – which is always an 
apologia, a vindication of one’s life – to a daughter who has left it all 
behind, who has established a new place for herself and lives safely 
with her American husband and children in the U.S.? “To whom this 
writing then? The answer: to you but not to you; to me; to you in 
me” (5). Curren is writing an apology to herself, then. But does this 
make for melodrama?
Curren is dying, and dying of cancer, which is a disease that does 
not attack from the outside – out of the blue some of one’s own cells, 
which have functioned properly so far, which knew their proper roles 
in the larger “mechanism” of the body, go wild and start to multiply 
without control ruining the equilibrium and making the mechanism 
break down. Parallels between Curren’s cancerous body and the body 
of her country abound in the book3 and, if one looks at it from a cer-
 2 In 1990, Nelson Mandela is released from prison; in 1991 apartheid laws are 
repealed.
 3 To quote just two of many examples: “To have fallen pregnant with these 
growths, these cold, obscene swellings; to have carried and carried this brood beyond 
any natural term, unable to bear them, unable to sate their hunger: children inside 
me eating more every day, not growing but bloating, toothed, clawed, forever cold 
and ravenous. […] Death by fire the only decent death left. To walk into the fire, to 
blaze like tow, to feel these secret sharers cringe and cry out too, at the last instant, 
in their harsh unused little voices; to burn and be gone, to be rid of, to leave the 
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tain angle, there is a point in this metaphor: Curren, who is 70 years 
old, comes from the generation which introduced apartheid, starting 
in 1948, and although she inveighs against the authorities as “them” 
(“The disgrace of the life one lives under them: to open a newspaper, 
to switch on the television, like kneeling and being urinated on.” 
(9)), this has been the South Africa of all her grown-up life. Now the 
system is collapsing, violently destroying its own tissue, experiencing 
something akin to what is happening to Curren’s body.
However, this Hobbesian body politic does not admit Curren’s 
melodramatic familial sedation (“Mommy should not be sad, for she 
would not die but live on in you”), but returns the truth of it to her in 
its true, that is, inverted form when, carried away by her rhetorical 
fervour, she announces: “The bullies in the last row of school-desks, 
raw-boned, lumpish boys, grown up now and promoted to rule the 
land. They with their fathers and mothers, their aunts and uncles, 
their brothers and sisters: a locust horde, a plague of black locusts 
infesting the country, munching without cease, devouring lives” (25). 
Under the veneer of good-natured sentimentality there is something 
obscene and ominous in harping on family values; what is more, 
there may be something in it which is inherently linked with the 
violence connected to political subjugation. This is, therefore, the ori-
gin of the apology: a careful disentanglement of the liberal soul from 
the apartheid body politic – a radical dualism is presented here: 
Vercueil, the alcoholic derelict, and his dog are imagined as “fulfill-
ing their charge, waiting for the soul [Curren’s] to emerge. The soul, 
neophyte, wet, blind, ignorant” (170; italics added).
The discourse of melodrama is, however, not the only one that 
comes easily to Curren. Being a classicist, she often cannot help but 
slide into classical parallels,4 the strongest of which concerns her life 
under the apartheid laws:
A crime was committed long ago. How long ago? I do not know. But 
longer ago than 1916 [the year of Curren’s birth], certainly. So long 
world clean. Monstrous growths, misbirths: a sign that one is beyond one’s term. 
This country too: time for fire, time for an end, time for what grows out of ash to 
grow” (59); “I am not indifferent to this… this war. How can I be? No bars are thick 
enough to keep it out. […] It lives inside me and I live inside it” (95).
 4 To quote just two examples: “[Vercueil’s] dog has not warmed to me. Too 
much cat-smell. Cat-woman: Circe. And he, after roaming the sees in trawlers, mak-
ing landfall here” (77); “Blood on the floor, blood on the benches. […] A country 
prodigal of blood. […] Oxen kneeling over, their throats slit, hurling last jets into 
the air like whales. The dry earth soaking up the blood of its creatures” (57–58).
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ago that I was born into it. It is part of my inheritance. It is part 
of me, I am part of it.
Like every crime it had its price. That price, I used to think, 
would have to be paid in shame: in a life of shame and a shameful 
death, unlamented, in an obscure corner. I accepted that. I did not 
try to set myself apart. Though it was not a crime I asked to be 
committed, it was committed in my name. (149)
What we have here is not just the introduction of an aestheticis-
ing classical parallel but an attempt at a full-blown application of 
the tragic as represented by ancient Greek tragedy, Aeschylus in 
particular. A crime was committed and the tragic guilt is visited 
on the following generations which have to pay the price. But there 
is an altogether too familiar perverse twist in the logic of tragedy, 
because although the heroes commit terrible crimes, which are very 
often shameful as well (incest, matricide, etc.), yet – and it is a rule 
in tragedy – their status (and therefore their shame too) remains 
heroic, precisely because what they do is to assume their shame un-
questioning: Oedipus does not consider himself innocent but puts out 
his eyes for what he did without knowing it. Therefore the tragic “ef-
fect” is paradoxical to the extent that although shameful crimes are 
committed, the heroes in a sense escape the shame usually attached 
to such deeds and come out unsullied (though they are punished by 
the gods), radiating their tragic grandeur.
Curren seems to be attempting this kind of gesture in “heroically” 
assuming guilt in order to come out spotless:
It had something to do with honour, with the notion I clung to 
through thick and thin, from my education, from my reading, that 
in his soul the honourable man can suffer no harm. I strove always 
for honour, using shame as my guide. As long as I was ashamed 
I knew I had not wandered into dishonour. That was the use of 
shame: as a touchstone, something that would always be there, 
something you could come back to like a blind person, to touch, 
to tell you where you were. For the rest I kept a decent distance 
from my shame. I did not wallow in it. Shame did never become 
a shameful pleasure (150).5
Yet it suddenly becomes clear to her that her trick has not worked 
as she expected because it is precisely of shame that she is dying: 
 5 This looks forward to Coetzee’s next book, The Master of Petersburg, whose 
main protagonist, Dostoevsky, is precisely a gourmet of shame, and which is, in 
a sense, a treatise on the subject.
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“I have cancer from the accumulation of shame I have endured in 
my life. That is how cancer comes about: from self-loathing the body 
turns malignant and begins to eat away at itself” (132). But this 
realisation comes quite late in the book (on page 150 in an edition 
numbering 181 pages) and from that moment the melodramatic fam-
ily values discourse completely ceases to be invoked. What happens 
to it is something unexpected – it turns into a discourse far removed 
from the sentimental platitudes we have read so far:
But since this writing has time and again taken me from where 
I have no idea to where I begin to have an idea, let me say, in 
all tentativeness, that perhaps it dispirits me that your [Curren’s 
daughter’s] children will never drown. All those lakes, all that wa-
ter: a land of lakes and rivers: yet if by some mischance they ever 
tip out of their canoe, they will bob safely in the water, supported 
by their bright orange wings [lifejackets], till a motor-boat comes to 
pick them up and bear them off and all is well again. […] What can 
these two poor underprivileged boys paddling about in they recrea-
tion area hope for? They will die at seventy-five or eighty-five as 
stupid as when they were born. (178–79; italics added)
What happened to the sweet loving mother and grandmother senti-
mentalising family values and childhood’s time of wonder, that she 
should blurt out on the final pages of the book such scathing remarks 
about the stupidity of a safe American life led in peace among one’s 
happy relatives? And does this have anything to do with shame?
To answer this, we have to go back to the above-mentioned mo-
ment of clarity, to follow further its comments on the tragic in which 
goodness and heroism are opposed: “I have been a good person […] 
What I had not calculated on was that more might be called for 
than to be good. For there are plenty of good people in this coun-
try. We are two a penny, we good and nearly-good. What the times 
call for is quite different from goodness. The times call for heroism” 
(150–51). It is a devastating pronouncement for Curren because up 
to then all her comments on the political situation in South Africa, 
and especially the anti-apartheid struggle, had gone in precisely the 
opposite direction.
Curren presents herself as a South African liberal who vehement-
ly despises the apartheid authorities and we do not have cause to 
disbelieve her. However, there is the question of her attitude towards 
the “other side.” No doubt she supports the cause of bringing down 
apartheid (“Your days are numbered,” she whispers to herself with 
satisfaction when she sees its representatives on television (9)), but 
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when it comes to the struggle against the system she always resorts 
to her sentimental discourse in which family and especially proper 
childhood are the measure of everything.
There is an exchange between Curren and her black servant, 
Florence, in which two conflicting attitudes are brought into focus. 
After Bheki, Florence’s fifteen-year-old son, and his friend John have 
an argument and a fight with Vercueil, and chase him temporarily 
from Curren’s place, she inveighs against what she considers to be 
pathological violence which overthrows respect for elders and along 
with that destroys family ties:
The more you give in, Florence, the more outrageously the children 
will behave. You told me you admire your son’s generation because 
they are afraid of nothing. Be careful: they may start being care-
less of their own lives and end by being careless of everyone else’s. 
What you admire in them is not necessarily what is best.
I keep thinking of what you said the other day: that there are 
no more mothers and fathers. I can’t believe you mean it. […] What 
child in his heart truly wants to be told that? Surely he will turn 
away in confusion, thinking to himself, “I have no mother now, 
I have no father: then let my mother be death, let my father be 
death.” You wash your hands of them and they turn into the chil-
dren of death. (45)
To which a swift answer comes from Florence: “That is not true. 
I do not turn my back on my children. […] These are good children, 
they are like iron. We are proud of them” (46). This puts Curren’s 
family values into perspective: in a black family they seem to mean 
something quite different.
So what should the children do, according to Curren, instead of 
boycotting schools and running from the police?6 They should not 
behave like adults and despise childhood because it is “the time of 
wonder, the growing-time of the soul” (6). However, in these times 
“not hospitable to the soul” children scorn childhood and so “their 
souls, their organs of wonder” become “stunted, petrified” (6). This 
is the way John, the teenager who treats Curren with suspicion as 
the enemy throughout the book, is presented by her – as not fully 
human: “This boy is not like Bheki. He has no charm. There is some-
thing stupid about him, something deliberately stupid, obstructive, 
 6 Bheki says: “[The police] are not after me. They are after everybody. I have 
done nothing. But anybody they see they think should be in school, they try to get 
them. We do nothing, we just say we are not going to school. Now they are waging 
this terror against us” (61).
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intractable. He is one of those boys whose voices deepen too early, 
who by the age of twelve have left childhood behind and turned bru-
tal, knowing. A simplified person, simplified in every way: swifter, 
nimbler, more tireless than real people, without doubts or scruples, 
without humour, ruthless, innocent” (71–72).
If John is a simplified (and therefore deficient) version of a real 
person, the question should be asked: Who are the real people? The 
real people are obviously those whose souls are not stunted (“I am 
trying to keep a soul alive in times not hospitable to the soul,” writes 
Curren (119)) because they did not spurn their childhood: “When 
I think back to my own childhood I remember only long sun-struck 
afternoons, the smell of dust under avenues of eucalyptus, the quiet 
rustle of water in roadside furrows, the lulling of doves” (85), “when, 
passing down the street on a hot Sunday afternoon, you might hear, 
faint but dogged from a front parlour, the maiden of the household 
groping among the [piano] keys for that yearned-for, elusive reso-
nance. Days of charm and sorrow and mystery too! Days of inno-
cence!” (21) Days of enjoying Bach and Brahms, “the real music, 
the music that does not die, confident, serene” (21), of “searching 
with my fingers for the one chord I would recognize, when I came 
upon it, as my chord, as what in the old days we used to call the 
lost chord, the heart’s chord” (21). This is the sentimental image 
to which Curren’s idea of humanity, of a rounded, “real” existence 
is inextricably connected, and for that reason the display of “real” 
sensibility has to sound like this: “Let me be granted just one more 
summer-afternoon walk down the Avenue amid the nut-brown bod-
ies of children on their way home from school, laughing, giggling, 
smelling of clean young sweat, the girls every year more beautiful, 
plus belles. And if that is not to be, let there still be, to the last, 
gratitude, unbounded, heartfelt gratitude, for having been granted 
a spell in this world of wonders” (51).
For Curren, humanity as such is encapsulated in sensual image-
ry and because of that she projects it indiscriminately on anybody 
to whom for some reason she warms up: “Bar by bar the Goldberg 
Variations erected themselves in the air. I crossed to the window. 
It was nearly dark. Against the garage wall the man [Vercueil] was 
squatting, smoking, the point of the cigarette glowing. […] Together 
we listened. At this moment, I thought, I know how he feels as sure-
ly as if he and I were making love” (26–27). This way, Vercueil, the 
alcoholic man of leisure (we will return to this), is freely admitted 
to the class of real people, while John, the troublemaker with his 
pig iron sensibility (this is the age of iron), blinded by his hatred of 
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the whites, is allowed only an ideological rant (Curren: “Stay away 
till things have gone back to normal,” John: “Things will never be 
normal,” Curren: “Please! I know the argument, I haven’t the time 
or interest to go through it again” (123)). The reason is plain: “My 
heart does not accept him as mine: it is as simple as that” (124).
But what does Curren know about the time of wonder, the child-
hood that John has given up so thoughtlessly? The imaginary pic-
ture of it is this: “Poor John, who in the old days would have been 
destined to be a garden boy and eat bread and jam for lunch at the 
back door and drink out of a tin, battling now for all the insulted 
and injured, the trampled, the ridiculed, for all the garden boys of 
South Africa!” (138) The aggression in her irony is unmistakable: 
he should have known his place – his life as a garden boy might 
have been happy (he and his children and his children’s children, 
etc. destined to be servants forever), but he threw it away and now 
he is dead (John is killed by the police in Curren’s house). Bach and 
Brahms for the real people, bread and jam for the stunted.
Yet the real confrontation with the image of what the black South 
African children have thrown away, their world of wonders, comes 
on the Flats, a black township called Guguletu, where Curren goes 
with Florence to look for Bheki:
We were at the rear of a crowd hundreds strong looking down upon 
a scene of devastation: shanties burnt and smouldering, shanties 
still burning, pouring forth black smoke. Jumbles of furniture, bed-
ding, household objects stood in the pouring rain. Gangs of men 
were at work trying to rescue the contents of the burning shacks, 
going from one to another, putting out the fires; or so I thought 
till with a shock it came to me that these were not rescuers but 
incendiaries, that the battle I saw them waging was not with the 
flames but with rain. (87–88)
And when the crowd takes flight as the incendiaries advance on it, 
all the refinement of the real person is gone – bumped into by “an 
enormously fat teenager” Curren’s behaviour becomes inexplicably 
“stunted”: “Damn you!” (89) she gasps in falling and, when she is 
able to get up, she wants to go home (to this fountain of family 
values). To which Thabane, one of the blacks who had brought her 
there, retorts: “But what of the people who live here? When they 
want to go home, this is where they must go. What do you think of 
that?” The same can just as well be said about Curren’s favourite im-
age of childhood, “the time of wonder, the growing-time of the soul”: 
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when these children want to enjoy their childhood, this is where they 
must go to grow their souls.7
Curren’s response to Thabane’s words clearly brings into focus 
what we are looking for here. At first she speaks of leisure, detach-
ment, the touchstone of real people: “There are many things I am 
sure I could say […] But then they must truly come from me. When 
one speaks under duress […] one rarely speaks the truth.” And then 
about the truth of an individual, personal expression of the heart’s 
chord searched for on a lazy Sunday afternoon: “These are terri-
ble sights. They are to be condemned. But I cannot denounce them 
in other people’s words. I must find my own words, from myself. 
Otherwise it is not the truth” (91).
These are rather strange statements from a person who is dying 
and simultaneously writing her confession, which is generally con-
ceived as a statement of the truth of one’s life. As we have already 
noted, what is supposed to produce the truth of her confession is not 
detachment in the sentimental sense of a Sunday afternoon under 
the eucalyptus trees when things can be measured with a neutral, 
or even better, a passionate eye, but a trauma, the fact that she 
knows she is dying – the truth therefore is supposed to be provided 
precisely when one is speaking under sentence of death.
And although the setting of smoke and fire is more appropriate 
for a Christian image of hell (which is obviously how it figures in the 
novel too), we can observe that the whole scene looks as if it were 
taken out of an Aeschylean tragedy: “It was from the people gath-
ered on the rim of this amphitheatre in the dunes that the sighing 
 7 In case the scene in Guguletu is considered too extreme to serve as a model 
image of black life in South Africa, here is a more everyday image to grow one’s soul 
on: “He, William, Florence’s husband, had a job and the job could not be interrupted. 
His job was to pounce on a chicken, swing it upside down, grip the struggling body 
between his knees, twist a wire band around its legs, and pass it on to a second 
younger man, who would hang it, squawking and flapping, on a hook on a clattering 
overhead conveyor that took it deeper into the shed where a third man in oilskins 
splashed with blood gripped its head, drew its neck taut, and cut it through with 
a knife so small it seemed part of his hand, tossing the head in the same movement 
into a bin full of other dead heads. […] For six days of the week this was what he 
did. […] A work he had been doing for fifteen years. So that it was not inconceivable 
that some of the bodies I had stuffed with breadcrumbs and egg-yolk and sage and 
rubbed with oil and garlic had been held, at the last, between the legs of this man, 
the father of Florence’s children. Who got up at five in the morning, while I was 
still asleep, to hose out the pans under the cages, fill the feed-troughs, sweep the 
sheds, and then, after breakfast, begin the slaughtering, the plucking and cleaning, 
the freezing of thousands of carcasses, the packing of thousands of heads and feet, 
miles of intestines, mountains of feathers” (38–39).
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came. Like mourners at a funeral they stood in the downpour, men, 
women and children, sodden, hardly bothering to protect themselves, 
watching the destruction” (88; italics added). The crowd of Guguletu 
assumes the role of the ancient Greek chorus here: what takes place 
in a tragedy deeply concerns the chorus because it represents the 
local community as such, the people in their unheroic, everyday as-
pect – it is for this reason that the chorus usually consists of old 
men or women who are moved by fear because they are unable to 
act against what threatens to destroy them.8
The crowd which at first sighs painfully upon seeing the destruc-
tion of their living space and then flees when threatened by the thugs 
stops in its flight to gather around the two actors engaged in the agon 
(Curren and Thabane), and when their exchange is ended the chorus 
– or rather a voice from the crowd, the coryphaeus – pronounces, in 
the traditional choric role, the verdict of the community: “This woman 
talks shit” (91). Curren refuses to leave it at that and, carried away 
by her melodramatic rhetoric, finally does speak the truth, her truth, 
the truth of her position, although as usual she does not realise it: “To 
speak of this […] you would need the tongue of a god” (91). Precisely: 
the word of a god is different from the human word, because it is an act.
For Curren, however, any act that is worth the name, that is, 
one that breaks down the status quo, challenges her fantasy of how 
real people should behave, is indecent. This can be clearly seen in 
the very image of the act that Curren plans to perpetrate herself, 
that is, her imagined self-incineration in front of the South African 
Parliament (“the House of Lies,” she calls it) as a protest against 
apartheid. The idea is toyed with by her for a long time but when 
she is finally challenged by Vercueil to “do it” (“Then from his jacket 
pocket he drew a box of matches and held it out to me. ‘Do it now,’ 
he said”), she reacts in the following way: “It was like being trapped 
in a car with a man trying to seduce you and getting cross when 
you did not give in. It was like being transported back to the worst 
days of girlhood” (112). Suddenly we are confronted with the stifling 
shame again, but it is no longer the touchstone of honourable behav-
iour; it is not a shame which tells Curren what to do, but a shame 
caused by doing nothing. So, is not this shame the shame she is dy-
ing of, rather than the accumulation of shame she feels because of 
what the authorities are doing? Because her shame here is not only 
the accidental shame of being caught with her rhetorical pants down 
 8 Jacqueline de Romilly, La tragédie grecque (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1992), 27–28.
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and unable to act on her words, but the shame felt for a life of doing 
nothing, which has been raised to the status of a philosophy of life.
Until the final scene of the “denial” of her American grandchil-
dren, Curren’s relationship to death is purely narcissistic. The im-
pulse for her imaginary attempt at self-incineration goes back to her 
visit in Guguletu – after Bheki is found dead, Curren carries on in 
her familiar vein: “I no longer cared if I lived. What might hap-
pen to me no longer mattered. I thought: My life may as well be 
waste. We shoot these people as if they are waste, but in the end 
it is we whose lives are not worth living” (96). The effect is that, 
in order to find some sense for her existence, she imagines herself 
burning and thinking in the act: “How easy to give meaning to one’s 
life” (129).9 And, as is usual with her, the melodramatic discourse 
inevitably takes us right into the middle of the attempted tragic 
discourse – if we remember that she keeps repeating that her life is 
a waste because it is a life of shame, there is a clear tragic paral-
lel here with Ajax, who committed suicide because he had disgraced 
himself by slaughtering a flock of sheep thinking they were Greek 
warriors, his madness being visited on him by Athena. His suicide 
is a protest against the shame brought upon him by forces beyond 
his control. Such classical parallels are priceless for one’s narcissism 
– what could be better than to recognise your identity in the image 
of a heroic figure, the paragon of the larger-than-life? Yet a surprise 
waits for Curren here – when she is urged by Vercueil to “do it,” 
she not only feels shame at being unequal to the task, which gives 
the lie to her imaginary identification, but she also experiences what 
it would feel like to act – in order to act you have to cease being 
a “real,” “rounded,” person: “But how hard it is to kill oneself! One 
clings so tight to life! It seems to me that something other than 
the will must come into play at the last instant, something foreign, 
something thoughtless, to sweep you over the brink. You have to 
become someone other than yourself ” (109; italics added).
The contemplated suicide fails then, but there is a parallel scene 
in the novel which may tell us more about the real causes of this 
failure – perhaps it is not lack of will that stops Curren from killing 
herself but something quite different. When, after she fails to at-
tempt suicide, she speaks for the second time of her cancer as a re-
sult of “the accumulation of shame I have endured in my life,” the 
 9 In answer to Vercueil’s question “What for?” she says, “it has to do with my 
life. To do with a life that isn’t worth much any more. I am trying to work out what 
I can get for it” (104).
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cancer born “from self-loathing” (132), and about her life as waste. 
Then she has this advice for John: “You are too young for this kind 
of thing. […] You are throwing away your lives before you know what 
life can be. What are you – fifteen years old? Fifteen is too young to 
die. Eighteen is too young. Twenty-one is too young” (131). One can 
just as well add that for Curren seventy is too young, because in fact 
what we witness here is her own litany, the litany of a person who, 
even knowing that she is dying, refuses to accept that knowledge 
because she has always imagined herself as the highest good, and 
the image of the proper childhood is only a synecdoche for it – as we 
have already noted, all the harping on the treasures of childhood is 
related to her childhood, not John’s or Bheki’s, so this long mourning 
over how the youth throw away their lives thoughtlessly is simply 
a veiled way of mourning herself and an outcry against the stupidity 
of approaching death, her own death. Thus the melodramatic under-
side shows through Curren’s tragic discourse – the image of what 
for the ancients would be an honourable suicide to protest against 
dishonour and fate becomes just a stand-in for its very opposite: the 
paralysis of the will in the face of death.
The indecency of any political act finally reappears in Curren’s 
last conversation with Thabane on the telephone when the subject 
of childhood and struggle comes back. Thabane speaks of action and 
the youth the way Florence had spoken earlier, but his questioning 
of Curren’s position is put into sharper focus here:
When you are body and soul in the struggle as these young people 
are, when you are prepared to lay down your lives for each other 
without question, then a bond grows up that is stronger than any 
bond you will know again. That is comradeship. I see it every day 
with my own eyes. My generation has nothing that can compare. 
That is why we must stand back for them, for the youth. We stand 
back but we stand behind them. (136–37)
The family bond (proper childhood, etc.) that is the lifeblood of 
Curren’s sentimental discourse is relegated here to secondary status 
together with the importance of one’s individual (beautiful) heart 
and soul. This is anathema to Curren and she rolls out her biggest 
cannons against it:
The Germans had comradeship, and the Japanese, and the 
Spartans.10 Shaka’s impis too, I am sure. Comradeship is nothing 
 10 The Spartans probably function here as the antithesis of the humane 
Athenians, whom Curren may perceive as the originators of the care for the beauti-
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but a mystique of death, of killing and dying, masquerading as 
what you call a bond (a bond of what? Love? I doubt it.). I have no 
sympathy with this comradeship. You are wrong, you and Florence 
and everyone else, to be taken in by it and, worse, to encourage it 
in children. It is just another of those icy, exclusive death-driven 
male constructions. (137)
And as usual in her arguments the fullness of a “good” life in the 
world of wonders is juxtaposed against the false abstraction of free-
dom11:
I still detest these calls for sacrifice that end with young men bleed-
ing to death in the mud. War is never what it pretends to be. 
Scratch the surface and you find, invariably, old men sending young 
men to their death in the name of some abstraction or other. (149)
One may wonder whether the scene she witnessed in Guguletu 
appeared so abstract to her (“Can this really be happening to me? 
I thought. What am I doing here? I had a vision of the little green 
car waiting quietly at the roadside. There was nothing I longed for 
more than to get into my car, slam the door behind me, close out 
this looming world of rage and violence” (88–89)). But perhaps it is 
her life behind closed doors between Bach and Brahms which is more 
abstracted than anything the blacks engaged in the struggle may 
experience. She has a presentiment of this when she feels herself to 
be a doll:
I have intimations older than any memory, unshakeable, that once 
upon a time I was alive. Was alive and then was stolen from life. 
From a cradle a theft took place: a child was taken and a doll left 
in its place to be nursed and reared, and that doll is what I call I. 
[…] [Dolls] exist forever in that moment of petrified surprise prior 
to all recollection when a life was taken away, a life not theirs 
but in whose place they are left behind as a token. Their know-
ing a knowledge without substance, without worldly weight, like 
a doll’s head itself, empty, airy. As they themselves are not babies 
but the ideas of babies, more round, more pink, more blank and 
ful soul, but as every reader of Thucydides knows, under the thin veneer of cultural 
achievement, they were just as ruthless as the proverbially cruel Spartans.
 11 Curren’s point here is especially strange because she does not seem to allow 
for the real existence of any bond that is not bond of love. Does one have to love 
one’s compatriots to feel a national bond? Obviously not. However, there is a certain 
consistency in her claim because within the discourse of melodrama the only bond 
is the bond of love.
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blue-eyed than a baby could ever be, living not life but an idea of 
life, immortal, undying like ideas. (100–101)
It is her life, which has been “pure spirit,” a total abstraction that had 
all the messy details of existence swept, or rather forced, out of the 
frame. Curren likes to invoke love as the opposite of death (“a mys-
tique of death […] masquerading as what you call a bond (a bond of 
what? Love? I doubt it”)) but what is love to her other than an ab-
stract going through the motions of a certain melodramatic discourse 
which she had learned as appropriate for her class of masters?
We can judge the truth of this discourse especially in the mo-
ments when the doll is confronted with the “mess” absent from her 
life so far, that is, when she is confronted with the real of violence. 
When Curren comes across Bheki’s dead body, this is her highly 
rhetorical reaction: “If someone had dug a grave for me there and 
then in the sand, and pointed, I would without a word have climbed 
in and lain down and folded my hands on my breast. And when 
the sand fell in my mouth and in the corners of my eyes I would 
not have lifted a finger to brush it away” (96). This is a veritable 
discursive flight, not without its charms, and obviously schooled in 
the tragic authors, especially the Romans with their love of rampant 
rhetoric and predilection for the tastelessly macabre (“I could have 
taught you most things Roman, I am not sure about the Greek,” 
says Curren to Vercueil at one point (176)). Yet it is repulsive in 
its bombastic nerve and we do not have to be aware of her refusal 
to incinerate herself later in the novel to know that it is “just talk.”
The melodramatic discourse is a lie in a deeper sense than just 
that it is rhetorical hyperbole. Whether it appears in the seemingly 
benign guise of images of beauty (searching for one’s heart’s chord, 
childhood as paradise) or that of the mock-tragic, it serves the vio-
lent purpose of making something disappear.
If we take the images of beauty, it is the blacks who simply van-
ish from them – their unspiritual existence has to be removed from 
the picture to make it appear beautiful:
We were photographed, that day, in a garden. […] I recognize the 
place. It is Uniondale, the house in Church Street bought by my 
grandfather when ostrich-feathers were booming. Year after year 
fruit and flowers and vegetables burgeoned in that garden, pouring 
forth their seed, dying, resurrecting themselves, blessing us with 
their profuse presence. But by whose love tended? Who clipped the 
hollyhocks? Who laid the melon-seeds in their warm, moist bed? 
Was it my grandfather who got up at four in the icy morning to 
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open the sluice and lead water into the garden? If not he, then 
whose was the garden rightfully? Who are the ghosts and who the 
presences? Who, outside the picture, leaning on their rakes, leaning 
on their spades, waiting to get back to work, lean also against the 
edge of the rectangle, bending it, bursting in it? (102)
This fragment is a more self-conscious version of all the images of 
irretrievably past beauty, some of which we have already quoted. All 
of them have a truly Arnoldian ring. There is an amazing passage 
in Culture and Anarchy in which Arnold admits his shocked surprise 
at the coming into view of the material underside of his existence: 
“that vast proportion […] of the working class which, raw and half-
developed, has long lain half-hidden amidst its poverty and squalor, 
and is now issuing from its hiding-place to assert an Englishman’s 
heaven-born privilege of doing as he likes, and is beginning to per-
plex us by marching where it likes, meeting where it likes, bawling 
what it likes, breaking what it likes.”12 Culture as a properly refined 
image of life, in other words “sweetness and light” (this Arnoldian 
phrase seems to have a clearly “Currenian” ring), does not toler-
ate the ugly materiality necessary for its subsistence – for Arnold, 
the Populace, the squalor and poverty, have to be returned to their 
proper place, that is, put outside the picture. This, however, is not 
done with the idea of finding some way of re-introducing the monster 
to be viewed in a more acceptable form. Arnold’s prescription has to 
be read to be believed:
We shall say boldly that we do not at all despair of finding some 
lasting truth to minister to the diseased spirit of our time; but that 
we have discovered the best way of finding this to be not so much 
by lending a hand to our friends and countrymen in their actual 
operations for the removal of certain definite evils, but rather in 
getting our friends and countrymen to seek culture, to let their 
consciousness play freely round their present operations and the 
stock notions on which they are founded, show what these are like, 
and how related to the intelligible law of things, and auxiliary to 
true human perfection.13
Not surprisingly, what we have here is another way of prescribing 
“proper” childhood, a time of wonder – conditions which can be ob-
served only by those leading a life of leisure within the picture – for 
 12 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. J. Dover Wilson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960), 88; italics added.
 13 Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, 164.
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those who are forcefully removed from it in order that it form the 
perfect image of sweetness and light.
So the images of a forfeited beautiful life that Curren would like 
to go back to (“Let me be granted just one more summer-afternoon 
walk down the Avenue amid the nut-brown bodies of children on 
their way home from school,” etc.), the images of life as aesthetic 
pleasure, are not as benign as they look, because their function is 
to erase black life from view. In other words, they are superimposed 
on the real of sheer violence Curren encounters in Guguletu in or-
der to make it disappear from one’s field of vision (“I have not see 
black people in their death before […]. They are dying all the time, 
I know, but always somewhere else. The people I have seen die have 
been white and have died in bed, growing rather dry and light there, 
rather papery, rather airy” (114)). But the political reality erased 
from the life of the Beautiful Soul is one in which a part of the 
population does the dirty work (in both senses of, on the one hand, 
chicken slaughter, etc. and, on the other, the repressive apparatus 
in all its guises) in order that the rest may live their liberal life like 
Curren as good people upholding their family values (“For there are 
plenty of good people in this country. We are two a penny, we good 
and nearly-good”) who certainly condemn the atrocities perpetrated 
in their name.
Yet another side of the same discourse of melodramatic values is 
what we have already called the mock-tragic. When violence knocks 
at the liberal door, when it bursts into the picture, as sooner or later 
it must, there are always many related strategies for neutralising 
the trauma: one can resort to rhetorical tragic grandeur (“If someone 
had dug a grave for me there and then in the sand, and pointed,” 
etc.), or even better to a presentation of life as ruled by a number of 
tragic universals which are supposed to describe the human condi-
tion as fate (“The lively ones are picked off, the stolid ones survive,” 
Curren thinks of Bheki and John (123–24)14), and finally to accusa-
tions of propagating the mystique of death, in other words, of per-
petrating evil. What, however, if within the horizon of Curren’s life 
any act as such is evil?
Although Curren presents herself as speaking from the life-af-
firming position that is hostile to any ideology and thus denounces 
“death-driven male constructions” which are to her of purely ideologi-
 14 Don’t these mock-universal truths deserve the name of “death-driven [female?] 
constructions”?
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cal nature, her place of enunciation is created by a gesture which is 
ideology at its purest:
The fundamental ideological gesture consists in providing an im-
age for this structural “evil.” The gap opened by an act (i.e. the 
unfamiliar, “out-of-place” effect of an act) is immediately linked in 
this ideological gesture to an image. As a rule this is an image 
of suffering, which is then displayed to the public alongside this 
question: Is this what you want? And this question already implies 
the answer: It would be impossible, inhuman, for you to want this! 
Here we have to insist on theoretical rigour, and separate this (usu-
ally fascinating) image exhibited by ideology from the real source of 
uneasiness – from the “evil” which is not an “undesired,” “second-
ary” effect of the good but belongs, on the contrary, to its essence. 
We could even say that the ethical ideology struggles against “evil” 
because this ideology is hostile to the “good,” to the logic of the act 
as such.15
Curren’s world is a world of inaction and pseudo-acts and she free-
ly admits to the reason for it: “This car is old, it belongs to a world 
that barely exists any more, but it works. What is left of that world, 
what still works, I am trying to hold on to. Whether I love it or hate 
it does not matter” (65). Yet, although she forgets to add that this 
world has all along been also the world of her aesthetic life which 
is materially founded on the politics of apartheid, she knows that 
the accusation is inevitable and thus she tries another version of 
her former defence. While talking to John, she presents a kind of 
apologia to him, too:
You say, […] I don’t want to listen to the story of how you feel, it is 
just another story, why don’t you do something?” […] There is noth-
ing I can reply but “Yes” when you put that question to me. But let 
me tell you what it is like to utter that “Yes.” It is like being on 
trial for your life and being allowed only two words, Yes and No. 
Whenever you take a breath to speak out, you are warned by the 
judges: “Yes or No: no speeches.” “Yes,” you say. Yet all the time 
you feel other words stirring inside you like life in the womb. […] 
You do not believe in words. You think only blows are real, blows 
and bullets. But listen to me: can’t you hear that the words I speak 
are real? Listen! They may only be air but they come from my 
heart, from my womb. They are not Yes and they are not No. What 
is living inside me is something else, another word. And I am fight-
ing for it, in my manner, fighting for it not to be stifled. (132–33)
 15 Alenka Zupančič, Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan (London: Verso, 2000), 95.
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The whole speech (of which only a part is quoted here) takes us back 
to Guguletu where Curren was also “put on trial” and refused to 
condemn violence in somebody else’s words, as only her own words 
would name the truth. Now in the peace and quiet of her house she 
is striving for this word and although she does not name it here we 
have already come across it earlier in the novel: “ ‘Are you going to 
do it [incinerate herself]?’ asked Vercueil, his man-eyes gleaming. 
‘Yes-no,’ I should have answered. […] Yes-no: every woman knows 
what it means as it defeats every man” (106). One is tempted here to 
give oneself to Curren’s habit of finding a parallel from the classics: 
wouldn’t it be the image of Circe herself defeating men by providing 
them with the fulfilment of their wishes and this way turning them 
into pigs? Wouldn’t accepting the lure of a never-never land of her 
vision of Edenic childhood and charmed evenings under the euca-
lyptus trees mean being turned into a pig precisely by becoming the 
traitor of the bond Thabane spoke of on the phone and because of 
that also the traitor of black family values, of the parents who are 
proud of their children who are like iron?16 And, finally, wouldn’t it 
all mean turning oneself into the “pig” himself, that is, the police-
man protecting the image of childhood Curren keeps projecting, the 
childhood that is accessible to the masters only?
Such is the obscene underside of the discourse of melodrama we 
witness throughout the novel which has already been judged by the 
chorus of Guguletu (“This woman talks shit”), a discourse which prop-
agates the heart (not stunted, then white), the womb (the white womb 
– the black mother, Florence, denies that discourse), and the precious-
ness of every individual (but mostly of the “real people,” therefore not 
of the “iron” black youth involved in the struggle against apartheid). 
Melodrama is the lifeblood of Curren’s discourse and it is only within 
it that she can utter heart and womb. Because of this, we can see how 
what was supposed to be her ownmost word, her truth, turns into 
the mechanical platitudinous discourse of the Beautiful Soul – what 
Curren comes up with as her own words are words determined in ad-
vance and spoken not by her but by the melodramatic master signifier 
(family values, etc.) that she identifies with.
But perhaps this paradox of the inside (one’s ownmost core of 
subjectivity) which turns out to coincide with the outside (the pure 
mechanicity of a melodramatic discourse) is not a paradox at all. 
 16 “ ‘They are making you into a dog!’ said the boy [John to the drunk Vercueil]. 
‘Do you want to be a dog?’ ” (42) – dog being here the equivalent of pig. We will 
return to this matter.
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Taking into consideration its mechanicity, it is not surprising that 
Curren’s argument has already been rehearsed and in front of the 
same audience. When Curren visits John in the hospital she sup-
ports her plea (or is it injunction?) “Be slow to judge” with the same 
claim that “given time to speak, we would all claim to be exceptions. 
For each of us there is a case to be made” (73). But this time she 
accompanies this platitude with a disturbing image that forms in 
her mind:
I, a white. When I think of the whites, what do I see? I see a herd 
of sheep (not a flock: a herd) milling around on a dusty plain under 
the baking sun. I hear a drumming of hooves, a confusion of sound 
which resolves itself, when the ear grows attuned, into the same 
bleating call in a thousand different inflections: “I! I! I!” And, cruis-
ing among them, bumping them aside with their bristling flanks, 
lumbering, saw-toothed, red-eyed, the savage, unreconstructed old 
boars grunting “Death!” “Death!” (72–73)
A nice, although slightly too melodramatic, image of white South 
Africa, interesting not because of its poetic power but because of 
making “death” the echo of “I” – I, the exception: “swimming lessons, 
riding lessons, ballet lessons; cricket on the lawn; lives passed within 
walled gardens guarded by bulldogs; children of paradise, blond, 
innocent, shining with angelic light, soft as putti. Their residence 
the limbo of the unborn, their innocence the innocence of bee-grubs, 
plump and white, drenched in honey, absorbing sweetness through 
their soft skins. Slumbrous their souls, bliss-filled, abstracted” (6–7).
Once again the world of the Beautiful Soul, the world where one 
looks for one’s heart’s chord, turns out to be just the reverse image 
of the world of death in both of its incarnations. Firstly, the limbo 
of bliss in which one’s soul disappeared and what is left is the doll 
cultivating not the soul but the idea of the soul whose coordinates 
were laid down for it a long time before it was born and whose only 
substance or activity is going through the motions of the assigned 
rituals (riding lessons, swimming lessons, etc., Bach and Brahms in-
cluded) – a clockwork rather than an exception. Secondly, the sheer 
violence of the boars which are just the ugly but inevitable condition 
of the possibility of such bliss (“for nothing comes without its price” 
(129)).
Where, therefore, is the real soul to be located? In other words, 
where is this piece of infinity that makes us human, something re-
moved from the obscene realm of images of the good? Curren is very 
close to naming it unknowingly when she speaks deprecatingly of 
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freedom (for her, probably another representative of death-driven 
male constructions): “I have no idea what freedom is, Mr Vercueil. 
I am sure Bheki and his friend had no idea either. Perhaps free-
dom is always and only what is unimaginable” (150). Although she 
probably means to make of freedom something akin to the ineffable 
– some truth that is out there but which human language is unable 
to utter and therefore it must melancholically strive for without be-
ing able to attain it – she is closer to the truth that she imagines, 
because freedom is unimaginable in the same way that it is infinite.
“To speak of this […] you would need the tongue of a god,” Curren 
said in Guguletu, the words of a god being those that create or 
change something, that is, words that are tantamount to an act. 
However, in order to act in the proper sense of the word (not just 
swimming, riding, or playing cricket) one would have to relinquish 
one’s image of oneself as a precious treasure of “I, the exception.” In 
other words, the subject would have to change in the radical sense of 
relinquishing its fundamental fantasy, its heart’s chord. To find the 
words of a god the subject has to do what within the framework of 
his identification so far is considered impossible, often equated with 
what is inhuman. Curren has already had an intimation of what it 
means to act when she reflected on the difficulty of killing oneself: 
“It seems to me that something other than the will must come into 
play at the last instant, something foreign, something thoughtless, to 
sweep you over the brink. You have to become someone other than 
yourself” (109). In order to accomplish an act one has to place oneself 
in the position of the infinite, the place in which one is no longer 
determined by the discourse which equates “what is” (the imaginary 
state of things) with the real. In other words, one has to take the po-
sition of “God,” that is, one who has a choice, one who is not totally 
determined by his social conditions and upbringing. Paradoxically, 
however, becoming “God” means also becoming “a thing,” “something 
thoughtless” because in order for freedom to assert itself an act has 
to be committed which will disintegrate the old ego and the image 
of the world it has, or rather the image of the world it incarnates 
– thus the new subject is “ ‘realised,’ ‘objectified’ in this act.”17 In 
this sense, there is no subject in the act: the “old” subjectivity is 
destroyed precisely by the act itself, while the “new” subjectivity is 
the outcome of the act so it is not yet “present” in it.
We can also explain what is at stake here by means of a differ-
ence which Kierkegaard, in a different context, tried to describe, 
 17 Zupančič, Ethics of the Real, 104.
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distinguishing between reminiscence and repetition. Reminiscence is 
the Socratic process of reading in which you try to identify the truth 
of who you already and “really” are – when you are looking for your 
heart’s chord, or trying to find your own words to name your own 
truth. In contrast to this, what constitutes the core of repetition is 
the encounter with a traumatic event that comes from the outside 
and which you allow to hit you at the very centre of your identity. 
Kierkegaard’s famous example here is, of course, faith. Faith does 
not obey the logic of cause and effect because one can never be ar-
gued into believing; it is always a blind leap beyond one’s conscious 
control. Yet the image we encounter here is not the gentrified one, 
which is usually retailed as something good for one’s identity, moral-
ity, “humanity” and soul, but faith at its most traumatic and there-
fore amoral, inhuman and unstomachable, which we encounter in 
God’s demand that Abraham sacrifice his son or in the story of Job. 
The point is, of course, that although ultimately Abraham did not 
have to kill Isaac and prosperity was returned to Job, they did not 
come out of their experiences as the same men: in a sense, Abraham 
did kill his son, because he took the decision to do it and in doing 
that he had to kill the very kernel of his identity – something that 
Curren would call his soul – because for him his son had been his 
highest good. Abraham did the impossible (within his horizon of val-
ues), and in order to be able to do it he had to destroy his identity, 
had to become someone other than himself; therefore, after the fact, 
he enters a new dispensation: he has to rebuild his identity again 
from scratch (in Lacanian terminology, he traversed his fantasy).18 
In order to be willing to kill Isaac, he has to pass over to the side of 
the object,19 that is, to relinquish who he is and identify himself with 
the act (the thing done), the act with which his new identity starts.
Taking into consideration Curren’s ceaseless anti-apartheid rheto-
ric, the only logical act for her would be to identify with the black 
struggle by traversing her fantasy of innocence and childhood, an im-
age which hides behind itself sheer political violence of colonialism. 
This, however, is something she avoids at all costs because it would 
mean the loss of her Beautiful Soul, of which she is so proud. Thus 
her confusion or bad faith can be clearly exemplified by another recur-
ring piece of her rhetoric – she calls the black youth “dour little pu-
ritans, despising laughter, despising play” (114) and inveighs against 
 18 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology 
(London: Verso, 2000), 212.
 19 Zupančič, Ethics of the Real, 104.
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“the spirit of Geneva triumphant in Africa. Calvin, black-robed, thin-
blooded, forever cold, rubbing his hands in the afterworld, smiling his 
wintry smile” (47). However, it is precisely her own attitude, which 
goes back to the spirit of Geneva with its puritan examination of 
the state of one’s soul and diligent watch for the signs of redemption 
(attention paid to one’s soul in times inhospitable to the soul). Isn’t 
the presentation of the image of a childhood that only the masters 
can have as a necessary precondition of being human an exact South 
African liberal parallel of the doctrine of predestination?
Unable “to become somebody else,” Curren devises a half-meas-
ure, a pseudo-act. In order to “save her soul,” she invents another 
melodramatic strategy: “How shall I be saved? By doing what I do 
not want to do. […] I must love, first of all, the unlovable. I must 
love for instance this child [John]. Not bright little Bheki, but this 
one. He is here for a reason. He is part of my salvation” (125). As 
we have already noted, in the discourse of melodrama the only thing 
one can do is to love.
It is telling that she presents her new vocation as the saving of 
her soul – her Beautiful Soul, one may add. Rather that lose her 
fantasmatic identification by becoming “somebody else” and getting 
a “better” soul in return, she comes up with a way of refurbishing 
her old specular image, which means that her new program boils 
down to nothing more than to the saving of her face. However, the 
child she speaks of is not amenable to her love since, as we already 
know, he is the representative of everything that Curren’s liberal 
soul abhors – in loving him she would have to love his “stupidity” 
(which is Curren’s name for his struggle: “There is something stupid 
about him, something deliberately stupid, obstructive, intractable”) 
because he basically is his struggle, as Curren knows very well for 
she turns it into an accusation against him: “A simplified person, 
simplified in every way: swifter, nimbler, more tireless than real peo-
ple, without doubts or scruples, without humour, ruthless, innocent” 
(71–72). And her failure to love is clearly shown by her already-
quoted ironic comment on John’s death: “Poor John, who in the old 
days would have been destined to be a garden boy and eat bread and 
jam for lunch at the back door and drink out of a tin, battling now 
for all the insulted and injured, the trampled, the ridiculed, for all 
the garden boys of South Africa!” (138). But if the task of loving the 
unlovable is impossible with a black insurgent, there is somebody 
else at hand who would fit perfectly as an object of love ministra-
tion – Vercueil, who will not mind being turned into somebody who 
is there for a reason.
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Vercueil’s biggest asset is his blackness, so “loving” him immedi-
ately refurbishes Curren’s waning image of herself as a compassion-
ate liberal. What is more, loving Vercueil seems to imply accomplish-
ment of the difficult task of overcoming of her rarefied sensibility for 
the sake of the other, since he is a dirty and smelly alcoholic with 
the objectionable habit of bringing his drunken “girlfriends” home. 
And, thirdly, he appears in Curren’s life on the same day that she 
receives the news of being past saving, which must have had an 
impact on her sentimental imagination and encouraged her to act 
against her rational better judgement: she so often denies the seri-
ousness of her pet idea of his being the messenger, the angel sent to 
show her the way out of this world, that the very repetition suggests 
that she actually takes the conceit seriously. (Vercueil is also made 
into the messenger by Curren herself since the day after he arrives 
she starts to write the letter of confession to her daughter which 
Vercueil will be asked to post after Curren’s death.)
The reason that Vercueil is a black that Curren is able to accom-
modate, that is, one she can “love” without changing herself, is that in 
many respects he reflects to her her own image, a somehow distorted 
mirror likeness but one which can help her self-recognition none the 
less, unlike the black youth from the township who are intractably 
resistant to being used in boosting some white self-representation.
While Curren’s first advice to John is “Be slow to judge” (72) – 
since his judgement of her that she is not a compassionate bleed-
ing heart but an oppressor is a traumatic presence that threatens 
Curren’s liberal self-image – Vercueil is one who “watches but does 
not judge. Always a faint haze of alcohol about him. Alcohol, that 
softens, preserves. […] That helps us to forgive” (75). This softness 
is the core of the parallel but it does not really stand for “good-
ness” – Curren can identify with Vercueil so easily because like her 
he is a lotus-eater, permanently lost in a limbo of Edenic existence: 
“[a] man in his middle years still sucking on bottles, yearning for the 
original bliss, reaching for it in his stupors” (53). In other words, he 
is a mirror image of Curren’s “aesthetic” approach to life, a life in 
pursuit of “wonder,” of the upsurges of the Beautiful Soul but within 
the framework of the possibilities allowed in South Africa to blacks. 
His life is in this respect a caricature of the blissful life of whites, 
Curren included, but a caricature only because his kind of bliss (al-
coholic intoxication) is the only kind within the reach of his race. 
What is more, by being the incarnation of the only life of wonder 
accessible to blacks in South Africa, Vercueil is at the same time not 
a caricature at all, but the real image of what Curren (admittedly 
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without realising it) would like John and Bheki to turn into, present-
ing them with Edenic images of what their childhood should be (the 
childhood they can never have as blacks) – not bearing in mind the 
real choices allowed to them under apartheid, her Circe’s voice lures 
them precisely into choosing the life led by Vercueil.
This is something the black boys seem to grasp much more clearly 
than the aged university lecturer and hence their aggression towards 
Vercueil: “ ‘They are making you into a dog!’ said the boy [John]. ‘Do 
you want to be a dog?’ ” (42) They see in him their own fallen image 
and it is not death they find the most degrading (which is Curren’s 
case) but living a life which is the spitting image of that of their 
former masters. Therefore, by choosing the struggle (death) rather 
than this kind of life they stand the Hegelian dialectics of the slave 
and the master on its head, and by spurning the melodramatic (but 
in fact obscene) vision offered to them by Curren they choose what 
the discourse of tragedy would call heroic status.
What is more, it is precisely this which puts them in the posi-
tion of truth since truth, if we may resort to Heidegger’s idea for 
a moment, “is neither ‘subjective’ [one’s heart’s chord] nor ‘objective’ 
[the music of the spheres]: it designates simultaneously our active 
engagement in and our ecstatic openness to the world.”20 The con-
junction, however, has to be thought as simultaneity, that is: active 
engagement is ecstatic openness as such. Therefore the praising of 
openness to the world without engagement is nothing other than to 
preach the old metaphysical dichotomies between the subjective and 
the objective, soul and body and so on, which is, of course, what 
Curren always does, propagating her aesthetic attitude. However, as 
Hegel, the first critic of the Beautiful Soul, had already noted (writ-
ing on tragedy!), this kind of position is accessible only in the state 
of idleness and only to “the gods” living in their artificial paradise of 
the masters: “The substance of ethical life, as a concrete unity, is an 
ensemble of different relations and powers which only in a situation 
of inactivity, like that of the blessed gods, accomplish the work of 
the spirit in the enjoyment of an undisturbed life.”21 The ethical sub-
stance can abide in this state “solely on Olympus and in the heaven 
of imagination and religious ideas,”22 and when it comes to realise 
itself in the world it can only be through the “mess” Curren so ab-
 20 Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile Absolute – or Why Is the Christian Legacy Worth 
Fighting for? (London: Verso, 2000), 79.
 21 G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998), II, 1196.
 22 Hegel, Aesthetics, 1196.
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hors: “When they now come actually to life as a specific ‘pathos’ in 
a human individual, [the gods] lead, despite all their justification, to 
guilt and wrong.”23 In other words, the ethical action leads through 
the images of suffering but these images are only melodramatic im-
ages of the Beautiful Soul who exists in the imaginary heaven of 
insubstantial fantasy.
This aspect of Vercueil, which is so infuriating for the boys, is his 
other asset in Curren’s eyes – since she describes her life as a life of 
shame, Vercueil is a perfect image to hold on to, since as a derelict 
he is a veritable figure of shame and hence can be appropriated as 
the angel whom she imagines to be her guide: “So I have continued 
to tell myself stories in which you lead, I follow. […] The angel goes 
before, the woman follows. His eyes are open, he sees; hers are shut, 
she is still sunk in the sleep of worldliness. That is why I keep turn-
ing to you for guidance, for help” (153).
Another typical liberal-melodramatic attitude is illustrated here. 
The sentimental imagination has always had a certain fascination 
with the figure of the clochard romanticised as a sage or a vision-
ary, which is testified by many products of western culture, from 
Les Misérables to recent Hollywood films. The source of this is, of 
course, the romantic imagination, which made the child, the mad-
man, and the poet into the characters more intimately related to the 
truth than other mortals. Hence, for Curren, Vercueil keeps meta-
morphosing between a child (mumbling like a child in bed (52), suck-
ing on bottles (53), etc.), a guide who sees more than herself, and 
a proper Byronic hero carrying some dark mystery from his past in 
his heart (“You are hiding something, I thought, but what? A tragic 
love? A prison sentence?” (76)). But all this effort of the imagination 
is only to cover up the satisfaction that his status as a victim brings 
to his benefactor, a victim towards whom we can feel compassion but 
only as long as he remains a victim (unlike the township youth). So 
none of the games Curren plays with him concern his “substance” at 
all because they are profoundly narcissistic – they are played so that 
she can save face in her own eyes or in the eyes of her daughter.
The whole purpose of the “wager on trust” (“Because I cannot 
trust Vercueil I must trust him,” which is another form of the game: 
“I must love, first of all, the unlovable”) can be seen as a way “to 
keep a soul alive in times not hospitable to the soul” (119), the im-
age of her soul being, as we have tried to show, the reverse side of 
colonial violence. Therefore, it is not surprising that the “nature” 
 23 Hegel, Aesthetics, 1196.
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of Vercueil is described by Curren in terms quite similar to those 
in which she describes whites as different from blacks, the whites 
whose deaths are not messy and heavy as iron, as black deaths are, 
but who die “in bed, growing rather dry and light there, rather pa-
pery, rather airy” (114) – just like them: “He [Vercueil] is dry. His 
drink is not water but fire. Perhaps this is why I cannot imagine 
children of his: because his semen would be dry […] like pollen or 
like the dust of this country” (179–80).
This is, therefore, what happens to iron when alcohol dissolves it 
– it turns into pollen and melts into thin air, leaving an empty place 
enabling white narcissistic projections. It is precisely what the blacks 
engaged in the struggle despise: being turned into mere metaphors, 
word games, a way for the whites to boost their self-respect.24 To 
quote one of Curren’s favourite accusations: “The new puritans, hold-
ing to the rule, holding up the rule. Abhorring alcohol, that softens 
the rule, dissolves iron. Suspicious of all that is idle, yielding, round-
about. Suspicious of devious discourse like this” (75). She inveighs 
against such kind of “coarseness,” calling it the coming of the age of 
iron, referring us to Ovid (Hesiod too but her preferred identification 
is with the Romans, as we have noted) who speaks of it this way:
Hard steel succeeded [the age of bronze] then:
And stubborn as the metal, were the men.
Truth, modesty, and shame, the world forsook:
Fraud, avarice, and force, their places took.
As the novel progresses, however, the iron which at first sight seems 
to figure the coldness and cruelty of “the new puritans” (forsaking 
“truth, modesty, and shame” which are Curren’s favourite references) 
progressively becomes a sign of something much less metaphoric: 
“these people will not burn, Bheki and the other dead. It would be 
like trying to burn figures of pig iron or lead. They might lose their 
sharpness of contour, but when the flames subsided they would still 
be there, heavy as ever. Leave them long enough and they may sink, 
millimetre by millimetre, till the earth closes over them. But then 
they would sink no further. They would stay there, bobbing just un-
der the surface” (114).
 24 “Word-games, from a past that I alone could look back to with nostalgia, 
when we of the middle classes, the comfortable classes, passed our Sundays roaming 
the countryside from beauty-spot to beauty-spot, bringing the afternoon to a close 
with tea and scones and strawberry jam and cream in a tea-room with a nice view, 
preferably westward over the sea” (63).
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So what is this something that floats just under the skin of the 
South African earth, “the age of iron waiting to return” (115)? Curren, 
horrified, states it herself: “this torrent of black blood […]. A country 
prodigal of blood. […] The dry earth soaking up the blood of its crea-
tures. A land that drinks rivers of blood and is never sated” (57–58). 
It is this blood which iron figures because, unlike white “airiness,” 
it is “heavy blood. […] So much blood! If I had caught it all I would 
not have been able to lift the bucket. Like trying to lift a bucket of 
lead” (114). Thus, it is not surprising that this vision of the age of 
blood also finds its expression in Ovid:
Then sails were spread, to every wind that blew.
Raw were the sailors, and the depths were new:
Trees, rudely hollow’d, did the waves sustain;
E’re ships in triumph plough’d the watry plain.
Then land-marks limited to each his right:
For all before was common as the light.
Nor was the ground alone requir’d to bear
Her annual income to the crooked share,
But greedy mortals, rummaging her store,
Digg’d from her entrails first the precious oar;
Which next to Hell, the prudent Gods had laid;
And that alluring ill, to sight display’d.
Thus cursed steel, and more accursed gold,
Gave mischief birth, and made that mischief bold:
And double death did wretched Man invade,
By steel assaulted, and by gold betray’d.25
One can read here a pertinent and laconic description of the develop-
ment of colonialism, which was, moreover, more or less coterminous 
with the highest cultural achievements of, to use an Eliotian phrase, 
the mind of Europe, in the products of which Curren is so deeply 
steeped. Thus what we arrive at finally is the most interesting jux-
taposition taking place in the novel between the black blood bobbing 
just under the surface of the earth and “the Goldberg Variations 
[which] erected themselves in the air” (26)26 which coexist there 
without touching but which mirror each other like South African 
earth and sky, since the airy kingdom is just a product of violent 
sublimation, of the imaginary refining of black blood out of exist-
 25 Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. Samuel Garth, John Dryden, et al., eBooks@
Adelaide, The University of Adelaide Library: 11 Nov. 2006, <http://etext.library.
adelaide.edu.au/mirror/classics.mit.edu/Ovid/metam.1.first.html>.
 26 Also called “celestial music,” “the music that does not die,” “pure spirit” (20–21).
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ence, turning it into insubstantial pollen that vanishes into thin air. 
Both of these spaces are kingdoms of the dead – on the one hand, 
the “airy” dead, the dead of pure spirit represented by Bach and the 
music of the spheres, and, on the other, the black blood floating just 
under the surface of the earth.
And here the final return to tragedy is in order: there the dead 
do not go away but prey upon the living – in tragedy, the return and 
the importunate demands of the corpses become the form of fate.27 
Thus in the dying Curren there is a battle raging between the two 
spaces of death, and although in her waking life she worships the 
airy Apollonian gods, when she falls asleep she is brought down-
wards and her feet are riveted to the earth and submerged to the 
ankles in the bloodbath of Borodino:
When I fall asleep there commences a restless movement of shapes 
behind my eyelids, shapes without body or form, covered in a haze, 
grey or brown, sulphurous. Borodino is the word that comes to me 
in my sleep: a hot summer afternoon on the Russian plain, smoke 
everywhere, the grass dry and burning, two hosts that have lost all 
cohesion plodding about, parched, in terror of their lives. Hundreds 
of thousands of men, faceless, voiceless, dry as bones, trapped on 
a field of slaughter, repeating night after night their back-and-
forth march across that scorched plain in the stench of sulphur 
and blood: a hell into which I plummet when I close my eyes. (126)
Not being able to resolve itself on this level, that of the “sulphurous 
horror” into which she plunges in her sleep, the conflict intensifies 
and starts entering her waking life in the form of attacks of “mad-
ness” that from a certain moment start plaguing her, and she de-
scribes them thus:
Clouds come over, thoughts begin to bunch, to take on the dense, 
angry life of a swarm of flies. I shake my head, trying to clear them 
away. This is my hand, I say, opening my eyes wide, staring at 
the veins on the back of my hand; this is the bedspread. Then as 
quick as lightning something strikes. In an instant I am gone and 
in another instant I am back, still staring at my hand. Between 
these instants an hour may have passed or the blink of an eye, 
during which I have been absent, gone, struggling with something 
thick and rubbery that invades the mouth and grips the tongue at 
its root, something that comes from the depths of the sea. I surface, 
shaking my head like a swimmer. In my throat is a taste of bile, 
 27 Jan Kott, Zjadanie bogów (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1999), 9–10.
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of sulphur. Madness! I say to myself: this is what it tastes like to 
be mad! (167)
As in ancient tragedy the offended gods visit madness on the hero, 
here the gods of black blood which has been refined out of exist-
ence come from the depths of the repressed sea of blood and grip 
Curren by the throat. And thus finally the trauma forces her to 
commit an act of judgement and, as usual at first without realising 
it, pronounce the verdict of the struggle in an appropriately mytho-
logical way: “Once I came to myself facing the wall. In my hand was 
a pencil, its point broken. All over the wall were sprawling, sliding 
characters, meaningless, coming from me or someone inside me” (167; 
italics added).28 The biblical parallel here is unmistakable: the most 
famous incomprehensible writing on the wall appears in the Book of 
Daniel, the script that comes to disturb a beautiful life of leisure and 
abundance founded on blood:
Belshazzar the king made a great feast to a thousand of his lords, 
and drank wine before the thousand. Belshazzar, whiles he tasted 
the wine, commanded to bring the golden and silver vessels which 
his father Nebuchadnezzar had taken out of the temple which was 
in Jerusalem; that the king, and his princes, his wives, and his 
concubines, might drink therein. Then they brought the golden ves-
sels that were taken out of the temple of the house of God which 
was at Jerusalem; and the king, and his princes, his wives, and his 
concubines, drank in them. They drank wine, and praised the gods 
of gold, and of silver, of brass, of iron, of wood, and of stone. In 
the same hour came forth fingers of a man’s hand, and wrote over 
against the candlestick upon the plaister of the wall of the king’s 
palace: and the king saw the part of the hand that wrote. Then the 
king’s countenance was changed, and his thoughts troubled him, so 
that the joints of his loins were loosed, and his knees smote one 
against another. (Daniel 5, 1–6)
And when nobody is able to translate the writing, Daniel is sent for 
and explains it thus:
And this is the writing that was written, MENE, MENE, TEKEL, 
UPHARSIN. This is the interpretation of the thing: MENE; God 
 28 Also to judge oneself, one has to become somebody foreign to oneself: “But 
how hard it is to kill oneself! […] It seems to me that something other than the will 
must come into play at the last instant, something foreign, something thoughtless, 
to sweep you over the brink. You have to become someone other than yourself ” (109; 
italics added).
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hath numbered thy kingdom, and finished it. TEKEL; Thou art 
weighed in the balances, and art found wanting. PERES; Thy king-
dom is divided, and given to the Medes and Persians. (Daniel 5, 
25–28; italics added)29
By analogy Curren’s own verdict on her apologia for her aesthetic 
existence is that, notwithstanding her liberal good heart and soul, 
when weighed against the heaviness of black blood, it is found in 
the balance all too light.
Until the final pages of the novel, Curren seems to repress this 
insight but something of this unconscious, “mad” knowledge finally 
breaks through to assert its presence in her conscious mind – as 
we have noted, in the final pages of the book, her relationship to 
her daughter and grandchildren in the U.S. is radically altered: the 
sentimental championing of family values, and the precedence of 
the preciousness of every human individual over all other claims, 
disintegrate and naked animosity surfaces: “It dispirits me that 
your children will never drown. […] They will die at seventy-five 
or eighty-five as stupid as when they were born” (178–79). Is this 
a verdict passed on the grandchildren she has never laid her eyes 
on? It rather looks like the final judgement passed on her own life as 
a colonial doll living in the limbo of the unborn – the pastoral world 
of beauty and abundance – projected onto the U.S. which still seems 
to be a safe place, unlike South Africa where she is dying together 
with her country. So ultimately we return yet again into the space of 
tragedy to find Curren reluctantly admitting to no less than Oedipus’ 
guilt: the crime which brought the plague of shame on me was not 
somebody else’s doing (the authorities’) but my own.
 29 The Bible, King James Version, Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia 
Library: 11 Nov. 2006, <http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccernew2?id=KjvDani.sgm 
&images=images/mo deng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=5&
division=div1>.
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The Master of Petersburg (1994)
Although all Coetzee’s works are very much involved in intertextual 
play with the tradition of the European novel, and some of them (e.g. 
Foe) develop this involvement to a remarkable extent, The Master 
of Petersburg is a special case in Coetzee’s writing up to this date, 
not only because it takes as its protagonist a writer emotionally 
and technically seemingly light years away from Coetzee, but also 
because it is a rather sophisticated third degree palimpsest.
In The Master of Petersburg, Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky 
comes from Dresden to Petersburg in October 1869 to mourn the 
recent death of his stepson Pavel Alexandrovich Isaev and retrieve 
from the police what is left of the young man’s papers and pos-
sessions. The death is officially presented as suicide but the po-
lice, knowing that Isaev was involved in the revolutionary circle 
led by Sergei Gennadevich Nechaev, harbour the suspicion that 
Isaev was killed by his own comrades. This circumstance, of course, 
immediately brings to mind one of the subplots we come across 
in Dostoevsky’s The Possessed where the leader of the revolution-
ary cell, Peter Verkhovensky, in order to cement the secret bond, 
makes the members kill one of them, a student named Shatov, 
who has become dubious of Verkhovensky’s credentials for leader-
ship. Moreover, Dostoevsky’s source for the characters of Shatov 
and Verkhovensky was the detailed press coverage of the trial 
of members of a revolutionary cell. In 1869, at the instigation of 
their leader Sergei Nechaev, they had lured into the park of the 
Academy of Agriculture one of their number, Ivan Ivanov, who 
suspected Nechaev of being a liar (he presented himself as an 
emissary of a revolutionary organisation widely spread throughout 
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Russia, which was not true), had killed him and sunk the body in 
a nearby pond.1
Historical facts, however, are not to be treated as sound currency 
in The Master of Petersburg because Coetzee adds a twist to this mul-
tilayered story: he casts another historical character, Dostoevsky’s 
stepson Pavel Isaev, in the role of the victim while the historical 
Isaev actually outlived his stepfather. What is more – and here may 
lie the real perversity of the undertaking – for all we know, Isaev 
was a “disgrace” and a constant source of worries for his stepfather 
not because of his revolutionary activities, but precisely the opposite, 
because of his egotism, idleness and sponging habits.
In Coetzee’s “version,” Dostoevsky2 comes to Petersburg to make 
good a promise he had made to his stepson Pavel: “I will come back 
[…]. You will not be abandoned.”3 But the boy is dead, and it might 
seem that all promises have died with him and their relation is dis-
solved. Not for Dostoevsky, however. He rents the room last occu-
pied by the boy – or rather the young man: when Pavel dies he is 
twenty-one – and waits for him to appear: “He stands by the door, 
hardly breathing, concentrating his gaze on the chair in the corner, 
waiting for the darkness to thicken, to turn into another kind of 
darkness, a darkness of presence. Silently he forms his lips over his 
son’s name, three times, four times” (5). Dostoevsky imagines himself 
to be a kind of Orpheus: “A gate has closed behind his son, a gate 
bound sevenfold with bands of iron. To open that gate is the labour 
laid upon him” (19). But he is a strange kind of Orpheus, who does 
nothing and just waits for the dead one to come and present himself 
in order that he may redeem his guilt by asking him forgiveness for 
not having loved him enough; in other words, to come back from the 
dead to his stepfather and save him.
On the level of common sense, Dostoevsky comes to Petersburg 
to assuage the guilt that haunts him. In order to do this, he has to 
cause Pavel to be buried not only corporeally but also symbolically; 
the symbolic debt has to be paid in order that his haunting by guilt 
should stop. This, however, cannot easily be done, and not only be-
cause Dostoevsky’s attitude towards his deceased stepson is more 
convoluted that he would like to admit. Although the writer would 
 1 Stanisław Mackiewicz, Dostojewski (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydaw­
niczy, 1957), 205.
 2 From now on, unless otherwise stated, the name Dostoevsky will refer to 
Coetzee’s fictional character.
 3 J. M. Coetzee, The Master of Petersburg (London: Minerva, 1995), 5. Further 
references in the body of the text; unless indicated otherwise, all italics are Coetzee’s.
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very much like to play out the relation with his stepson on strictly 
personal grounds of the sentimental, sometimes even melodramatic, 
attachments between father and son, the debt that remains to be paid 
is actually not intimate but interpersonal, because the circumstances 
of Pavel’s death are unclear: although the official verdict is that he 
committed suicide, the police hint that he was killed by Nechaev, 
and Nechaev in turn maintains it was by the police. If Dostoevsky 
hopes ever to be freed from guilt, he has to resolve the contradic-
tions of this situation in order, first of all, to ascertain the nature of 
symbolic debt involved in this knot of circumstances. In other words, 
he has to decide whose version of the truth he should choose, in 
what way he can stay true to Pavel after his death. Accomplishing 
it has less to do with solving a criminal riddle and a lot with decid-
ing who Pavel really was. Therefore the task before him is mainly 
to answer the question, “What does/did Pavel want?” and only sec-
ondarily, “Who killed him?”
Dostoevsky’s first step may appear weird and enigmatic, but for 
all we know about him (both in Coetzee’s novel and also from the 
“real” writer’s books), it is the easiest and most natural one for him 
to take. At the beginning of his visit, Petersburg presents itself to 
him as a vast and dark tomb which he enters to find the body of 
his stepson lying there shorn of everything, even his name (his grave 
is marked only with a number), stigmatised by his implied suicide, 
a man disgraced in the eyes of all but his stepfather.4 Situating Pavel 
in the symbolically well-established place of a sensitive and innocent 
victim, Dostoevsky can easily fall into the old tracks of the discourse 
he is known for and write another chapter of his “Christology” in 
order to attempt to answer the enigmatic question (“What does Pavel 
want?”) in the most facile way:
Because it is not his son he must not go back to bed but must get 
dressed and answer the call. If he expects his son to come as a thief 
in the night, and listens only for the call of the thief, he will never 
see him. If he expects his son to speak in the voice of the unexpect-
ed, he will never hear him. As long as he expects what he does not 
expect, what he does not expect will not come. Therefore – paradox 
within paradox, darkness swaddled in darkness – he must answer 
 4 In this way Pavel bears a resemblance to the “ugly” image of dead Christ 
painted by Hans Holbein. Prince Muishkin in The Idiot comments that it is an im-
age which can make many lose their faith in Christ (“That picture! That picture!” 
cried Muishkin, struck by a sudden idea. “Why, a man’s faith might be ruined by 
looking at that picture!”; 2 Jan 2007: <http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext01/idiot10.
txt>). The historical Dostoevsky saw this painting in Basel in 1867.
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to what he does not expect. (80) […] He is waiting for a sign, and 
he is betting (there is no grander word he dare use) that the dog 
is not the sign, is not a sign at all, is just a dog among many dogs 
howling in the night. But he knows too that as long as he tries by 
cunning to distinguish things that are things from things that are 
signs he will not be saved (83) […] Pavel will not be saved till he 
has freed the dog and brought it into his bed, brought the least 
thing, the beggarmen and the beggarwomen too, and much else he 
does not yet know of; and even then there will be no certainty. (82)5
Yet the subject of this question is actually no longer Pavel, since his 
image has migrated to the region of parable as a shadowy creature 
of the biblical “thief in the night” type. For Dostoevsky, the question 
about Pavel imperceptibly turns here into “What does Christ want 
(from me)?” which is much easier to answer, although the answer 
may have its own problems, because, as we can see, it can only be 
formulated in contradictory apophatic language. What is more, the 
apophatic formulation of this question, its very “darkness,” that is, 
difficulty, is precisely where it facility lies – such a form of the ques-
tion is the easiest way for Dostoevsky to gloss over the complica-
tions of the “superficial” dimension of Pavel’s life (revolution, police, 
etc.) since the apophatic surely must signal a more elevated level of 
meaning. Hence the parable, in which, for Dostoevsky, the distaste-
ful “darkness” of Pavel’s engaged life (in which his stepfather had 
no place and which therefore cannot be played out sentimentally) 
becomes swaddled in the “darkness” of the apophatic where Pavel is 
safely removed from being the enervating young man who strongly 
resented Dostoevsky and turns into a featureless “neighbour” (the 
least thing) in the image of Christ. Hence Dostoevsky predilection 
for sentimentalising Pavel when speaking (either to himself or to 
others) from the position of the father, a position whose truth some-
times comes to the fore in short outbursts of resentment against his 
stepson when his sentimentalising is questioned.
This is the approach Dostoevsky tries first: situating Pavel in 
Christ’s position he does answer the dog’s call and does take the beg-
gar to his bed, hoping for revelation and forgiveness to appear. Yet 
the trick does not work. It is not only that Pavel materialises neither 
“personally” nor in his sleep (“Never before has time passed so slug-
gishly, never has the air been so blank of revelation” (88)) but, what 
is more, instead of ascending towards the sublime that has been pre-
 5 The wavering between “he [Dostoevsky] will not be saved” and “Pavel will not 
be saved” is telling. We will come back to this.
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pared by Dostoevsky’s apophatic discourse, the whole situation be-
gins to get out of hand and slide toward the ridiculous: the “beggar” 
(a police spy named Ivanov), leering obscenely at Dostoevsky, returns 
to him his own discourse treating him to assorted bits of apophatic 
wisdom (“Even if it isn’t in Scripture, would it not be in the spirit 
of Scripture: that we deserve what we do not deserve? What do you 
think?” (89) “I may not be a proper holy simpleton, but that does not 
disqualify me from speaking the truth. Truth can come, you know, 
in winding and mysterious ways” (89)). Coming from Ivanov, how-
ever, this type of discourse is dismissed (“Charlatan! He [Dostoevsky] 
thinks” (88)), since it is difficult to sentimentalise over this dirty, 
smelly, pudgy, worn-down man. But may not the disgust Dostoevsky 
feels towards him also be a sign of another kind of identity he wants 
to deny? Ivanov is quite happy to make a show of his grief in front 
of others; in fact, it seems that mourning is precisely the state that 
allows him to enjoy himself in ways quite resembling what happens 
to Dostoevsky in The Master of Petersburg: “Tears are rolling down 
his cheeks. He wipes them away with his cuff, but more flow. He 
seems to have no trouble in talking while he cries. In fact, he seems 
quite cheerful. ‘I believe I will grieve for my lost babies for the rest 
of my days,’ he says” (87).
Having indulged in the apophatic trick Dostoevsky is confronted 
with a different possibility of locating the question he asks himself 
about Pavel. When he comes to the police station to reclaim Pavel’s 
papers, which have been taken in for investigation, he is presented 
with the evidence of his stepson’s involvement in a revolutionary 
group, the People’s Vengeance, led by Nechaev. Now the symbolic 
debt that is to be paid unexpectedly appears to be located in a dis-
course completely different from the one expected by Dostoevsky. 
This is a harder version of the question, a version he doggedly keeps 
dismissing as the result of Pavel’s naivety and political gullibility. 
But there is more to it than just Dostoevsky’s political or ideological 
disagreement with the revolutionaries. Dostoevsky may be the most 
fervent propagator of the supremacy of Orthodox Christianity and 
the Russian monarchy but even he is semi-conscious, in his convo-
luted way, of a different level of confrontation hidden behind his 
elevated words about Jesus and the Russian people.
When Councillor Maximov questions him about the relations be-
tween his stepson and Nechaev, Dostoevsky, who presents Pavel 
throughout the book as an innocent idealist (e.g. in the story of the 
white suit, to which we will return), refuses to accept Nechaev as 
an ideological enemy: “Nechaev is not a police matter. Ultimately 
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Nechaev is not a matter for the authorities at all, at least for the 
secular authorities. […] Nechaevism is not an idea. It despises ideas, 
it is outside ideas. It is a spirit, and Nechaev himself is not its em-
bodiment but its host; or rather, he is under possession by it. […] 
Perhaps […] in young people there is something that has not yet 
gone to sleep, to which the spirit of Nechaev calls” (43–44). This 
is the way in which Dostoevsky presents his conviction that there 
is something more than the rational discourse of ideas behind the 
animosity between what Nechaev stands for and his own position 
expressed, in a fittingly theological flight, as possession.
Moreover, although Dostoevsky tries to deny that Pavel had 
a first-hand relationship with this “something” (evil spirit), even he 
has to admit that such a relationship somehow existed (“in young 
people there is something […] to which the spirit of Nechaev calls”). 
But here comes Maximov’s clever twist to Dostoevsky’s story:
Not easy to be a father, is it? I am a father myself, but luckily 
a father of daughters. I would not wish to be the father of sons in 
our age. But didn’t your own father… wasn’t there some unpleas-
antness with your father, or do I misremember? […] So I wonder, 
in the end, whether the Nechaev phenomenon is quite as much of 
an aberration of the spirit as you seem to say. Perhaps it is just 
the old matter of fathers and sons after all, such as we have always 
had, only deadlier in this particular generation, more unforgiving. 
(45)
Dostoevsky, of course, rejects this angle on the matter of revolu-
tion because he is not yet ready to admit to the perversity of his 
apophatic discourse, but the thought sticks to him and reverberates 
throughout the novel. What is more, it will be, of all people, Nechaev 
who will repeat Maximov’s challenge to Dostoevsky:
I have always had a suspicion about fathers, that their real sin, the 
one they never confess, is greed. They want everything for them-
selves. They won’t hand over the moneybags, even when it’s time. 
The moneybags are all that matter to them; they couldn’t care less 
what happens as a consequence. I didn’t believe what your stepson 
told me because I had heard you were a gambler and I thought 
gamblers didn’t care about money. But there is a second side to 
gambling, isn’t there? I should have seen that. You must be the 
kind who gambles because he is never satisfied, who is always 
greedy for more. (158)
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So, indeed, there seems to be something supraideological in the 
animosity between Dostoevsky and Nechaev, something to do with 
possession, but not as understood within the limits of the theological 
discourse Dostoevsky uses. What is more, it is precisely the image 
that spontaneously comes to Dostoevsky’s mind during his oratory 
flight while talking to Maximov, that shows the ugly stitching of the 
discursive costume he chooses to wear. While he is speaking about 
being possessed by the evil spirit “[he] makes an effort to visualise 
Sergei Nechaev, but all he sees is an ox’s head, its eyes glassy, its 
tongue lolling, its skull cloven open by the butcher’s axe. Around it 
is a seething swarm of flies. A name comes to him, and in the same 
instant he utters it: ‘Baal’ ” (44). If we consider that Ba’al in Hebrew 
means “lord” or “master” (Pavel in his diary calls Dostoevsky “The 
Master”) and that the butcher’s axe is the symbol (the seal) of the 
group People’s Vengeance, it is not difficult to see in this image the 
slaughtered greedy father with his dead glassy eyes and his lolling 
tongue, always hungry for more.6 What is even stranger, however, is 
that although the father seems to be dead (“its skull cloven open”), 
the whole image serves to illustrate his enjoyment which seems to 
have survived him, leading some kind of undead existence out in the 
world. Who does it belong to in the final analysis?
It is typical of Dostoevsky’s discourse (as the case of Ivanov shows) 
that it is always his antagonist whom he imagines experiencing en-
joyment in a sick way, drawing perverse pleasure from shameful 
activities – unnatural sensuality, “extremism of the senses” is pre-
cisely Dostoevsky’s charge against Nechaev. However, when he is 
in a less “metaphysical” mood, the truth of his cryptic accusation 
of “Baalism” is presented in a more understandable way – it boils 
down to an accusation of Jesuitism as Dostoevsky imagines it: “This 
place is like a Spanish convent in the days of Loyola: well-born girls 
flagel lating themselves, rolling about in ecstasies, foaming at the 
lips; or fasting, praying for hours on end to be taken into the arms 
of the Saviour. Extremists all of them, sensualists hungering for the 
ecstasy of death – killing, dying, no matter which” (104–105).
Here we are touching the central nerve of Dostoevsky’s problem 
with Nechaev: revolutionary activity is presented not really as pos-
session by an evil spirit but as something ecstatic whose jouissance 
is disgusting to Dostoevsky, but nevertheless (or because of it) ever 
 6 Incidentally, a similar image of Beelzebub (Lord of the Flies, a variation 
on Baal) becomes the icon of the island supposedly bereft of fathers in William 
Golding’s Lord of the Flies, where the bloody head is that of a wild pig.
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more fascinating. Yet, by a typical turn of Dostoevsky’s mind (“dark-
ness swaddled in darkness”), it is Nechaev himself, supposedly the 
master sensualist, who is presented as a man who cannot enjoy. To 
show this, Dostoevsky engages in a bout of rather vulgar “Freudian” 
interpretation: “There are people to whom sensation does not come by 
natural means. […] That is how Sergei Nechaev struck me from the 
beginning – as a man who could not have a natural connection with 
a woman, for instance. I wondered whether that might not under-
lie his manifold resentments” (114). Moreover, he obsessively keeps 
deprecating Necheav as a lover (an assessment to be compared with 
Dostoevsky’s own sexual feats with Anna, his landlady, to which we 
will return later)7: “An egoist and worse. A poor lover too, for sure. 
Without feeling, without sympathy. Immature in his feelings, stalled, 
like a midget. A man of the future, of the next century, with a mon-
strous head and monstrous appetites but nothing else” (196).
Who is this man who is at the same time the supreme jouisseur 
and one unable to enjoy? Or, how can he be both at the same time? 
The first thing we should note is the familiar structure of the accusa-
tion we encounter here – it is one that has always been used, for ex-
ample, against the Jew.8 The Jew cannot enjoy the world “naturally” 
because of his obsessive (monstrous) attachment to money, which is 
only the abstract equivalent of things that can be “naturally” en-
joyed; but somehow this “unnatural” enjoyment comes back with 
a vengeance, because the Jew is at the same time one against whom 
our innocent women should be protected because he is always on the 
look-out for a chance to pollute their purity with his disgusting lust. 
The logic of this image is quite obvious: since the Jew always seems 
to be having a good time (performing his rituals, eating his food, etc. 
– doing things unknown or incomprehensible to us) while we cannot 
really say the same about ourselves, the very spectacle of it trauma-
tises us and we find him to be the thief of the enjoyment rightfully 
belonging to us. And since enjoyment is “naturally” ours, the Jew, by 
definition, must use it in some “unnatural” (excessive) way.9
 7 For example: “So was that meant to bring about the birth of the saviour? […] 
A real river of seed. You must have wanted to make sure. The bed is soaked” (225).
 8 And, of course, in populist anticommunist discourse the communist and the 
Jew become identified. The historical Dostoevsky was a noted anti-Semite.
 9 “What a Jewish performance!” thinks Dostoevsky, summing up the way he 
threw himself on Pavel’s fresh grave (9). In a different context, the logic of “stolen” 
jouissance is analysed in Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (Seminar 
VII), ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Dennis Porter (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 
167–230.
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Another question is that of Dostoevsky’s own “natural connection 
with a woman” – the only times he feels overwhelming satisfaction 
in his relationship with his wife are moments of voluptuous self-
abasement when he falls to his knees in front of her and confesses 
his worthlessness.10 So much for the way in which sensation comes 
by natural means. So, Dostoevsky’s apophatic self-abasement before 
Pavel shaped in the image of Jesus (“Pavel will not be saved till he 
[Dostoevsky] has freed the dog and brought it into his bed, brought 
the least thing, the beggarmen and the beggarwomen too, and much 
else he does not yet know of”) may be seen in exactly the same light 
– it is the discourse of the perverse jouisseur.
Dostoevsky knows that his attitude towards Nechaev goes beyond 
ideology, one sign of which is his disgust with not only what his 
adversary stands for but with himself personally. When Dostoevsky 
speaks to him or thinks of him, he is always represented as an ugly 
man whose physical appearance in itself is revolting (“He remembers 
a remark made by Princess Obolenskaya, Mroczkowski’s mistress 
‘He may be the enfant terrible of anarchism, but really, he should 
do something about those pimples’ ” (101)). What he does not admit, 
however, is that what infuriates him most in Nechaev is the enjoy-
ment he seemingly has (or had) access to but which, to Dostoevsky, 
is inaccessible and therefore sickening. And it is precisely this enjoy-
ment that Dostoevsky wants to deny in the image of the pure and 
innocent Pavel – it is impossible that his stepson, supposedly a para-
gon of purity, could have enjoyed in the obscene Nechaevite way. 
But whence comes such strong reluctance to allow the possibility 
of enjoyment to a grown-up man of twenty-one years of age? Since 
the innocent image of Pavel is the ideal ego with which Dostoevsky 
 10 These moments when “her husband kneels before her and confesses he has 
gambled away their last rouble and beats his breast and kisses the hem of her 
dress” (84) are for Dostoevsky those in which he enjoys his shame: “Yet he cannot 
deny that a certain gaiety is creeping into his own heart, a gaiety of the spendthrift 
husband. Of course, they are something to be ashamed of, these reckless bouts of 
his. Of course, when he comes home stripped bare and confesses to his wife and 
bows his head and endures her reproaches and vows he will never lapse again, he 
is sincere. But at the bottom of his heart, beneath the sincerity, where only God 
can see, he knows he is right and she is wrong” (159). Even if the confession can 
be dispensed with, it is forced on his wife: “His indiscretions hitherto have been fol-
lowed by remorse and, on the heels of remorse, a voluptuous urge to confess. These 
confessions, tortured in expression yet vague in point of detail, have confused and 
infuriated his wife, bedevilling their marriage far more than the infidelities them-
selves” (62).
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explicitly identifies,11 isn’t the enjoyment so fervently denied because 
it is ultimately Dostoevsky’s own?
The moment Dostoevsky for the first time leaves the Nechaevites, 
who have ironically tried to use his theological discourse against him 
(which worked to a certain extent), he, in a state of confusion, asks 
himself, “When you [Nechaev] say I am Judas, who is Jesus?” (107) 
As we have seen, the way Dostoevsky first confronts Pavel’s death is 
by placing him in the position of a Jesus-like pure and innocent victim 
who is able to come and save him from his guilt. Now, however, when 
he has to confront the image of a vengeful stepson (a sympathiser or 
member of the People’s Vengeance), which does not fit Dostoevsky’s 
angelic fantasy, and having confronted Nechaev’s revolutionary jouis-
sance, which must have been also Pavel’s,12 he is momentarily shaken 
in his religious identifications, the defences are down for a moment, 
and what follows this question about Judas is a horrific scene in 
his mind of his stepson experiencing enjoyment (because the mind 
is Dostoevsky’s, the scene is tinged with masochistic flavour): “He 
sees the Finn [one of the Nechaevites] naked, enthroned on a bed of 
scarlet cushions, her bulky legs apart, her arms held wide to display 
her breasts and a belly rotund, hairless, barely mature. And Pavel 
on his knees, ready to be covered and consumed” (107).13 Confronted 
with Nechaev’s jouissance, all the screening devices malfunction for 
a moment and we see what is behind them, what Dostoevsky really 
dreads. Interestingly, what we encounter here is a kind of reversal of 
the famous Freudian primal scene when the child witnesses or imag-
ines his parents making love, a kind of beginning of his or her ana-
lytic story – in Dostoevsky’s vision the relation seems at first glance 
to be reversed (instead of the child observing the parents, we have 
the parent spying on the child), but it is obviously not accidental that 
Pavel is kneeling, which is the position in front of women that allows 
Dostoevsky to experience enjoyment.
 11 For example: “He should wear a black tie, or a black band around his arm in 
the Italian manner, then his standing would be clearer – to himself too. Not a full 
man any longer: half a man. Or on his lapel a medal with Pavel’s image. The better 
half taken, the half that was to come” (192).
 12 “Christ in his wrath, he thinks [about Nechaev]: that is who he models him-
self on. The Christ of the Old Testament, the Christ who scourged the usurers 
out of the temple. Even the costume is right: not a dress but a robe. An imitator; 
a pretender; a blasphemer” (103).
 13 It could be suggested that what Dostoevsky did by marrying somebody of 
Pavel’s generation (the wife he left in Dresden) is also a way of spying on his step-
son’s lovemaking (Dostoevsky taking the place of his stepson or somebody of his 
generation).
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So who is Jesus, then? Dostoevsky answers this question himself, 
accusing Nechaev of behaving like Christ: “Instead of making your 
escape like a sensible person [Dostoevsky, of all people, as the ad-
vocate of acting sensibly!], you behave like Jesus outside Jerusalem, 
waiting for the arrival of an ass to carry you into the hands of your 
persecutors. Are you hoping I will play the part of the ass?” (187). It 
may be said that the image of Jesus is split for Dostoevsky between 
Pavel, the pure innocent victim who does not enjoy and in front of 
whose image candles should be burned,14 and Nechaev, the one who 
brings the sword and with it enjoyment, where the latter is the truth 
of the former. The underpinning of the image of innocence comes 
to the fore all too obviously in a few instances when Pavel actually 
does appear to Dostoevsky in the novel – this takes place solely dur-
ing or after his making love to Anna, Pavel’s former landlady and 
a surrogate mother: “It is as though they are making love through 
a sheet, the grey, tattered sheet of his grief. At the moment of climax 
he plunges back into sleep as into a lake. As he sinks Pavel rises to 
meet him. […] This is the vision in its ugly extremity that rushes 
at him out of the vortex of darkness into which he is descending 
inside the woman’s body. It bursts upon him, possesses him, speeds 
on” (56).
While no amount of sentimentalising fervency is able to bring 
Pavel back, it is enough to start behaving like Baal (The Master) 
who does not respect the Law (Dostoevsky has a wife in Dresden) 
– whose only law is his will to enjoy his (Nechaevite?) “monstrous 
appetites” – for the “saviour” to appear. In this regard, Dostoevsky’s 
vision of “Nechaev in Siberia haunting the beginnings of his son” 
(143) is perfectly clear in meaning:
What he has been thrusting away, what comes back insistently as 
he talks, is what he can only call a troll, a misshapen little crea-
ture, red-haired, red-bearded, no taller than a child of three or four. 
Pavel is still running and shouting in the snow, his knees knocking 
together coltishly. As for the troll, he stands to one side looking on. 
He is wearing a rust coloured jerkin open at the neck; he (or it) 
does not seem to feel cold. […] Who is this troll-creature? He peers 
more closely into the face. With a shock it comes home to him. The 
cratered skin, the scars swelling hard and livid in the cold, the thin 
beard growing out of the pock-marks – it is Nechaev again. (143)
 14 Matryona and Dostoevsky: “ ‘May I light a candle for him?’ ‘Yes, you may’ ” 
(78).
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Here we have it all: disgust expressed in ugliness and the mis-
shapenness of the raw flesh of the figure of enjoyment (“hard and 
livid”)15 juxtaposed against the child’s innocence set in the expanses 
of a purity of whiteness. But these are not really the beginnings 
of Dostoevsky’s son, since the boy is already seven years old; these 
are the beginnings of Dostoevsky’s image of him as a little innocent 
(a small colt in the purity of snow). So is the troll the Nechaevite 
aspect of Pavel (enjoyment) to develop in him later in life, or is it 
rather the image of Dostoevsky’s own obscene enjoyment of the spec-
tacle of innocence he has created? Because spectacles of innocence, in 
order to work properly, that is, to be sentimentally efficient, have to 
be ones of hurt innocence, as the nineteenth century novel (especially 
Dickens and Dostoevsky himself) taught us.
This is precisely Nechaev’s insight into Dostoevsky and the work-
ings of his enjoyment: “ ‘Don’t sentimentalise me, don’t pretend you 
are not my enemy. I know about your sentimentalising. You do it to 
women too, I’m sure. Women and little girls.’ He turns to the girl 
[a young prostitute they have encountered]. ‘You know all about it, 
don’t you? How men of that type drop tears when they hurt you, 
to lubricate their consciences and give themselves thrills’ ” (193). 
Dostoevsky’s sentimentalising about Pavel is only a screen that hides 
his aggression towards him, the aggression which comes to the fore 
every time the “real” Pavel (the one who does not fit his angelic im-
age) is mentioned: the Pavel who did not want to give up his jouis-
sance by getting up in the morning, or by abandoning his mother to 
Dostoevsky (“how could one love him when he was so suspicious, so 
unsmiling, when he clung to his mother like a leech, and grudged 
every minute she spent away from him” (151; emphasis added)), 
or the Pavel who thought that his new stepmother was too young 
for Dostoevsky. It is also transparent in the dream Dostoevsky has 
shortly after moving into Pavel’s old room, and, tellingly, just after 
he performs the sentimental spectacle of throwing himself on Pavel’s 
fresh grave before the eyes of Anna and her astonished daughter 
Matryona, where the imp of perverse enjoyment is with him all 
along (“Let her see there are no bounds!” (9), it whispers in his ear 
as it has always done during other demonstrations of self-abasement 
in front of women):
He is swimming underwater. The light is blue and dim. He banks 
and glides easily, gracefully; his hat seems to have gone, but in his 
 15 One cannot help but recall the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century im-
ages of misshapen onanists popular in religious educational pamphlets.
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black suit he feels like a turtle, a great old turtle in his natural 
element. […] He grows more and more ponderous, till his breast-
bone is brushing the silt of the river-bed. Pavel is lying on his back. 
His eyes are closed. […] From his turtle throat he gives a last cry, 
which seems to him more like a bark, and plunges toward the boy. 
He wants to kiss his face; but when he touches his hard lips to it, 
he is not sure he is not biting. (17–18)
The sentimentalised innocent Pavel is supposed to come and 
forgive, but since the very image of innocence is the outcome of 
Dostoevsky’s concealment of his own aggression (enjoyment!) from 
himself, he can appear either as an image “infected” by Nechaev (the 
master of “unnatural” enjoyment: “He tries to summon up Pavel’s 
face. But the face that appears to him instead, and appears with sur-
prising vividness, is […] the face of the young man who sat behind 
Bakunin on the stage at the Peace Congress two years ago” (49)), or 
else during the very enjoyment of making “illicit” extramarital love.16 
Hence Pavel is the one who “constitutionally” cannot forgive because 
he is an image made out of aggression whose other side is Nechaev, 
the very paragon of the fight to the death, of the slogan “everything 
is possible.” What is more, it is Nechaev who really occupies the 
position Dostoevsky “against himself” identifies with, though he rare-
ly has the courage to admit this (he invented the sentimentalised 
Pavel in order to dissimulate this identification to the world): “He 
[Nechaev] is like me, I was like him, he thinks – only I did not have 
the courage” (193). Therefore, in the final analysis, at least part of 
the disgust he feels towards Nechaev is a displaced disgust for Pavel 
(and, in the image of Pavel, also for Dostoevsky himself) for being 
a “bit of a sissy, in fact” (160), “a mascot” (100), while his professed 
reverence for Pavel’s idealism is a displaced reverence for Nechaev, 
a displacement which can easily be spotted in the two characteristic 
scenes of Pavel as the Good Samaritan and Nechaev as the Christ 
impostor.
The story of the white suit that had belonged to Pavel – the only 
substantiation of his otherwise vague innocence and goodness17 – is 
 16 And what makes for enjoyment is, of course, precisely its “illicitness” – with 
his legally wedded wife it comes not from making love but from self-abasement for 
wrongful deeds.
 17 One may note that Dostoevsky’s confessions to his wife (the source of his 
perverse enjoyment) are constructed quite similarly to his relation to Pavel – they 
are “tortured in expression yet vague in point of detail” (62). As for Pavel, there are 
many “infuriating” details Dostoevsky mentions about him, while his goodness is left 
mostly unsubstantiated.
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an insipidly didactic story,18 which does not show any imaginative 
engagement on Dostoevsky’s part. Its character remains a dead let-
ter: Dostoevsky only pays lip service to the flat image he chooses to 
identify with. He creates a cardboard protagonist fit to sentimental-
ise over but totally devoid of typically Dostoevskyan “spark”:
In Tver there lived a retired officer, a captain, whose sister kept 
house for him. The sister’s name was Maria Timofeyevna. She was 
a cripple. She was also weak in the head. […] A visitor from Moscow, 
a young man who wasn’t familiar with the situation, got into con-
versation with Maria and began to draw her out. […] She confided 
to this visitor that she was betrothed, or, as she said, “promised.” 
[…] And – it now emerged – the man she was convinced was going 
to marry her was none other than Pavel. Where she got the idea 
I don’t know. Maybe he gave her a smile one day, or complimented 
her on her bonnet – Pavel had a kind heart, that was one of the 
nicest things about him, wasn’t it? […] You can imagine what fun 
Tver society had with the story of Maria and her phantom suitor. 
[…] When Pavel heard the story, he went straight out and ordered 
a smart white suit. And the next thing he did was to call on the 
Lebyatkins, wearing his white suit and bearing flowers – roses, 
I believe. And though Captain Lebyatkin didn’t at first take kindly 
to it, Pavel won him over. To Maria he behaved very considerately, 
very politely, like a complete gentleman, though he was not yet 
twenty. The visits went on all summer, till he left Tver and came 
back to Petersburg. It was a lesson to everyone, a lesson in chiv-
alry. A lesson to me too. (72–74)19
As we noted earlier, it is precisely the creation of images of this kind 
that Nechaev accuses Dostoevsky of. While they talk about the pros-
titute’s hungry children, Nechaev explains, “These innocents would 
fall upon you like rats and chew you up if they did not know you 
were strong enough to beat them off. But you prefer not to recognize 
that. You prefer to see three little angels on a brief visit to earth” 
(186). It is obvious that the image of the “three little angels” is made 
precisely from the same pathetic imaginative stuff Pavel’s innocence 
is made of (although in his diary he shows only resentment towards 
his stepfather), while it is Nechaev who absorbs Dostoevsky’s imagi-
nation to a feverish degree. Fascination and something approaching 
reverence for Nechaev’s strength of will radiates from the image 
 18 Nineteenth century Christian educational pamphlets come to mind again.
 19 This story is, of course, taken from The Possessed where it is far from didac-
tic: it illustrates the perversity of Stavrogin – he courts Lebyatkin’s “simple” sister 
out of boredom and as a joke, then abandons her without a word.
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below (one among many instances), although it mixes glorification 
(admiration) with disgust (defence against such admiration):
More and more it is becoming clear: Nechaev will not be satisfied 
till he is in the hands of the police, till he has tasted that too. So 
that his courage and his resolution can be put to test. And he will 
come through – no doubt of that. He will not break. No matter how 
he is beaten or starved, he will never give in, not even fall sick. 
He will lose all his teeth and smile. He will drag his broken limbs 
around, roaring, strong as a lion. (193)
What is more, Dostoevsky is aware that his identification with the 
white suit, the image of chivalry and innocence, is obscene: “He 
opens Pavel’s suitcase and dons the white suit. Hitherto he has worn 
it as a gesture to the dead boy, a gesture of defiance and love. But 
now, looking in the mirror, he sees only a seedy imposture and, be-
yond that, something surreptitious and obscene, something that be-
longs behind the locked doors and curtained windows of rooms where 
men in wigs bare their rumps to be flogged” (71). In other words, he 
realises that his imaginary identification is fake, that the identifica-
tion itself is perversity because it is precisely by donning the white 
suit (whether actually or symbolically while sentimentalising about 
Pavel) that Dostoevsky can obscenely enjoy extremity, following in 
the footsteps of the lion-strong Nechaev. It is his pretended identifi-
cation with the (imagined?) prissiness of his weakling stepson that 
allows Dostoevsky to break all the chains which prevent his enjoy-
ment (“Let her [Anna] see there are no bounds!” (9)).
The aggression directed towards Pavel is so strong that it must 
have deeper foundations than just the disappointment of a noted 
stepfather in a middling stepson and Maximov is clever enough to 
strike at the core of Dostoevsky’s problem in a passage we have 
quoted earlier: “Not easy to be a father, is it? I am a father my-
self, but luckily a father of daughters. I would not wish to be the 
father of sons in our age. But didn’t your own father… wasn’t there 
some unpleasantness with your father, or do I misremember?” (45). 
The unpleasantness he is talking about is partly explained later by 
Nechaev: “I know about your father, Pavel Isaev told me – what 
a petty tyrant he was, how everyone hated him, till his own peasants 
killed him. You think that because you and your father hated each 
other, the history of the world has to consist of nothing but fathers 
and sons at war with each other” (188–89). (This is more or less an 
accurate image of the historical Dostoevsky’s father. Moreover, we 
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know that, later in his life, he lived permanently drunk and created 
for himself a little harem from among his peasants).20 In this way 
the figure of the obscene Master appears again.
Dostoevsky has to construe the image of his stepson as pure and 
innocent (a stranger to enjoyment) because he knows very well that 
in the eyes of his stepson it is he himself who had assumed the po-
sition of the hated Master, not primarily the Master Writer, but the 
Master of (“unnatural,” “obscene”) Enjoyment, because of his mar-
riage to Anna Snitkina (the wife left in Dresden), a woman more 
or less of Pavel’s own age, and thus a generation younger than 
Dostoevsky himself. Because of what he feels to be the “obscenity” 
of this marriage, Pavel does not want to admit that his stepparents 
share a bed: “Pavel was nineteen, yet obstinately would not accept 
that she, Anna Grigoryevna, would henceforth share his father’s bed. 
For the year they all lived together Pavel maintained the fiction that 
Anya was simply his father’s companion: someone to keep house, or-
der the groceries, attend to the laundry” (108). Thus we come across 
a deeper source of the excessive guilt Dostoevsky feels in connec-
tion with his stepson. As we have noted, although he sentimentalises 
Pavel most of the time and displays the idealised image of the boy 
as the source of his guilt (the guilt of not loving him enough), what 
he really remembers about his stepson are the moments he behaved 
like a brat (“half a dozen times in a single night they would hear 
from the next room that high, insistent little voice calling to his 
mother to come and kill the mosquito that was biting him” (151)), so 
this source of guilt is only a screen that is paraded before the eyes of 
the world in order to hide a different source of guilt and to provide 
a bit of masochistic enjoyment in Dostoevsky’s self-abasing kneeling 
before the image of his stepson.21 What seems to be the real source 
of guilt has to do with Pavel but on a different level: Pavel is a kind 
of mirror – in his eyes Dostoevsky sees his own resemblance to his 
own father, the obscene father of enjoyment, the drunken tyrant, the 
master of his harem.22 The father who is supposed to be dead unex-
 20 Mackiewicz, Dostojewski, 18.
 21 Pavel is presented as beautiful, chaste, innocent, etc., so his image is in 
a conventional way feminised.
 22 Gilles Deleuze, “Coldness and Cruelty” in: Masochism (New York: Zone Books, 
1991), 60: “The masochist feels guilty, he asks to be beaten, he expiates, but why 
and for what crime? Is it not precisely the father-image in him that is thus mini-
aturized, beaten, ridiculed and humiliated? What the subject atones for is his re-
semblance to the father and the father’s likeness in him: the formula of masochism 
is the humiliated father.”
~ 135  ~
pectedly rears his ugly head in his son, Dostoevsky, and therefore, 
in order to deny his own obscenity, Dostoevsky has to invent the 
fantasy of a virgin son, Pavel, with whom he can identify.
But it is more than just a matter of guilt. When Nechaev con-
fronts Dostoevsky with his image of master jouisseur (the image 
Pavel passed on to Nechaev), he confronts him with much more than 
just an aspect of his stepson which Dostoevsky was not aware of or 
did not want to be aware of – he brings before his eyes the whole 
set of dubious identifications that Dostoevsky’s existence is based on, 
the questioning of which evokes a feeling close to panic.
The first thing Nechaev questions is the centrality of the father-
son relation, which is crucial to Dostoevsky for reasons we shall 
shortly come to. In a twist thoroughly typical of Dostoevsky, when 
he is accused of perversity by Nechaev (“You know all about it, don’t 
you? How men of that type drop tears when they hurt you, to lubri-
cate their consciences and give themselves thrills” (193)), he immedi-
ately comes up with an image of the father as Nechaev’s last chance 
to be saved: “Go home to your father. You have a father somewhere 
in Ivanovo, if I remember. Go to him, kneel, ask him to hide you. 
He will do it. There are no limits to what a father will do” (194). 
As we can see, the kneeling posture and the feeling of consuming 
boundlessness (“Let her see there are no bounds!”), characteristic for 
Dostoevsky’s method of enjoyment, are already there and Nechaev 
reads them correctly, countering with another image, a corrective 
to the elevated image of fatherhood, and brings before Dostoevsky’s 
eyes the way the father enjoys:
My father! What do you know about my father? I’m not a ninny 
like your stepson! I don’t cling to the people who oppress me! I left 
my father’s house when I was sixteen and I’ve never been back. Do 
you know why? Because he beat me. I said, “Beat me once more 
and you will never see me again.” So he beat me and he never saw 
me again. From that day he ceased to be my father. I am my own 
father now. I have made myself over. […] You say there are no 
limits to what a father will do. Do you know that my father shows 
my letters to the police? I write to my sisters and he steals the 
letters and copies them for the police and they pay him. Those are 
his limits. (194)
What we have here is another image of boundless obscenity of the 
father at the same time enjoying his own aggression (beating) and 
participating in the jouissance of Power supposedly higher than him 
but which he perversely uses for the purpose of his own enjoyment 
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(by humiliating himself before that power: betraying his son for the 
“higher” purposes of the State). What is more, Dostoevsky himself 
invokes the truth of the boundlessness of “what a father will do” in 
the story of one of the convicts he met in Siberia:
He recalls a fellow-convict in Siberia, a tall, stooped, grey man who 
had violated his twelve-year-old daughter and then strangled her. 
He had been found after the event sitting by the side of a duckpond 
with the lifeless body in his arms. He had yielded without a strug-
gle, insisting only on carrying the dead child home himself and 
laying her on a table – doing all of this with, it was reported, the 
greatest tenderness. In the evenings he would sit on his bunk wear-
ing a quiet smile, his lips moving as he read the Gospels to himself. 
In time one might have expected the ostracism to relax, his contri-
tion to be accepted. But in fact he continued to be shunned, not so 
much for a crime committed twenty years ago as for that smile, in 
which there was something so sly and so mad that it chilled the 
blood. The same smile, they said one to another, as when he did 
the deed: nothing in his heart has changed. […] Does that explain 
Nechaev’s vengefulness: that his eyes have been opened to the fa-
thers naked, the band of fathers, their appetites bared? (124–25)
In this story we encounter the ultimate image of the obscene fa-
ther of jouissance hidden behind all the father figures in the novel 
(Maximov too is a jouisseur, getting his share of the enjoyment of his 
place of Power23) envious of the others’ enjoyment and complete with 
what looks like Christian humility but which in fact is just another 
way of getting off on self-abasement before the figure of authority.
There is a telling contrast between Nechaev’s “I am my own 
father now. I have made myself over,” and Dostoevsky’s “I am his 
[Pavel’s] mother and his father, I am everything to him, and more!” 
(16). Nechaev symbolically kills his “lawless” father (kills his fa-
ther’s image in himself), the father who did not introduce the Law 
which would limit also his own and not only his son’s enjoyment.24 
 23 “A father like an old rat creeping in afterwards upon the love-scene to see 
what is left for him. Sitting on the corpse in the dark, pricking his ears, gnawing, 
listening, gnawing. Is that why the police-pack hunts the free youth of Petersburg 
so vengefully, with Maximov, the good father, at its head?” (107).
 24 In Lacanian psychoanalysis the proper father function consists of two mo-
ments: alienation and separation. Alienation consists of the father’s “No!” (prohibi-
tion), which separates the child from the mother (hence it is called symbolic castra-
tion), creating a lack in the mother; while separation is the naming (symbolising) of 
this lack, in other words, naming what the mother lacks, that is, what she desires. 
With alienation the father prohibits enjoyment, with separation he introduces the 
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Yet he sees no proper fathers around him, all of them are obscene 
jouisseurs preying on their own or others’ children in one way or 
another (Nechaev, disguised as a woman to hide from the police, 
says: “Do you know what it is like to be a woman by yourself on 
the streets of Petersburg? […] Do you know what you have to lis-
ten to? Men dog your footsteps whispering filth such as you cannot 
imagine, and you are helpless against it! […] Or perhaps you can 
imagine it only too well. Perhaps what I describe is only too famil-
iar to you” (102)). Thus, in order to “make himself over” Nechaev 
looks for a clear cut:
You think that because you and your father hated each other, the 
history of the world has to consist of nothing but fathers and sons 
at war with each other. You don’t understand the meaning of the 
revolution. Revolution is the end of everything old, including fa-
thers and sons. It is the end of successions and dynasties. And it 
keeps renewing itself, if it is true revolution. With each generation 
the old revolution is overturned and history starts again. That is 
the new idea, the truly new idea. Year One. Carte blanche. When 
everything is reinvented, everything erased and reborn: law, moral-
ity, the family, everything. (189)
Surprisingly enough, for Nechaev it is Dostoevsky himself who 
stands behind this fantasy of permanent revolution much more than 
Bakunin or other revolutionaries of the time, because Dostoevsky 
is the creator of the character of Raskolnikov, whom Nechaev ad-
mires. Raskolnikov, who severed the connection with “everything 
old” by means of the blow of the axe, tests the new idea which 
puts an end to “law, morality, the family, everything.” Raskolnikov 
smashes the heads not only of the old usurer but also of her in-
nocent and, not surprisingly, “simple” sister (a soul-mate of Maria 
Timofieyevna), since, as we have seen, these two images have to 
Law, which consists of the rules and aims that the child should pursue in order to 
be loved by his parents (symbolic achievements). The important thing is that the 
Law, to fulfil its function, has to be obeyed by the parents as well – this allows the 
child to transform his enjoyment of the mother into achieving cultural goals, which 
the parents desire. The “obscene” father is the father who does not obey the Law 
– the one who threatens, but does not accept any limitations of his jouissance, he 
prohibits and punishes because he “feels like it” at a given moment, not because he 
himself accepts the Law. In this situation the child is not able to identify with the 
Law (the Name-of-the-Father) and remains stalled at the level of jouissance of the 
mother, which overwhelms him (Bruce Fink, A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis: Theory and Technique (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1999), chapter 9).
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go together to be effective – killing the image of obscenity means 
also killing the image of innocence, since the latter is always the 
creation of the former.
There is, however, in Crime and Punishment a twist that at first 
sight may seem at odds with the story of struggle of sons against fa-
thers: the obscene jouisseur who is killed by Raskolnikov is a woman, 
not a man, and so ultimately represents the mother, not the father. 
Yet this complication may be no obstacle at all if we recall that the 
father we have been speaking about so far is not the representative 
of the proper father function in the family (the Name-of-the-Father 
who introduces the Law), but the primal father of the psychoana-
lytic myth of the genesis of culture invented by Freud in Totem and 
Taboo, the father of enjoyment who did not obey any laws and who 
enjoyed all women, killing, castrating or exiling his sons as rivals. 
What is more, since in the triangle of mother-father-son it is the fa-
ther (paternal function) who is the representative of the Law, erect-
ing bounds for jouissance by separating the child from the mother, 
the assertion which tries to undo the “triangulation” and revert to 
undifferentiated plenitude (“I am his mother and his father, I am 
everything to him, and more!” (16)) must be the product of the rival 
agency, that is, the maternal superego.
As we have already noted, Dostoevsky’s formula of jouissance is 
“there are no bounds,” a jouissance which he experiences as a vortex 
of time and space in which the world around becomes confusion and 
what remains is only the feeling of falling (69). Or it may be “the 
vortex of darkness into which he is descending inside the woman’s 
body” (56). But the ultimate image of what it means to enjoy is 
nothing other than the epileptic fit: it starts in “joy breaking like 
a dawn,” to be exacerbated into “a wave of terror [which] overtakes 
him, terror without object,” to culminate in complete disappearance 
of the subject: “There is a cry that echoes down the stairwell, so 
loud and so frightful that sleepers are woken by it. As for him, he 
hears nothing, he is gone, there is no longer time” (68). The fits, 
the conjunction of joy and terror, are “not visitations. Far from it: 
they are nothing – mouthfuls of his life sucked out of him as if by 
a whirlwind that leaves behind not even a memory of darkness” (69).
Thus we come to the pernicious side of jouissance: enjoyment be-
comes a cause of anxiety, because to enjoy fully would mean to dis-
appear as a subject, to disappear completely inside the mother’s body 
and become her instrument of enjoyment. “There are no bounds” sig-
nifies, therefore, the disappearance of the Law, recession into a state 
where there is nothing but enjoyment of the maternal Thing, which 
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is neither good nor bad because there is nothing apart from it. For 
this reason, the paternal “No!” is a prohibition (of enjoyment of the 
mother) and therefore introduces a boundary between what is al-
lowed and what is not, which ultimately becomes a separation of 
good and evil. However, in order that the Law be introduced prop-
erly it has to be the Name-of-the-Father, not the prohibition of the 
father of enjoyment for whom there are also no bounds (his enjoy-
ment is the law). This, of course, is the case of Dostoevsky’s father: 
there was no “objective” split into good and evil introduced by him 
– since the only thing that counted was his enjoyment, what was evil 
yesterday, today may turn out to be good. And it is precisely this 
image of himself that Dostoevsky finds in the eyes of his stepson, in 
spite of all his apophatic flights.
What is more, the parallel with the Freudian myth of the origin 
of culture can be extended in our context: as the tyrannous primal 
father is murdered by the confederacy of brothers (his sons), the old 
jouisseur Dostoevsky père gets killed by a bunch of peasants who 
by this act undoubtedly fulfil the wishes of his son. Moreover, the 
killers remain unpunished because if tried by the legal system, they 
would have been sent to Siberia and be lost as property to the fami-
ly.25 In the psychoanalytic myth, after their aggression is spent in 
the act of killing and devouring the father, their love of him gets the 
better of the brothers, so in order to overcome their guilt they estab-
lish him in the realm of the sacred, or rather with the establishment 
of the father in the dimension beyond mundane existence, the realm 
of the sacred is invented. In other words, by creating the image of 
the perfect father (which is possible only when the obscene murder-
ous father is already dead and therefore no longer an actual threat), 
they take upon themselves the guilt of killing him (while in fact they 
did only what their father had done: killing, castrating, exiling his 
sons – their guilt is, therefore, their resemblance to the father), in 
this way erasing from their memory his tyranny and obscenity. The 
brothers kill the father and thereby establish laws that the “real” 
father did not know or needed (what should and should not be done 
– what is good, what is evil), laws that the Name-of-the-Father (the 
dead father turned divine) guarantees. Old Dostoevsky’s peasants, 
however, just kill – the “No!” spoken to obscene enjoyment is voiced 
with all its force, yet the “contents” of the Law (What is good? What 
is evil?) remain enigmatic.
 25 Mackiewicz, Dostojewski, 18.
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To a certain extent, Dostoevsky does what the brothers did: he dis-
places his guilt as the imaginary killer of his father into acknowledg-
ing the omnipotence of the idealised image of the Father (God) which 
allows him at the same time to erase the excesses and depravities 
of his biological father. But since those who got rid of the obscenity 
were the “Russian People,” the image of God becomes identified with 
a specifically Russian God as the only true God, who established 
His rule by conquering the obscene Baal (from now on identified, 
by Dostoevsky, with the depraved God of Western Europe26). After 
the act, however, this God keeps silent, as it has no discourse of its 
own, so its Law remains enigmatic. What is more, its Law cannot 
be the law of Russian monarchy27 because the peasants are not tried 
and punished as they should be. So we come again to the question 
with which we started in relation to Pavel (What does he want?) 
but this time in the form: how are we to distinguish good from evil? 
(What is the command of the Russian God? What does He want?) 
This question must be answered if the lawless (“boundless”) rule of 
the father of jouissance is to be broken for good, but, as we have 
already seen, Dostoevsky, unable to distinguish between good and 
evil,28 finds himself in the position of his own father in the eyes of 
his stepson who sees clearly that Dostoevsky is an “unnatural” jouis-
seur not only in enjoying his too young wife, but precisely in the way 
he offers himself to the Russian God – what he offers to Him is not 
his obedience but enjoyment, or rather his obedience takes the form 
of enjoyment: the guilt of the son for killing the father is transformed 
not into reluctantly (joylessly) obeying his word (the Law) but into 
excessive self-abasement before the enigmatic image of the Stranger 
(Dostoevsky’s voluptuous breast-beating in front of his wife is only 
a version of that) whose message is expressed in apophatic language, 
that is, language whose meaning is always unclear because deferred 
by contradiction (“darkness swaddled in darkness”), the language in 
which “there are no bounds”:
 26 There is nothing on the depravity of Western Christianity in The Master of 
Petersburg, but I think we can borrow this typical trait of the historical Dostoevsky 
for the purposes of our argument.
 27 In nineteenth-century Russia, the autonomy of religious from secular author-
ity is almost non-existent – the Church, since the times of Peter I, has been com-
pletely under control of the monarchy’s functionaries.
 28 “He lies down on the bed, his arms tight across his chest, breathing fast, try-
ing to expel the demon that is taking him over. He knows he resembles nothing so 
much as a corpse laid out, and what he calls a demon may be nothing but his own 
soul flailing his wings” (16).
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Because it is not his son he must not go back to bed but must get 
dressed and answer the call. If he expects his son to come as a thief 
in the night, and listens only for the call of the thief, he will never 
see him. If he expects his son to speak in the voice of the unexpect-
ed, he will never hear him. As long as he expects what he does not 
expect, what he does not expect will not come. Therefore – paradox 
within paradox, darkness swaddled in darkness – he must answer 
to what he does not expect. (80)
Since Dostoevsky does not know the Law (What is good? What 
is evil?), the only thing he can offer to this enigmatic divinity is his 
enjoyment. However, as we have already noted, the injunction to 
enjoy is the Mother’s injunction and it is to her that the enjoyment 
is offered.29 In other words, it is the Mother (Mother Russia!) whose 
wholeness is protected by such an offering and it is the Mother who 
demands it (“I am not here in Russia in this time of ours to live 
a life free of pain. I am required to live – what shall I call it? – 
a Russian life: a life inside Russia, or with Russia inside me, and 
whatever Russia means. It is not a fate I can evade” (221)).30 Since 
 29 “The pervert constitutes himself as what is lacking in the mOther. […] He 
becomes what she is missing […] and what she wants. […] The Other’s desire/lack 
is […] anxiety producing, insofar as it is not named; the pervert’s solution to this 
anxiety is to become the object that can stop up the desire by providing the Other 
with jouissance” (Fink, A Clinical Introduction, 176); “Freud reveals to us that it is 
thanks to the Name-of-the-Father that man does not remain bound [attaché] to the 
sexual service of his mother” (Lacan, Écrits, 723).
 30 Slavoj Žižek, “Woman is One of the Names­of­the­Father, or How Not To 
Misread Lacan’s Formulas of Sexuation,” Lacanian Ink, No. 10 (1995): 6 Aug. 2006 
<http://www.lacan.com/zizwoman.htm>: “The usual way of misreading Lacan’s for-
mulas of sexuation is to reduce the difference of the masculine and the feminine 
side to the two formulas that define the masculine position, as if masculine is the 
universal phallic function and feminine the exception, the excess, the surplus that 
eludes the grasp of the phallic function. Such a reading completely misses Lacan’s 
point, which is that this very position of the Woman as exception – say, in the 
guise of the Lady in courtly love – is a masculine fantasy par excellence. As the 
exemplary case of the exception constitutive of the phallic function, one usually 
mentions the fantasmatic, obscene figure of the primordial father-jouisseur who was 
not encumbered by any prohibition and was as such able fully to enjoy all women. 
Does, however, the figure of the Lady in courtly love not fully fit these determina-
tions of the primordial father? Is she not also a capricious Master who wants it 
all, that is, who, herself not bound by any Law, charges her knight-servant with 
arbitrary and outrageous ordeals? […] In this precise sense, Woman is one of the 
names-of-the-father. The crucial details not to be missed here are the use of plural 
and the lack of capital letters: not Name-of-the-Father, but one of the names-of-the-
father – one of the nominations of the excess called primordial father. In the case 
of Woman – the mythical She, the Queen from Rider Haggard’s novel of the same 
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language is the outcome of the paternal “No!,” the Mother’s demand 
is the demand for jouissance, which is pre-symbolic and cannot be 
expressed in language.31 The enjoyment is therefore offered to the 
Mother (Mother Russia) whose representative becomes the immacu-
lately conceived (no enjoyment involved) son, Jesus/Pavel. Because 
the Mother’s demand is pre-symbolic, it is necessarily enigmatic 
(therefore expressed in apophatic discourse, which cannot be prop-
erly understood: what does it mean to save a dead child?). However, 
that this demand is addressed to Dostoevsky he has never any 
doubt, even if others – Nechaev, Maximov, Anna – try to persuade 
him it may not be so. Not knowing what to offer Pavel (not knowing 
what he wanted, not knowing what was good and what was evil for 
him), he offers himself instead, providing self-laceration (a form of 
enjoyment) before Pavel’s idealised image. And, at the end of all the 
substitutions described above, Dostoevsky lands in the position of 
the lawful father, one that is dead, that is, free of enjoyment (“I am 
the one who is dead, he [Dostoevsky] thinks” (19)),32 because his re-
lationship to Pavel is also one of “immaculate conception”; he claims 
to be his father emotionally (to love him dearly as a son), but he is 
not his father “sexually” (the son came to life without sexual enjoy-
ment on Dostoevsky’s part), so his jouissance (self-laceration) can be 
presented as precisely the loss thereof (mourning).33
name for example – as well as in the case of the primordial father, we are dealing 
with an agency of power which is pre-symbolic, unbridled by the Law of castration; 
in both cases, the role of this fantasmatic agency is to fill out the vicious cycle of 
the symbolic order, the void of its origins: what the notion of Woman (or of the pri-
mordial father) provides is the mythical starting point of unbridled fullness whose 
‘primordial repression’ constitutes the symbolic order.”
 31 Fink, A Clinical Introduction, 176. It cannot be expressed in language, in the 
sense that it cannot be symbolised in it, but as we have noted it appears in lan-
guage as enjoyment of apophatic discourse, which produces no proper meaning (jou-
issance of language similar to the acute enjoyment children derive from nonsensical 
nursery rhymes, etc.). This is why Dostoevsky’s discourse is “confession without end” 
(222) – there is no message in it, just enjoyment.
 32 “How, indeed, could Freud fail to recognise such an affinity, when the neces-
sity of his reflection led him to tie the appearance of the signifier of the Father, 
as author of the Law, to death – indeed to the killing of the father – thus showing 
that, if this murder is the fertile moment of the debt by which the subject binds 
himself for life to the Law, the symbolic Father, insofar as he signifies this Law, is 
truly the dead Father” (Lacan, Écrits, 464).
 33 “Sentence had been pronounced; and the letter of sentence, addressed to me, 
was on its way, passing from hand to hand, only I did not know it. The joy of your 
life is over: that is what the sentence said” (9).
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Even on the “political” plane, the only answer Dostoevsky can 
provide to the problem of the poor is offering oneself to the Other’s 
enjoyment. When Nechaev evokes for Dostoevsky the image of the 
revolution (the announcement of the new Law, Day One: “The first 
work will be to raze the banks to the ground, and the stock ex-
changes, and the government ministries, raze them so thoroughly 
that they will never be rebuilt” (182)), Dostoevsky provides him with 
another way of “solving” the problem:
This little girl […] If you were to give her a good wash and cut her 
hair and put a new dress on her, I could direct you to an establish-
ment where tonight, this very night, she could earn you a hundred 
roubles on your five-rouble investment. And if you feed her prop-
erly and kept her clean and didn’t overuse her or allow her to get 
sick, she could go on earning you five roubles a night for another 
five years at least […] There are enough children in the cellars of 
Petersburg, and enough gentlemen on the streets with money in 
their pockets and a taste for young flesh, to bring prosperity to all 
the poor folk of the city. All that is required is a cool head. (182–83)
One could say that Dostoevsky is trying to reduce ad absurdum 
what he perceives as Nechaev’s Jesuitism (“Everything is permitted 
for the sake of the future” (200)), were it not for his own “taste for 
young flesh.” Of course, Dostoevsky may be too refined (or twisted) 
to enjoy the physical violation of children, but he has other ways of 
making them serve his enjoyment. We have already mentioned the 
ways he gets off on his fantasy of Pavel and his memory, but the 
story does not end here. As the image of Pavel fades out in his mind 
and is gradually overshadowed by Nechaev’s, it is Matryona, Anna 
Kolenkina’s daughter, who assumes the central focus of his atten-
tion, because it appears to Dostoevsky that “somewhere in her he 
[Pavel] still lives, breathing the warm, sweet breath of youth” (14).34 
Although Dostoevsky ends up in bed with Anna, her mother, this 
can be conceived as a roundabout way to get to Matryona, as is clear 
from an imaginary scenario in Dostoevsky’s head35:
If he were more confident of his French he would channel this 
disturbing excitement into a book of the kind one cannot publish 
in Russia […]. A book that she, Anna Sergeyevna, its true beget-
 34 In the moments when Dostoevsky stops his sentimentalising, we find that 
the children’s attitude towards Dostoevsky is the same: “[Pavel] did not take to me” 
(143) and “Matryona does not like me” (167).
 35 It is also something Anna finally accuses him of: “It’s the truth, clear for 
anyone to see! You use me as a route to her, and I cannot bear it!” (231).
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ter, would never see. With a chapter in which the noble memoirist 
reads aloud to the young daughter of his mistress a story of the 
seduction of a young girl in which he himself emerges more and 
more clearly as having been the seducer. A story full of intimate 
detail and innuendo which by no means seduces the daughter but 
on the contrary frightens her and disturbs her sleep and makes her 
so doubtful of her own purity that three days later she gives herself 
up to him in despair, in the most shameful of ways, in a way of 
which no child could conceive were the story of her own seduction 
and surrender and the manner of its doing not deeply impressed 
on her beforehand. (134)
Dostoevsky’s own version of frightening and disturbing sleep is less 
“frenchified” (not an erotic story) and much more bluntly Russian. 
In the middle of relating to Matryona the story of Pavel’s white suit 
(a schoolbook sentimental tale which no doubt would be approved as 
suitable for young girls), he strikes:
“Perhaps, in her simplicity, she thought that is what the world 
is: a place where you get beaten. […] That is how a dog must see 
the world, after all, or a horse. Why should Maria [Timofeyevna 
Lebyatkin] be different? A horse does not understand that it has 
been born into the world to pull carts. It thinks it is here to be 
beaten. It thinks of a cart as a huge object it is tied to so that 
it cannot run away while it is being beaten.” […] He knows: she 
rejects with all her soul the vision of the world he is offering. She 
wants to believe in goodness. But her belief is tentative, without 
resilience. He feels no mercy toward her. This is Russia! he wants 
to say, forcing the words upon her, rubbing her face in them. In 
Russia you cannot afford to be a delicate flower. In Russia you 
must be a burdock or a dandelion. (72–73)
Then he adds to it the tale of the indifferent God (“It is more 
likely that Pavel put himself at risk, to see whether God loved him 
enough to save him. He asked God a question – Will you save me? 
– and God gave him an answer. God said: No. God said: Die” (75)) 
and even provides an illustration of what such a God may look like, 
giving his own lascivious smile to him (“an ugly, crooked, bearded 
smile” (75)), the smile of the God through whose mask of indifference 
obscenity is breaking through. In other words, in the way Dostoevsky 
relates the imaginary death of Pavel, he provides Matryona with the 
story of a God who actually enjoys the death of the son.36 So, rather 
 36 “He said to God: If you love me, save me. But there was only silence. Then he 
said: I know you are there, I know you hear me. I will wager my life that you will 
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than with the image of Jesus (Pavel?) whose message is clear (“Love 
your neighbour”),37 Matryona is presented with the trauma of the 
God whose truth is the horrific demand of Abraham: “Kill me your 
son.”38 Having thus hurt Matryona, Dostoevsky has her sobbing in 
his arms (“she gives herself up to him in despair”) in a way under-
standing that her life too is in danger (“I don’t understand […] why 
did he have to die?” (76) – it is also a question about herself, her 
mortality, and the cruelty of God) and Dostoevsky can unashamedly 
enjoy her suffering. Obscene images ride through his mind:
He thinks of a little terracotta statue he saw in the ethnographic 
museum in Berlin: the Indian god Shiva lying on his back, blue 
and dead, and riding on him the figure of a terrible goddess, many-
armed, wide-mouthed, staring-eyed, ecstatic – riding him, drawing 
the divine seed out of him. […] He has no difficulty in imagining 
this child in her ecstasy. His imagination seems to have no bounds. 
(76; emphasis added)
Moreover, it is a moment of clarity for him, as he is perfectly aware 
of what he is doing:
This is as far as violation goes: the girl in the crook of his arm, the 
five fingers of his hand, white and dumb, gripping her shoulder. But 
she might as well be sprawled naked. One of those girls who give 
themselves because their natural motion is to be good, to submit. 
He thinks of child-prostitutes he has known, here and in Germany; 
he thinks of men who search out such girls because beneath the 
garish paint and provocative clothes they detect something that 
outrages them, a certain inviolability, a certain maidenliness. She 
is prostituting the Virgin, such a man says, recognizing the flavour 
of innocence in the gesture with which the girl cups her breasts 
for him, in the movement with which she spreads her thighs. In 
the tiny room with its stale odours, she gives off a faint, desperate 
smell of spring, of flowers, that he cannot bear. Deliberately, with 
teeth clenched, he hurts her again and again, beyond mere wincing, 
mere bearing of pain: for the sudden wide-eyed look of a creature 
that begins to understand its life is in danger. (76–77)
save me. And still God said nothing. Then he said: However much you stay silent, 
I know you hear me. I am going to make my wager – now! And he threw down his 
wager. And God did not appear. God did not intervene” (75).
 37 Pavel’s death, as told by Dostoevsky, can be read as the story of Jesus’s death 
– the Jesus of atheists who shouts “Why have you forsaken me?” – dies, and is not 
resurrected.
 38 The demand which is as enigmatic and incomprehensible as the demand of 
Mother Russia already mentioned.
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So Dostoevsky’s story of prostituting the Virgin which he tells to 
Nechaev is not just a perverse but ultimately harmless story (“This 
is all out of one of your books! It is all part of your perverse make-
believe!” is Nechaev’s reaction (184)), but a scenario which consti-
tutes the backbone of Dostoevsky’s convoluted relationship with his 
jouissance, the core of his existence.
It also adds to the understanding of possession that Dostoevsky 
so often evokes. There is a moment in which Dostoevsky’s jouissance 
materialises in front of his eyes in a hallucinatory way: while talking 
to Matryona about Nechaev, warning her about him (being jealous 
that he has stolen Matryona from him: now instead of listening to 
his obscene stories about God, she embraces Nechaev’s fantasy of 
the revolution), his enjoyment jumps at him with all its force in the 
image of the “possessed” Matryona: “Her lips part, the corners of her 
mouth quiver. She is going to cry, he thinks. But it is not like that 
at all. When she raises her eyes, he is enveloped in a glance that 
is at once shameless and derisive. She draws away from his hand, 
tossing her hair. ‘No!’ he says. The smile she wears is taunting, pro-
vocative. Then the spell passes and she is a child as before, confused, 
ashamed” (213).
Dostoevsky rightly recognises the source of what happened – it is 
as if he were present to himself during his fit, that is, in the moment 
when his jouissance breaks out and wipes out his self:
It is impossible that what he has just seen has truly taken place. 
What he has seen comes not from the world he knows but from 
another existence. It is as though for the first time he has been 
present and conscious during a seizure; so that for the first time his 
eyes have been open to where he is when he is seized. In fact, he 
must wonder whether seizure is any longer the right word, whether 
the word has not all along been possession – whether everything 
that for the past twenty years has gone under the name of sei-
zure has not been a mere presentiment of what is now happening, 
the quaking and dancing of the body a long-drawn-out prelude to 
a quaking of the soul. (213)
Although it is Nechaev who Dostoevsky calls possessed, the truth 
of what he calls possession turns out to have its source in his own 
jouissance, which he cannot bear any longer39 and which, when it 
disfigures the image of Matryona, frightens him.
 39 It is a Lacanian commonplace that the human body is not made to the meas-
ure of jouissance.
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Dostoevsky knows the price of jouissance: it is the loss of real-
ity, the state of falling without up and down, the loss of the self 
experienced in the epileptic fit; therefore, as he himself voices it, 
he needs somebody to save him. In other words, he needs somebody 
who would put a stop to jouissance, somebody who would announce 
the Law (prohibit jouissance), somebody who would introduce coordi-
nates creating up and down, draw the boundary between good and 
evil. At first he thinks of Pavel as such a person, the fantastic vision 
of an innocent Pavel created in the image of Christ, who, kissing 
Dostoevsky on the lips (“I want to have him back […]. I want to kiss 
him on the lips” (140)), would inaugurate a new era, open the new 
dispensation, announce the new Law. But, as we have already noted, 
Dostoevsky’s image of Pavel is just a screen behind which his own 
jouissance is hidden, which even Dostoevsky belatedly recognises – 
now the Christ imagery of resurrection becomes a source of fear of 
the son who has risen against his father: “He knows now why he 
has not gone back to Yelagin Island [where Pavel is buried]. It is 
because he fears to see the soil tossed aside, the grave yawning, the 
body gone. A corpse improperly buried; burried now within him, in 
his breast, no longer weeping but hissing madness, whispering to 
him to fall. […] He is sick and he knows the name of his sickness. 
Nechaev, voice of the age, calls it vengefulness, but a truer name, 
less grand, would be resentment” (234).
But even before fully admitting to such resentment, he must have 
known about it somehow, since this is precisely why he “prostitutes” 
Pavel’s image (innocence) in Matryona. Why does he do it, however, 
knowing that it is precisely what causes his “falling”? It is done be-
cause he wants to provoke the Other into announcing the Law, into 
introducing a prohibition. Yet the Other is reluctant to do this, s/he 
has to be frightened into it, jouissance offered must reach the level s/he 
cannot bear any more.40 So the moment comes when it is all too much 
to Anna and she says her “No!” when Dostoevsky announces that he 
would like to have a child with her (“No! This is my decision” (224)).
 40 Fink, A Clinical Introduction, 187: “ ‘The masochist tries to bring something 
into being… by which the Other’s desire makes the law” ([Lacan] Seminar X, 
January 16, 1963), and the Other must often first be made extremely anxious before 
he agrees to enunciate the law. Though the masochist seems to be single-mindedly 
devoting himself to “pleasuring” the Other, the Other cannot take it after a certain 
point: jouissance becomes unbearable, and the partner finally imposes limits on it. 
By making the Other anxious (by making himself into the instrument of the Other’s 
jouissance), the masochist manages to get himself commanded (se faire commander, 
a formulation of the masochist’s drive).”
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Moreover, simultaneously the true sense of possession comes to 
the fore again: “It is the word he himself uses, though he cannot 
believe in the same sense as she. The devil: [Anna uses it] the in-
stant at the onset of the climax. When the soul is twisted out of 
the body and begins its downward spiral into oblivion. And, flinging 
her head from side to side, clenching her jaw, grunting, it is not 
hard to see her too as possessed by the devil” (230–31). Again, it is 
Dostoevsky who is the devil provoking others and frightening them 
at the same time, his excessive jouissance painting the ugly obscene 
smile on the surface of reality as was the case with his vision of the 
possessed Matryona. Her mother, however, cannot bear it anymore – 
Dostoevsky’s enjoyment frightens her too much, so she breaks down 
and tells him to leave Petersburg (231–32). Thus Dostoevsky suc-
ceeds in provoking a breakdown, yet his success is only temporary 
– it does not produce the announcement of the law: Anna pronounces 
her “No!” but a few hours later she recants and returns to bed again 
for more (“Don’t pay attention to what I said. […] There are times 
when I am not myself [possessed?], you must get used to that” (232)), 
wiping herself and him out in a sexual trance (“At first her intensity 
carries itself over to him. There is a long passage in which he again 
loses all sense of who he is, who she is. About them is an incan-
descent sphere of pleasure; inside the sphere they float like twins 
gyrating slowly” (230)).
What is more, Dostoevsky’s plan of “prostituting the Virgin” (and 
Pavel’s image in her) by confronting her with enjoyment in the most 
blatant image of sex and seduction (as planned for the “French” nov-
el) is finally realised now, when the child finds them naked after the 
night of “possession”: “This is how he and she are when Matryona 
finds them in the morning: her mother, wild-haired, fast asleep in 
the crook of his arm, snoring lightly; and he in the act of opening 
his eyes on the grave child at the door. […] She sees all, she knows 
all” (232–33). The moment Anna refrains from pursuing the path of 
castration (“Don’t pay attention to what I said” instead of “No!”), it 
is inevitable that the whole situation will be turned by Dostoevsky 
to his advantage, that is, as another way of increasing his enjoyment 
by using the mother as a route to the child.
The outcome of this exacerbation of jouissance cannot be any-
thing else than falling, but this time not a falling into an epileptic 
fit – it is becoming clear that all the histrionics about being saved 
by Pavel or God were just a smokescreen behind which another pos-
session takes place: “There is a choice before him. He can cry out 
in the midst of this shameful fall, beat his arms like wings, call 
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upon God or his wife to save him [Dostoevsky’s usual method of 
self-abasement]. Or he can give himself to it, refuse the chloroform 
of terror or unconsciousness, watch and listen instead for the mo-
ment which may or may not arrive – it is not in his power to force 
it – when from being a body plunging into darkness he shall be-
come a body within whose core a plunge into darkness is taking 
place, a body which contains its own falling and its own darkness” 
(234). Thus, the image of darkness swaddled in darkness reappears 
again but this time the darkness in Dostoevsky is far from sublim-
ity of apophatic discourse: “The madness is in him and he is in the 
madness; they think each other; what they call each other, whether 
madness or epilepsy or vengeance or the spirit of the age, is of no 
consequence” (235). Moreover, the apophatic figure of the stranger in 
the night also returns in a new guise. Although Dostoevsky cannot 
completely dispense with the familiar discourse he has been using 
freely throughout the novel41 for reasons we have already analysed, 
the stranger in the night – the one who was supposed to be Pavel 
coming to save him at the beginning of his stay in Petersburg – be-
gins to materialise before Dostoevsky’s eyes without his fully realis-
ing or wanting it (as it is only fitting: “the thief will not come till 
the householder has forgotten him and fallen asleep”).
The moment he unpacks his writing-case (it is “no longer a mat-
ter of listening for the lost child calling from the dark stream, no 
longer a matter of being faithful to Pavel when all have given him 
up” (235)), the stranger starts to take corporeal form:
In the mirror on the dressing table he catches a quick glimpse of 
himself hunched over the table. In the grey light, without his glass-
es, he could mistake himself for a stranger; the dark beard could be 
a veil or a curtain of bees. […] He moves the chair so as to face the 
mirror. But the sense of someone in the room besides himself per-
 41 “He has not forgotten the thief in the night. If he is to be saved, it will be by 
the thief in the night, for whom he must unwaveringly be on watch. Yet the thief 
will not come till the householder has forgotten him and fallen asleep. The house-
holder may not watch and wake without cease, otherwise the parable will not be 
fulfilled. The householder must sleep; and if he must sleep, how can God condemn 
his sleeping? God must save him, God has no other way. Yet to trap God thus in 
a net of reason is a provocation and a blasphemy” (236). Or again: “To Pavel it is 
given to speak once only. Nonetheless, he cannot accept that he will not be forgiven 
for having been deaf or asleep or stupid when the world was spoken. What he lis-
tens for, therefore, is Pavel’s second word. He believes absolutely that he does not 
deserve a second word, that there will be no second word. But he believes absolutely 
that a second word will come” (239).
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sists: if not a full person then of a stick-figure, a scarecrow draped 
in an old suit, with a stuffed sugar-sack for a head and a kerchief 
across the mouth. […] He is distracted, and irritated with himself 
for being distracted. The very spirit of irritation keeps the scare-
crow perversely alive. (236; emphases added)
Who is this exasperating presence Dostoevsky at first does not want 
to acknowledge? As the title of the last chapter of Coetzee’s book and 
two fragments Dostoevsky writes down in it bear witness to, he is 
Stavrogin, one of the main protagonists of The Possessed – suppos-
edly a fictional character taking shape in Dostoevsky’s head. But to 
say this is not enough, because the figure is something much more 
and Dostoevsky senses it, asking himself questions: “Is it Ivanov? 
[…] Or is it Pavel? […] Is this how Russia manifests itself […]? Or 
is the name that is dark to him the name of the other boy, the one 
he repudiates: Nechaev?” (237–38) He concludes that it is none of 
them, but we may note that all are figures with which Dostoevsky 
identified to a greater or lesser extent.
The presence of the figure is suffocating: “Confronting it is like 
descending into the waters of the Nile and coming face to face with 
something huge and cold and grey that may once have been born of 
woman but with the passing of the ages has retreated into stone, 
that does not belong in his world, that will baffle and overwhelm 
all his powers of conception” (240). And indeed it does not belong 
in Dostoevsky’s world, at least in the world he likes to evoke with 
the sublimity of his religious discourse.42 But his resistance is to no 
avail – the moment he puts his pen to the paper, the real nature of 
this disturbing presence springs up from the page:
Thus at last the time arrives and the hand that holds the pen be-
gins to move. But the words it forms are not the words of salvation. 
Instead they tell of flies, or of a single black fly, buzzing against 
a closed windowpane. High summer in Petersburg, hot and clammy; 
from the street below, noise, music. In the room a child with brown 
eyes and straight fair hair lying naked beside a man, her slim feet 
barely reaching to his ankles, her face pressed against the curve of 
his shoulder, where she snuggles and roots like a baby. (241)
 42 There is a split in the historical Dostoevsky’s writing that may be pertinent 
here – as his readers know, his “official” views as expressed in his journalism (most-
ly Orthodox and Panslavic imperial propaganda) are dreadful stuff, while his “real” 
literature, of which Stavrogin is one of the more memorable creations, presents his 
ideas in much more ambiguous terms.
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This scene, of course, takes us to the famous deleted, or rather 
“censored,”43 chapter from The Possessed in which Stavrogin confess-
es to child violation, but at the same time to the aforementioned 
violation of Matryona in The Master of Petersburg. In other words, 
the oppressive presence of the unspeakable Thing (huge, cold, grey, 
chilling) Dostoevsky tries to give shape to is the very substance of 
enjoyment which Dostoevsky is painfully fathering into writing. Yet 
it is nothing but such enjoyment that makes him a writer and it 
feels as if somebody else were writing him. Who is fathering whom 
then? It is the question that cannot be answered because it is unde-
cidable – what makes him write is enjoyment (madness, darkness, 
the Nile substance) but at the same time it is the only thing he can 
write about: “This presence, so grey and without feature – is this 
what he must father, give blood to, flesh, life? Or does he misunder-
stand, and has he misunderstood from the beginning? Is he required, 
rather, to put aside all that he himself is, all he has become, down 
to his very features, and become as a babe again? Is the thing before 
him the one that does the fathering, and must he give himself to be-
ing fathered by it?” (240–41)
Hence he speaks about his writing as betrayal, as “perversions 
of the truth”: “I write perversions of the truth. I choose the crooked 
road and take children into dark places. I follow the dance of the 
pen” (236).44 The story had started with the white suit Dostoevsky 
found in Pavel’s empty room and his attempt to bring him back 
(“You are an artist, a master […]. It is for you, not for me, to bring 
him back to life,” says Anna (140)), but the plan did not go as it was 
supposed to, because the presence which filled the suit turned out to 
have the ox-face of Baal (“Is there a way, starting from the feet, of 
building up the body within the suit till at last the face is revealed, 
even if it is the ox-face of Baal?” (238)). The split head of Baal ap-
pears as the head of the father of enjoyment; it is the obscene image 
of the Master himself, who throughout the book is “perverted” into 
– wears the mask of – the image of innocence that Dostoevsky wants 
to present to the world. Yet, as soon as he gets down to writing, the 
perversion takes a different shape. Although Stavrogin is born as 
the mocking presence of Dostoevsky’s (and his father’s) jouissance 
 43 Katkov, the editor of the journal in which Dostoevsky serialised his novel, 
had refused to publish the part which we today know as “Stavrogin’s Confession,” 
because of its “offensive” subject matter, so Dostoevsky had to rewrite the book so 
that it made sense without this key episode.
 44 If it were not so clichéd, one would remark on the appropriateness of the pen/
penis parallel in our context.
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(“Intermittently the stick-figure returns, the crumpled, old-man trav-
esty of himself [Dostoevsky]” (237; emphasis added)), the more “flesh” 
it puts on, the younger it becomes, finally reaching the form of the 
“body […] as perfectly formed as a god’s” (241).
This is precisely the place where the jouissance of writing starts 
(“In the act of writing he experiences, today, an exceptional sensual 
pleasure” (245)). The Stavrogin figure “gives off […] marmoreal cold-
ness” (241) but its presence (it is the figure of enjoyment) is precisely 
what causes the fall: “[Dostoevsky] is not himself any longer, not 
a man in the forty-ninth year of his life. Instead he is young again, 
with all the arrogant strength of youth. He is wearing a white suit, 
perfectly tailored. […] In the blood of this young man, this version 
of Pavel, is a sense of triumph. He has passed through the gates 
of death and returned: nothing can touch him any more. He is not 
a god but he is no longer human either. He is, in some sense, beyond 
the human, beyond man. There is nothing he is not capable of” (242).
Thus, what we have here is yet another image of possession (mad-
ness, fall, etc.), possession of the father who not only refuses to let 
go of his jouissance, but who is also envious of his children’s enjoy-
ment and wants to take it over because he conceives of all enjoyment 
that is not his as having been stolen from him. Those who enjoy in 
ways inaccessible to Dostoevsky (Nechaev, Pavel, Matryona) are ac-
cused by him of being possessed by the evil spirit (Baal), but their 
“possession” is precisely the reflection of his own obscenity which he 
glimpses in their faces – their suppossed shamelessness and obscen-
ity are Dostoevsky’s own. While he cannot steal the other’s jouis-
sance in “real” life, writing is precisely the realm where this can be 
done. When Dostoevsky speaks to Maximov about reading as “demon 
possession” (Maximov’s words (47)), he only projects his own experi-
ences as a writer into the reader, which is clear from his descrip-
tion: “What is it that frightens you Councillor Maximov? When you 
read about Karamzin or Karamzov or whatever his name is, when 
Karamzin’s skull is cracked open like an egg, what is the truth: do 
you suffer with him, or do you secretly exult behind the arm that 
swings the axe? You don’t answer? Let me tell you then: reading is 
being the arm and being the axe and being the skull; reading is giv-
ing yourself up, not holding yourself at a distance and jeering” (47). 
This heady possibility of having it all, the chance to have your cake 
and eat it, to be the father and the son simultaneously, is precisely 
the voluptuosity of writing that Dostoevsky conceives of in terms of 
the Satanic temptation of Christ: “He sits with the pen in his hand, 
holding himself back from a descent into representations that have 
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no place in the world, on the point of toppling, enclosed within a mo-
ment in which all creation lies open at his feet, the moment before he 
loosens his grip and begins to fall” (241; emphasis added). Writing 
appears here as the way “to turn the falling into a flying” (235), to 
be present at one’s own epileptic fit, to be able to plunge into the 
substance of madness/enjoyment but at the same time remain con-
scious in order to enjoy it. This is the true meaning of possession: 
not only to be able to enjoy, but to be able to witness one’s enjoy-
ment.45 In other words, what we come across here is the fantasy of 
being present at one’s origin. Since the way in which one enjoys con-
stitutes the hard kernel of who one really is, for Dostoevsky writing 
presents itself as the way to experience himself to the full.
What is more, if we look more attentively at the figure Dostoevsky 
creates, it does not appear to be a beautified and strengthened im-
age of Pavel, in spite of what Dostoevsky says (“Not Nechaev – he 
knows that now. Greater than Nechaev. Not Pavel either. Perhaps 
Pavel as he might have been one day, grown wholly beyond boyhood 
to become the kind of cold-faced, handsome man whom no love can 
touch” (240)). Notwithstanding all denials, the image is an image of 
Nechaev since it has all the features of him that Dostoevsky is at the 
same time fascinated and repelled by: a young man strong as a lion, 
with a sense of triumph, one who has passed through the gates of 
death,46 who died as a private person and returned as a man in 
whom death has already asserted its rights.47 The image is obviously 
beautified (“greater than Nechaev”), but it is definitely not Pavel’s, 
because, firstly, Pavel, as Dostoevsky admits, lacked Stavrogin’s fea-
tures of character even in budding form (he was “a sissy”) and, sec-
ondly, the process of beautification has already been accomplished on 
Pavel by Dostoevsky and the result was the sentimentalised figure 
the latter presented to the world.
If we accept the foregoing, Dostoevsky’s final duel with God can 
be seen in an unexpected light. Dostoevsky’s last “act” in the book is 
the creation of a new version of the story of the white suit, the one 
 45 Because one always enjoys as the other, one is never conscious of one’s enjoy-
ment (the epileptic fit is an extreme example of this) – one is not present to oneself 
while enjoying.
 46 “The revolutionary is a doomed man […]. He has no interests, no feelings, no 
attachments, not even a name. Everything in him is absorbed in a single and total 
passion: revolution. In the depths of his being he has cut all links with the civil or-
der, with law and morality. He continues to exist in society only in order to destroy 
it. […] He does not expect the least mercy. Every day he is ready to die” (60–61).
 47 Maurice Blanchot, The Work of Fire, trans. Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995), 320.
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we know from The Possessed. “Rewritten,” it ceases to be an educa-
tional story of how to be chivalrous and becomes a story of perverse 
enjoyment. The substance of the story remains exactly the same, 
what is changed is the motivation: Pavel was supposed to court 
Maria Labyatkin to teach the town a lesson in subtle feelings, while 
Stavrogin courts her just for a joke, because “summer in the country 
is so boring” (249). This “perversion of the truth” is commented upon 
in this way: “It is an assault upon the innocence of a child. It is an 
act for which he can expect no forgiveness. With it he has crossed 
the threshold. Now God must speak, now God dare no longer remain 
silent. To corrupt a child is to force God. The device he has made 
arches and springs shut like a trap, a trap to catch God” (249).
Returning to our earlier proposition – that Dostoevsky provokes 
Anna to put a stop to his jouissance, which is not finally achieved (the 
“No!” is pronounced but the Law is not announced) – we can speculate 
that the “rewritten” story of the white suit is supposed to accomplish 
the same with respect to God, to “frighten” him into announcing the 
Law. In our context, “an assault on the innocence of a child” (em-
phases added) may have two meanings. Either the innocence that 
is corrupted is Pavel’s (in real life he was innocent and chivalrous, 
while the version of him in The Possessed, Stavrogin, is corrupt) or 
it is Matryona’s, since after writing the draft of the “rewritten” story 
Dostoevsky leaves it open on the table for Matryona to read (since she 
knows the “chivalrous” version, the reading of the perverse one will 
corrupt her faith in Pavel and in innocence – with this her own in-
nocence will be lost). These two meanings are obviously non-exclusive, 
since both of them can be meant at the same time.
However, what one should note is that both of these “corruptions” 
or challenges to God have taken place in the book long before they 
appear in the final pages. Pavel’s image, “no longer weeping but 
hissing madness” (235), that is, resentment or denial,48 is something 
against which Dostoevsky bumps his head throughout the book, and 
he admits to Pavel’s vengefulness long before the final act of the 
book (“Let us not be sentimental – in ordinary life he was as venge-
ful as any other young man” (113)). Thus, if Pavel’s chivalrous image 
is something of Dostoevsky’s own creation, its corruption is a chal-
lenge to a different kind of Master, to the one who brought this 
image to life, that is, to Dostoevsky himself. Since it is the image 
 48 “From me nothing has come but negation,” claims Stavrogin accordingly in 
The  Possessed (8 March 2007: <http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext05/8devl10h.htm 
#1_4_8>).
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with which he identifies, the perversion of it is only fitting since it 
constitutes the reflection of Dostoevsky’s own perversion (the father 
stealing enjoyment from the son). What we witness here is not even 
perversion of the truth (innocence) but the hidden truth itself that 
comes to light; therefore the only one who may be “forced” to become 
angry is the Master himself and with him God, but only as the im-
age of the divine name the Master created to deny Dostoevsky’s re-
semblance to his obscene father.
As for the corruption of Matryona’s innocence, it was already at-
tempted in the scene of intellectual violation analysed above (“the 
world is […] a place where you get beaten,” etc. (72–77)). What is 
more, the scenario Dostoevsky pursues in the last act is a repetition 
of the challenge Dostoevsky – while “violating” Matryona – assigns 
to Pavel. (Dostoevsky has already spoken to Maximov, so he knows 
that the suicide story is likely to be a police fabrication. Maximov 
himself suggests Pavel was killed by the Nechaevites.) In his story, 
Pavel – who has featured so far as an innocent child – challenges 
God with his suicide (“He asked God a question – will you save me? 
– and God gave him an answer. God said: No. God said: Die” (75)). 
What we have to note is that, firstly, innocence and this type of 
challenge are very much at odds with each other and, secondly, that 
God’s silence, which at first constitutes the predicament (“There was 
only silence” (75)) is finally taken for an answer. God stays silent 
anyway, so objectively nothing changes, yet the act is supposed to 
force God to speak “No” – finally it is the same silence of God which 
is taken as a proof of his existence (a typical example of Dostoevsky’s 
“darkness swaddled in darkness”).
Let us now return to the image of Stavrogin. We have already 
noted that it, in fact, resembles Nechaev (the one who really en-
joys, according to Dostoevsky) much more than Pavel (only a shadow 
of Nechaev’s strength). Therefore, what if the perversion is not of 
Pavel’s (false, imaginary) innocence, but of Nechaev’s? Not innocence 
in a fake “chivalric” form as preached by Dostoevsky (who cannot 
hide even from himself that it is his own invention) but the inno-
cence of the faithful son that Necheav, in a sense, is: “ ‘I have read 
your book Crime and Punishment […]. It is an excellent book. I have 
never read anything like it. […] You must have heard it praised by 
many people. Still, I am telling you –’ He clasps a hand to his breast, 
then, as though tearing out his heart, flings the hand forward” (177). 
Dostoevsky’s reading of this gesture is unexpected – it is here where 
genuine innocence is met: “A virgin heart, he thinks, bewildering 
itself in its stirrings” (177). While Pavel Isaev resented Dostoevsky, 
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Nechaev chooses Dostoevsky to be his spiritual father as the creator 
of Raskolnikov, a “sympathetic” character beyond good and evil, one 
with whom readers can identify.49 Now, Dostoevsky, in order to deny 
this bond, has to create another character beyond good and evil, but 
this time a repellent one, who takes his own life as a result of sheer 
self-disgust.50 Yet the subduing of admiration for Nechaev does not 
go so easily: although Stavrogin is repellent, shreds of admiration for 
him appear throughout The Possessed. And such subduing is even 
harder because, as we have seen, Stavrogin is at the same time the 
image of Dostoevsky’s own enjoyment reflected in the “strengthened” 
figure of his true “stepson” Nechaev.
The nature of the final challenge to God may be seen in this 
different light also if we juxtapose it with another challenge that 
takes place in The Master of Petersburg. In the disease-incubating 
cellar where the poorest of the poor vegetate, Nechaev challenges 
Dostoevsky to write a pamphlet on his stepson’s death or actually 
on anything he pleases (“Whatever statement you choose to make. 
[…] Whatever you write we will distribute, I promise” (198)). Thus 
the father is challenged to show his mettle – to take a side, in other 
words, to choose a truth, the truth of the Father (the police that 
represent the monarchy) or the truth of the son (revolution). And 
Dostoevsky’s choice is the one which may be expected – he chooses 
to sentimentalise over an innocent victim: “On the night of October 
12th, in the year of our Lord 1869, my stepson Pavel Alexandrovich 
Isaev fell to his death from the shot tower on Stolarny Quay. A ru-
mour has been circulated that his death was brought about by the 
Third Section of the Imperial Police. This rumour is a wilful fabri-
cation. I believe that my stepson was murdered by his false friend 
Sergei Gennadevich Nechaev” (202–203). This choice is not surpris-
ing, since if Dostoevsky had chosen otherwise, he would have to ad-
mit to the obscene nature of the main images that populated his 
imagination (God, tsar, Russian People) and with taking upon him-
self his obscenity he would have to admit that, to the obscene step-
 49 Although Raskolnikov falls sick and repents, this can be taken as Dostoevsky’s 
tortured self-censorship before the image of the Father: the one who raises his hand 
against the obscenity of the Father (the usuress) has to repent. Nechaev (like many 
critics, including Lev Shestov) senses it correctly and dismisses the sentimentalised 
ending of Crime and Punishment: “Raskolnikov was at least alive, until he came 
down with the fever or whatever it was” (186).
 50 There is, however, another suicide in The Possessed, that of Kirillov who 
seeks thereby to prove that God does not exist, to take the position of God and 
become a new man beyond good and evil.
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father’s relief, his stepson is finally dead, and admit therefore to his 
indifference to the problem of who killed him. With the choice of the 
police truth, an unbelievably narcissistic explanation worthy of the 
Master is inevitable – “Pavel’s death was merely the bait to lure him 
from Dresden to Petersburg. He has been the quarry all the time” 
(203) – as if revolution is being staged with the primary purpose of 
robbing him of his enjoyment.
It is difficult to believe that Nachaev, in challenging Dostoevsky, 
expects that the writer will be able to wipe his slate clean and recreate 
his symbolic universe from scratch, since, in the case of Dostoevsky, 
it would amount to admitting to the killing of his father (or the wish 
thereto) as well as his substitute, God (“we will go to God and stand 
before his throne and call him off,” says Nechaev (190)). Thus, it is 
more likely that he does it to free himself from the last father that is 
left to him, the one who fathered him in the image of Raskolnikov – 
when he is “betrayed” by his spiritual father (“There are no limits to 
what a father can do” (194)), he at last becomes truly fatherless, the 
son who has “made [himself] over” (194), therefore becoming a real 
challenge to the established order, ready to bring about “the end of 
everything old, including fathers and sons” (189).
Therefore, what Dostevsky does in his final act may ultimately be 
conceived as a remedy for Nechaev’s challenge, a repetition of his act 
of challengeing the Father, but this time directed at reinstating the 
Father’s rule. Choosing the image of Pavel as the innocent victim is 
choosing everything that goes with it, everything that we have tried 
to analyse above. This means, among other things, choosing the im-
age of God as a defense, a mask that covers the obscenity of the 
Father. However, corrupting the image of innocence into the image 
of the depraved Stavrogin is only a way of extracting even more en-
joyment from it (“In the act of writing he experiences, today, an ex-
ceptional sensual pleasure” (245)). As was the case with Dostoevsky’s 
self-abasement in front of his wife or in front of the image of Pavel, 
the more serious the offence, the more self-laceration it demands 
and, therefore, the more enjoyment it brings. And the more enjoy-
ment it brings, the stronger the image of God has to become, since it 
is the mask which hides the obscene Father who enjoys. Thus, para-
doxically, after the choice has been made (innocent victim) the more 
challenging the act, the stronger faith it results in (the stronger im-
age of God) because the more enjoyment it brings. “A trap to catch 
God” (249) turns out to be just another device to catch enjoyment of 
the Father (“he and God circle each other. […] Time is suspended, 
everything is suspended before the fall” (249) – does this not bring 
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to mind Dostoevsky and Anna “gyrating slowly” while making love?). 
But whence his final bitterness: “He has betrayed everyone; nor does 
he see that his betrayals could go deeper”? (250)
There is something interesting about the “unhistorical” twist to 
the story of the real Pavel Isaev, the one who did not die in 1869. 
This “perversion of the truth” seems to constitute a kind of act of 
faith on the part of the author of The Master of Petersburg: although 
he includes a “lie” in his plot, such a lie can be conceived as taking 
the side of historical Dostoevsky; in other words, identifying with 
him on a level deeper than that of “mere” truth (Dostoevsky liked 
to keep up appearances of Pavel being a good son – as he liked to 
pretend his father was a proper nobleman – while he knew it to be 
false). Gentrifying the image of Pavel by letting him die at the right 
moment, the author can be said to fulfil Dostoevsky’s secret wish 
and therefore to do much more than just attempt imaginatively to 
step into his shoes to lend more psychological or “existential” truth 
to his character. We are not speaking about an act of faith by chance 
– in a famous letter Dostoevsky declares that if Christ were not the 
truth and he had to choose, he would abandon the truth and follow 
Christ.51 Isn’t The Master of Petersburg an example of such a thor-
ough identification? But after all we have said about enjoyment in 
this novel, a perversity at its core may not really come as a surprise: 
can’t we therefore conceive of the whole book as a hallucinatory re-
alisation of Dostoevsky’s wishes, of the stepfather who did not go to 
Petersburg in October 1869 but who had to withstand the whirlwind 
of letters from his stepson demanding money and accusing him of be-
ing a bad father? Can’t we take the following fragment coming from 
the last chapter of The Master of Petersburg as the proper beginning 
of the book, presenting a perverse defensive hallucination, complete 
with the clarity and voluptuousness of the fall?
Yet at the same time that he sits here so calmly, he is a man 
caught in a whirlwind. Torrents of paper, fragments of an old life 
torn loose by the roar of the upward spiral, fly all about him. High 
above the earth he is borne, buffeted by currents, before the grip 
of the wind slackens and for a moment, before he starts to fall, 
he is allowed utter stillness and clarity, the world opening below 
him like a map of itself. […] Letters from the whirlwind. Scattered 
leaves, which he gathers up; scattered body, which he reassembles. 
(245–46)
 51 A letter from February 1854 to N. Fonvizina. The claim is repeated in The 
Possessed by Shatov who relates that he heard it from Stavrogin.
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Disgrace (1999)
Disgrace begins, like every decent modernist novel, with a display 
of the Twilight of the Gods mood. The protagonist, David Lurie, an 
adjunct professor at the Cape Town Technical University (“formerly 
Cape Town University College”1), feels that he is a clerk “in a post-re-
ligious age” (4): formerly a professor of modern languages (with three 
books published, on opera, on “vision as eros” (4), and on Wordsworth) 
he has to teach “Communication Skills” in a new “rationalised” uni-
versity and “because he has no respect for the material he teaches, 
he makes no impression on his students” (4). The only outlet for the 
literary passions he has left is one special-field course a year, which 
he is allowed to offer “irrespective of enrolment, because it is good for 
morale” (3). But the course in the Romantic poets he is giving when 
the novel opens is a sordid business, we are given to understand: 
“He has long ceased to be surprised at the range of ignorance of his 
students. Post-Christian, posthistorical, postliterate, they might as 
well have been hatched from eggs yesterday” (32). The older teachers 
(“his colleagues from the old days” (4)) have become bureaucrats of 
a “rationalised” institution “burdened with upbringings inappropriate 
to the tasks they are set to perform” (4), the younger ones, like the 
students, come “postliterate,” only to learn and then teach “skills.” So 
what is wrong with “this […] emasculated institution of learning” (5) 
he finds himself in and which he does not respect?
His general complaints and caustic remarks about the university 
and its students have a more personal side to them which puts into 
 1 J. M. Coetzee, Disgrace (London: Vintage, 2000), 3; further references in the 
body of the text.
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sharper focus their “universalist” pretensions as comments on the 
state of western civilisation:
His childhood was spent in a family of women. As mothers, aunts, 
sisters fell away, they were replaced in due course by mistresses, 
wives, a daughter. The company of women made of him a lover of 
women and, to an extent, a womanizer. With his height, his good 
bones, his olive skin, his flowing hair, he could always count on 
a degree of magnetism. If he looked at a woman in a certain way, 
with a certain intent, she would return his look, he could rely on 
that. That was how he lived; for years, for decades, that was the 
backbone of his life.
Then one day it all ended. Without warning his powers fled. 
Glances that would once have responded to his slid over, past, 
through him. Overnight he became a ghost. If he wanted a woman 
he had to learn to pursue her; often, in one way or another, to buy 
her. (7)
A telling parallel to the descent from the era of disinterested, but 
at the same time passionate, involvement in one’s discipline to the 
enrolment- (that is money-) oriented truncated tertiary educational 
institution. As the underside of cultural frustration we find sexual 
frustration and what links them even closer is the inefficacy of “cul-
tural goods” in mediating the sexual act with – in order to make love 
to a student, Melanie Isaacs, Lurie has to “buy” or impress her, yet 
she is not very much impressed with Wordsworth, nor with the video 
of a dance act he shows her. Although he is a connoisseur, “guardian 
of the culture-hoard” (16) on whose mediating power he has to rely 
now, that power seems not to be effective upon the post-Christian 
postliterate. If the pupil of the Romantic poets he considers himself 
to be cannot bring off seduction (“The pentameter, whose cadence 
once served so well to oil the serpent’s words, now only estranges” 
(16)), there must be something constitutionally wrong with this 
world. But, of course, Lurie is too intelligent to think only that.
“Do you have any literary passions?” he asks Melanie, and is non-
plussed by her frown at the strange word (13). In the same conversa-
tion he calls Wordsworth one of his masters and talks about poetry 
thus: “In my experience poetry speaks to you either at first sight or 
not at all. A flash of revelation and a flash of response. Like light-
ning. Like falling in love” (13). And it is precisely passion and love 
that become the key terms in his ironic challenge to the authority 
of the university. But what kind of passion does he have in mind? 
After all, the “rationalised” university is definitely not devoid of all 
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passions, even if what is left be only a passion to enrol as many 
students as possible to make ever more money. Lurie provides his 
challenge precisely at the two points that we know to be his passion-
ate investments: Wordsworth and opera.
When Lurie reads the definition of language in his Communication 
Skills handbook he has only scorn for it. It goes: “human society has 
created language in order that we may communicate our thoughts, 
feelings and intentions to each other” (3–4). Lurie’s reply is that “the 
origins of speech lie in song, and the origins of song in the need to 
fill out with sound the overlarge and rather empty human soul” (4). 
There is an irreducible void, a gap at the origin of language or the 
symbolic order, which the signifiers always unsuccessfully try to fill, 
to “suture.” This, obviously, is a far cry from the handbook defini-
tion (Communication Skills seems to be a kind of applied linguistics) 
of language as a system of laws to be mastered to pass along pre-
existent information, a system or structure that can be exhaustively 
rendered by the dispassionate metalanguage of positive knowledge. 
And Lurie’s challenge to the university discourse lies in the conclu-
sion he draws from this: since it is impossible to be passionately 
involved with metalinguistic laws, enjoyment of the university dis-
course must come from somewhere else, that is, from the approval of 
the master, the powers-that-be whose interests the “rationalisations” 
of the university serve2 – rather than getting off on knowledge as 
passionate investment, the “rationalised” academics get off on their 
alienation, their justification of the master’s discourse.
Lurie’s characteristics of the institution he finds himself in echoes 
closely Lacan’s description of the university discourse, in which 
knowledge takes the place of master signifier3:
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Lacan’s point is to a large extent the same as Lurie’s: knowledge (S2
as the supposedly coherent system of signifiers) interrogates a (sur-
plus jouissance) – the incoherence of the symbolic order (the void at
its origin), a little piece of the real, something that does not fit into
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2 Fake rationalisation of social and economic relations.
3 The meaning of the mathemes of all four principal Lacanian discourses is de-
veloped in detail in: Jacques Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis (Seminar
XVII), trans. Russell Grigg (New York, W.W. Norton, 2007). The mathemes used
here are the simplified versions of the ones to be found in: Jacques Lacan, Encore
(Seminar XX), trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), p. 16.
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fit into the system – in order to rationalise it. Or in different terms: 
linguistics poses language as a system entirely explainable by means 
of laws of cause and effect. Yet the product of this is S│ , the alienated 
subject in a double sense of the word: the void (the gap between the 
cause and the effect) is only dissimulated by the scientific laws that 
purport to explain all the field (if they do not, this is considered to 
be only temporary), so the product is self-deception; the obverse side 
of this is the production of the unknowing subject or the subject of 
the unconscious which is created by the university discourse, but 
at the same time excluded by it to maintain the consistency of its 
laws.4 The truth of the university discourse is S1, the master signifier 
or the signifier of the master, which is nonsensical because it con-
sists of only the injunction to obey: the master must be obeyed not 
because there is some rationale (scientific or not) for it but because 
he says so, or rather wills so. A more political explanation of the 
university discourse matheme would be: university knowledge (S2) 
interrogates surplus value subtracted from the worker (a) and justi-
fies exploitation – the product of this is the alienated subject (S│  ), and 
the whole process serves the interest of the master (the capitalist 
(S1)).5 In other words, the university discourse is only an incarnation 
of the discourse of the master, which tries to cover up by means of 
its rationalisations the inconsistency on which it is founded. What is 
more, it gets off on its own alienation: in Lacan’s mathemes of the 
discourses the place of jouissance is always the right-hand “denomi-
nator” – in the university discourse it is S│ .6 The enjoyment seems 
to be extracted from the very process of dissimulating the master, 
of convincing others and oneself that the laws to be obeyed are “ob-
jective” and leave no surplus – the law of the master is presented 
as the unavoidable law of Nature, Logic, History, Market, etc. (the 
unalienated discourse of the master did not have to pretend that it 
was founded on “objective laws,” it did not justify his “Obey!”).
What discourse does Lurie counter the university discourse with? 
It is not difficult to see what that would be in Lacan’s mathemes – it 
is the hysteric’s discourse:
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4 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 132.
5 Fink, The Lacanian Subject, p. 132.
6 Fink, The Lacanian Subject, p. 198.
/
 4 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 132.
 5 Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 132.
 6 Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 198.
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It is easy to notice at first sight that the hysteric’s discourse is 
the exact reversal of the university discourse and that S2 (knowledge) 
appears in the place of jouissance. The hysteric7 addresses the mas-
ter signifier S1 (in our present case, this is rationalised university 
knowledge – linguistics and its claims) and calls it into question. It 
is found lacking and in this lack the hysteric finds his knowledge S2 
(the knowledge of the lack in knowledge) whose truth is object a (in-
consistency, gap, void). Rather than accepting the Communication 
Skills definition of language, Lurie contests it with his hypothesis 
(passionate belief?) that the truth of language is the void, which the 
human voice tries to fill with signifiers. In other words, the hysteric’s 
discourse is based on the intimation of the difference between the 
symbolic order (a system of signifiers) and “something more” which 
makes language (and the human being as the user and product of 
language) what it is. This “something more” is of course object a, 
a place where the real enters language and scrambles the smooth 
functioning of linguistic laws. The gap opens up a space for human 
desire and therefore the hysteric’s knowledge is eroticised. In other 
words, it is only in the hysteric’s discourse that knowledge (founded 
on the lack) becomes the end in itself, while in the university dis-
course “knowledge is not so much the end in itself as that which 
justifies the academic’s very existence and activity.”8
Moreover, Lurie despises the institution he works in not for not 
being what it can never by its nature become but mainly for the 
failure to live up to its notion, and here he again scores a Lacanian 
point: for the late Lacan it is the hysteric’s discourse which is the 
true discourse of science. In the seventies he comes to the con-
clusion that there are two discourses that operate in science: the 
spurious science of the university discourse and the proper science 
that takes the hysterical position with respect to its field, that is, it 
interrogates the master discourse (of its field) and finds it lacking. 
But the lack we are speaking about here is not a hole that it will 
be possible to fill with “more knowledge” produced by the master 
discourse but the gap that is structurally necessary for a given 
field of knowledge to constitute itself – something that is not just 
“yet unknown,” but what cannot be known for structural reasons.9 
 7 For Lacan, the hysteric’s discourse is, like his other discourses, a type of so-
cial bond, and not necessarily the discourse that a “clinical” hysteric always has to 
adopt (Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 129–30).
 8 Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 133.
 9 Fink’s example from physics is Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle: one can 
only measure either position or momentum of a particle, never both. This impossibil-
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In other words, the true scientist subtracts something from the 
field and makes it not-whole; he confronts head-on the necessary 
antagonism, the inconsistency of his field. There appears something 
in the field that does not obey its laws and therefore disrupts the 
smooth functioning of the cause-effect determination chain; there is 
a point at which causality breaks down, so the field of knowledge 
ceases to coincide with itself.10 In the same sense, the message in 
speech (“thoughts, feelings and intentions”) is not what primarily 
constitutes the field of language; there has to be something else 
that enables the passage of messages, and, what is more, since it 
is not just another message and cannot be explained by the system-
atic laws of passing messages, it impairs their smooth functioning. 
In Lurie’s terms, song encroaches on the systematic field of com-
munication laws and wreaks havoc on it.
This non-identity of the field of speech with itself (the gap in 
it) is precisely what makes desire possible. This is the logic behind 
falling in love with a language, in Lurie’s case with Wordsworth: 
“In my experience poetry speaks to you either at first sight or not 
at all. A flash of revelation and a flash of response. Like lightning. 
Like falling in love” (13). One does not fall in love with the long 
dead poet’s thoughts (unclear), feelings (old-fashioned) or intentions 
(unknown), one can only fall in love with his song, something in 
his language that makes it more than the expression of thoughts, 
feelings and intentions, something that arouses, hooks up to one’s 
desire, something that makes it flow; and any attempt to “explain” 
Wordsworth in terms of his thoughts, feeling and intentions is only 
an attempt to dissimulate the gap that enables the work of desire, 
and therefore an attempt to chastise literature of desire and make 
it into the object of systematic knowledge. In other words, the hys-
teric’s discourse passionately engages in maintaining the gap in the 
field that produces this passionate engagement, while the university 
discourse sets itself the task of closing the gap, suturing it to be able 
to master the field. This is the connoisseur’s discourse opposed to the 
discourse of the master.
This, however, is not all we get to know about Lurie’s cultural 
desire. His relation to the master’s discourse is more convoluted that 
it would appear to be from his half-joking engagement in theoris-
ity cannot be overcome by particle physics because it grounds it (Fink, The Lacanian 
Subject, 134).
 10 Another famous example from physics: a photon can pass through two sepa-
rate slits at the same moment. The identity principle no longer operates: how can 
it be in two different places at the same time?
~ 165  ~
ing language. Not surprisingly, the other side of this relation is dis-
played in Lurie’s lecture on Wordsworth. It appears at a moment of 
exasperation in one of his lectures to seemingly uncomprehending 
students. Lurie is explaining the feeling of grief Wordsworth feels 
at seeing Mont Blanc for the first time in a passage from Book 6 of 
The Prelude:
From a bare ridge we also first beheld
Unveiled the summit of Mont Blanc, and grieved
To have a soulless image on the eye
That had usurped upon a living thought
That never more could be. (21)11
He speaks to the students about pure ideas of the mind, imagination 
usurped by mere sense-images and the way in which Wordsworth 
tries to reconcile these two extremes in the lines:
But to my conscious soul I now can say –
“I recognise thy glory”: in such strength
Of usurpation, when the light of sense
Goes out, but with a flash that has revealed
The invisible world, doth greatness make abode,
There harbours; whether we be young or old,
Our destiny, our being’s heart and home,
Is with infinitude, and only there;
With hope it is, hope that can never die,
Effort, and expectation, and desire,
And something evermore to be.12
The coming together of an image and infinitude is a locus classicus 
of the sublime feeling most famously expounded in Kant’s Critique 
of Judgement. Kant’s familiar example of the dynamic sublime is 
the feeling evoked by a spectacle of “furious” nature (storms, hur-
ricanes, etc.), which, if beheld from a safe distance, on the one 
hand, makes us painfully aware of our weakness and insignificance 
in confrontation with such power, but, on the other, provides us 
with the pleasure of awareness that our capability of exercising 
reason lifts as above the condition of a being determined by nature. 
For Wordsworth, however, the “spectacle” of Mont Blanc is painful 
(grief) for a different reason: it is not equal to “a living thought,” its 
original, “platonic,” more beautiful image in his mind. In a certain 
 11 The Works of William Wordsworth (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1994), 683.
 12 The Works of William Wordsworth, 684.
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sense, the sense-image of the mountain becomes subtracted from an 
imaginary plenum of its “living image”; it introduces a cut that ruins 
the fullness, makes it not-whole and causes its differentiation from 
itself. Wordsworth’s imagination tries to fill this gap but finds this 
task impossible. However, this self-shattering strain of imagination, 
this impossibility of repairing the image, paradoxically brings pleas-
ure, because a similar feeling – self-shattering awe – was expected 
to be the outcome of confrontation with the sublime image of Mont 
Blanc in the first place. Therefore, the infinity “appended” to the 
image of Mont Blanc is ultimately not the positive infinity of which 
Nature is the expression (pantheistic transcendence), but the purely 
negative infinity of the impossibility of recovering the whole. And 
here we come back to Kant, although by a detour through Hegel: 
what Wordsworth experiences in his illumination is pure negativity 
as the primary feature of reason/spirit. What is introduced into the 
symbolic order here is a gap which imagination cannot fill. What 
momentarily comes to light in Wordsworthian sublime is the lack in 
the symbolic – an infinity whose other name is freedom (e.g. in the 
sense of the point in the symbolic that scrambles the functioning of 
its laws and from which the symbolic can be reconfigured into some-
thing quite new).
In the experience of encountering the abyss of freedom (pure neg-
ativity), Wordsworth ceases to be the master, but he reconfigures 
himself as one (and a typically Romantic master to boot) when he 
gentrifies this experience and interprets the sublime feeling as an 
indication of positive transcendence, when he imagines encountering 
in the doubling up of the image of Mont Blanc not the infinity of 
the void which scrambles the laws of the field in which it appears, 
but the infinity that confirms these laws; in other words, the infinity 
that makes us slaves to them (even if we do not feel their inevita-
bility as enslavement). And it is precisely this “second” Wordsworth 
that becomes Lurie’s master (“Wordsworth has been one of my mas-
ters,” he says to a student (13)) and this is where Lurie withdraws 
from his hysteric’s stance.
This comes out clearly at Lurie’s moment of impatience with his 
students. When they do not seem to grasp the point he is explaining, 
he again takes love as a metaphor for what is meant in the passage: 
“Like being in love […]. If you were blind you would hardly have 
fallen in love in the first place. But now, do you truly wish to see the 
beloved in the cold clarity of the visual apparatus? It may be in your 
better interest to throw a veil over the gaze, so as to keep her alive 
in her archetypal, goddesslike form” (22). Lurie admits that “it is 
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hardly in Wordsworth,” but what he is doing (leaving aside the un-
fortunate reference to blindness) is cutting his master to the shape of 
the secularised society and exchanging of that which is above (tran-
scendence) for that which is behind (“the idea that lies buried more 
deeply in the soil of memory” (22)). It is neither corrosive negativity 
nor transcendent universality that shines through the image but the 
“all too human” universality of the archetype: when the beloved’s 
image splits itself from itself, when she appears to us as “something 
more in her than herself,” one has to domesticate this split and su-
ture it throwing the veil of the archetype over it – the eminently 
Wordsworthian gesture, which is a betrayal of Wordsworth’s original 
intuition.
It is also at odds with Lurie’s own half-joking theory of human 
language where he identifies the source of this doubling up as 
original void and the element that tries to fill it as imageless (song 
or pure voice beyond signification). In his lecture he speaks of ar-
chetypes, ideas that lie “buried more deeply in the soil of memory” 
– in other words, images of the feminine or masculine sanctified by 
tradition with which one unconsciously identifies. Seeing the other 
through the veil of the archetype allows us to heal the narcissistic 
wound to our self-sufficiency, since a certain image of the feminine 
goes together with the complementary image of the masculine in 
the symbolic order and these images serve as models for a success-
ful sexual relationship. Therefore the “archetypal” love is always 
narcissistic love, because in choosing a feminine archetype I also 
choose the masculine archetype to complement it, so the feminine 
image is only a mediated way to identify myself. (The same goes of 
course for a female choosing a masculine archetype.) What I choose, 
therefore, is the image which Freud called the ideal ego as the 
answer to the gaze of the authority which observes and judges me 
(the ego ideal), the place in the Other (the symbolic order in which 
I have been brought up), a signifier operating as my ideal point of 
identification in what Lurie calls “the culture-hoard.” Yet if it is 
only the archetype that allows us to relate to the opposite sex, we 
are not only condemned to narcissistic masturbatory relationships, 
we are also condemned to the “eternally feminine” which underlies 
each new feminine icon – in other words, we will always repeat 
the patriarchal relationship of the past, no matter how it is dis-
simulated in a given epoch.
So what is the psychic mechanism that produces the “archetypal 
sublime” and the logic of narcissistic identification? One does not 
have to look far to find that the logic of the sublime is very similar 
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to the logic of the superego13: the spectacle of furious nature, as the 
voice of the punishing superego, humiliates the ego and teaches it its 
insignificance, while at the same time the ego congratulates itself on 
possessing reason, and thus the ability to disengage itself from na-
ture. In other words, it congratulates itself on its power to overcome 
its weakness and sacrifice its pathological (guided by self-interest) 
motives on the altar of an ideal which is produced at the point of 
symbolic identification and which is the origin of the image of oneself 
behaving accordingly. We find here not only the logic of the Kantian 
sublime, but also the logic of Freudian sublimation, or at least what 
is popularly understood as Freudian sublimation, that is, redirection 
of sexual energies into a culturally validated activity.
What causes the desexualisation of a part of libidinal energy is 
what Freud at first called the ego ideal,14 and which in his second 
topic (id, ego, superego) was reworked into the agency of superego. 
And it is not surprising that the tentative elaboration of the mecha-
nism of sublimation is undertaken by Freud in the work called “On 
Narcissism,” since the work of overcoming pathological motivations 
or overcoming immediate sexual satisfaction is what brings narcis-
sistic satisfaction to the subject (he is able to identify with a bet-
ter image of himself). The feeling of sublimity (pleasure in pain) is 
precisely the feeling evoked by such superegoic sublimation. Hence 
Lacan’s dictum that the superego’s injunction is ultimately “Enjoy!”15 
But that is not all: since the superego is precisely the agency that 
enjoins the ego to sublimely overcome itself, enjoyment or, in other 
words narcissistic satisfaction, becomes its duty16 and is posed as an 
ethical standard. We end up here with a kind of aesthetic standard 
 13 Alenka Zupančič, Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan (London: Verso, 2000), 
151–52.
 14 A place in the symbolic order from which the subject is looked at, the place 
of authority as different from the image with which one identifies: the ideal ego.
 15 In contrast to Freud, who seems to use the terms “ego ideal” and “superego” 
interchangeably in The Ego and the Id, Lacan distinguishes between them, the ego 
ideal being a place of symbolic identification (the signifier) and the superego being 
the voice of the surplus that every Law produces. This voice is the maternal agency, 
which is produced in the gaps or inconsistencies of the paternal Law (prohibition 
of enjoyment, symbolic castration) and constitutes its obscene support. Since the 
Law symbolically castrates the subject (he has nothing to enjoy with, enjoyment is 
structurally inaccessible) and that maternal injunction is to enjoy, the superegoic 
agency is a masochistic component of the subject.
 16 Leo Bersani, “Erotic Assumptions: Narcissism and Sublimation in Freud,” 
in: The Culture of Redemption (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 
39.
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of ethics since its basic propelling power is fascination with an im-
age – one’s own image.
That is how we reach Lurie’s “fall”: he finally succeeds in seduc-
ing Melanie Isaacs, has a short troubled relationship with her (about 
one of their meetings he comments, “Not rape, not quite, but unde-
sired nevertheless” (25)), encounters her furious boyfriend who has 
been told of everything, and then her parents who also know, and 
after that she complains of harassment to the university authorities 
and drops out of the university.
To the university committee before which he appears he pleads 
guilty and behaves generally in a quixotic way, rejecting any sug-
gestions that he should try to keep his job by making a public act 
of contrition. Generally his attitude is ironic, and when pressed he 
claims to have been “a servant of Eros” (52). With this we come to 
the other side of his challenge to the university discourse as the dis-
course of the master: his claim to be “the servant of desire” is based 
on the status of seduction as autonomous activity (“As for impulse, 
it was far from ungovernable. I have denied similar impulses many 
times in the past, I am ashamed to say” (52)). Seduction, in itself 
constituting a field that is not-whole (the impulse is unexplainable in 
terms of causes and effects but it can be resisted or suppressed), is 
opposed to the discourse of Political Correctness, which he considers 
to be the secularised (“rationalised,” “universitised”) discourse of the 
master, as, in his opinion, can be seen in its demands for confes-
sion, contrition and repentance (God as the ultimate master) as well 
as self-abasement in front of the audience (Stalin’s Russia, Mao’s 
China). Yet again the truth of his challenge to the discourse of the 
master unexpectedly puts us on the side of the master.
When his daughter calls him a scapegoat he says, “Scapegoating 
worked in practice while it still had religious power behind it. You 
loaded the sins of the city on to the goat’s back and drove it out, 
and the city was cleansed. It worked because everyone knew how 
to read the ritual, including the gods. Then the gods died, and all 
of a sudden you had to cleanse the city without divine help. Real 
actions were demanded instead of symbolism. The censor was born 
[…]. Purgation was replaced by the purge” (91). The transcendent 
authority is dead and now the mortals have to decide how to remit 
their sins, or, in modern times, they have to decide which actions 
are morally wrong. Yet the moral substance of a deed can only be 
appropriately established after its commission, taking into considera-
tion its real and not imaginary outcome. In a parallel way, when the 
hegemonic cultural authority is dead in the postliterate world, the 
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clear rules of the ritual of seduction die with it and now they come 
to appear only in the retroactive manner: one discloses one’s desire 
to the other and it is up to the other to decide if the maxim on which 
one acted was appropriate (seduction) or inappropriate (harassment). 
There are no pre-established ritual gestures to rely on.17 So again 
Lurie’s complaint is ultimately about the loss of the master who or-
dered the field in a way that was predictable for (and enforceable by) 
the guardians of the culture-hoard.
In the end, Lurie voluntarily destroys his former life as a uni-
versity professor for good. He presents the whole affair as a case of 
standing up for one’s principles and comes out of it, in his own eyes, 
“heroic”: he sacrifices everything in his life (his position and the com-
fortable livelihood that goes with it) apart from what he considers 
to be his honour (as an autonomous academic and as a human be-
ing). He turns down the committee’s suggestion that he takes coun-
selling because it would imply that he was not responsible for his 
deeds; public contrition he treats as a TV-propelled narcissistic need 
for self-abasement, which is despicable. He parades Blake’s phrase 
“sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse unacted desires” 
as his credo. So did he not give up on his desire? To answer this 
question, let us return to the matter of identification.
Lurie calls Wordsworth one of his masters but, as “a guardian of 
the culture-hoard,” he does not really feel at home outside the city. 
He quotes Blake but is himself completely lacking in visionary im-
pulse. He gives honour as the signifier of his identification but for 
the truth of this position we have to look somewhere else: it comes 
from a poet who seems much more to his taste, more ironic but also 
more melodramatic, both in his life and work.
Discussing with his students Byron’s “Lara,” what he says about 
Lucifer sounds, especially in retrospect (taking his own “fall” into 
consideration), like a description of his model hero:
“Erring”: a being who chooses his own path, who lives dangerously, 
even creating danger for himself. […] He doesn’t act on principle 
but on impulse, and the source of his impulses is dark to him. […] 
His madness was not of the head, but heart. […] Note that we 
are not asked to condemn this being with the mad heart, this be-
ing with whom there is something constitutionally wrong. On the 
contrary, we are invited to understand and sympathize. But there 
is a limit to sympathy. For though he lives among us, he is not 
 17 Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile Absolute – or Why Is the Christian Legacy Worth 
Fighting For? (London: Verso, 2000), 111.
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one of us. He is exactly what he calls himself: a thing, a monster. 
Finally Byron will suggest, it will not be possible to love him, not 
in a deeper, more human sense of the word. He will be condemned 
to solitude. (32–34)
So here we have it: Lucifer as a sublimated image of Byron and 
both the symbolic authority that Lurie tries to please – the typical 
Byronic protagonist is a great sinner but it is precisely his dark se-
cret that makes him magnetic.
The whole of Lurie’s “trial,” in spite of the second thoughts he 
might have had, is staged for the eyes and ears of the “Byronic” 
tribunal much more than before the harassment committee. That is 
why the whole affair does not really scar Lurie’s self-image at all – 
if anything, he comes out of his trial with a more consolidated ego, 
proud of himself for behaving “heroically” passing his ethical test 
with flying colours. One can even claim that he enjoys the whole 
process (superegoic aggressiveness sublimated in the painful pleas-
ure of standing for a principle) and his “social death,” instead of 
humiliating him, makes him even stronger. This is why he can bring 
himself to apologise to Melanie’s father only after his Romantic iden-
tifications are at least partially gone. The point is not that Lurie has 
to experience the rape of his daughter to be able to put himself in 
the place of Isaacs (so to identify with his role as the father in the 
symbolic order),18 but precisely the opposite: he can relate to him only 
when he ceases to identify himself in Isaacs’s way, when instead of 
asking, as Isaacs does, the hysteric question, “What does God want 
from you?” (in his version it would be something like “What does 
Eros-cum-romanticised-Satanic-honour want from you?” – the same 
question formulated from exactly the opposite position of the same 
constellation), he is on the threshold of entering a new symbolic (and 
rather feminine) dispensation. That is also why he perceives Isaacs 
(his own reversed image) as an obscene father playing his own tricks 
of discourse and why now he can detachedly fulfil what this obscene 
master wants from him – he mockingly goes through the spectacle 
of self-abasement falling to his knees and prostrating himself before 
the Isaacs family.
Let us, however, come back to the aftermath of the “fall.” After 
the scandal and his forced resignation from the university, he goes 
to live temporarily with his daughter Lucy on a farm where she runs 
a boarding kennel and grows flowers and garden produce. Apart from 
the two of them, there is also Petrus, a middle-aged black, Lucy’s as-
 18 A melodramatic interpretation, some reviewers have suggested.
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sistant and recently co-proprietor, and his wife. One day Lurie and 
his daughter are attacked and robbed by three black men, she is 
raped and he is beaten and burned. During the attack Petrus is not 
in the vicinity.
The first and greatest injury to Lurie is the rape of his daughter; 
it is more painful for him that his burns and humiliation and we 
can suppose more painful than if he had been raped himself. He 
is desperate and almost insane, overflowing with fatherly feelings, 
yet his first “discursive” reaction to what happened to his daughter 
is strangely Sadean: “Too many people, too few things. What there 
is must go into circulation, so that everyone can have a chance to 
be happy for a day. That is the theory; hold to the theory and the 
comforts of theory. Not human evil, just a vast circulatory system, 
to whose workings pity and terror are irrelevant. […] There must 
be some niche in the system for women and what happens to them” 
(98). It was Sade himself, in his “Yet Another Effort, Frenchmen, 
If You Would Become Republicans,” who promulgated a system of 
liberation of desire in which, among other things, theft is under-
stood as socially justified (the more the poor steal from the rich, the 
wider – and therefore more justly – the goods are distributed) and 
each citizen is obliged to offer his or her body for the enjoyment of 
others. Only a system which consists of permanent ferment is fit to 
be the system of the republic – the moment the ferment subsides, 
the moment any stable relations appear, one finds himself again in 
a society of masters and servants.
Of course, Lurie finds “comfort” in this theory because it allows 
him momentarily to distance himself from his pain, but one might 
not be too surprised to find earlier in the novel another Sadean ex-
planation. Explaining to Lucy what he means by “the rights of de-
sire,” he speaks about a dog their neighbours had: “Whenever there 
was a bitch in the vicinity it would get excited and unmanageable, 
and with Pavlovian regularity the owners would beat it. This went 
on until the poor dog didn’t know what to do. At the smell of a bitch 
it would chase around the garden with its ears flat and its tail be-
tween its legs, whining, trying to hide. […] What was ignoble about 
the […] spectacle was that the poor dog had begun to hate his na-
ture. It no longer needed to be beaten. It was ready to punish itself. 
At that point it would have been better to shoot it” (90). A strictly 
Sadean point, if applied to people, and of course Lurie means to il-
lustrate what can happen to human desire, not to animal instinct.
Although what he is trying to do by means of his theory of circu-
lation is only to screen himself from the irruption of the traumatic 
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real into his life, so this theory does not really try to explain the 
nature of what happened; we can take this theory as symptomatic 
of the truth hidden behind his benevolent theory of desire preached 
so far: in the fantasy of the Sadean “explanation” the aggressive 
underside of his desire comes to light.
The rape, however, has nothing to do with desire, or this is at 
least the way Lucy relates it to her father: “They see me as owing 
something. They see themselves as debt collectors, tax collectors. […] 
I think they are rapists first and foremost. Stealing things is just 
incidental” (158), she says, dismissing her father’s little theory. The 
symbolic debt of apartheid is being paid here and the point is not 
the pleasure or desire but Herrschaft,19 which Lucy carefully sepa-
rates from another term. When Lurie, speaking about the rapists, 
says: “They want you for their slave,” Lucy objects: “Not slavery. 
Subjection. Subjugation” (159). While slavery, although founded on 
violence, is a kind of social contract, subjugation is just negation, 
and this was what made the rape most shocking for her: “It was 
done with such personal hatred. That was what stunned me more 
than anything” (156). But, of course, Lucy is wrong to call this ha-
tred personal since they had never set their eyes on her before; the 
hatred she experienced was the hatred of the debtor as such – the 
symbolic debtor who is no other than the obscene father of jouis-
sance, the white master whose colonial enjoyment is seen as the 
enjoyment which is stolen from the blacks. It is not Lurie person-
ally, of course, but he is nevertheless a perfect symbolic incarnation 
of colonial jouissance: the connoisseur of exquisite cultural pleasures 
which can be enjoyed due to the history of colonial exploitation – as 
in the case of his philandering, his position in the system is one of 
power (even if disavowed). But who is the one that sees it? It is the 
Other (the symbolic order) where the (symbolic) debt is registered 
and the whole spectacle is organised for its gaze. The rapists, like 
all sadists, are only the instruments of the Other, instruments by 
means of which the Other’s will to enjoy is to be realised, as the 
sadist does not perform what he does for his own pleasure but so 
that the Other can enjoy.20 Like the Sadean libertines in The One 
Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom the rapists find excitement not 
in “what is here” (rape does not change anything as far as their dis-
 19 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (Seminar 
XI), trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1979), 183.
 20 This does not mean that in performing the sadistic act the sadist does not 
enjoy, but that it is precisely his instrumentalisation that he finds pleasurable.
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possession is concerned) but in “what is not here”21 – what propels 
them is the idea of “getting even.” Therefore, it is crucial that the 
rape be multiple; it has to be registered by the gaze of the Other, 
which in this case is represented by the other members of the “credi-
tor” community for whom the rape has also “educational” value: “He 
was there to learn” (159), says Lucy about the boy among the rapists 
– he is not there to learn that banging girls against their will is fun 
but to learn that there is a debt to be paid (since he might be too 
young to remember apartheid). “They must have had every reason to 
be pleased with their afternoon’s work; they must have felt happy in 
their vocation,” muses Lurie (159).
The catastrophe transforms Lurie completely but not all at once, 
as is shown by his quick concoction of a desire distribution theory 
in reaction to what has happened. Yet something happens to him 
and we can trace its origin to the moment during the attack when 
he “goes mad”: “he throws himself about, hurling shapeless bellows 
that have no words behind them, only fear” (96); and a few moments 
later: “ ‘Lucy!’ he shouts, over and over, till he can hear an edge of 
craziness in his voice” (97). What we have here is a telling juxtaposi-
tion to his aestheticising theories of the origin of human language. 
The abyss of subjectivity turns out not to be the sublimating song 
but the scream as uncontrolled reaction to the pure horror of the 
traumatic real. In this scream, all Lurie’s imaginary and symbolic 
identifications are resolved and he encounters his core as empty. 
“This attitude of radical impassivity, of the helpless witness who 
can only observe the inexorable run of things, unable to affect its 
course with [his] intervention, is the zero-level of subjectivity: I can 
only experience this inexorable fate as an unbearable dread insofar 
as I subtract from it my subjective position of enunciation, insofar 
as I am not fully immersed into it.”22 There is no longer a master 
signifier (like “honour”) that he can hold on to and the result is the 
involuntary scream in which he experiences a thorough subjective 
destitution in which the consistency of his world comes apart – in 
other words, he undergoes symbolic death. The encounter does not 
transform his life immediately – as we have noted, when the at-
tackers go away he immediately returns to his old symbolic identi-
fications (circulation of desire, etc.) – but the experience of the void 
of himself will not be forgotten and the rest of his story describes 
 21 Gilles Deleuze, “Coldness and Cruelty,” in: Masochism (New York: Zone 
Books, 1991), 28.
 22 Slavoj Žižek, “I Do not Order My Dreams,” in: Slavoj Žižek and Mladen Dolar, 
Opera’s Second Death (London: Routledge, 2002), 195.
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the process of letting go of everything he used to be. The event is 
the beginning of a process that can be called the proper process of 
sublimation, not understood as a redirection of sexual energies into 
“higher” aesthetic activities, but as a process in which one separates 
oneself from the Other.23
The scream is also a watershed in Lurie’s life in another sense: 
“His pleasure in life has been snuffed out” (107) – his desire and 
everything that it implies is radically curtailed. What we witness in 
the scream is also the dying scream of the father of enjoyment, the 
non-castrated father of the primal horde who could enjoy all women, 
the great myth of Freud’s Totem and Taboo. The scream announces 
the death of the uncastrated colonial father of jouissance who could 
enjoy all colonial pleasures as his due, stealing them from the colo-
nial subjects and feeling no guilt – which is also a kind of retroac-
tive myth.
In a classic essay, Theodor Reik24 interprets the droning sound of 
a primitive Jewish horn, the shofar, used in the Yom Kippur ritual, 
as “the endlessly prolonged scream of the suffering-dying-impotent- 
humiliated father.”25 Although the official version of the Jewish tradi-
tion is that the sound of the shofar imitates the sound of the thunder 
that was heard when Moses received the Ten Commandments from 
God, and thus stands as the commemoration of the founding gesture 
of the Law, both interpretations refer to the same scene of founda-
tion of the covenant: what happens on Mount Sinai is comparable 
to what happens in the Freudian myth where the brothers kill their 
father (who obeys nothing but his chaotic drives) only to elevate him 
to the status of the symbolic authority from which prohibition origi-
nates, the-Name-of-the-Father which guarantees the Law, and is the 
beginning of the new dispensation. Therefore the strange fact that it 
is the father who screams during the rape while his daughter is sur-
prisingly quiet finds justification in the fact that, for Lacan, the Law 
is always subsumed under the paternal metaphor, so that it always 
reverberates with the echo of the father’s scream. What is crucial 
about the shofar is the “association of its sound with the traumatic, 
shattering moment of the institution of the Law: in so far as we re-
 23 Joan Copjec, Imagine There’s No Woman: Ethics and Sublimation (Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 2002), 45.
 24 Theodor Reik, Das Ritual: Psychoanalytische Studien (Leipzig: Internationaler 
Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1928).
 25 Slavoj Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder: The Essay on Schelling and Related 
Matters (London: Verso, 1996), 150; in further interpretation of the shofar I rely on 
this text.
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main within the Law, its origin is sensu stricto unthinkable – that 
is to say, the rule of the Law presupposes the ‘foreclosure’ of its (‘il-
legal’) origins; its performative efficiency relies on our accepting it 
as always-already-given.”26 The primordial crime has to remain “fore-
closed,” because in the language inherited from the old order there 
are no names for it (“War, atrocity: every word with which one tries 
to wrap up this day, the day swallows down its black throat” (102)), 
and because physical violence in general is something that does not 
speak. Every time Lurie tries to make Lucy tell the police what hap-
pened to her, she counters with: you don’t understand, you weren’t 
there, you don’t know what happened. Even when he proceeds to the 
description of the scene: “You were raped. Multiply. By three men. 
[…] You were in fear of you life. You were afraid that after you had 
been used you would be killed” (157), she counters him with “And?”, 
as if his names for what happened were beside the point. And he is 
conscious of it himself: “he can, if he concentrates, if he loses him-
self, be there, be the men, inhabit them, fill them with the ghost of 
himself. The question is, does he have it in him to be the woman?” 
(160).27 But there is a reason which is even more important: the con-
fession – to the ineffectual guardians of the old order, the police, for 
instance – will render impossible the constitution of the new order 
repeatedly confronting it with its “illegality” (its criminal origin). The 
new paternal figure, Petrus, promises that “now it is all right” (138), 
if Lucy remains “a forward-looking lady, not backward-looking” (136). 
If the “origin” (violence) does not remain “foreclosed,” it will have to 
repeat itself in one form or another again and again.
Petrus’s involvement in the affair is ambiguous and there are 
hints that he might have had a hand in provoking the attack. The 
fact remains that on the day of rape he disappeared from the scene 
for no apparent reason. This would seem to put Petrus in an awk-
ward position as the new figure of the symbolic authority, the Name-
of-the-Father, but such “shadiness” of the figure of the Law is pre-
cisely what allows it to function. For in order to be operative the 
Law has to split itself into two figures, or rather, its split origin 
(illegal beginning of legality) makes it function properly only when 
it is doubled up. What we witness in the new dispensation is Petrus 
as the guardian of the letter of the Law (of prohibition), the Name-
of-the-Father, and another presence that hides in the cracks and 
 26 Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder, 153.
 27 Of course, apart from these “structural” reasons, another reason why the 
scene of rape is “foreclosed” from the book is that what applies to Lurie also ap-
plies to Coetzee as an author.
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inconsistencies of the Law – we encounter here none other than the 
reincarnated father of enjoyment. And it is not difficult to find him; 
it is enough to ask who the figure is that revolts the (symbolically) 
dead jouisseur the most, somebody who is his incarnation in the new 
order, and because of that the most disgusting. It is Pollux, the boy 
rapist, who is the new representative of the obscene, enjoying side of 
symbolic authority. Petrus is the man of contracts (laws): his proposal 
to marry Lucy has nothing to do with enjoyment, but is a means to 
exchange land for protection, and, even more importantly, a remedy 
offered to retroactively cover the wound in the real by dissimulating 
it symbolically,28 while Pollux is an obscene jouisseur peeping in on 
Lucy while she takes a bath (a spitting image of Lurie’s desirous-
ness). Petrus’s promise is: “I will protect her” (139); Pollux’s echo is: 
“We will kill you all!” (207) (the echo of the uncastrated father and 
the primordial founding crime). What we have here are two faces of 
the Law: the official, legalistic, disinterested side, and the other one, 
the side of obscene rituals which go against the letter of the law, but 
which are practised and accepted by the members of a given com-
munity precisely because those common “transgressions” constitute 
the bond of the community (without it, the “communal spirit” would 
cease to exist). If the outsider does not know the obscene rituals, the 
formal side of the law will always remain dysfunctional and a dead 
letter to him – justice will always remain indefinitely adjourned until 
he learns the obscene underside that makes the official side work.29 
Thus, although “something is wrong with him” (207) (“Morally defi-
cient. Mentally deficient” (208)), Pollux “is here [says Lucy], he won’t 
disappear in a puff of smoke, he is a fact of life” (208) – in order for 
the Law to operate Pollux and his “impure” desire would have to be 
handled.
What is more, the doubling of the Father (Petrus/Pollux) is pre-
cisely the point that Lurie tried to dissimulate in his dealings with 
the university committee: he claimed there that the discourse of the 
(dead) letter of the Law (the “neutral,” castrated, delibidinised signi-
fier) and obscene jouissance of this letter (whether in seduction or 
confession) are not the same, being himself the incarnation of such 
 28 The sons, after killing their father, make him into the highest and all-pow-
erful authority who guarantees the laws, therefore they could not have killed him; 
Lucy is a pregnant woman, now she has a husband who is the figure of authority 
in the vicinity, so the rape could not have happened.
 29 Such functioning of the law is most brilliantly described in Kafka’s novels, 
and analysed by Slavoj Žižek in Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan 
Through Popular Culture (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), chapter 8.
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doubling as both the figure of authority to the students (a professor) 
and their obscene jouisseur. This is precisely what he is accused of 
by the committee and what they demand of him is not to change (as 
he conceives of it), but really just “to come out of the closet,” to make 
public the jouissance of authority he has practised so far in private, 
to turn it into the jouissance of disgraced authority breast-beating in 
front of the cameras. To use a Lacanian expression: in dealings with 
the harassment committee, Lurie receives the truth of his position 
from the Other in the inverted form.
Now, after the rape, he encounters the separation but this time 
he finds it horrifying. “You want to know why I have not laid a par-
ticular charge with the police. […] The reason is that, as far as 
I am concerned, what happened to me is a purely private matter” 
(112), says Lucy to him. This claim is completely incomprehensible 
to Lurie; the signifier “private” shines for him with a new, dark, un-
canny light. It is as if it had been severed from the signifying chain 
of explanations, of causes and effects. In Lurie’s discourse there is no 
place for such a signifier, so it tears a hole in the dissimulated whole 
of the symbolic order with which he identifies. In discursive/symbolic 
terms, what happens here is a repetition of what just happened in 
the real: Lurie’s stitched-up discourse, awkwardly and temporarily 
“repaired” with theories of circulating of desire and vengeance (“It 
was a history of wrong speaking through them” (156)), is torn up 
again by encountering a signifier that for him does not seem to have 
any meaning, because it does not refer to anything he can find in 
the Other. So he painfully tries to stitch it up again by trying to 
explain what Lucy means by “privacy” in his own terms. But to no 
avail; he keeps being contradicted by his daughter: “Do you think 
that by meekly accepting what happened to you, you can set your-
self apart from farmers like Ettinger [the paradigmatic master of 
apartheid addressing ‘his’ blacks as ‘boys’]?” – “I’m not just trying to 
save my skin. If that is what you think, you miss the point entirely.” 
“Do you hope you can expiate the crimes of the past by suffering in 
the present?” – “You keep misreading me. Guilt and salvation are 
abstractions. I don’t act in terms of abstractions” (112). And so on, 
almost to the end of the novel.
When his old point of keeping different (religious and secular) 
discourses apart fails, he tries to persuade Lucy to leave the farm, 
even go to Holland (where her mother lives). She will not listen and 
when he presses her she turns his implied argument about separate 
discourses on its head: “I wish I could explain. But I can’t. Because 
of who you are and who I am, I can’t” (155). And later: “It is as if 
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you have chosen deliberately to sit in a corner where the rays of the 
sun do not shine. I think of you as one of the three chimpanzees, the 
one with his paws over his eyes” (161). It is Lucy who walks in the 
sun, and one does not have to go as far as to recall the Platonic cave 
to see the associations of light with knowledge or even wisdom. In 
order to get into the sunlight, however, one has to die to the world 
(“I am a dead person,” she claims in the same letter to Lurie from 
which the above quote is taken (161)), to die in Paul’s sense of dying 
to the old Law to be reborn in the new one, to be able to enter a new 
covenant. Lucy walks in the light precisely because of it, she even 
shines with this sublime light because she has taken a step beyond 
the Law, the old symbolic order.30
For Lurie, this sublime light is, however, inhuman. He keeps em-
phasising her lack of “ordinary human responses”: she does not cry, 
she is stiff as a pole, she is reserved and composed. He tries to gen-
trify her behaviour by explaining it to himself as the aftermath of 
the shock, but she never changes; she remains this “different person” 
to the end of the book. He does not know how to handle this change 
and the effect is that he only exasperates his daughter. But what 
he is too afraid or too confused to admit about her, he freely recog-
nises in the new order – for him it is monstrous. “This is not how 
we do things. […] We Westerners” (202), he is on the point of saying 
when Petrus comes up with his proposition to marry Lucy. (“It was 
blackmail pure and simple,” he comments, and as we can expect his 
daughter corrects him: “It wasn’t blackmail. You are wrong about 
that” (202)).
Lurie finds the new order completely at odds with his image of 
what the relations between humans should be, and here we find him 
ultimately as a participant in the Politically Correct discourse he 
formerly derided: the other is fine only as long as he is the specular 
image of myself, if he does not believe in the same values (like my 
inalienable right not to be disturbed in my self-realisation), he ceases 
to be the benign other whose rights I am told to respect and becomes 
a monstrosity (a fundamentalist, a terrorist, generally somebody the 
authority should protect me from). We do not need psychoanalysis to 
unravel the inconsistency behind this attitude (I should respect the 
other but only if he agrees to become the mirror image of myself), 
yet we may nevertheless use it.
 30 There are certain parallels here to the sublime light radiated by Antigone in 
Lacan’s analysis of her act (Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (Seminar 
VII), trans. Dennis Potter (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), chapters XIX–XXI).
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There are two signifiers by which Petrus is described in the 
book: he refers to himself ironically as the dog-man (we will come 
to canine matters later), but there is yet another term for him: 
“It is hard to say what Petrus is, strictly speaking. The word that 
seems to serve best, however, is neighbour” (116). In the old days 
of apartheid Petrus’s place in the symbolic order was fixed, he was 
a “boy,” a servant of the master, not really to be reckoned with. 
Now he emerges as a neighbour and with this change his former 
master becomes hystericised by the question he has to confront 
now: what does he want from me? The appearance of this ques-
tion in the intersubjective space signals the appearance of the real 
neighbour (in contrast to the imaginary one), whose desire is al-
ways enigmatic.31 That is precisely why the commandment to love 
one’s neighbour constituted for Freud such a scandal, an injunction 
impossible to obey.32
Lacan, discussing the nature of the good, returns to Freud’s out-
rage and, with a reference to Bentham, turns our attention to the 
truth of the modern discourse of the good (the greatest amount of 
happiness for the greatest number of people; a utilitarianism the 
modern version of which is PC discourse): “My egoism is quite con-
tent with a certain altruism, altruism of the kind that is situated 
on the level of the useful. […] It is a fact of experience that what 
I want is the good of others in the image of my own. That does not 
cost so much.”33 The point which is dissimulated, however, by such 
“goodness” is that “my neighbour’s jouissance, his harmful, malig-
nant jouissance, is what poses the problem for my love.”34 We en-
counter this problem in its classic formulation already in Augustine’s 
reference to his younger brother sucking their mother’s breast and 
Augustine’s envy: what he envies is not the access to the object (in 
this case the mother’s milk, which he would probably have found 
disgusting), but the very enjoyment itself.35 So my neighbour’s jouis-
sance (his good) is something that I can never find because it has no 
discernible object, and since it cannot be found it is always treated 
as always already stolen from me, creating a trauma. Therefore, the 
neighbour can be a neutral subject of my benevolence or altruism 
 31 Žižek, The Fragile Absolute, 109.
 32 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. James Strachey 
(New  York: W.W. Norton, 1962), 56–63.
 33 Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 187.
 34 Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 187.
 35 Augustine, Confessions, Book 1, par. 7, trans. E. B. Pusey. 7 July 2007. 
<https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3296/3296-h/3296-h.htm#link2H_4_0002>.
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only if his good is the same as what I understand to be good – yet 
in such form the other ceases to be the other. Thus, when the real 
other appears he always materialises as a traumatising force, one 
whose jouissance is a scandal, ultimately directed against me, and 
therefore evil and monstrous. This is precisely what we find in Lurie 
who takes the traumatised position, while Lucy seems to have ac-
complished the impossible: to work through the traumas of the rape 
and of the neighbour.
To dissimulate the dimension of the impossible, Lurie keeps ex-
plaining to Lucy that her logic of sacrifice is a completely misguided 
strategy when one is dealing with vengeance. Taking Christ as the 
ideal ego does not make sense to him because it will not be able 
to stop the vicious circle of retribution: “This is not how vengeance 
works, Lucy. Vengeance is like fire. The more it devours, the hungrier 
it gets” (112). Whether this is a correct description of the mechanism 
of vengeance is debatable, but an interesting point is that Lurie of-
fers here the precise logic of the superego: the superego, which is the 
propelling force of sacrifice. We have already described it on Lurie’s 
example, when he sacrificed his academic career in order to keep 
intact his symbolic identifications and identify with the heroic image 
of himself. So, without saying it explicitly, Lurie accuses Lucy of his 
own flaw, that is, narcissism. Even worse, if we bear in mind the 
excessive satisfaction his own renunciation brought him, he accuses 
her between the lines of secretly enjoying her dispossession, that is, 
of masochism. We have also noted that Lucy keeps contradicting his 
claims and we have to take her word for it: she is not guided by the 
logic of sacrifice, it is not the superegoic image that stands behind 
her attitude.
Her choice has nothing to do with imaginary identifications. The 
case is exactly the opposite: rather than cover up the trauma with 
familiar discourse, the cost of which is the “inexplicable” experience 
of guilt we can see on Lurie’s example, she exercises the power that 
was thrust on her by her subjective destitution: she steps out of her 
former symbolic universe (which lies in ruins anyway) and freely 
chooses what is inevitable. When the consistency of one’s symbolic 
order is destroyed in the collapse of one’s identifications, one realises 
that there is nothing precious in oneself, nothing one can sacrifice, 
and what is left to do is either trying to dissimulate the traumatic 
fact by pretending nothing happened to one’s symbolic universe (but 
the repressed always returns through the cracks, as for Lurie) or to 
turn the catastrophe on its head and realise its liberating potential: 
I am no longer bound by who I imagined myself to be. The choice 
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is forced, so I can basically choose either mental collapse or a step 
forward into the future as somebody completely new.
What we encounter here is a structure of Heideggerian Entwurf 
as a paradoxical situation in which I freely choose my own destiny, 
freely assume the fate that is already mine.36 This notion of choice 
is not a liberal individualist “choice between a series of objects [or 
actions] leaving my subjective position intact [should I choose public 
repentance or standing for a principle?], but the fundamental choice 
by means of which I ‘choose myself.’ ”37 The paradox here is that the 
choice is forced (so it has nothing to do with the symbolic positions 
with which I may or may not identify) but none the less it is autono-
mous. What is more, such choice retroactively “erases itself,” because 
in choosing myself I choose that I have always been like that, that 
what the choice implies has always been my “nature”: when I am 
interpellated as a Pole, the moment I recognise myself as a Pole 
means that I assume being Polish from birth on and the moment of 
interpellation as choice disappears from my history; it is only a mo-
ment in which I become conscious of what I always have already 
been. This is crucial from a Kantian ethical perspective – for Kant 
we act ethically only in obeying the injunction that is unconditional, 
that is, the one that is not pathological (not guided by self-interest). 
However, all our conscious choices are, or at least can be thought to 
be, at least minimally pathological, so the conclusion may be that 
only a forgotten choice, a forgotten injunction, can be strictly speak-
ing unconditional and non-pathological.38 “That is what Hegel has in 
mind when he claims that in the course of a dialectical process, the 
immediate starting point proves itself to be something already medi-
ated, that is, its own self-negation; in the end, we ascertain that we 
always and already were what we wanted to become [or were forced 
to become], the only difference being that this always-already state 
changes its modality from in-itself to for-itself. The ethical is in this 
sense the domain of repetition qua symbolic.”39
Lurie’s understanding of autonomy (western liberal) as the force 
acting behind his choices in the harassment affair has already been 
discussed. But Lurie’s discomfort with the ungraspable cause of 
Lucy’s behaviour may also have a reverse side – that “object” in Lucy 
 36 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), 184–88 and passim.
 37 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology 
(London: Verso, 1999), 18.
 38 Žižek, “I Do not Order My Dreams,” 141.
 39 Žižek, “I Do not Order My Dreams,” 152.
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that has no cause,40 that he cannot include in the chains of explana-
tions, the behaviour of Lucy that is for him totally irrational and 
“impossible” is a reminder to him of his own moment of subjective 
dispossession in the scream, the moment when he ceased to be who 
he formerly was but did not have the courage to turn this moment 
of loss into a moment of liberation from the tyranny of the Other. 
Yet Lurie, in his own way, constantly experiences this moment of 
the impossible as another moment of nonsensical contradiction in his 
symbolic world: he feels guilty that he did not save Lucy, although 
he knows perfectly well that it was not in his power to do anything 
to stop the course of events.41 This is especially strange because in 
his former life (before the rape) the feeling of guilt was completely 
strange to him; all he had to do to absolve himself of it was to refer 
to the ultimate cliché that he just is who he is: “That is his tempera-
ment. His temperament is not going to change, he is too old for that. 
His temperament is fixed and set” (2). He was not born to be a hus-
band, it is his temperament to be a servant of Eros, and so on. Now, 
however, the feeling of guilt persistently reminds him of something 
in which he failed and which he does not want to know about: that 
there is something impossible he can accomplish. In this mood he 
quotes Rilke: “Du musst dein Leben ändern!: you must change your 
life. Well, he is too old to heed, too old to change. Lucy may be able 
to bend to the tempest; he cannot, not with honour” (209).
At first glance the passage looks familiar; Lurie activates the 
same defences as usual to keep his identifications intact: honour, 
a temperament unable to reform itself. But the old excuses are jux-
taposed with the quote from a poem which does not really fit in 
Lurie’s intended context: in Rilke’s poem it is beauty – Apollo’s ar-
chaic torso – that enjoins the viewer to change his life, beauty that 
is wild and broken:
Sonst stünde dieser Stein entstellt und kurz
unter der Schultern durchsichtigem Sturz
und flimmerte nicht so wie Raubtierfelle.42
 40 For Lacan the object without the cause (excluded from the signifying chain) 
is the cause of anxiety as distinct from fear, which has a cause (Zupančič, Ethics of 
the Real, 144).
 41 According to Kant such split in the subject is where freedom manifests itself 
– see: Zupančič, Ethics of the Real, 25–27.
 42 “Archaïscher Torso Apollos,” in: Reiner Maria Rilke, Poezje (bilingual edition), 
trans. Mieczysław Jastrun (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1987), 124. In trans-
lation by David Young: “And then this stone would stand here, short and broken, /
under the shoulders’ clear, cascading plunge / and wouldn’t ripple like a wild beast’s 
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The point is precisely that true beauty tears out a hole in one’s 
world and confronts one with what can be glimpsed on the other 
side, something that destroys the peaceful surface of one’s habitual 
identifications. It is enough to recall another famous passage from 
Rilke’s “First Duino Elegy,” where beauty is only “the beginning of 
the terrible” that despises our destruction:
[…] Denn das Schöne ist nichts
als des Schrecklichen Anfang, den wir noch grade ertragen,
und wir bewundern es so, weil es gelassen verschmäht,
uns zu zerstören […]43
Therefore, the monstrous new order, which Lurie cannot compre-
hend, is unwittingly (unconsciously?) referred to by him as the 
modality of the beautiful, or rather – in Kantian parlance – the 
sublime.44 In this sense, the monstrous and the sublime coincide, 
and the new always comes in the mask of the terrible, because it 
“despises our destruction,” that is, it is incomprehensible in terms 
of the old symbolic order it enters violently, it destroys our image 
of who we are for others and for ourselves. This is precisely what 
Lurie would have to learn, but this process of educating the former 
educator is far from what he has always imagined it to be – it in-
volves neither imaginary identification nor learning skills. In fact, 
his educators become women and dogs.
The status of the image of the dog is ambiguous in the novel. 
A definite association between dogs and blacks persists through the 
first part of the novel, until the rape. On their first encounter Petrus 
calls himself half-jokingly “the dog-man” (64), Lurie projects this im-
age onto the rapists (“Call your dogs! they said to her. Go on, call 
your dogs! No dogs? Then let us show you dogs” (160)); he compares 
their sperm to dog’s urine (199); but what is more interesting, when 
Lurie and Lucy have an argument on animal welfare, he brings up 
a point which may sound obscene in South Africa. Lucy, contesting 
her father’s privileging “higher life” (of the “spirit”), claims that “there 
is no higher life. This is the only life there is. Which we share with 
fur” (Selected Poems of Rainer Maria Rilke: The Book of Fresh Beginnings, trans. 
David Young (Oberlin, OH: Oberlin College Press, 1994), 60).
 43 Rilke, Poezje, 184. In translation by A. S. Kline: “For beauty is nothing but /
the beginning of terror, that we are still able to bear, / and we revere it so, because 
it calmly disdains/to destroy us” (6 March 2007 <http://www.tonykline.co.uk/PITBR 
/German/Rilke.htm>).
 44 In Kantian terminology “the beautiful” is the beauty of standards, while beau-
ty in its destructive/terrible modality is called “the sublime.”
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animals. […] That’s the example I try to follow. To share some of our 
human privilege with the beasts.” To which Lurie’s answer is: “Yes, 
I agree, this is the only life there is. As for animals, by all means 
let us be kind to them. But let us not lose perspective. We are of 
a different order of creation from the animals. Not higher, necessar-
ily just different” (74). What we have here is precisely a modality of 
discourse which has been used as an excuse for apartheid: although 
we all know that blacks are an inferior species and we despise them, 
yet for the sake of the Other let us claim that our desire to live apart 
from them is the sign of our respect for their alterity. As if this were 
not enough, Lurie’s next sentence is: “So if we are going to be kind, 
let it be out of simple generosity, not because we feel guilty or fear 
retribution.” Retribution from whom? Dogs and cats and cows and 
sheep? Or whales and elephants and gorillas and pandas? It is only 
too clear whose retribution Lurie fears and what kind of guilt he is 
trying to repress. Later, when out of boredom and to accept Lucy’s 
suggestions he agrees to help in the animal clinic run by Bev Shaw, 
a friend of Lucy’s, he does it only on condition that, as he jokingly 
puts it, he will do it “only as long as I don’t have to become a better 
person” (77),45 which, juxtaposed with his claims that his affair with 
the student did make him a better person,46 goes some way towards 
explaining the nature of his enjoyment (exercise of authority aiming 
at extraction of pleasure in the guise of generosity). Yet it is Lurie 
who, towards the end of the novel, becomes a dog-man, helping Bev 
Shaw put the unwanted dogs down and making sure they have a de-
cent “burial” in the nearby incinerator (when the hospital staff do it, 
they break the dogs’ stiffened limbs with shovels because they get 
stuck in the trolleys and the corpses return, half-burned, from the 
flames). How can we account for such a change?
The first time he helps in the clinic Lurie has nothing but scorn 
for what Bev Shaw does: “Bev Shaw, not a veterinarian but a priest-
ess, full of New Age mumbo jumbo, trying, absurdly, to lighten the 
load of Africa’s suffering beasts” (84). Yet, he cannot help being fas-
cinated with a strange spectacle he sees there: “She kneels down 
again beside the goat, nuzzles his throat, stroking the throat upward 
with her own hair. The goat trembles but is still. […] She is whis-
pering. ‘What do you say my friend?’ he hears her say. ‘What do you 
 45 Yet his first impulse was to resist: “It sounds like someone trying to make 
reparations for past misdeeds” (77).
 46 “Every woman I have been close to has taught me something about myself. 
To that extent they have made me a better person” (70); or “I was enriched by the 
experience” (56).
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say? Is it enough?’ The goat stands stock still as if hypnotized. Bev 
Shaw continues to stroke him with her head. She seems to have 
lapsed into a trance of her own” (83). If it were not for such strange 
behaviour, she would be nicely accommodated by his symbolic order 
– he finds her discourse to be the other side of the PC discourse he 
has just heroically opposed: “to me animal-welfare people are a bit 
like Christians of a certain kind. Everyone is so cheerful and well-
intentioned that after a while you itch to go off and do some rap-
ing and pillaging. Or to kick a cat” (73). This coming together of 
Christianity and violence is by no means accidental – although he 
appears to contrast Christianity to violence, in fact (especially if we 
juxtapose here Christianity, PC and animal welfare), his point would 
be to show the identity of these attitudes with violence (the discourse 
of the master). What is claimed here, in the Nietzschean spirit, is 
that the guilt propagated by each of these discourses breeds violent 
resentiment and because of that it is pure life-denying mastery (in 
response to his suggestions Lucy asks incredulously: “You think Bev 
is part of the repressive apparatus?” (91)).
His position changes radically after the attack on the farm. To 
occupy himself, he helps at the animal clinic as often as he can and 
assists Bev Shaw in putting down dogs witnessing her strange tranc-
es when the animals seem to be hypnotised by her voice. But Lurie 
becomes more and more moved by what goes on in the clinic: “The 
more killings he assists in, the more jittery he gets. One Sunday 
evening, driving home in Lucy’s kombi, he actually has to stop at the 
roadside to recover himself. Tears flow down his face that he cannot 
stop; his hands shake” (142–43). This is the only time we see him 
crying. Moreover, as we have mentioned, he ends up operating the 
incinerator where the dead dogs are burned. Whence such overflow-
ing of pity in such a narcissistic man?
Narcissism is precisely the key to the answer. Musing on his rea-
sons for taking on the job of “dog undertaker” he explains them thus: 
“To lighten the burden of Bev Shaw? For that it would be enough 
to drop off the bags at the dump and drive away. For the sake of 
the dogs? But the dogs are dead; and what do dogs know of honour 
and dishonour anyway? For himself then. For his idea of the world, 
a world in which men do not use shovels to beat corpses into a more 
convenient shape for processing” (145–46). An imaginary identifica-
tion again, this time with the image of a better world, which, as we 
have seen, always serves the interests of the narcissistic ego, if only 
to sharpen its recently faltering image of a man with finer sensibili-
ties than others, but which is at the same time being a dissimulated 
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image of “the idea of the world in which black men do not rape white 
women and humiliate their fathers for pleasure.” So what we ulti-
mately witness here is Lurie’s self-pity and his defence against the 
feeling of guilt – a symbolic enactment of saving the honour of dogs’ 
corpses, in place of the symbolic corpses of himself (the symbolic 
death denied) and his daughter (the symbolic death assumed). The 
narcissistic plea of being a servant of Eros is turned into the no less 
narcissistic task of being the servant of dead dogs (“there is no one 
else stupid enough to do it” (146)) – the spitting image of the “elec-
tion” (forced choice) of Lucy, yet on a humbler scale: “I was elected 
by gods,” becomes “I was elected by dogs” (“History repeating itself, 
though in a more modest vein,” muses Lurie on the day he appears 
on the farm (62)). One should not miss the irony of the indecently 
literary anagram (GOD-DOG): “the first time as tragedy, the second 
as farce.”47 None the less the modesty shows that he is learning.48
Lurie’s education is complete only when he learns to abandon 
self-pity in the image of the dog, that is, when he identifies with the 
dog without it being an identification with the idea/image of a bet-
ter world; in other words, when he accepts that he is (symbolically) 
dead. This is the lesson he finally learns from Lucy: the radically 
ethical act is to be able to give up one’s past for the sake of the 
future. Not to abandon one’s secondary identifications (teacher, intel-
lectual, womaniser) for the sake of one and the ultimate identifica-
tion (e.g. honour), but to give up this final identification too for noth-
ing. Nothing in the sense of having no image – the monstrous future 
encroaches on the symbolic order of the chooser as horrifying noth-
ingness which engulfs the understandable order of things. This is to 
understand there is no agalma in me, no treasure of something more 
in me than myself, which constitutes the kernel of my being and the 
 47 Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International 
Publishers, 1969), 15.
 48 This image of dogs as objects of narcissistic pity brings to mind another cliché 
of western discourse which is not present in the book, but whose absence may also 
be telling: the image of an “ethnic” or black as helpless victim. Dogs are objects 
of pity because they are unconscious victims of circumstances, and they are pitied 
only as long as they remain victims; the moment they “bite back” they become mad 
dogs and are considered beyond the pale of the law. In the same way, in the hu-
man rights liberal discourse, oppressed groups are pitied only as long as they stay 
oppressed: the moment they do something to counter the oppression – and this 
necessarily has to break the laws established by the oppressors – they become incar-
nations of monstrosity (terrorist, fundamentalist, etc.), which shows the narcissistic 
nature of the image of the victim: by making it into the object of pity I secretly enjoy 
my “liberal” status.
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giving up of which will result in the ultimate humiliation, or, rather, 
understanding that the agalma is precisely nothing: a split, a gap in 
myself that allows me to “step over myself,” to detach myself from 
him whom I used to be and start again from zero-point. More than 
this: to do it willingly. That is the final lesson his daughter teaches 
him: “Yes, I agree, it is humiliating. But perhaps that is a good point 
to start from again. Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. To 
start at ground level. With nothing. No cards, no weapons, no prop-
erty, no rights, no dignity.” “Like a dog,” is Lurie’s answer. “Yes, like 
a dog,” echoes Lucy (205). Despite appearances there is no self-pity 
in this comparison if we take into consideration what Lucy means by 
it – life without privilege – and it is only Lurie, not “fully educated” 
yet, who inserts in it the context of the final sentence from Kafka’s 
The Trial: “ ‘Like a dog!’ he said: it was as if he meant the shame 
of it to outlive him.”49
Yet the end of the book is surprisingly serene, suggesting that 
Lurie has finally learned his lesson, an old man sitting at the back 
of the animal clinic strumming a banjo, singing to himself, the very 
image of dispossession. Seeing Lucy in her garden visibly pregnant 
with the child of the rape, thinking a surprising thought of his ap-
proaching grandfatherhood, he sees nothing monstrous in it anymore. 
What is more, the image becomes a flash of beauty which takes his 
breath away (“even city boys can recognize beauty when they see 
it, can have their breath taken away” (218)). “A new footing, a new 
start,” he thinks, “Is it too late to educate the eye?” (218)
But this is just surprise at the disappearance of horror from his 
vision, the gesture of freely embracing it comes after that. The fol-
lowing Sunday, at the end of their Lösung session, as he calls put-
ting down the dogs, he offers up a dog and his own attachment to 
him as his own choice of the inevitable: “One ceases to be surprised 
that what used to be as hard as hard can be grows harder yet. He 
can save the young dog, if he wishes, for another week. But a time 
must come, it cannot be evaded, when he will have to bring him to 
Bev Shaw in her operation room” (219). In this gesture his narcis-
sistic self-pity is overcome and we can interpret this as Lurie’s first 
free, non-pathological act, an act foreign to his inclinations,50 an act 
that completes his subjectification: he accomplishes something inevi-
table yet monstrous (betrayal of the attachment between the dog and 
 49 Franz Kafka, The Trial, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir (London: Compact, 
1994), 251.
 50 Zupančič, Ethics of the Real, 23.
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himself) by choosing it freely – and he calls it love: the highest good 
(love) coincides here with the highest evil (death).
What is the place of opera in this scheme? How does it relate 
to the events (if it relates at all)? We have already mentioned that, 
in a sense, Lurie finds the truth of the opera (song) in his “dying” 
scream of the subject’s aphanisis (disappearance, fading), but there 
is another voice to which he is drawn, the voice with which Bev 
Shaw “enchants” the animals – although he at first derides her as 
a New Age priestess, he cannot help being fascinated with a voice 
that seems to work in the real, for animals react to it.
Lurie starts his operatic project, which he provisionally titles Byron 
in Italy, as another exercise in narcissism (“One wants to leave some-
thing behind” (63)): with Byron at the centre of the opera with his 
mistress, the Contessa Guiccioli, lushly orchestrated in the manner 
of Strauss (63). “Trapped in the Villa Guiccioli in the stifling heat of 
Ravenna, spied on by Teresa’s jealous husband, the two would roam 
through the gloomy drawing-rooms singing of their baulked passion” 
(180). Byron full of doubt, Teresa passionately in love with him and 
an appropriate, slightly decadent atmosphere: “Byron’s pet monkeys 
hanging languidly from the chandeliers and peacocks fussing back 
and forth among the ornate Neapolitan furniture” (181). All this is ex-
pressive of Lurie’s Romantic identification with Byron, with the erotic 
and the elegiac (lament), not to mention the wish-fulfilling passionate 
love of a much younger woman (Teresa is 18 years old). Yet with his 
fall from grace in Cape Town, his project starts to change and it is 
only after the attack on the farm that it really starts to develop – at 
first the huge orchestra is gone and Byron is on the point of setting 
off for Greece, singing (quoting The Aeneid) “sunt lacrimae rerum, et 
mentem mortalia tangunt,” bored with Teresa whom he has found 
empty-headed: the elegiac is still present, although in a subdued form 
(“a very meagre accompaniment – violin, cello, oboe or maybe bassoon” 
(63)), but the tone of the erotic is transformed radically into some-
thing smacking of disgust. The narcissistic sublimation is still pre-
sent but in a more sobering form. Then a crucial step is taken: Lurie 
abandons Byron (his point of identification) as his main protagonist 
and puts Teresa at the centre, but she is middle-aged now – all beauty 
gone, a plain, ordinary woman. So Byron in Italy becomes a work in 
which the eponymous hero, a womaniser and unacknowledged rapist 
(“Among the legions of countesses and kitchenmaids Byron pushed 
himself into there were no doubt those who called it rape” (160)), is 
not present or rather is present only as “groans and sighs from Byron 
offstage” (214). There is a hole at the centre of the opera that Teresa 
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has to fill herself, to evoke his ghostly presence by singing his words 
back to him (183). So we are left with only one voice which expresses 
itself in a prolonged sigh, “Mio Byron,” – “there is no action, no devel-
opment, just a long halting cantilena hurled by Teresa into the empty 
air” (214). “Past honour” (209), she “sits staring out over the marshes 
towards the gates of hell, cradling the mandolin on which she accom-
panies herself in her lyric flights” (184). Teresa projects herself into 
the underworld to call Byron back from the dead to bring her old life 
to her, to make her immortal as his love (“I was your Laura. Do you 
remember?” (183)).
What we encounter here, in an ironic and reversed mode, is a re-
turn to two fundamental gestures of the proper father of the opera, 
Claudio Monteverdi. One is the motif of bringing the dead back from 
the underworld, which founded the genre as such, as presented in 
the work that is generally considered to be the first opera equal to 
its notion, that is, Monteverdi’s Orfeo (1607); the second, executed 
by Monteverdi the following year, takes place when, in Arianna, the 
lament is given over to the operatic protagonist who will rule the 
stage from that moment on, that is, the distraught woman, in this 
case Arianna who has been abandoned by Theseus (in Orfeo Euridice 
is a minor character). What we witness in this gesture is, as Mladen 
Dolar puts it, the appearance of the “Diva, the goddess of the opera 
whose status depends on being in total despair.”51
But Teresa’s despair is of a strangely narcissistic kind: what she 
presents as the longing of love (“come to me, love me!” (185)) is re-
ally the address to the Other for immortality (as Byron’s “Laura”) 
and thus she appropriately mixes the religious and the erotic, as has 
been the case throughout most history of music, in which music pre-
sented itself as the proper medium both to obtain the mercy of gods 
(as in the case of Orpheus, who in Monteverdi’s opera fails his test 
and loses Euridice, but is, after the second lament, granted immor-
tality by Apollo) and to soften the beloved’s heart (Arianna).52 Hence 
also its ambiguous status: in music the religious and the erotic may 
become conflated. And this is precisely what happens in Byron in 
Italy. Byron – not a god but nevertheless somebody able to grant 
symbolic immortality – is called as a lover to break through the 
gates of hell and appear as living dead among the living: a properly 
demonic or monstrous presence.
 51 Mladen Dolar, “If Music Be the Food of Love,” in: Žižek and Dolar, Opera’s 
Second Death, 15.
 52 Dolar, “If Music Be the Food of Love,” 10.
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In opera, the interpenetration of love (Eros) with the demonic or 
death (Thanatos) comes to the fore only gradually. The first period 
of opera, from Monteverdi to Mozart, witnesses the ambiguous eroti-
cised complaint/lament to the Other – the power of music in opera is 
presented as being so strong that the Other relents and grants mer-
cy: we have the happy ending and the work of death in the power of 
music is forgotten. A new step is taken in Mozart’s Don Giovanni, 
where, in Kierkegaard’s famous analysis, music becomes the incarna-
tion of a self-destructive and all-devouring instinct (Don Giovanni, 
like Teresa, also disturbs the peace of the dead, although for differ-
ent reasons). But it is in Wagner that Eros and Thanatos become 
completely conflated: in the famous Wagnerian Liebestode Isolde dies 
of singing her overwhelming love for Tristan, and her voice becomes 
the very medium of death.53 What is more, the Wagnerian hero is 
precisely the hero born from the spirit of Byron – we may take the 
Flying Dutchman as the first and paradigmatic case – who in the 
past has committed some unspecified unspeakable crime and now 
has to wander, unable to find peace in death. The paradox here is 
that such a hero is monstrous not because he incarnates death, but 
just the opposite, because he incarnates immortality, the inability to 
die; in other words, what psychoanalysis calls the death drive, which, 
despite its name, is the very opposite of longing for annihilation.54
This is precisely what we find in Teresa: she is not able to live 
her everyday life peacefully, she longs to enjoy life to excess, to be 
seen as something more than “a woman past her prime, without 
prospects, living out her days in a dull provincial town” (182). And 
this is how she finds this strange extimate55 object, the voice of death 
in herself, something in herself that is more than herself – some-
thing that only a lover and a great poet can speak of, can give voice 
to, as Byron used to do in his letters, the truth of which is contested 
by his former acquaintances. In order to appease this foreign object 
in herself she tries to give it a voice, imagining it as Byron’s voice 
speaking to her from the realm of the dead – she ventriloquises his 
answers to fill the lack in her: “So faint, so faltering is the voice of 
Byron that Teresa has to sing his words back to him, helping him 
along breath by breath” (183). She wants to become Byron’s Laura, 
 53 Žižek, “I Do Not Order My Dreams,” 106.
 54 Žižek, “I Do Not Order My Dreams,” 106–107.
 55 Extimité (extimacy) is Lacan’s neologism which problematises the difference 
between inside and outside because the subject is ex-centric for psychoanalysis. For 
instance, because the unconscious consists of signifiers it is an intersubjective struc-
ture – in this way, what is most intimate to me is exterior to me, too.
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Woman paradigmatic, whole and complete. She feels that without 
Byron (without her position as his Muse) she is nothing, “but to 
be all, to be ‘the Woman all men are missing,’ […] involves a psy-
chotic stance. In this case Woman becomes “the Other of the Other,” 
which is a psychotic position because it has no representation in 
the symbolic.”56 But this is precisely the position the operatic female 
voice attempts to take: “the voice beyond meaning, the object of fasci-
nation beyond content” by means of which the prima donna attempts 
to prove that Woman exists after all57: “Come to me, mio Byron, love 
me!” is the only message Teresa has, not really a message but one 
prolonged sigh that constitutes the whole of the opera. And Byron’s 
voice is only a negative side of this voice-object trying to fascinate, 
which bears Teresa no message apart from the one that her voice 
is forever unable to accomplish the task assigned to it: “Leave me, 
leave me, leave me be!” (185).
Teresa finds this voice in her as a foreign body that splits her, 
so it functions precisely as the reverse of the metaphysical voice of 
“phonocentrism,” as analysed by Derrida, where the voice grounds 
the self-presence and self-transparency of the subject:
The voice is heard (understood) – that undoubtedly is what is called 
conscience – closest to the self as the absolute effacement of the sig-
nifier: pure auto-affection that necessarily has the form of time and 
which does not borrow from outside of itself, in the world or in “re-
ality,” any accessory signifier, any substance of expression foreign 
to its own spontaneity. It is the unique experience of the signified 
producing itself spontaneously, from within the self.58
Against this illusion of “hearing oneself speak” (s’entendre parler) 
Derrida champions writing, not as its actual practice but as a trace 
that always already muddles up the supposedly pure source of sub-
ject’s self-affection, as a trace by which the source is always dislo-
cated.
The voice can undoubtedly be approached in its narcissistic and 
auto-affective dimension and it has been treated like that throughout 
the history of metaphysics, as Derrida’s analyses clearly show, but is 
that all there is to the voice? There is another counterhistory of the 
 56 Eric Laurent, “Positions féminines de l’être,” La Cause Freudienne 24 (1993), 
108; paraphrased in: Renata Salecl, (Per)versions of Love and Hate (London: Verso, 
1998), 27.
 57 Dolar, “If Music Be the Food of Love,” 19.
 58 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976), 20.
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voice that accompanies its treatment as the assurance of self-pres-
ence: a long tradition of attempts to discipline the voice, to make it 
properly signifying, serving the expression of the logos. From ancient 
China through Plato, Augustine and on, at least to the banning of 
the singing by castrati (treated as an exemplification of unnatural 
aristocratic decadence) at the time of the French Revolution, we wit-
ness tremendous efforts on the part of the authorities to discipline 
the voice so that it sticks to the “masculine” message it is supposed 
to impart (e.g. the word of God the Father) rather than to submerge 
itself in the “feminine” self-enjoyment beyond signification (sensual 
and therefore devilish).59 But the paradox here is of course that the 
pure Word, devoid of the proper admixture of enjoyment, remains 
a dead letter; without it the message does not “speak,” does not en-
gage the subject; without it the Law remains devoid of its performa-
tive, interpellative dimension. In other words, the Law is a dead let-
ter without hiding within itself the echo of the voice of the enjoying 
uncastrated father of jouissance: Teresa can enjoy her voice (enjoy 
immortality) only insofar as this enjoyment comes from addressing 
the Other for the symbolic immortality that she thinks she lacks, but 
paradoxically the more she sings, the more “nothing” she becomes, 
because the foreign object in her prevents her from becoming wholly 
sublimated into the signifier of her passion for Byron (the signifier: 
Byron’s Muse). In other words, the more passionately she wants to 
become the signifier of immortality, the more passionately she sings 
– the more she enjoys and appears on the side of the voice, which 
prevents her apotheosis in signification. The more she tries to be 
the living proof of the truth of Byron’s letters in which he addressed 
her as “My love for ever” (182), the more she tries to prove that 
“there is sexual relationship,” that they should be included among 
the pantheon of paradigmatic lovers – the more it turns out that her 
jouissance is what Lacan called the jouissance of the Other, that she 
does not need a man to enjoy, that she is self-sufficient in it. Yet 
this jouissance of the Other is not pure unmediated self-affection, but 
takes place as the enjoyment in/of the code (of language, that is, of 
the Other’s discourse), so its paradox is that it can cause fascination 
only in the third, somebody overhearing the address, not the one ad-
dressed (he would pay attention only the message addressed to him 
and therefore completely miss how the subject enjoys this message); 
 59 This “counterhistory” is described in more detail in Mladen Dolar, “The Object 
Voice,” in: Gaze and Voice as Love Objects, ed. Renata Salecl and Slavoj Žižek 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1996). I lift the discussion of the voice in these 
paragraphs from him.
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the one who is fascinated is not Byron therefore, but the listener 
who “overhears” the lament.
We encounter a similar configuration at the animal clinic where 
Bev Shaw “enchants” the animals with her voice – although Lurie 
disparages her as a New Age priestess, he cannot help but be fasci-
nated by her voice, yet only when she addresses animals which seem 
to react to it (the voice seems to work in the real); when she speaks 
to him or to others, she is one of “dumpy little women with ugly 
voices” (79). What Lurie is fascinated, but at the same time trauma-
tised, by (hence his violent reaction) is this self-sufficient jouissance 
which seems to show that certain women (like young children and 
wild cats, says Freud, ever since hated by feminists) have not given 
up some part of their libido. What Lurie seems to hear in her voice 
are the remains of uncastrated enjoyment in the real (beyond signi-
fication), which is unreachable for men, because they are completely 
submitted to the phallic (symbolic) order, and for whom therefore 
such jouissance is barred. What he perceives as Bev Shaw’s jouis-
sance introduces an enigma into Lurie’s world, making his knowl-
edge defective. And the degree of Lurie’s fascination can be seen in 
his deeper and deeper involvement in the animal clinic, especially 
after the attack on the farm. This more and more fervent activity 
is accompanied by greater and greater involvement in the writing of 
his opera.
Lurie’s opera may be conceived as his way of coming to terms 
with his new situation, but even more than that it is an attempt to 
come to terms with the traumatic dimension of the voice: on the one 
hand with the fascinating aspect of Bev Shaw’s voice as traumatic 
feminine jouissance, but on the other hand, and more importantly, 
his own dying scream, the dimension of the voice that erases the 
subject and that actually covers the terrifying silence of the event 
which it is impossible to symbolise (even the unarticulated scream 
does not “describe” the event, it is only its echo, a negative sign of 
the impossibility). But are these two voices ultimately different?
The scream of the father is an echo of the “impossible” scene, of 
the impossible jouissance/violence that had to be excluded from the 
symbolic order for it to gain consistency, something that from the in-
side of he symbolic horizon is just an empty signifier, an excremental 
remainder into which the real of the transgressive founding act must 
turn.60 On the other hand, the self-enjoying voice is the transgressive 
surplus of signification because it suggests the “impossible” enjoyment 
 60 Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder, 147.
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beyond the Law, the logos. Therefore, the two voices may be treated 
as the same voice in different modalities.61 At first Lurie tries to heal 
its traumatic impact by projecting it onto the fantasmatic screen of 
his opera – he tries to keep his symbolic identifications of the past 
(honour, etc.) by staging the scene he was part of in the real and 
reworking it into heroic-elegiac terms: Byron sails toward his death 
singing “sunt lacrimae rerum, et mentem mortalia tangunt.” Then, 
suddenly, Byron (the Father) is dead and Teresa is given the words 
of Lucy as she appears to Lurie in a daydream within a strangely op-
eratic setting: “her words – ‘Come to me, save me!’ – still echo in his 
ears. In the vision she stands, hands outstretched, wet hair combed 
back, in a field of white light” (103). Thus, the wound is no longer 
elegised into an abstract lament about human mortality. Identifying 
with Teresa he also identifies with his daughter – for him it is, 
however gentrified it may sound, an attempt to put himself in the 
position of a woman in total despair: “he can, if he concentrates, if he 
loses himself, be there, be the men [his daughter’s rapists], inhabit 
them, fill them with the ghost of himself. The question is, does he 
have it in him to be the woman?” (160). But finally he has to con-
front the truth that he does not have it in himself, and that is why 
the writing of the opera will go on interminably. Lurie is trying to 
cover a distance that cannot be covered within the symbolic horizon 
of opera, which is also the symbolic horizon of his former life. Yet 
this failed sublimation is not really a failure after all: it is precisely 
the displacement of the traumatic dimension of the voice into his 
opera, the projecting of his interminable lament onto the fantasmatic 
screen, that enables him to exorcise his “masculine” fascination with 
it (which is strictly parallel to his ability to imaginatively become the 
rapists) and, in a “feminine” way, to assume the wound, to identify 
with it by freely embracing the actuality of subjective destitution.
 61 Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder, 155.
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Slow Man (2005)
Slow Man is Coetzee’s first novel in which references to the experi-
ence of modern South Africa are lacking. His earlier novels either 
took place there or, if they did not, attempted to grapple with prob-
lems whose South African origins were easy to trace, whether these 
related to the colonial experience or to political violence and its rela-
tion to writing (Foe and The Master of Petersburg). In contrast, Slow 
Man is set in Australia, the country to which Coetzee moved from 
South Africa, a seemingly peaceful and opulent place far removed 
from the life and death choices which featured in Coetzee’s previous 
novels. Although Australia too has its colonial and violent past – one 
aspect of it being the “usual” stealing of the land from the aboriginal 
inhabitants, the other its status as a penal colony – this past has 
been so thoroughly repressed from its social tissue that it never ap-
pears in the pages of the novel.
The plot starts rather dramatically with Paul Rayment, a sixty- 
year-old former photographer, flying through the air after he and 
his bicycle have been hit by a car driven by a reckless teenager. 
The outcome of the accident is concussion and the amputation of 
Rayment’s right leg. Rayment could have been killed or paralysed, 
yet he escapes with this sorry but rather “affordable” loss – even his 
sexual functions are not impaired. His reaction to his new “reduced” 
body is, however, quite violent:
They [doctors and nurses] talk about his future, they nag him to do 
the exercises that will prepare him for that future, they chivvy him 
out of bed; but to him there is no future, the door to the future has 
been closed and locked. If there were a way of putting an end to 
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himself by some purely mental act he would put an end to himself 
at once, without further ado.1
Where does such disproportionate aggression come from and who is 
really its addressee? We do not have to wait too long to find out:
He is convinced that he would put an end to himself if he could, 
right now. Yet at the same time that he thinks this thought he 
knows he will do no such thing. It is only the pain, and the drag-
ging, sleepless nights in this hospital, this zone of humiliation with 
no place to hide from the pitiless gaze of the young, that make him 
wish for death. (13; emphasis added)
In his eyes he is no longer what he remains in his former lover’s 
opinion, “the same handsome, healthy man you always were” (38). 
His self-image has received a devastating blow, made palpable as 
“the lumpish thing he will henceforth have to lug around with him” 
(14), which becomes an object of detestation and shame. He has lost 
half of his leg (“it was thought best to take the leg off cleanly above 
the knee, leaving a good length of bone for a prosthesis” (7)) but 
what is this other thing he lost with it, so that he speaks about his 
“crippled self” (17) and being “a lesser man” (113) henceforth?
He had an unexpected brush with death and what he considers 
to be the obscenity of his stump now becomes the persistent pres-
ence of his lost immortality – the image of the whole he has project-
ed for himself, represented in social relations by his self-sufficiency 
(“I don’t want a prosthesis. […] I would prefer to take care of myself” 
(10)) is gone for good: “The clock stands still yet the time does not. 
Even as he lies here he can feel time at work on him like a wasting 
of disease, like the quicklime they pour on corpses. Time is gnawing 
away at him, devouring one by one the cells that make him up. His 
cells are going out like lights” (11–12).
The blow to his narcissistic identification is overwhelming and 
hence the aggression directed at first at the young and their “uni-
versal plot”: “The nurses are good, they are kind and cheery, but 
beneath their brisk efficiency he can detect […] a final indifference 
to their [his and another aged patient’s in the room] fate. […] So 
young and yet so heartless! he cries to himself” (12). The accusation, 
however, is obviously misdirected, as the nurses cannot be rightfully 
accused of giving Rayment care instead of love, and this is precise-
 1 J. M. Coetzee, Slow Man (New York: Viking, 2005), 12–13; further references 
in the body of the text.
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ly what he demands from them, pathetically blaming “this lumpish 
thing” for the lack of it (“It is as though at some unconscious level 
these young people who have been assigned to care for them know 
they have nothing to give to the tribe and therefore do not count” 
(12)).
Who is therefore the rightful addressee of the aggression that he 
directs towards the youthful hospital personnel? The answer can be 
made out most clearly at the significant moment when Rayment’s 
aggression is at its most violent and blind: when he wants to shout 
(he cannot really because of anaesthetics): “Who did this to me?” 
(11). This, of course, can be answered by a series of metonymic sub-
stitutions: Dr Hansen, who operated, Wayne Blight, who ran into 
him, and ultimately God, whose instrument Wayne Blight was. And 
although Rayment speaks about the teenager as God’s angel half-
jokingly, or rather sarcastically (54), it is precisely the fantasmatic 
gaze of God that Rayment projects into the young (“[the old] have 
nothing to give to the tribe and therefore do not count”) and this is 
where his shame comes from: from imagining his current appearance 
in the gaze of the Other as worthless.
It is only by taking this gaze into consideration that we can ex-
plain the violent degradation of his self-image that Rayment experi-
ences. It is not only that he sees no future for him and speaks about 
his crippled self (not crippled body); his self-deprecation goes much 
further: “By the sign of this cut let a new life commence. If you have 
hitherto been a man, with a man’s life, may you henceforth be a dog, 
with a dog’s life. That is what the voice says, the voice out of the 
dark cloud” (26). His life will be the life of the dog, a degraded life, 
because “his limbs have been unstrung and now his spirit is unstrung 
too” (27). His body might have toppled “like a wooden puppet” (27) on 
Magill Road, where the accident took place, but what is much more 
important he is no longer able to see in the Other’s gaze his narcis-
sistically complete image of himself – he will lug his stump around 
with him as a palpable proof of his incompleteness and dependence.
What else does the voice out of the dark cloud say? It keeps re-
peating over and over again the same thing that Rayment read in 
the pitiless gaze of the young: “If none is left who will pronounce 
judgement on such a life, if the Great Judge of All has given up 
judging and withdrawn to pare his nails,2 then he will pronounce 
 2 This Joyceian reference to a writer as the gaze of God will materialise later 
as Elizabeth Costello, not surprisingly the author of the novel The House on Eccles 
Street.
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it himself: A wasted chance. […] What could be more selfish, more 
miserly – this in specific is what gnaws at him – than dying child-
less, terminating the line, subtracting oneself from the great work of 
generation? Worse than miserly, in fact: unnatural” (20). But what 
he wants and what he mourns not having is not just a child who 
could confirm his role in the “work of generation.” What he is after is 
something much more specific: “It would be nice to have a daughter, 
girls have an appeal of their own, but the son he does not have is 
the one he truly misses. […] But it is not a baby he wants. What he 
wants is a son, a proper son and heir, a younger, better version of 
himself” (44–45). Therefore, what we witness has nothing to do with 
“natural” or “unnatural” ways of conducting oneself in the society 
– by imagining his unborn son, he yet again returns to his obses-
sive imaginary identification: the son is just another incarnation of 
Rayment’s image of completeness, and therefore immortality – even 
if I become “truncated,” my son, who in a way is myself too, makes 
up for my deficiency and in his better image I can take refuge from 
the degradation of my wholeness. With a grown up son I can afford 
to lose a leg because (ideally) he will say: “You have done your duty, 
taken care of me, now it is my turn. I will take care of you” (45). 
And since in his (potentially loving) image I will be able to recognise 
myself as whole (even a better version of myself), his gaze will not 
(unlike the hospital staff’s imaginary gaze) reflect my incomplete-
ness to me. In other words, my son would be the natural prosthesis 
to me, the image able to repair my truncated image of myself, while 
a mechanical (“unnatural”) prosthesis seems only to be a mocking 
incarnation of the imaginary “pitiless gaze of the young” (“There was 
an old man with one leg / Who stood with his hat out to beg. And so 
forth” (99)). When Rayment is offered a rationale for wearing the ar-
tificial limb he counters it with a characteristic displacement of the 
gaze from the outside (simulation of wholeness by wearing a pros-
thesis is unnatural) to the inside (what is natural, therefore not even 
gaze but feeling): “I don’t want to look natural […] I prefer to feel 
natural,” says he (59).
Hence Rayment’s otherwise inexplicable obstinacy in refusing or-
thopaedic prosthesis. What is more, he seems to treat this attitude 
of his, which is incomprehensible to the medical personnel, as a kind 
of heroic action consisting in contesting the role assigned to him by 
their pitiless gaze. It is a continuation of his refusal to participate in 
the Other’s “games” in the hospital: “He knows it is expected of him 
now that he is improving to experience gross desires toward these 
young women [nurses]. […] Being a lecherous old goat is part of the 
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game, a game he is declining to play” (14). Another of his “surpris-
ing” decisions is also taken for similar reasons: “I have no intention 
of suing […]. Too many openings for comedy. I want my leg back, 
failing which…” (15). Yet the ending of this statement adds a per-
verse twist to this “heroic” attitude: “I leave that side of things to the 
insurance people.” There is the intention of suing but somebody else 
will do what is needed, sparing Rayment the need to appear within 
the space of the gaze that he feels must ridicule him. What we find 
here is a similar logic to the one that can be discerned in Rayment’s 
refusal to accept a prosthesis. The very structure of the refusal is 
quite revealing: “I don’t want a prosthesis. […] I would prefer to take 
care of myself” (10). Leaving aside the ruminations “taking care of 
oneself” leads Rayment into (in the train of thoughts it inaugurates, 
the phrase becomes an euphemism for suicide), it is precisely a pros-
thesis which would allow him to become a “biped” again and take 
care of himself without external help (it is said that he will even be 
able to ride his bicycle again), so refusing it is not a heroic gesture 
– in fact, something exactly the opposite: it is being helpless which 
gives a certain “grandeur” to pronouncements like the following:
Whatever love he might once have had for his body is long gone. He 
has no interest in fixing it up, returning to some ideal efficiency. 
The man he used to be is just a memory, and a memory fading fast. 
He still has a sense of being a soul with an undiminished soul-life; 
as for the rest of him, it is just a sack of blood and bones that he 
is forced to carry around. (32)
Such “heroic” passages abound in the book and one cannot help but 
invoke here the truth of the melancholic self for whom “the self-tor-
menting […] is without doubt enjoyable.”3 Although the mechanism 
of melancholic displacement described by Freud is supposed to refer 
to interpersonal relations (the lost object of love being the other), 
it nevertheless seems to fit Rayment’s relation to his own image 
perfectly: “If the love for the object [self-image] – a love that can-
not be given up though the object itself is given up [‘spoiled’ in the 
accident] – takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate 
comes into operation on this substitutive object [the new, ‘truncated’ 
body], abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer and deriving sadistic 
satisfaction from its suffering.”4
 3 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” in: On Metapsychology: The 
Theory of Psychoanalysis, ed. Angela Richards (London: Penguin, 1991), 260.
 4 Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” 260.
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In order to accept a prosthesis Rayment would first have to work 
out a “prosthetic” ego for himself, taking as his cue his own deri-
sive phrase about the order of things he has fallen into: “thesis, 
antithesis, then prosthesis” (62). In other words, his life is becoming 
a wasted chance not, as he claims, because of the lack of offspring 
which would just reproduce for him the same but rejuvenated im-
age of himself (“a younger, better version of himself”), but because 
of his fixation on his own perfect and, because of it, “stalled” image 
– perfection, as is well known, cannot develop. The accident is an 
opportunity to shake up this identification, especially because what 
becomes broken is the real of his body, and it is precisely this chance 
which is being wasted – instead of the triad of the narcissistic ego 
(thesis), the loss of the ego because of the amputation (antithesis), 
and a new ego (a new identification which is “better” because it in-
troduces a new constellation, no longer a better version of the same), 
everything Rayment does points to his regression to the former nar-
cissistic ego in an attempt to save it in any possible “diminished” 
form (from a man’s life to a dog’s life).5
In spite of all the rhetorical pronouncements about his former life 
as a chapter closed for good (“That part of my life is over” (15)), the 
accident has done nothing to his image of himself, which he freely 
admits: “But escaping death ought to have shaken him up, opened 
windows inside him, renewed his sense of the preciousness of life. 
It has done nothing of this sort. He is trapped with the same old 
self as before, only greyer and drearier” (54).6 And although he calls 
himself “an after-man” (34) and heaps all kinds of abuse and scorn 
on his new body and life, he quickly finds a surprising but also very 
telling image to identify with from now on. In the context already 
mentioned, where he contrasts feeling natural with looking natural, 
Rayment muses:
Does the Venus of Milo feel natural? Despite having no arms the 
Venus of Milo is held up as an ideal of feminine beauty. Once she had 
arms, the story goes, then her arms were broken off; their loss only 
 5 Even Rayment himself admits to this, although he does not fully grasp the 
true meaning the words for his position: “I may be labile, but being labile is not an 
aberration. We should all be more labile, all of us. This is my new, revised opinion. 
We should shake ourselves more often” (210).
 6 The real shaking up would have had nothing to do with the renewed precious-
ness of life, if it had happened – what took place actually did something of that 
sort: it evoked the preciousness of living in the old image of wholeness, hence the 
melodramatic: “If you have hitherto been a man, with a man’s life, may you hence-
forth be a dog, with a dog’s life.”
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makes her beauty more poignant. Yet if it were discovered tomor-
row that the Venus was in fact modelled on an amputee, she would 
be removed at once to a basement store. Why? Why can the frag-
mentary image of a woman be admired but not the image of a frag-
mentary woman, no matter how neatly sewn up the stumps? (59)
What takes place here is more than just a wry commentary on his 
condition – in the image of the Venus of Milo he finds an image in 
which a truncated body is miraculously connected to the image of ul-
timate beauty. What he suddenly realises is that only an imaginary 
operation is required for his treasure to be returned back to him: 
if it is possible to turn the fragmentary image of a woman into the 
image of a fragmentary woman without altering the real object itself 
(the damaged sculpture), the reverse transformation should also be 
in principle possible: turning the image of a fragmentary man into 
the fragmentary image of a man – his disgusting reflection can be 
made whole again (become perfect and immortal) by a purely imagi-
nary effort. The problem, however, is that he cannot accomplish it on 
his own – as the Venus of Milo becomes the image of perfect beauty 
because it is recognised as such by the Other, Rayment’s miraculous 
transformation into the whole man again would also have to be certi-
fied by the Other’s gaze. In other words, Rayment finally subscribes 
to the scenario he purported to spurn at the outset because of “too 
many openings for comedy.” He desperately attempts to have his 
“leg” (that which was extracted from him) back on the imaginary 
level: in order to achieve that he has to make somebody create the 
image of this “leg” for him – make somebody produce for him the 
image of himself as whole (beautiful, perfect).
He desperately applies this programme when a suitable occasion 
presents itself. His former friends and lovers, like Margaret McCord, 
are out of the question since they knew him when his body was 
“whole” and therefore will always, while comparing his present state 
with his “old self,” perceive him as “broken” and deficient even if 
they do not mind his present image: “He does not care to become 
the object of any woman’s sexual charity, however good-natured. Nor 
does he care to expose to the gaze of an outsider, even if she is 
a friend from the old days, even if she does claim to find amputees 
romantic, this unlovely new body of his, that is to say, not only the 
hectically curtailed thigh but the flaccid muscles and the obscene 
little paunch that has ballooned on his abdomen” (38). His first day 
nurse, Sheena, is of no use either, because of her “indecency”: she 
stares unashamedly at the sign of his reduction and, what is more, 
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makes (mild) jokes about his private parts (which seem to bear me-
tonymic relation to his stump, being for him his most obscene part 
now7), which amplifies Rayment’s feeling of deficiency and leads to 
his complaints that he is being treated like a child (or an idiot, he 
thinks, therefore a “reduced” man) and result in depression: “The 
gloom seems to have settled in, to be part of the climate” (25).
All of this changes dramatically when Marijana Jokić, a Croatian 
immigrant, takes over after Sheena: “at once all gloom is gone, all dark 
clouds” (72). With her, Rayment has a feeling that his manly whole-
ness may be returned to him again: “He does what he can to maintain 
the decencies, and Marijana backs him. […] In all of this he is trying 
to remain a man, albeit a diminished man; and it could not be clearer 
that Marijana understands and sympathises” (32). What with Sheena 
was a castrating operation of direct “pitiless” gazes, with Marijana 
turns into a veritable hall of mirrors in which the imaginary presence 
of the obscene Thing, “le jambon” (29), the “sightless deep-water fish” 
(28) becomes almost refined out of existence in the exchange: “When 
nakedness cannot be helped, he averts his eyes, so that she will see 
he does not see her seeing him” (32). The consequences are predict-
able: Rayment seizes the occasion and falls head over heels in love 
with this “decent woman, […] decent through and through” (33). Yet 
his infatuation suspiciously follows the line of the least resistance: in 
this imaginary relation with Marijana the fantasmatic frame is set up 
through which he gazes at his own image again, the image the content 
of which we have already seen: “Marijana would have set him right, 
had he only met her in time, Marijana from Catholic Croatia. […] 
A woman built for motherhood. Marijana would have helped him out 
of childlessness. Marijana could mother six, ten, twelve and still have 
love left over, mother-love” (34).
In the times when Rayment’s narcissism was “natural,” when his 
body was whole, he admits to loving only narcissistic women (“Curious 
that he has fallen for Marijana, seeing that in the past he fell always 
for women who loved themselves” (163)). Now, however, he needs 
somebody who will return to him his lost imaginary substance – and 
what can be more “substantial” than the “ethnic” fullness Marijana 
represents to Rayment in her many imaginary incarnations: in her 
exotic Balkan habits (“she smokes in an unreconstructed old-Euro-
pean way” (31), she wears “not a nurse’s cap but a head-scarf, like 
any good Balkan housewife” (40), her ferocious Balkan passion (“An 
 7 Of course, as we have already noted, the loss of the leg also performs a “cas-
tration” on his self-image, making it deficient.
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intimate relationship with a row every now and again, Balkan style, 
to add a dash of spice: accusations, recriminations, plates smashed, 
doors slammed. Followed by remorse and tears, followed by heated 
lovemaking” (253)), and especially, of course, as the mother of three 
children (a large family also has a dash of exoticism in the “First” 
World), including the idealised sixteen-year-old son Drago (“a name 
from folk-epic,” thinks Rayment (69)).
If a substantial woman like this could yield to his advances (no res-
ervations this time about becoming “the object of any woman’s sexual 
charity”: “Does he want to become her lover too? Yes, he does, in 
a sense, fervently” (72)), he would become the male counterpart of the 
Venus of Milo: in spite of his real deficiency Marijana would fill his 
lack with her overabundant substance (reflect to him his old idealised 
image) and so he would become whole once again in the gaze of the 
Other. Therefore, it is his own image of beauty (“natural” substantial 
wholeness) that Rayment loves in Marijana and it is his own deluded 
image that he projects onto her, finding in her what nobody else has 
yet seen: “The gaze of love is not deluded. Love sees what is best in 
the beloved, even when what is best in the beloved finds it hard to 
emerge into the light. Who is Marijana? A nurse from Dubrovnik with 
a short waist and yellow teeth and not bad legs. Who except he, with 
the gaze of love, sees the shy, sloe-eyed gazelle hiding within?” (161–
62). Marijana indeed is a nurse with short waist and yellow teeth and 
her being a gazelle in Rayment’s “gaze of love” is a fantasmatic pro-
jection, based on the above-mentioned “Balkan” clichés (phoney-East-
European-exotic), and such projection is anything but disinterested. 
Therefore, the reverse of Rayment’s statement that the gaze of love is 
not deluded is the case here: the image of beauty Rayment evokes has 
nothing to do with Marijana because, being based on pure prejudice 
(“Balkan marriage,” etc.), it is an image which is his sheer fabrication, 
so in loving it Rayment can finally fall in love with himself again.
Moreover, what Rayment takes to be his loving insight into 
Marijana as a sloe-eyed gazelle – something which he presents as in-
controvertible proof of the truth of his love – is precisely what makes 
him blind to Marijana’s real situation, which is surprisingly close to 
his own. The paradox here is that what he perceives as the grace of 
her overabundant ethnic substance (“Marijana from Catholic Croatia” 
and everything exotic it implies) either never existed8 or, if it in some 
 8 “But Marijana is cultured person. Diploma in restoration – she tell you that? 
No restoration work in Australia, but still. In Munno Para [working class neighbour-
hood in which the Jokićs live], who she can talk to?” says her husband Miroslav (148).
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way did, it was excised by her leaving her Yugoslav existence and 
making herself over into a nurse in Bielefeld.9 Therefore, Marijana 
Jokić is also an amputee: an important part of her “substance” had 
been removed from her life – one can venture that the result of aban-
doning a semi-artistic profession and moving to another hemisphere 
to “start zero” (49) as somebody akin to a manual labourer in com-
pletely unknown cultural circumstances may be more painful “mor-
ally” than the real amputation of a leg. In other words, Marijana 
has been through Rayment’s predicament of the loss of the ego and 
survived without Rayment’s moaning and apocalyptic scenarios, in 
spite of the fact that it is her new life which may be treated as re-
duced, as a dog’s life in comparison with her life in Dubrovnik: “You 
think you know how it is to be nurse, Mr Rayment? Every day I nurse 
old ladies, old men, clean them, clean their dirt, I don’t need to say 
it, change sheets, change clothes. Always I am hearing Do this, do 
that, bring this, bring that, not feeling good, bring pills, bring glass of 
water, bring cup of tea, bring blanket, take off blanket, open window, 
close window, don’t like this, don’t like that. I come home tired in my 
bone, telephone rings, any time, mornings, nights: Is emergency, can 
you come…” (212). And when Rayment is confronted with this image, 
which obviously does not fit into his scenario at all, his reaction to 
it is characteristically obscene: knowing full well that being a nurse 
has nothing to do with calling in her case, he nevertheless offers to 
her in return another of his delusive imaginary substances: “I always 
thought […] that nursing was a vocation. I thought that was what 
set it apart, what justified the long hours and the poor pay and the 
ingratitude and the indignities too, such as those you mentioned: that 
you were following the calling. Well, when a nurse is called, a proper 
nurse, she doesn’t ask questions, she comes” (213).10 This may sound 
strange in the mouth of a person whose calling seems to be to make 
a nuisance of himself wherever he happens to be (every time and with 
everybody it is “a game he is declining to play”), but there is a certain 
logic to this attitude – since, as we have tried to show, the perfect im-
age he perceives as Marijana’s is actually his own image as it should 
be reflected in the eye of the Other (the positions on both sides of 
 9 It is said that “she left the land of her birth twelve years ago” (27), which 
would indicate 1988, that is, before the ethnic atrocities that took place in the 
former Yugoslavia.
 10 As we all know, this is the position of authority itself: in all types of state ser-
vices invoking the calling is a rationale resorted to when the matter of underpayment 
arises (nurses, teachers, etc.). What Rayment is performing here is well expressed by 
the usage of double entendre that Marijana should come if she is called for.
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the mirror are reversible); every time the image becomes undone at 
its seams Rayment identifies with the Other, and chastises others 
(hospital personnel, Marijana, later Drago) with the image of beauty 
(wholeness, substance) they have not risen up to, while it is precisely 
he himself who behaves in a questionable way (demanding love from 
hospital personnel, etc.). In this way the Other seems to justify his 
perverse behaviour as rightful, which can be clearly seen in the mat-
ter concerning Drago’s education.
As often happens, Drago, the only son, is his mother’s weak spot 
and therefore the easiest way to get to her. Rayment must place 
him in the same ethnic/heroic framework (“a name from folk-epic. 
The Ballad of Drago Jokić ”) he has placed his mother in (“Marijana 
from Catholic Croatia. […] Marijana could mother six, ten, twelve 
and still have love left over, mother-love”). At first, this seems to be 
a counterproductive effort, because such “ethnicity” would actually 
exclude Rayment from the picture as a figure belonging to a differ-
ent “post-ethnic” and “post-religious” discourse. Yet it is precisely by 
means of the heroic narrative that he is able to insinuate himself 
into the Jokićs’ ballad: “No ordinary boy, this one! The envy of gods 
he must be. […] No wonder his mother is fearful” (70). Taking into 
consideration Rayment’s earlier obscenely “heroic” posturing, what 
comes next is predictable: “But Drago above all he wants to save. 
Between Drago and the lightning-bolt of the envious gods he is ready 
to interpose himself, bare his own breast” (73).
And soon enough the time comes when the heroic discourse has to 
be translated into a less lofty one to become effective: Drago can be 
saved from his fate (recklessly driving a motorcycle and hanging out 
with “unsuitable” friends) by being sent to a boarding school of his 
choice to prepare for military service, so Rayment, as a preface to the 
baring of his feelings to Marijana, devises a plan to help financially 
with his education, which the Jokićs would otherwise not be able to af-
ford. At this moment a typical “Raymentian” gesture appears: in order 
to neutralise the traces of perversity in this scenario he presents it as 
his rising up to the perfect image in the gaze of the Other (something 
Marijana as a nurse is accused of failing to perform): “Would Jesus 
approve? That is the question I put to myself nowadays, continually. 
That is the standard I try to meet. […] Marijana and her children – 
I want to bless them and make them thrive” (156).
The truth of this statement, however, comes to the surface when 
the real treasure, another aspect of his self-image, becomes endan-
gered, that is, the collection of historic Australian photographs (“his 
collection may be the best in the country, even in the world” (48)), 
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which are to be bequeathed to the State Library in Adelaide and 
bear Rayment’s name. When Drago borrows or misplaces a couple of 
Rayment’s favourite “original” photographs by Fauchery, his tragi-
cally heroic image is immediately degraded to a much lower genre: 
“Is that who they are then? […] Gypsies? What else of mine have 
they stolen, these Croatian gypsies?” (220).
It is interesting that the photographs, which represent gold-
diggers and their families in Australia from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, were borrowed by Drago for clearly “prosthetic” 
purposes. He doctors them by means of a computer program in or-
der to insert into them faces from his own family photographs. In 
this way his paternal grandfather becomes one of the diggers, for 
instance. In other words, Drago is constructing for himself a kind 
of mock-heroic history (or a Ballad of Drago Jokić !) as a part of the 
history of Australia – the national past that was taken away from 
him before he could claim it (he left Yugoslavia at the age of four) is 
being imaginarily recreated in his new country, even if in a humor-
ous fashion. In other words, the boy overcomes his amputation by 
making photographs obey narrative logic, by producing a mutation of 
the fetish of “historic truth,” by doing what his former compatriots 
were not able to do, that is, letting go of his “ethnic” identification 
and producing another one in its place.
This flies in the face of Rayment’s obsessive fixation: “he tends 
to trust pictures more than he trusts words. Not because pictures 
cannot lie but because, once they leave the darkroom, they are fixed, 
immutable. Whereas stories […] seem to change shape all the time” 
(64). In this sense, Rayment’s relation to his collection does not seem 
to be so different from his relation to his self-image: it may not be 
true in the absolute sense, but there is a different kind of truth 
which one can ascribe to it and that is immutability. Photographs 
are important to him because they turn what is most evanescent 
and insubstantial (light, images) into substance: “The camera, with 
its power of taking light and turning it into substance, has always 
seemed to him more a metaphysical than a mechanical device. His 
[…] greatest pleasure was always in darkroom work. As the ghostly 
image emerged beneath the surface of the liquid […] he would some-
times experience a little shiver of ecstasy, as though he were present 
at the day of creation” (65). And as we know from elsewhere, God 
created the world and saw that it was good.
Rayment claims that he lost interest in photography when 
he found out “that to the rising generation the enchantment lay 
in a techne of images without substance, images that could flash 
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through the ether without residing anywhere, that could be sucked 
into a machine and emerge from it doctored, untrue. He gave up 
recording the world in photographs then, and transferred his ener-
gies to saving the past” (65). But what kind of past is recorded this 
way? A past that has no meaning whatsoever since images, unlike 
memory (narrative), do not fix meaning – taken out of the context 
they become only objects of fascination.11 It is the past turned into 
beautiful images, since it can be said that all photographs, unlike 
paintings or literature, become more beautiful with age. In this way, 
even a bad photograph will acquire its specific aura if only we wait 
long enough.12 In other words, photography transforms the world in 
the object of aesthetic contemplation which make the auratic object 
out of the world of “that poverty and that grinding labour on hollow 
stomachs” (52) which Rayment’s favourite photographs represent.
This world enters his life in non-aestheticised form, when Marijana’s 
outburst about her grinding labour breaks down his image of her (his 
own mirror image on which his imaginary relation is based) because 
it introduces antagonism between them. But, as we noted, Rayment 
quickly takes control of the situation by assuming the position of the 
Other and accusing her of breaking the aesthetic distance, of failing to 
rise up to the insubstantial image of the ideal nurse and of introduc-
ing such unpleasantly crude material considerations as coming home 
“tired in my bone.” In other words, he blames her for refusing to be 
a “moving (coming?) picture” exploited for his imaginary and aesthetic 
satisfaction as a nurse able to commune with her patient.
Therefore, it is not surprising that this aesthetic disposition is 
precisely what Marijana will not admit, and she refuses to accept 
the auratic dimension of photography: “You make photograph, or 
this man, how you say, Fauchery, make photograph, then you make 
prints, one two three four five, and these prints all original, five 
times original, ten times original, hundred times original, no cop-
ies?” (245). For Rayment these photographs are “substantial” objects 
of no other but aesthetic value (nothing disinterested in it, however: 
“You come here, you say to Drago he must find originals. For what? 
So you can die and give originals to library? So you can be famous? 
(246)), while for Drago it is the very meaning which can be wrestled 
out of them which is of importance: within a proper context (on his 
website) the doctored images will speak their version of Australian 
 11 John Berger, “Uses of Photography,” in: About Looking (New York: Vintage, 
1991), 55.
 12 Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Picador, 2001), 141.
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history taking place under the eyes of Rayment, the same grinding 
labour that he prefers to ignore while he sees it, but wants to save 
in the nineteenth-century images as if they were just the images of 
a long forgotten and non-existent, overcome past.
So, what Rayment cannot stomach is something altogether dif-
ferent from what he claims in the following statement: “It is the 
desecration that he feels most of all: the dead made fun of by a cou-
ple of cocky, irreverent youths” (218). Yet, it is precisely by means 
of what he calls “desecration” that fidelity is kept to the dead, that 
is, by keeping their predicament on display, making their grinding 
immigrant labour meaningful within the historical constellation of 
the year 2000, while Rayment’s “saving the past” is the ultimate 
betrayal since its driving force is “fidelity to the photographs them-
selves, the photographic prints, most of them last survivors, unique” 
(65). The fidelity described by Rayment, if it is fidelity at all, is the 
aesthetic fidelity to the photographer and therefore to the meaning-
less objects of fascination photographs made these people into, and 
ultimately to the aesthetic order which makes human suffering into 
an object of aesthetic judgement.
In Rayment’s aforementioned statement we finally come full circle 
to the original scene in the hospital: it is claimed that desecration of 
the photographs is felt so acutely because it is performed by the piti-
less (because irreverent) gaze of the young. But the object of ridicule 
here is obviously not the dead diggers but as usual the very image of 
Rayment in which he keeps recognising himself: “The state Library, 
a mob of worthy old gents and ladies fanning themselves against the 
heat, some boring bigwig or other unveiling the Rayment Bequest, 
and – hello, hello! – who is this at the centre of the pièce de ré-
sistance of the collection but one of the Jokić clan from Croatia!” (220).
So, in the final analysis, there is some poetic justice in Rayment’s 
momentary loss of aestheticising distance (rather than spinning The 
Ballad of Drago Jokić, it is: “What else of mine have they stolen, 
these Croatian gypsies?”). He becomes so infuriated because in the 
whole affair his own weapon is turned against him: in order to make 
somebody ridiculous you also have to reduce him to a funny picture 
while distancing yourself from him in the sense of disregarding the 
painful effects your action will induce in your object. So the com-
ment Costello adds to Rayment’s accusation when he pronounces the 
Jokićs to be gypsies can just as well be directed back to Rayment 
as, in a sense, it sums up his aesthetic attitude: “[Rayment is] not 
[a] particularly bad [Australian], just a little callous, a little rough 
on the heart” (220).
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We have tried to show that what Rayment loves in Marijana is 
simply the possibility of his own restored image being returned to 
him and this knowledge is brought to him with the appearance on his 
doorstep of Elizabeth Costello, supposedly a well-known Australian 
writer. She appears just after he announces his feelings to Marijana 
and the first thing she offers him is a completely different image of 
love: “Forget about Mrs Jokić and your fixation on her. Cast your 
mind back. Do you remember the last time you visited the osteopa-
thy department at the hospital? Do you remember the woman in the 
lift with the dark glasses? In the company of an older woman? Of 
course you remember. She made an impression on you” (95–96). At 
first sight, however, the proposition Costello makes seems to be an 
attempt to involve Rayment into some kind of tasteless joke:
Let me fill you in on the woman with the dark glasses. She is, alas, 
blind. She lost her sight a year ago, as the result of a malignancy, 
a tumour. Lost one whole eye, surgically excised, and the use of 
the other too. Before the calamity she was beautiful, or at least 
highly attractive; today, alas, she is unsightly in the way that all 
blind people are unsightly. One prefers not to look on her face. Or 
rather, one finds oneself staring and then withdraws one’s gaze, 
repelled. […] Being blind is worse than she was warned it would 
be, worse than she had ever imagined. She is in despair. In a mat-
ter of months she has become the object of horror. She cannot bear 
being in the open, where she can be looked at. She wants to hide 
herself. She wants to die. And at the same time – she cannot help 
herself – she is full of unhappy lust. She is in the summer of her 
womanly life; she moans aloud with lust, day after day, like a cow 
or a sow in heat. (96)
And she adds: “I say to you: Why not see what you can achieve to-
gether, you and Marianna, she blind, you halt?” (97).
It is not only that she counters his self-pity by confronting him 
with what he tries to avoid at all costs, that is, with the comic side of 
his affliction (“Losing a leg is not a tragedy. On the contrary, losing 
a leg is comic. Losing any part of the body that sticks out is comic. 
Otherwise we would not have so many jokes on the subject” (99)), 
but she wants to involve him in a positively preposterous narrative 
of the halt leading the blind, and on top of that the blind, who has 
the same name as the Croatian object of his passion, is dying to pro-
vide him precisely with what Marijana refuses. Yet, perhaps there 
is more in this scenario than just a joke, notwithstanding the sick 
humour of the situation.
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If we look closer at it, Marianna may be the only chance that 
Rayment has of curing himself of his affliction which is primarily 
neither the lost leg nor misplaced passion (an old man engaging his 
heart unsuitably is also a comedy matter, as Costello duly reminds 
Rayment (199)) but his fixation with the gaze of the Other. This comes 
out clearly in the scene of what he characteristically calls Australian 
Gothic (107), that is, a scene in which Marianna and Rayment meet 
and make love: “ ‘If you would sing, that would be best of all,’ he says. 
‘We are on stage, in a certain sense, even if we are not being watched.’ 
[…] But in a certain sense they are being watched, he is sure of that, 
on the back of his neck he can feel it” (103). And he behaves accord-
ingly, in his usual way, acting his ridiculous role of a sensible and 
restrained gentleman (“There is no need […] for us to adhere to any 
script. No need to do anything we do not wish. We are free agents” 
(105)), while his thoughts spit derision: “Matilda and her bloke, worn 
down by a lifetime of waltzing, parts of their bodies falling off or fall-
ing out, face the photographer one last time” (107).
The old story of imaginary fixation – “Beauty without the sight 
of beauty [Rayment is blindfolded] is not yet, to him, imaginable” 
(107–108) – repeats itself over again. But, as we have noted, in his 
case the image of beauty is precisely the image of blindness, that is, 
bad faith consisting in projecting his own “repaired image” on the 
object of his passion. Here, however, such a trick is impossible as 
Marianna is literally blind – hers is a body beyond any imaginary 
repair. In other words, as was the case with his jambon in the begin-
ning, in the relationship with Marianna he would be constantly con-
fronted with her returning to him his own “broken” image and it is 
precisely for this reason that only falling in love with her would cure 
him of his imaginary fixation with himself. Yet, in order to do this, 
he would have to become ridiculous, that is, become a dog: “He is not 
sure he has ever liked passion, or approved of it. Passion: a foreign 
territory; a comical but unavoidable affliction like mumps, that one 
hopes to undergo while still young, in one of its milder, less ruinous 
varieties, so as not to catch it more seriously later on. Dogs in the 
grip of passion coupling, hapless grins on their faces, their tongues 
hanging out” (45–46). In other words, rather than shaping the “seri-
ous” images of his narcissistic love for the gaze of the Other which 
are all ultimately but unintentionally comic (“Between Drago and 
the lightning-bolt of the envious gods he is ready to interpose him-
self, bare his own breast,” “Marijana and her children – I want to 
bless them and make them thrive,” etc.), rather than asking “Would 
Jesus [the Other] approve?” he would have to fall in love “blindly,” 
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that is, completely disregarding the possibility of appearing comic to 
the Other and its pitiless gaze. The moment he was able to make 
love to Marianna without shame, he would also have to admit that 
they are alone and that the pitiless gaze of the Other was his own.
The pitiless gaze appears in the space of the aesthetic distance 
that constitutes the position from which he judges himself and others 
and which is the ultimate place where he finds the true substance 
of his enjoyment: even if he finds his self-image lacking (“may you 
henceforth be a dog, with a dog’s life”), he enjoys the possibility of 
finding his self-image lacking as this very possibility implies the exist-
ence of another “higher” judging faculty of the self and therefore his 
self paradoxically finds itself to be better than itself.13 In other words, 
as his gaze had aestheticised the suffering of others (e.g. diggers), so 
his own suffering is distilled into an aesthetic pleasure of his super-
ego. Therefore, having found him incurable, Marianna leaves him to 
his own devices, accepting payment as a good psychoanalyst in order 
to annihilate the symbolic debt of responsibility that might have ap-
peared in their relationship, and she does it quite successfully: she 
disappears completely from the last two thirds of the book.
Thus, being stuck with his narcissistic image, Rayment cannot 
change: the only thing that he does do up to the last pages of the 
novel is confess his love to Marijana. And this is precisely the reason 
Costello appears: because he cannot develop as a character of the 
novel. We have already mentioned that Costello introduces herself 
as an Australian writer, but we also know that she is a protagonist 
of Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello, a collection which consists mostly of 
hybrid forms somewhere between short stories and essays, and who 
often seems to hold opinions close to those of the author. As we also 
have noted, Costello materialises on Rayment’s doorstep just after 
his momentous confession to Marijana, asks him to give her his hand 
and comments on what she has just done: “wanting to explore for 
myself what kind of being you are. Wanting to be sure […] that our 
two bodies would not just pass through each other. Naïve, of course. 
We are not ghosts, either of us – why should I have thought so?” 
(81). What is more, she starts to recite to the dumbfounded Rayment 
the book we are reading, Slow Man, from the first sentence on. But 
her initial request to give her a hand also bears a figurative message 
– “Push!” she urges him, “Push the mortal envelope” (83).
A display of the mechanics of (Coetzee’s?) authorial technique fol-
lows: “You came to me. […] In certain respects I am not in command 
 13 Alenka Zupančič, Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan (London: Verso, 2000), 153.
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of what comes to me” (81), she claims and what came with him 
were also the Jokićs; but there is a catch: “Do you think you are the 
only man who in the autumn of his years […] thinks he has found 
what he has never known heretofore, true love? Two a penny, Mr 
Rayment, stories like that are two a penny. You will have to make 
a stronger case for yourself” (82). Hence the appeal for pushing, as 
to a woman in labour. But how is a character in the novel supposed 
to invent himself? Isn’t that precisely the task of the author? What 
does it mean that neither Rayment nor Costello are ghosts?
“You occurred to me – a man with a bad leg and no future and 
unsuitable passion. That was where it started. Where we go from 
here I have no idea” (85). The character appears out of nowhere and 
his presence just insists. In a sense, he is beyond the author’s voli-
tion as the latter has to follow this insistence blindly and see what 
will become of it: “You may not see the point of it, Mr Rayment, the 
pursuit of intuitions, but this is what I do. This is how I have built 
my life: by following up intuitions, including those I cannot at first 
make sense of. Above all those I cannot make sense of ” (85). None 
the less, in order to remind us of the place of the author, Costello 
has some God-like lines: “Come back with me […] to my house in 
Carlton. You will like it, it has many mansions” (234), “on the sev-
enth day we can rest” (231), etc.
The author may attempt to exercise her volition by proposing 
a development of action while sensing difficulties in the initial intui-
tive material but it turns out to lead to questionable results. In this 
way, Costello tries to draw Rayment away from Marijana, knowing 
full well that there is no future in this relationship from the point 
of view of the writer (“stories like that are two a penny”). The only 
chance of development on Rayment’s part is that he traverses his 
fantasy of wholeness and this cannot happen considering his narcis-
sistic relationship to the Croatian. Therefore Costello comes up with 
another character, claiming: “She came to me as you came to me 
[…]. A woman in darkness. Take up a story of such a one: words 
in my sleeping ear, spoken by what in the old days we would have 
called an angel calling me to a wrestling match” (115). But the re-
sult, as we have seen, is miserable: a curiously theatrical piece verg-
ing on the ridiculous in rather dubious taste and a markedly foreign 
insertion in the fabric of the narration.
After this initial writerly blunder, Costello takes a back seat, not 
plotting anything in particular, that is, leaving her will to be re-
placed by blind intuition, urging it (that is, Rayment) to do some-
thing. It is only in the state of inaction that he has to face Costello 
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and her jibes: “It does not have to be this way, Paul. I say it again: 
this is your story, not mine. The moment you decide to take charge, 
I will fade away. You will hear no more from me; it will be as if 
I had never existed” (100). But until he does something, she mourns 
the disintegration of her narrative, which started so grippingly from 
the catastrophe: “Think how well you started. What could be bet-
ter calculated to engage one’s attention than the incident on Magill 
Road […] What a sad decline ever since! Slower and slower, till by 
now you are almost a halt, trapped in a stuffy flat with a caretaker 
[Marijana] who could not care less about you” (100).
Rayment’s confused state and inaction do not seem to add up to 
a narrative and a reflection of this is Costello’s chaotic jottings in her 
notebook: “One leg blue, one red. […] Harlequin, crazy-coloured. In 
Germany, brindle cows are the crazy ones, the moonstruck, the ones 
that jump over the moon. And the little dog laughs. Bring in a dog, 
a little mutt that wags its tail to all and sundry, yapping, eager to 
please? PR [Paul Rayment]’s reaction: ‘I may be doggy, but not to 
that extent, surely!’ Mutt and Jeff” (122). When Rayment reads it, 
his reaction is as follows: “It is as he feared: she knows everything, 
every jot and tittle. Damn her! All the time he thought he was his 
own master he has been in a cage like a rat, darting this way and 
that, yammering to himself, with the infernal woman standing over 
him, observing, listening, taking notes, recording his progress” (122).
So, having enough of her, the character (Rayment) chases the 
author (Costello) from his apartment and as a metaphor for the lack 
of inspiration, plodding on, wasting and being wasted by the protago-
nist who does not come off, she starts living, as she claims, in parks, 
sleeping on benches, etc. – the state of the writer generally becoming 
unstrung: “A word with which you are familiar, I seem to remember. 
No more tensile strength. The bowstring that used to be taught has 
gone as slack and dry as a strand of cotton. And not just the bodily 
self. The mind too: slack, ready for easeful sleep” (160).
But the lore of the writer is a vulture lore, as Rayment finally 
concedes: “Even to Marijana he has not really opened his heart. Why 
then does he lay himself bare before the Costello woman, who is 
surely no friend to him? There can be only one answer: because she 
has worn him down. A thoroughly professional performance on her 
part. One takes up position beside one’s prey, and waits, and eventu-
ally one’s prey yields. The sort of thing every priest knows. Or every 
vulture” (157; italics added). So, towards the end of the book, as the 
first concession, Rayment comes up with the story of his youth and 
first love in France, to which Costello reacts with enthusiasm and 
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wonder: “It is news to me Paul, I promise you. You came to me with 
no story attached. A man with one leg and an unfortunate passion for 
his nurse, that was all. Your prior life was a virgin territory” (195).
But time is running out, 203 pages have been written and noth-
ing of substance has happened so far; the book has consisted mainly 
of the exchanges between Rayment and Costello and a few events 
the likes of which one can find in every TV series, so Costello keeps 
urging: “As I try to impress on you, our days are numbered, mine 
and yours, yet here I am killing time, being killed by time, waiting 
– waiting for you. […] Push!” (203–204; italics added). There is no 
pushing, however; just the same old fixation, and this is precisely 
what Costello has to rely on to make him act – if it is impossible to 
get him to make a fresh start by confronting him with his predica-
ment head-on (as was the case with Marianna), she has to use his 
fixation as a lever to somehow take him out of himself.
To achieve that, Costello has to implicate herself in Rayment’s 
imaginary self-relation, playing the part of the superego, whispering 
in his ear like Mephistopheles. Just after Drago, the envy of the gods 
– whose image has just become even more inflated because he helped 
Rayment without flinching after he had an accident with a walker in 
the shower (urinous pyjamas, etc.) – moves out of his flat, Costello’s 
first question is the application of such a lever: “Is your photograph 
collection fine too?” (217). As this causes a radical desublimation and 
the aforementioned cursing of gypsies, seeing her stratagem work-
ing, she pushes on in the same vein, twisting the screw harder: “Ten 
to one your beloved Fauchery is still in Drago’s hands. Tell him you 
will call the police if it is not returned at once” (221).
Although this challenge – aimed at revealing his real relation to 
the Jokićs – is declined, it is declined on grounds of self-interest, not 
love. It is no longer the heroic “Between Drago and the lightning-bolt 
of the envious gods he is ready to interpose himself, bare his own 
breast,” but the flatly rational “No. He will just take fright and burn 
it” (221). But Costello, not discouraged easily, has an even more per-
verse thought to confront him with: “Then speak to his mother. […] 
She will be embarrassed. She will do anything to protect her first-
born. […] Mea culpa. Do with me as you wish. And so forth. Can’t 
I persuade you? Otherwise what you will be left with? An inconse-
quential story about being taken for a ride by the gypsies, the high-
coloured gypsy woman and a handsome gypsy youth. Not the main 
thing at all, the distinguished thing” (221–22; emphasis added).
Although this suggestion contains a carrot and a stick at the same 
time, bundling together both Rayment’s desire (“She will do any-
~ 216  ~
thing”) and his ultimate horror (“Not […] the distinguished thing,” 
the ridicule of being swindled), in return he, for once, rises up to the 
role of the true opponent of Costello, refusing to allow her to lead 
him where she will but proposing that they should exchange places 
and that he will write a letter to Miroslav Jokić. At which Costello 
has a fit: “A letter! Another letter! What is this, a game of postal 
chess? Two days for your word to reach Marijana, two days for her 
word to come back: we will expire of boredom before we have a reso-
lution. This is not the age of epistolary novel, Paul. Go and see her! 
Confront her!” (227). Despairing, she even brings on stage literary 
images for Rayment to identify with:
Think of Don Quixote. Don Quixote is not about a man sitting in 
a rocking chair bemoaning the dullness of La Mancha. It is about 
a man who claps a basin on his head and clambers onto the back 
of his faithful old plough-horse and sallies forth to do great deeds. 
Emma Rouault, Emma Bovary, goes out and buys fancy clothes 
even though she has no idea of how she is going to pay for them. 
We only live once, says Alonso, says Emma, so let’s give it a whirl! 
Give it a whirl, Paul. See what you can come up with. […] Live 
like a hero. (228–29)
Costello’s examples of the heroism to follow are, characteristically, 
not those from the “serious” high epic tradition Rayment has already 
attempted to insert himself into (“Between Drago and the lightning-
bolt of the envious gods he is ready to interpose himself, bare his 
own breast”), but from modern mock-epic in which the comic and 
tragic cannot be disentangled because one is just the reverse of the 
other – there is no other way to become a hero than by pursuing the 
way of the comic; the very ridicule, by persevering in it, becomes the 
modern incarnation of the tragic. So we are returning here to our 
old motif of overcoming the petrifying qualities of the gaze of the 
Other – Costello sums up her injunction to action in an exemplary 
way: “Consider: somewhere in a jungle in Maharashtra State a tiger 
is at this very moment opening its amber eyes, and it is not think-
ing of you at all! It could not care less about you or any other of the 
denizens of Coniston Terrace [where Rayment lives]” (229).
Not surprisingly, Rayment remains unconvinced but the lever in 
a way does its work, and so Costello and he, in order not to remain 
stuck with the ridiculous image of being swindled by gypsies, take 
a taxi to Munno Para to confront the Jokićs. On arrival, the reaction 
of the writer who creates it all is rather amusing (sarcastic?): “ ‘So 
real!’ enthuses Elizabeth Costello, getting out of the car. ‘So authen-
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tic!’ ” And in a mock-reversal of her initiatory gesture,14 as if she were 
proud of the vividness of the image of “the [so-far] dark continent 
of Munno Para,” (241) she addresses Rayment: “Would you like me 
to give you a hand?” (242) Thus, in her excitement, the showdown 
awaited for so long takes place in which Rayment finally admits to 
being thoroughly humiliated but this time explicitly in his own eyes.
Firstly, visiting the Jokićs at their home makes all their exoti-
cism disappear, the exoticism which, depending on the perspective, 
has served as either source of charm (“Marijana would have set him 
right, had he only met her in time, Marijana from Catholic Croatia”) 
or excuse for callousness (“What else of mine have they stolen, these 
Croatian gypsies?”): the ethnic substance vanishes into thin air – as 
Costello comments upon seeing this typically Australian household: 
“Our friends the Jokićs have a lifestyle to support” (243). Secondly, 
Rayment’s imaginary obsession with photographic “substance” is 
ridiculed as precisely “ethnic,” “primitive” superstition: “Is just im-
ages. […] Is modern thing. Images, who they belong to? You want 
to say, I point camera at you […] I am thief, I steal your image?” 
(249) Thirdly, and most importantly, in the gift prepared for him he 
is confronted by the truth of his accusation that Marijana does not 
rise up to her calling (“when a nurse is called, a proper nurse, she 
doesn’t ask questions, she comes”), and of the Jokićs in general as 
being gypsies – theirs is attention he does not deserve: “He can feel 
a blush creeping over him, a blush of shame, starting at his ears and 
creeping forward over his face. He has no wish to stop it. It is what 
he deserves. ‘It’s magnificent,’ he says. […] Munificent too, he might 
add, but does not. He knows what he pays Marijana; he can guess 
what Miroslav earns. Much more than I deserve” (254).
Yet the gift is of troublesome nature – it is a recumbent bicycle, 
in other words, a version of prosthesis which he had and still has no 
intention of accepting: “The breeze is in his face. For a moment he 
allows himself to imagine he is rolling down Magill Road, the pen-
nant fluttering brightly overhead to remind the world to have mercy 
on him. A perambulator, that is what it is most like: a perambulator 
with a grizzled old baby in it, out for a ride. How the bystanders will 
smile! Smile and laugh and whistle: Good on you, grandpa! ” (256). 
Thus, as it was with the prosthesis, driving the recumbent bike is 
perceived by him as lethal to his dignity. It is only as long as he 
 14 “Will you give me your hand? […] Wanting to be sure […] that our two bodies 
would not just pass through each other. Naïve, of course. We are not ghosts, either 
of us – why should I have thought so?” (81).
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feels shame for other reasons (misjudgement of the Jokićs)15 that he 
is able to stoop to something he feels degrades him. But when the 
acuteness of shame dissipates a little, he makes a last effort and 
resorts for help to his imaginary version of Marijana: “ ‘What do you 
think, Marijana?’ he says […] She has seen from the beginning how 
he has striven to save his manly dignity, and has never jeered at 
him for it. […] Should he go on battling for dignity or is it time to 
capitulate? […] ‘Yeah,’ says Marijana slowly. ‘It suits you. I think 
you should give it a whirl” (256–57).16
With this pronouncement Marijana seems to drop out of the role 
assigned to her within the enchanted circle of Rayment’s imaginary 
identifications, yet she does it without completing her “mission.” 
Although within Rayment’s imaginary economy she is supposed to 
save him (his image) from incompleteness and therefore degradation 
(“Marijana would have set him right, had he only met her in time,” 
etc.), her role should perhaps be conceived as that of the one best 
prepared to excise this imaginary treasure from him, as she, having 
left her old life (her “substance”) behind, is the living proof of the 
possibility of such an operation. Her effort, however, is of no avail; 
she is not able to save him from his sad fate – his fixation survives 
all: “Of course he will never put it to use. It will go into the store 
room at Coniston Terrace and there gather dust. All the time and 
trouble the Jokićs have put into it will be for nothing” (256). And 
just as Marijana’s effort did not meet with success, the same can 
be said about the writer’s production of the final confrontation: al-
though in Munno Para Rayment faces his truth, that is, the shame-
ful nature of his perverse enjoyment, he remains unreconstructed, 
and thus of no further use to the author. Therefore, he is allowed to 
take his leave: “he leans forward and kisses [Costello] thrice in the 
formal manner he was taught as a child, left right left” (263). And 
hence the reader also is relieved. We have witnessed the way the 
writer can put to narrative use his writer’s block – which may be the 
ultimate ironic gesture – but, unlike in Fellini’s 81/2, the irony does 
not seem to come off: Slow Man is a narrative in which the reader 
(at least this reader) thoroughly identifies with the impatience and 
boredom of Elizabeth Costello.
 15 “Not just hours. Days, weeks. They must have spent weeks on it, father, son; 
mother too. The blush has not left his face, and he does not want it to” (255).
 16 We should not forget that precisely this was how Costello formulated her 
injunction to live like a hero: “We only live once, says Alonso, says Emma, so let’s 
give it a whirl! Give it a whirl, Paul.”
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Autobiography as Fiction: 
Boyhood (1998), Youth (2002), 
Summertime (2009)
The turn of the century marked an unexpected development in the 
work of J. M. Coetzee – an author so far considered to be reclu-
sive and taciturn started writing autobiographical fiction. Or so it 
seemed, at least.
Coetzee’s first “autobiographical” book, entitled Boyhood and pub-
lished in 1998, does not really arouse suspicion, because all that is 
unconventional about the narration can easily be explained away 
precisely by reference to the well-known personal reticence of the 
author. Therefore the use of third-person narration (“he” instead of 
a self-referential “I”) could be interpreted as simply a strategy that, 
on the one hand, helps to restrain emotional effusion and, on the 
other, indicates to the reader throughout that what is being read 
is “autre-biography,” a narrative construction of a subjectivity the 
writer no longer is and no longer entirely recognizes himself in. 
Moreover, third-person narration in autobiography is not so unusual 
after all, having a very long and respectable tradition that goes at 
least as far back as Julius Caesar’s Commentarii de bello Gallico and 
to old religious and devotional autobiographies in which the authors 
refer to themselves as “servants of God.” Apart from that, the use 
of the third person in modern autobiography must bring to mind 
the famous The Education of Henry Adams (1907), which perfectly 
dovetails into Coetzee’s agenda: the author often refers to himself 
in an ironic mode and one of the autobiography’s basic propositions 
is that the education he was provided with did not prepare him to 
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understand the world in which he was supposed to live. Although 
Boyhood does not expatiate on general matters such as the state of 
western civilization, the issue of not being able to fit in and the rea-
sons for it are some of its most important motifs, and the emphasis 
on a more social, “objective” perspective – already made by means of 
the “external” third-person narration – is strengthened by beginning 
the autobiographical account not from early childhood but when the 
protagonist is already ten years old. Because the conventional aim 
of autobiography is to tell the story of how one has become who one 
is, and the twentieth-century commonplace is that early childhood 
is the period most responsible for this, this decision on the part of 
autobiographer is telling.1
The above “disfigurements” of the convention are themselves 
rather conventional, so readers of Boyhood did not really have prob-
lems with adjusting their perspective and greeting the new work 
as a welcome account of the spiritual torments of a sensitive boy 
in South Africa under apartheid, especially from an author usually 
placed by journalists and critics under the rubric “the ethics of writ-
ing.” Moreover, what could be better than the marrying of the ethics 
to one of the best-selling genres of our times, celebrity autobiogra-
phy? But perhaps some second thoughts on the works Coetzee had 
previously written should have given the readers of Boyhood pause 
and disincline them to warmly welcome one of their favourites’ over-
coming of taciturnity about his private matters. One of the things 
that might have made them wary is that in his earlier works we 
very often encounter metafictional interaction with classic authors 
who used autobiography and confession as one of their basic narra-
tive strategies, writers such as Daniel Defoe and Fyodor Dostoevsky 
(both of them protagonists of Coetzee novels). Defoe is especially cru-
cial here – his case reminds us that in its beginnings the novel (fic-
tion) frequently took the form of autobiographical prose, often mak-
ing use of related genres like diary, memoir or letter. Another hint 
pointing at the problematic status of autobiographical accounts was 
Coetzee’s critical essay from 1985 entitled Confession and Double 
Thoughts: Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky, which explicitly thematises 
a number of issues pertinent to the “truth-value” of confession or 
autobiography.
 1 Because Coetzee is known for his admiration of the nineteenth-century 
Russian writers like Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, he must have been aware that he 
follows (pastiches?) the example of Leo Tolstoy’s autobiography in three parts: 
Childhood, Boyhood, Youth – with the first part conspicuously missing.
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In this essay, Coetzee starts his analysis of confessional literature 
from its founding specimen, Augustine’s Confessions, and singles out 
the famous episode of the theft of pears, which were stolen by the fu-
ture saint and his friends not in order to be eaten (they throw them 
to the hogs) but to commit a forbidden act. This is how Coetzee de-
scribes the aim of the confessional project: “In Augustine’s story, the 
theft of the pears is the transgression, but what calls to be confessed 
is something that lies behind the theft, a truth about himself that he 
does not yet know.”2 To explain reasons for committing a transgres-
sion is relatively easy (in a group “we are ashamed not to be shame-
less,” says Augustine3); but it is much more difficult to uncover the 
“truth” about oneself, that is, to explain “what is wrong with me,” 
because it demands looking at oneself from a position which has yet 
to be created by means of writing the report of one’s (sinful) life. In 
other words, it is only narration (that is, “literature”), which seems 
to produce the truth of an existence.
But the question remains whether the truth of such a confession 
is an innocent truth. What complicates matters here is shown by 
Coetzee using the example of Jean Jacques Rousseau, the found-
ing father of modern confession as autobiography. Rousseau starts 
his own Confessions with the promise that he will say everything 
about himself in the account of his life, including the most shame-
ful matters. The result is that such confessional “material,” ignoble 
and mean acts, becomes the basic currency of the exchange between 
the confessor and his reader, because it is the utter sincerity itself 
which for Rousseau proves the originality of his work – the shame-
ful moments make his confession (and himself) absolutely unique. 
Therefore, not only does the disclosure of embarrassing acts and de-
sires become the narrative core of the work, it also turns into a kind 
of bragging, because what is disclosed is intended to fascinate the 
reader and intensify the experience of reading. Because a “decent” 
autobiography tries to seduce us by means of a fascinating depic-
tion of the image of a childhood or the heroism or endurance of the 
protagonist, it risks sentimentality and bathos. Instead of these, the 
autobiographer can alternatively resort to lack of charity, or distaste 
towards his former self, as ways to enliven the autobiographic nar-
ration, and can furthermore imply that such “colouring” makes it 
more truthful. The mechanism we are describing here perfectly fits 
 2 J. M. Coetzee, Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews, ed. David Attwell 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 252.
 3 Augustine, Confessions, Book 2, par. 9, trans. E. B. Pusey. 18 June 2010, 
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3296/3296-h/3296-h.htm#link2H_4_0002.
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its historical context, since the time of Rousseau’s Confessions, the 
second half of the eighteenth century, was also a time of gradual 
reformulation of western aesthetic foundations in which the notion 
of sublimity plays a major part. Although shame features neither in 
Burke’s nor in Kant’s theories, its function in Confessions is verita-
bly sublime as it simultaneously invokes guilt (pain or displeasure) 
while being the source of the pleasure of confessing.
Although such sublimity is, if anything, perverse and comic, and 
thus quite removed from the high-tragic sublime of Romantic theory, 
it is precisely here that we find the ugly hidden face of the boundless 
wealth of the inner self and other paradoxical Romantic infinities. 
But this is not all. Because an account whose aim is to tell the whole 
truth (whether it is the truth of “the inner self,” as in the case of 
Rousseau, or the truth of “what is wrong with me,” as in the case of 
Augustine) is supposed to give meaning to existence, it necessarily 
has to be narratively coherent. What is, however, the nature of such 
truth? Is it on the side of empirical facts or on the side of narration? 
Because the signifier has its own “non-empirical” rules of function-
ing, narration in order to become coherent will necessarily give em-
pirical reference the slip and therefore become (at least relatively) 
autonomous.4 This dualism of the empirical and the narrative is, of 
course, at least as old as modernity and results in an often-repeated 
claim: “it may not be true to the letter, but it is true to the spirit.”5 
Even Rousseau is, in a sense, aware of this complication when, for 
instance, he claims that in many cases he put too much blame on 
himself (if we judge his guilt by empirical reference), but that the 
narration (about his inner truth) somehow demanded it.
Coetzee’s Boyhood is very Rousseauian in the choice of scenes 
from the past – it mostly consists of moments in which the protago-
nist is filled with shame or embarrassment and the central motif 
is his Augustinian feeling that “something is wrong with me.” To 
explain this “wrongness,” however, it is not enough to lay out a map 
of the protagonist’s self, because there is a strong political dimension 
to his failure to fit in. The protagonist considers himself abnormal 
because this is how he sees his family. Although both of his parents 
had grown up in quite typical, patriarchal Afrikaans families, they 
made their own into something monstrous according to Africaans 
standards. Firstly, they speak English, not Afrikaans, at home; sec-
 4 Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, 
Rilke, and Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 296.
 5 J. M. Coetzee, Summertime (New York: Viking, 2009), 32. Further references 
in the body of the text.
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ondly, they are religiously indifferent; but most horribly of all, they 
are not patriarchal: the protagonist, as the beloved child of the moth-
er, is first in importance at home, then comes his younger brother, 
and the father is almost a stranger in his own home (“He denies and 
detests his father”6).
This absence of patriarchal authority and its effects is an impor-
tant and continuous motif in Coetzee’s autobiographical writing, even 
if it is perhaps not so visible at first sight. However, the absence is 
not so entirely absent, because authority seems to adopt a rather con-
voluted displaced form. Although for the protagonist and his parents 
nationalist Afrikaners stand for all that is primitive and stupid, what 
the boy loves the most in the world is the farm in the Karoo where 
his father grew up and which now belongs to his uncle. And there is 
nothing more Afrikaans than an almost ecstatic attachment to the 
farm and agriculture, as Coetzee argues in his essays on the literature 
of white South Africans, White Writing.7 The boy’s love is paradoxical, 
because not only is the farm the mythical Afrikaans inheritance, but 
it also incorporates everything he, in other circumstances, seems to 
hate: a typical patriarchal family, the Afrikaans language, and a feu-
dal hierarchy of classes (the Coloured workers call him die kleinbaas, 
the little master). Moreover, the phrase which is most often repeated 
to him there is “mustn’t.” But on the farm everything which in the 
town is hateful seems good, because it gets translated into a mythi-
cal narration: there is no corruption here (“In a corner of the stoep, 
in the shade of the bougainvillea, hangs a canvas water-bottle. The 
hotter the day, the cooler the water – a miracle, like the miracle of 
the meat that hangs in the dark of the storeroom and does not rot, 
like the miracle of the pumpkins that lie on the roof in the blazing 
sun and stay fresh. On the farm, it seems, there is no decay” (82–3)); 
everything tastes exquisite (“Everything in the Karoo is delicious, the 
peaches, the watermelons, the pumpkin, the mutton, as though what-
ever can find sustenance in this arid earth is thereby blessed” (90)); 
the killing of animals is not just killing but a ritual, and the Coloured 
people are perfectly innocent and respected as workers (“the shearers 
[…] are country-bred and have never so much as heard of dishonesty” 
(93)), while in towns they seem only to beg.8
 6 J. M. Coetzee, Boyhood: Scenes from Provincial Life (London: Vintage, 1998), 
79. Further references in the body of the text.
 7 J. M. Coetzee, White Writing: On the Culture of Letters in South Africa (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).
 8 There is only one hint in this mythical narration that such perfectly natural 
feudal order is perhaps not so natural after all. While hunting is one of the most 
~ 224  ~
Paradoxically, this image of the ideal corporate order, where all, 
even Nature, joyfully take their place in the hierarchy – a strict-
ly patriarchal one – becomes ascribed to the mother: “He has two 
mothers. Twice-born: born from woman and born from the farm. Two 
mothers and no father” (96). What is more, the boy knows that his 
love of the farm is a “betrayal” of the mother – the father’s relatives 
do not approve of her, nor do they approve of his father’s low status 
in his own family. The mother (liberal relativism) and the farm (hi-
erarchic patriarchal order) exclude each other.
Although the mother’s family also used to have a farm, their rela-
tionship to it was different – it was just bought by the mother’s father 
as an investment. The mother remembers the farm quite warmly, 
but when the boy browses through her photographs from the 1930s 
and 40s it turns out that her life had nothing to do with working 
the land, because it consisted mainly of parties, tennis, hockey and 
trips to Europe. But although there are no farmers in the mother’s 
family, we come across writers there. A brother of the boy’s grand-
mother, uncle Albert, “has spent his days writing books and stories; 
his wife has been the one to go out and work” (120). Interestingly, al-
though the mother says that these books are very old-fashioned and 
people do not read things like that anymore, in the South African 
context they have quite telling titles: “One is called Kain, the other 
Die Sondes van die vaders, The Sins of the Fathers” (120). There is 
also a book entitled Deur ’n gevaarlike krankheid tot ewige genesing 
(Through a Dangerous Malady to Eternal Healing), whose author, 
Balthasar du Biel, came to South Africa from Pomerania as a mis-
sionary. The book has an important, although ambiguous, place in 
the history of the family:
The book was written by his great-grandfather, Aunt Annie’s fa-
ther; to it – he has heard the story many times – she has devot-
ed most of her life, first translating the manuscript from German 
into Afrikaans, then spending her savings to pay a printer in 
Stellenbosch to print hundreds of copies, and a binder to bind some 
of them, then touring the bookshops of Cape Town. […] He has 
tried to read Ewige Genesing, but it is too boring. No sooner has 
popular white pastimes, the gun is a forbidden object to the Coloured workers: 
“Though they will not explain themselves, the workers seem to have a holy terror 
of guns” (90). A holy terror of guns is not something you are born with, as any 
holy terror is rather the outcome of quite painful conditioning. But this “unnatural” 
support of the perfect order has to be repressed from the mythical narration: “‘You 
mustn’t ask them to touch guns,’ [the boy’s uncle] says. ‘They know they mustn’t.’ 
[…] They mustn’t. Why not? No one will tell him” (90).
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Balthasar du Biel got under way with the story of his boyhood in 
Germany than he interrupts it with long reports of lights in the 
sky and voices speaking to him out of heavens. The whole of the 
book seems to be like that: short bits about himself followed by long 
recounting of what the voices told him. (118)
Clearly, the first autobiography in the family was written by a psy-
chotic and one of the interpretations of the origins of psychosis is the 
lack of proper inscription of paternal authority.9
The father is treated as both a weakling and an enemy by his 
elder son, and evokes in him strong aggressive emotions, but before 
Boyhood ends, he totally disgraces himself in the eyes of the boy 
and becomes a completely inconsequential figure. The mother sup-
ports the family as the father falls further and further into debt and 
drinking. The final image of the sleeping father contains nothing but 
distaste: “His father is wearing pyjama pants and a cotton singlet. 
He has not shaved. There is a red V at his throat where sunburn 
gives way to the pallor of his chest. Beside the bed is a chamber-pot 
in which cigarette-stubs float in brownish urine. He has not seen 
anything uglier in his life” (159).
After Tolstoy’s Boyhood came his Youth, and so did Coetzee’s, 
which was published in 2002. Written in the same manner (third-
person narration, emphasis on everything shameful), it describes the 
protagonist’s last years in South Africa and his sojourn in England. 
It starts when he is 19 and ends in 1964 (when he is 24), just before 
he decides to quit his job in England and apply for a grant to write 
a Ph.D. in the U.S. where he relocates in 1965. Youth can almost be 
seen as a spiteful version of the later parts of A Portrait of the Artist 
as a Young Man (although without Joyce’s epiphanic ambitions) 
and is even more scathing toward the protagonist than Boyhood. 
Although the protagonist’s parents and their background are almost 
completely absent from the narration, in a somewhat displaced and 
abstracted manner they haunt what is being written throughout. In 
Youth, we meet a young man who has translated his impossibly con-
tradictory fundamental mythic narration of the farm into another 
mythic account of wholeness, which, at first sight, seems to be less 
convoluted. As the protagonist tells us, he has begun the work of 
 9 See Jacques Lacan, The Psychoses (Seminar III), ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, 
trans. Russell Grigg (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); and Sigmund Freud, “Psycho-
analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia,” in: The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James 
Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001), XII, 3–82.
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transforming himself into a different person, that is, he becomes an 
aspiring poet whose main guides are Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot. 
Both are American poets of a special kind: they – like Henry James 
before them – treated the U.S. as a cultural wasteland, moved to 
Europe and tried to become more European than Europeans by writ-
ing highly erudite poetry and literary criticism. In Coetzee’s caustic 
account the guidance is described as follows:
As guides to reading he relies upon Eliot and Pound. On their author-
ity he dismisses without a glance shelf after shelf of Scott, Dickens, 
Thackeray, Trollope, Meredith. Nor is anything that came out of 
nineteenth-century Germany or Italy or Spain or Scandinavia wor-
thy of attention. Russia may have produced some interesting mon-
sters but as artists the Russians have nothing to teach. Civilisation 
since the eighteenth century has been an Anglo-French affair.
On the other hand, there are pockets of high civilisation in 
remoter times that one cannot afford to neglect: not only Athens 
and Rome but also the Germany of Walther von der Vogelweide, 
the Provence of Arnaut Daniel, the Florence of Dante and Guido 
Cavalcanti, to say nothing of Tang China and Moghul India and 
Almoravid Spain. So unless he learns Chinese and Persian and 
Arabic, or at least enough of the languages to read their classics 
with a crib, he might as well be a barbarian.10
What we find here is not only the naïveté of an aspiring provincial 
author who does not see in the writers he admires precisely his own 
predicament, resulting in attempts to hide their literary inferiority 
complex by means of hyper-erudition. It is also not difficult to see 
the exchange of one mythical paternal heritage (the myth of the 
farm) for another mythical creation, this time that of his spiritual 
fathers. The whole concept of (western) tradition as described in 
Eliot’s famous critical essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent” 
presents the image of a timeless sacred nourishing ground, absent 
which one is just one’s despicable everyday self – it is hierarchic (“an 
ideal order”11) but its hierarchy seems to be of the natural-motherly 
kind, that is, its coercive foundation is repressed.12 As living on the 
 10 J. M. Coetzee, Youth (New York: Viking, 2002), 25–26. Further references in 
the body of the text.
 11 T. S. Eliot, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” in: Twentieth Century 
Poetry: Critical Essays and Documents, ed. Graham Martin and P. N. Furbank 
(Milton Keynes: The Open University Press, 1975), 80.
 12 As on the farm the “mustn’ts” are not treated as coercive by the boy, so are 
the “mustn’ts” of Eliot’s tradition. They are on the side of Nature/Mother, and the 
coercive Father (Prohibition) disappears from the picture.
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farm was living the Truth itself (mythical and therefore timeless – 
no decay), now creating Art becomes the very practice of Truth. And 
the Truth of Art is not only timeless but also placeless – at least in 
theory. When the protagonist lacks poetic inspiration, he thinks of 
trying his hand in prose in the manner of his role models:
But if he is going to write prose then he may have to go the whole 
hog and become a Jamesian. Henry James shows one how to rise 
above mere nationality. In fact, it is not always clear where a piece 
by James is set, in London or Paris or New York, so supremely 
above the mechanics of everyday life is James. People in James do 
not have to pay the rent; they certainly do not have to hold down 
jobs; all they are required to do is to have super-subtle conversa-
tions whose effect is to bring about tiny shifts of power, shifts so 
minute as to be invisible to all but the practiced eye. When enough 
such shifts have taken place, the balance of power between the 
personages of the story is (Voilà! ) revealed to have suddenly and 
irreversibly changed. And that is that: the story has fulfilled its 
charge and can be brought to an end. (64)
But when he actually gets down to it, the outcome turns out to be 
rather disturbing, although in his own estimation not so bad after 
all. Or perhaps what is disturbing is precisely this: that a story set 
in South Africa happens to be quite decent.
The story is set in South Africa. It disquiets him to see that he is 
still writing about South Africa. […] Though the story he has writ-
ten is minor (no doubt about that), it is not bad. Nevertheless, he 
sees no point in trying to publish it. The English will not under-
stand it. For the beach in the story they will summon up an English 
idea of a beach, a few pebbles lapped by wavelets. They will not 
see a dazzling space of sand at the foot of rocky cliffs pounded by 
breakers, with gulls and cormorants screaming overhead as they 
battle the wind. (62)
This slip into parental inheritance has continuation. Although 
what the protagonist is supposed to be doing in London is writing 
a thesis on Ford Madox Ford (a writer of Pound and Eliot’s cir-
cle), Ford’s lesser-known works that he finds in the British Library 
turn out to be boring. So, as a diversion from his arduous and high-
minded task, he dips into the until-recently self-forbidden territory 
of books on South Africa with stimulating results:
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On days when, sitting in the great, domed Reading Room, he finds 
himself too exhausted or bored to write any more, he allows himself 
the luxury of dipping into books about the South Africa of the old 
days, books to be found only in great libraries, memoirs of visitors 
to the Cape like Dapper and Kolbe and Sparrman and Barrow and 
Burchell, published in Holland or Germany or England two centu-
ries ago.
It gives him an eerie feeling to sit in London reading about 
streets – Waalstraat, Buitengracht, Buitencingel – along which he 
alone, of all the people around him with their heads buried in their 
books, has walked. But even more than by accounts of old Cape 
Town is he captivated by stories of ventures into the interior, recon-
naissances by ox-wagon into the desert of the Great Karoo, where 
a traveller could trek for days on end without clapping eyes on 
a living soul. Zwartberg, Leeuwriver, Dwyka: it is his country, the 
country of his heart, that he is reading about. (136–37)
Moreover, while inspiration for “international” prose and poetry is 
painfully lacking, interesting projects for South Africa-based literary 
works – projects which demand research of the South African mun-
dane – rush forth unbidden:
He would like to do it: to write a book as convincing as Burchell’s 
and lodge it in this library that defines all libraries. […] The chal-
lenge he faces is a purely literary one: to write a book whose ho-
rizon of knowledge will be that of Burchell’s time, the 1820s, yet 
whose response to the world around it will be alive in a way that 
Burchell, despite his energy and intelligence and curiosity and 
sang-froid, could not be because he was an Englishman in a foreign 
country, his mind occupied with Pembrokeshire and the sisters he 
had left behind.
He will have to school himself to write from within the 1820s. 
Before he can bring that off he will need to know less than he 
knows now; he will need to forget things. Yet before he can for-
get he will have to know what to forget; before he can know less 
he will have to know more. Where will he find what he needs to 
know? He has no training as an historian, and anyway what he is 
after will not be in history books, since it belongs to the mundane, 
a mundane as common as the air one breathes. Where will he find 
the common knowledge of a bygone world, a knowledge too humble 
to know it as knowledge? (138–39)
The project described above will come to fruition (although not ex-
actly in the form projected here) in Coetzee’s first novel Dusklands, 
but before it happens, he would have to go to the U.S. to be purified 
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of his “internationalism” even more and would have to be forced to 
return to South Africa by the U.S. authorities.13
As we have already noted, Boyhood seemed to be, and was re-
ceived as, a relatively unproblematic piece of autobiography and so 
was its sequel, Youth. But while some readers may enjoy the ironic 
portrait of the deluded would-be poet as a product of the disgust of 
an ageing double-Booker Prize winner toward his former self, more 
careful ones may notice something one was not in a position to de-
tect in Boyhood. Because Boyhood dealt with the long-gone fami-
ly past (Coetzee’s life between 10 and 14), there was little chance 
for the general reader to check the veracity of the facts presented 
there. But for Youth this is no longer the case and, although not 
much may be known about Coetzee’s life, one can note that there 
are certain facts which are missing from the book and since these 
facts are absolutely fundamental, the veracity of the entire account 
can be legitimately questioned. The crucial absence is this: Coetzee 
married in 1963, and there is no trace of this event in the account 
of his life, which is otherwise so full of excruciating introspections. 
However one considers marriage, it is rather difficult to expunge it 
completely from one’s autobiography. So the question arises whether 
the account we are given is “true” or whether it is just clever fiction. 
The problem here is not just the problem of perspective, of “autre-
biography,” that a “me” from fifty years ago is really a “he” in whom 
I do not recognise myself anymore; but whether what we take to be 
a “truthful” account is not just a matter of fabulation which ignores 
the autobiographical contract with the reader that the author shall 
not intentionally write untruths. Because what we encounter here is 
more than ambiguity, it is the question whether a novelist (“fiction-
eer”) be allowed to remain a novelist also in producing an account of 
his life, whether he be allowed to “cheat” (in the name of the spirit 
of truth?).
Additional light on these matters is cast by another development 
in Coetzee’s fiction which happened around the turn of the millen-
nium. More or less at the time he was writing Boyhood Coetzee also 
wrote an ambiguous work whose aim was to balance on the very 
edge of fiction. When he was invited in 1997 and 1998 to Princeton 
to deliver a series of lectures on human values, he performed a very 
curious (not to say: perfidious) gesture: instead of delivering his own 
views, he read out to his public a work of fiction about a renowned 
 13 Coetzee’s application for residency in the U.S. was turned down because of 
his participation in a protest against the war in Vietnam.
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(non-existent) Australian writer named Elizabeth Costello who had 
been invited to a fictitious American university to deliver two lec-
tures on topics of her choice and surprised her hosts, who expected 
the lectures on literary matters, by delivering two speeches praising 
compassion towards animals and criticising the eating of meat.14 It 
is well-known that Coetzee himself is a sworn vegetarian (or per-
haps vegan) because of his compassion for animals, and so Costello’s 
claims may be his own, but not only does he present these views as 
the views of a fictional character (so he can disown them), he also 
introduces the character of Costello’s daughter-in-law, Norma, a phi-
losopher, who presents to the reader the most obvious philosophical 
reservations about Costello’s stance. Therefore, we cannot be sure 
what Coetzee himself thinks, where he is as himself. Although we 
know that he is a vegetarian and probably shares Costello’s claims, 
he narratively so complicates the status of truth of his position that 
we do not know where we stand – an adversary cannot take the 
position of an adversary, because he does not know the whereabouts 
of the position he would like to attack. 
But who is Costello’s adversary here? In the context of the fic-
tion called The Lives of Animals, it is most of all academic reason. 
Summarising a number of arguments which disavow the comparison 
of the death of an animal to that of a human being, Costello points 
out that they are all founded on the claim that animals do not under-
stand their death; that is, they do not think, and it is precisely such 
tautology of reason which she finds questionable: “Of course reason 
will validate reason as the first principle of the universe – what 
else should it do? Dethrone itself? Reasoning systems, as systems of 
totality, do not have that power. If there were a position from which 
reason could attack and dethrone itself, reason would already have 
occupied that position; otherwise it would not be total.”15 Because 
reason uses categories of its own creation to describe the world, it 
is delighted by the reasonability of the world and its own capabil-
ity to reason. If we take into consideration that Costello is a kind 
of Coetzee alter-ego, we may see the literary construction we are 
 14 The “lectures” were published as The Lives of Animals (1999), in which they 
were followed by commentaries of known academics representing literary studies, 
philosophy, religious studies, and anthropology. They are also included (without the 
commentaries) in Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello (2003), a collection of hybrid forms, 
most of them half way between essay and fiction. More on The Lives of Animals in 
the Postscript to the present book.
 15 J. M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 25.
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describing as Coetzee’s attempt to attack such tautology. Without 
completely abandoning rational argumentation, he wants to make it 
difficult for rationalism to play its narcissistic game with itself. In 
other words, Coetzee strengthens the critique of reason by means 
of creating a literary space where reason has difficulty finding the 
(stable) position it is used to. We can therefore say that, by creating 
his metanarration (a lecture describing a lecture), Coetzee wanted to 
appeal to a different kind of reasoning. This other kind of reasoning 
would not rely exclusively on rationalistic logic that so far has just 
been used to justify cruelty, which is not a command of reason.
Although the title The Lives of Animals is probably meant to con-
vey the vegetarian credo of compassion, perhaps it is not entirely 
accidental that it also carries a biographical and apologetic hint (in 
line with The Lives of the Apostles or The Life of St Francis). If in 
Boyhood the autobiographical illusion was intact, and if this impres-
sion of truth still carried on into Youth (although here there are signs 
of its disintegration), after the statement (or was it a preliminary ex-
periment?) of The Lives of Animals something had to happen to the 
convention of autobiography and its relation to truth. One plausible 
outcome would have been the abandonment of the form – a decision 
not to return to autobiographical prose again. The likelihood of this 
possibility was reinforced by the fact that Coetzee’s time in the U.S. 
had been briefly recounted by him in a text entitled “Remembering 
Texas”16 and that continuing with his autobiography after returning 
to South Africa would have meant providing to the general reader 
a more or less fictional account of his mind during the time of writ-
ing of the works he is known for, which seemed extremely unlikely. 
Yet in 2009 Coetzee published Summertime, which might be treated 
as a continuation of Boyhood and Youth by different means. Even 
the title remains ironically in line: after boyhood (sentimental educa-
tion) and youth (struggle to become an artist), summertime, the time 
of coming to bloom, of writing his first two novels, Dusklands (1974) 
and In the Heart of the Country (1977), but before international rec-
ognition came with Waiting for the Barbarians (1980).
Summertime is a kind of autobiography which is not an auto-
biography, a post-Costelloan work, which is even more convoluted 
than The Lives of Animals. Subtitled “fiction” by Coetzee, it consists 
of supposed extracts from “Coetzee’s” notebooks which open (dated: 
 16 This is another text, written in 1984, from which his wife and, what is more, 
his two children (born 1966 and 1968) are also completely absent. But this account 
is really very brief (it occupies four pages in the collection Doubling the Point), so 
one cannot compare it to Youth.
~ 232  ~
1972–1975) and close (undated) the book, and an account by a Mr 
Vincent, “Coetzee’s” biographer, of his conversations with five people 
whom “Coetzee” knew: four women he was supposedly in love with 
and a male friend.17 Moreover, in this fictional world “Coetzee” is 
already dead, so the conversations occur posthumously, and on top 
of that the facts from the life of the “real” Coetzee, the author of 
Summertime, very often do not match with what we read about in 
the accounts. And this also includes the notebooks, not only other 
people’s relations. To mention just the most flagrant discrepancy: 
as already said, by 1968 Coetzee had a wife and two children and 
his mother died in 1985. In Summertime, which takes place in the 
1970s, “Coetzee” lives alone with his father and his mother is al-
ready dead. Even the name of the cousin he fell in love with when 
he was six, who appears in Boyhood as Agnes, and who is one of 
Vincent’s interviewees, is changed to Margot.
What is the purpose of all this confusion? We have already hinted 
at two possibilities. One: because of Coetzee’s taciturnity about him-
self, it was very unlikely he would have liked to discuss openly his 
sources of inspiration and the process of writing his novels.18 Two: 
when it comes to his personal matters and opinions, Coetzee likes to 
complicate the discursive space so much that his audience can never 
be sure of their position and therefore of their relation to the “object” 
that is presented to them. But his game with “truth” is very ambigu-
ous in Summertime. On the one hand, the above two points can be 
construed as testifying to Coetzee’s adamant refusal to provide his 
audience with what it wants by not meeting their expectations. But, 
on the other hand, what he does provide his readers with is precisely 
such fulfilment: much of the women’s accounts is devoted to the dis-
cussion of sexual life and other intimate matters. If such information 
serves its stimulating purpose, does it, in the last instance, matter 
whether the facts are fact or fiction?
But there are other reasons for changing the perspective to an 
external one, which are less ambiguous and definitely serve their 
purpose. Summertime is a continuation of the exercise of shaming 
oneself begun in Boyhood and continued in Youth. But, as we have 
already noted, shame has a very tricky status, because it tends to 
become the main currency of exchange between the writer and the 
reader, that is, it is conducive to discourse which has an inclina-
 17 I use quotation marks to refer to the character appearing in Summertime.
 18 Although it can be argued that, in a metafictional and impersonal way, he 
did this in Slow Man (2005), where the relationship between Costello and Rayment 
is interpreted as one between a writer and her protagonist.
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tion to autonomise itself, and hence instead of diminishing, it in-
flates the confessor’s status within the space of narration. But one 
should perhaps be more precise and distinguish between shame and 
embarrassment: the former is productive of discourse, the latter re-
mains silent.19 This distinction may clarify the turn Coetzee is able 
to accomplish with Summertime by means of creating his new nar-
rators. Although in Boyhood and Youth he treated his former self 
with great derision and distaste, he always ended up in the position 
of a Rousseau, who confesses with relish, whose disclosures are to 
give him and his audience an additional thrill, pleasure or whatever 
one calls such “indecent” excitation. What is more, this masochistic 
pleasure can be extended indefinitely because it becomes divorced 
from empirical constraints as it starts to obey its own logic, the au-
tonomous logic of the signifier. Therefore in order to actually evoke 
his protagonist’s embarrassment, Coetzee has to close off his “in-
teriority” and present his predicament from the outside, precisely 
because
The embarrassed person […] has nothing to say and knows only 
that there would be something to say and that he cannot say it. 
The embarrassed person has no inner wealth to which he is merely 
unable to give expression: he dries out where the paralysis of the 
tongue seizes him and he stutters himself away. There is nothing 
to expect from him; he does not have the depth of still waters. 
His failure is without reason, deep or otherwise, his falling silent 
not the silencing of anything. Embarrassment is flat, an emptiness 
without depth.20
What is more, there is another narratively aimed twist here, as it is 
precisely this mute embarrassment as such, which is productive of 
the discourse of the others in Summertime. The above description of 
the all-embracing paralysis is just a neutral version of all the pas-
sionate accusations the biographer Vincent hears from the women 
who pronounce on “Coetzee” in the novel. Although their levels of 
spite and gall vary, they all accuse him of basically the same things: 
he is a stiff, inhibited “wooden man,” which is meant personally, 
but also translates into the estimation of his status as a writer. Of 
course, the form of the accusation depends on the intellectual level 
 19 E. S. Burt, Regard for the Other: Autothanatography in Rousseau, De Quincey, 
Baudelaire and Wilde (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), 62.
 20 Hans-Jost Frey, Interruptions, trans. Georgia Albert (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1996), 72–73.
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of the accuser, so it can range from “How can you be a great writer 
when you know nothing about love” (199)21 to “As a writer he knew 
what he was doing, he had a certain style, and style is the beginning 
of distinction. But he had no special sensitivity that I could detect, 
no original insight into the human condition” (242). Yet the ultimate 
goal is the denial of “depth,” of “inner wealth,” that is, the denial 
of exactly these qualities a Rousseauian confession is after in order 
to stimulate itself. It is perhaps ironic that Coetzee chose women to 
be such harsh judges here, because the qualities they see lacking in 
“Coetzee” are not only the content of conventional (auto)biography 
– the Augustinian coherent narration of the depth of subjectivity is 
precisely the foundation of the ideal patriarchal order: all incoher-
ence has to be explained away, so that sinful obscurity disappears 
and the soul can rest itself in the divine wholeness of transparent 
meaning.
But there is yet another turn of interpretation that should be 
made here. Although women are the main voices in Summertime, 
I do not think they are the main presence for the reader. The book 
is structured in such a way that the figure of the father appears 
as most haunting: it is not only that “Coetzee’s” preliminary and 
final notes focus mainly on the father; he is also an acute presence 
in three of the five accounts that constitute the main body of the 
book. Moreover, unlike the transparent slapgat (“A slap gat: a rec-
tum, an anus, over which one has less than complete control. Hence 
slapgat: slack, spineless” (116)) figure of Boyhood who was so easily 
dismissed by the protagonist, in Summertime the father more and 
more appears as an enigma to his son, and here perhaps the au-
tobiographic project finds its fulfilment as the son’s memory keeps 
returning to the past in order to become conscious of the so-far un-
graspable originary impulse for his confession: “If he could summon 
up the courage, he would at least make full confession: Forgive me 
for deliberately and with malice aforethought scratching your Tebaldi 
record. And for more besides, so much more that the recital would 
take all day. For countless acts of meanness. For the meanness of 
heart in which those acts originated. In sum, for all I have done since 
the day I was born, and with success, to make your life a misery” 
(250; emphasis original).
In this light, the accusations of the women directed at “Coetzee” 
that he lacks human feeling, that he is only a one-dimensional man 
 21 Coetzee, one of whose major orientation points in literature is Kafka, would 
have no problem pointing out the counterexample.
of dry intellect, can be seen as just displacements of his own ac-
cusation about his attitude towards his father. This displacement 
becomes even clearer if we take into consideration that the women in 
question are themselves suspiciously one-dimensional and “wooden”: 
they are really rather crude incarnations of the basic conventional 
types of women in literary or cinematic fiction – a bored city house-
wife, a golden-hearted country girl, a passionate Latina, an intellec-
tual sophisticate – all of them offering platitudes on children, loving, 
and dancing (and sometimes even writing). Who else are they, in 
fact, than the furies (or Eumenides: the gracious or kind-hearted 
ones), the chthonic deities or vengeance, psychologistically interpret-
ed as remorse. In this light, the repeated female advice to “Coetzee” 
that “he should find himself a decent woman” (142), turns out to 
have a highly ironic ring – because this is precisely what he did (in 
fact, four of them) and that is why there is finally no escape from 
the South African sublime: the most shameful pleasure Rousseau 
confesses to in his famous work is the sensual pleasure he takes in 
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Postscript: The Lives of Animals (1999)
The Lives of Animals is an atypical affair, because it consists of 
two asymmetrical parts. The first part is a kind of literary work by 
J. M. Coetzee; the second one consists of “academic” comments (even 
if one of them has the form of a dialogue) of a literary scholar, a phi-
losopher, a religious studies scholar and an anthropologist (none of 
them fictional) on the ideas presented in the literary text. Therefore, 
we are dealing here with heterogeneous fields engaged in a dialogue, 
which, in a sense, produces frustration on both sides of the “bar-
ricade.” On the one hand, Elizabeth Costello, Coetzee’s protagonist, 
emphasises her aversion, perhaps even hostility, towards academic 
discourse (although Coetzee himself used to be an academic), which, 
according to her, chases its own tail and does not want to notice 
what lies outside of academia. On the other hand, the academic 
commentators do not know how they should really treat something, 
which, although it is a “fiction,” seems to raise pressing ethical is-
sues.
No wonder the academics are frustrated – The Lives of Animals 
originates in a rather perfidious gesture by Coetzee. When he was 
invited to take part in the Tanner Lectures on Human Values at 
Princeton, he read a literary work to those assembled, in which 
a supposedly known (but fictional) Australian writer, Elizabeth 
Costello (not he, J. M. Coetzee),1 accepts an invitation from an 
American university (not Princeton, but a fictional Appleton College), 
in order to give two lectures on a topic of her choice and surprises 
 1 Coetzee gave these lectures in 1997 and 1998, when he still lived and worked 
in South Africa. In 2002, he moved permanently to Costello’s homeland.
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her hosts, who expect a subject related to literature or literary criti-
cism, by delivering two ardent speeches calling upon her listeners 
to empathise with animals and criticising the eating of meat. (We 
may presume that Coetzee’s hosts were as surprised, because they 
probably expected lectures devoted to the ethics of literature, the 
topic which is treated ad nauseam in critical works devoted to this 
author). Thus, from the start Coetzee puts his adversaries, or even 
well-disposed commentators, in an awkward position. One of the lat-
ter, Peter Singer, an Australian philosopher working in the U.S. and 
the author of Animal Liberation, a bible of the movement to which 
Costello subscribes, puts it this way:
But are they Coetzee’s arguments? That’s just the point – that’s 
why I don’t know how to go about responding to this so-called lec-
ture. They are Costello’s arguments. Coetzee’s fictional device ena-
bles him to distance himself from them. And he has this character, 
Norma, Costello’s daughter-in-law, who makes all the obvious ob-
jections to what Costello is saying. It’s a marvellous device, really. 
Costello can blithely criticize the use of reason, or the need to have 
any clear principles or proscriptions, without Coetzee really com-
mitting himself to these claims. Maybe he really shares Norma’s 
very proper doubts about them. Coetzee doesn’t even have to worry 
too much about getting the structure of the lecture right. When he 
notices that it is starting to ramble, he just has Norma say that 
Costello is rambling.2
Therefore Coetzee, as a “civil person,” seemingly disowns the views 
propagated by his alter ego, but only in order to give them greater 
force, because they are propagated from a position that disarms an 
opponent’s arguments in advance.
Thus, each commentator has to deal in some way with the im-
possibility of a “direct” comment, and each of them does it in his or 
her own way, inevitably erasing the distance established by Coetzee 
between the space of literary truth and the space of the truth of 
rational argumentation. Marjorie Garber (a literary scholar) having 
analysed the form of the lectures and genres which they evoke, puts 
a rhetorical question, “Could it be, however, that all along [Coetzee] 
was really asking, ‘What is the value of literature?’”(84). Peter Singer, 
in spite of his already cited doubts, analyses Costello’s arguments 
in his usual rationalistic-pragmatic way. Wendy Doniger (a religious 
 2 J. M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 91. Further references in the body of the text. All emphases 
original, unless otherwise noted.
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studies scholar) identifies with Coetzee’s protagonist (“we can under-
stand [animals] because we love them” (102)). Barbara Smuts (an 
anthropologist) brackets the entire philosophical discussion and gives 
an example of a possible friendship between animals and man.
What is, therefore, the position from which Coetzee speaks, and 
what is the truth of this position if it is different (at least in inten-
tion) from the truth of academic reason and its discourse? Costello 
claims that academic discussions are propelled by an insipid use of 
reason, which, in the final analysis, aims only at justifying itself. In 
semi-caricature it goes like this:
Can we, asked this philosopher, strictly speaking, say that the veal 
calf misses its mother? Does the veal calf have enough of a grasp 
of the significance of the mother-relation, does the veal calf have 
enough of a grasp of the meaning of maternal absence, does the 
veal calf, finally, know enough about missing to know that the feel-
ing it has is the feeling of missing?
A calf who has not mastered the concepts of presence and ab-
sence, of self and other – so goes the argument – cannot, strictly 
speaking, be said to miss anything. In order to, strictly speaking, 
miss anything, it would first have to take a course in philosophy. 
(65–66)
One has to add that all philosophical arguments (there are also 
others, to which we shall return) brought to bear against Costello 
concern the faculty of reason, which supposedly divides man from 
animals absolutely, and therefore justifies inflicting death and suf-
fering on them (for instance in experimenting on them).3 In other 
words, all of them refer in a more or less straightforward man-
ner to Costello’s main enemy, that is, René Descartes, known for 
establishing an absolute dualism of body and spirit, which is ac-
companied by the assertion that animals are insentient machines. 
To be sure, a contemporary Cartesian – and it seems that in The 
 3 In Singer’s Animal Liberation, there are descriptions of many completely idi-
otic experiments conducted on animals, for instance: “At Brooks Air Force Base in 
Texas, monkeys are trained through electric shocks to keep these platforms level 
by means of controls that simulate the flying of Air Force bombers. They are then 
gassed or irradiated to test how long they can continue to keep the platforms level 
under simulated conditions of chemical or nuclear attack” (the caption to a pho-
tograph in an insert following page 157, referring to a longer analysis on pages 
25–28). Of course, this is another way academic reason justifies itself – it invents 
experiments that serve no purpose other than inventing more (equally idiotic) ex-
periments on their basis. Animal Liberation was first published in 1975. The quote 
comes from Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: Ecco, 2002).
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Lives of Animals every philosopher has a Cartesian approach to 
animals, including (the real) Peter Singer, who, as already quoted, 
shares “Norma’s [a fictional philosopher’s] very proper doubts” – no 
longer maintains that animals do not feel pain; he even wants to 
prevent their suffering, but none the less, because they lack self-
consciousness, and above all the consciousness of death, he or she 
considers them to be on a different level of existence. Philosopher 
O’Hearne, Costello’s fictional adversary, expresses this in the most 
“friendly” way:
I make the following statement with due deliberation, mindful of 
the historical associations it may evoke. I do not believe that life is 
as important to animals as it is to us. There is certainly in animals 
an instinctive struggle against death, which they share with us. 
But they do not understand death as we do, or rather, as we fail 
to do. There is, in the human mind, a collapse of the imagination 
before death, and that collapse of the imagination […] is the basis 
of our fear of death. That fear does not and cannot exist in animals, 
since the effort to comprehend extinction, and the failure to do so, 
the failure to master it, have simply not taken place.
For that reason, I want to suggest, dying is, for an animal, just 
something that happens, something against which there may be 
a revolt of the organism but not a revolt of the soul. (63)
O’Hearne speaks as if he has not understood that he is thereby 
confirming Costello’s accusation that (academic, philosophical) rea-
son is one huge tautology: “Of course reason will validate reason as 
the first principle of the universe – what else should it do? Dethrone 
itself? Reasoning systems, as systems of totality, do not have that 
power. If there were a position from which reason could attack and 
dethrone itself, reason would already have occupied that position; 
otherwise it would not be total” (25). Thus, if we take into consid-
eration that Coetzee himself is a vegetarian or a vegan and Costello 
is, therefore, in some way his alter ego (the author himself makes 
her a lecturer and puts her in a position which reveals his own: 
a lecturer at Princeton), one can here perceive the aim of Coetzee’s 
literary construction, which is, without abandoning rational argu-
mentation, not to allow academic reason to act out its tautological 
comedy. In other words, Coetzee reinforces his criticism of academic 
reason by creating a space of enunciation within which this kind of 
reason is not able to take the position it is used to. One can there-
fore say that, by creating a sort of metanarration (a lecture relating 
a lecture), Coetzee wanted to resort to a different kind of rationality, 
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a rationality which would go beyond the academic one, which so far 
has only rationalised cruelty which as such is irrational.
One can perhaps say that a similar desire produces another ges-
ture, the criticism of which is presented as the most important ethi-
cal charge against Costello in The Lives of Animals: the comparison 
of what happens to animals in slaughterhouses and laboratories to 
Auschwitz. Firstly, one should note that this is not a rational com-
parison: it is easy to find rational arguments against it (the logic of 
Vernichtung is not a commodity logic as is that of the consumption 
of animals, etc.), but of course this is not the point. As Peter Singer 
himself points out (referring also to writer Isaac B. Singer): “a com-
parison is not necessarily an equation” (86). Moreover, we learn that 
although (the real) philosopher Singer himself lost his grandparents 
in Nazi death camps, he does not feel offended by the comparison, 
unlike (the fictional) poet Abraham Stern, whose attitude inscribes 
itself into the well-known semi-religious approach to Auschwitz: any 
comparison to what happened to Jews there, and especially compar-
ing them to animals, that is, to creatures commonly considered as 
lower beings, is sacrilege; it “insults the memory of the dead. It also 
trades on the horrors of the camps in a cheap way” (50).4 Nonetheless, 
because Auschwitz is “incomprehensible,” because it was “the prod-
uct of pure metaphysical decision,”5 it seems it can serve Costello’s 
attempt to go beyond academic reason well. However, because her 
rhetoric is based on emotional blackmail – it summons the greatest 
crime to shut the adversary up6 – it can be used in either direction. 
An adversary can say, for instance, that Costello’s approach to men 
reminds him of Hitler’s, who was also a vegetarian and antivivisec-
tionist.
Apart from her “performative” attempt to create a space beyond 
the academic discourse, the very titles of Costello’s lectures – “The 
Philosophers and the Animals” and “The Poets and the Animals” – 
suggest her main strategy: she contrasts two different ideas of truth 
by identifying philosophical rationalism with indifference, while po-
 4 Coetzee himself refers in the notes to one of the better known philosophi-
cal books exemplifying this approach, La fiction du politique by Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe, published in English as Heidegger, Art and Politics.
 5 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the 
Political, trans. Chris Turner (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 48.
 6 This is not the place to develop this extensive topic, but we might men-
tion that, as Alain Badiou notes, the more often the “singularity” or uniqueness of 
Auschwitz is emphasised, the more it is used as the measure of so-called radical 
Evil. It is claimed that the Nazi extermination of the Jews is incomparable, but 
every collective crime gets compared to it.
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etry is presented as a discourse of empathy. Costello’s two “irra-
tional” propositions are “open your heart and listen to what your 
heart says” (37; for the aforementioned reasons, she thinks that the 
philosophical mind cannot be “opened”), and “there is no limit to the 
extent to which we can think ourselves into the being of another” 
(35), an animal in this case. Therefore, firstly, the heart is presented 
as an antidote to the vicious circle of reason. Secondly, empathy is 
proposed as man’s most important faculty, and is contrasted with 
rationality as a power surpassing it.
These claims, of course, lead to all kinds of problems. Singer com-
ments on the first one thus: “I feel, but I also think about what 
I feel. When people say we should only feel – and at times Costello 
comes close to that in her lecture – I’m reminded of Göring, who 
said, ‘I think with my blood’” (88–89). Hitler the vegetarian (because 
of compassion for animals) also fits in here quite well. But one can 
also use examples unrelated to emotional blackmail involving the 
Nazis. For instance, Sade justifies his opposition to the death pen-
alty by claiming that every real crime is a matter of the heart and 
“cold” (rational!) law is unable to judge it justly (in “Yet Another 
Effort, Frenchmen, If You Would Become Republicans,” for instance).
Concerning empathy, Costello says amazing things. For instance, 
she claims that poet Ted Hughes “shows us that we too can embody 
animals – by the process called poetic invention that mingles breath 
and sense in a way that no one has explained and no one ever will. 
He shows us how to bring the living body into being within our-
selves. When we read the jaguar poem, when we recollect it after-
wards in tranquillity, we are for a brief while the jaguar. He ripples 
within us, he takes over our body, he is us” (53).
This reference to a poetic attempt at identification with an animal 
from its own perspective, made by Hughes, is quite interesting be-
cause in a different place, when Costello criticises (the real, not fic-
tional) philosopher Thomas Nagel, because he denies the possibility 
of “embodying” a bat,7 she disqualifies the senses as a basis for this 
kind of empathy: “[Nagel suggests that] we need to be able to experi-
ence bat-life through the sense-modalities of a bat. But he is wrong; 
or at least he is sending us down a false trail. To be a living bat is 
to be full of being; being fully a bat is like being fully human, which 
is also to be full of being. Bat-being in the first case, human-being 
 7 Nagel is quoted by Costello: “I want to know what it is like for a bat to be 
a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this, I am restricted by the resources of my own mind, 
and those resources are inadequate to the task” (31).
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in the second, maybe; but those are secondary considerations. To be 
full of being is to live as a body-soul. One name for the experience of 
full being is joy” (33). Yet the problem is that, even if we admit that 
animals experience such fullness of being, man is precisely a crea-
ture who lacks such fullness. As a desiring being, his most defining 
feature is a lack which cannot be filled – even if one’s desire is fi-
nally realised, it always turns out that “this is not it,” because eve-
ry “fullness” (satisfaction) is accompanied by the feeling that there 
must be some “fuller fullness.” One can even, somewhat cruelly, note 
that Costello herself can serve here as the best example: her main 
problem seems to be the lack of the feeling of fullness of being and 
joy, which culminates in the last scene when she bursts out crying 
in the arms of her son and thinking: “Calm down, I tell myself, you 
are making a mountain out of a molehill. This is life. Everyone else 
comes to terms with it, why can’t you? Why can’t you?” (69).
How can we, then, “embody” fullness, something we cannot ex-
perience? Surprisingly, it turns out we can do it by means of pure 
abstraction, because fullness is a sublime idea of reason. As infinity, 
fullness is accessible to us only as an idea, which we can understand 
though we cannot imagine it and therefore experience it sensually. 
Things are therefore exactly opposite to what Costello claims: “When 
Hughes the poet stands before the jaguar cage, he looks at an in-
dividual jaguar and is possessed by that individual jaguar life. It 
has to be that way. Jaguars in general, the subspecies jaguar, the 
idea of a jaguar, will fail to move him because we cannot experience 
abstractions” (53). Yet it is in fact abstraction that Hughes experi-
ences, although he himself would surely support Costello’s claims. As 
Nagel noted, trying to embody a jaguar, Hughes must rely on the re-
sources of his own mind and therefore cannot “insert” any sensuous 
data into this experience. Therefore, the faculty of his imagination 
is defeated in confrontation with the emptiness of the notion Jaguar 
and the experience of this breakdown, this impossibility, is taken for 
an “opening,” for an experience of fullness which is beyond-reason 
and beyond-human. In other words, we are dealing here with purely 
abstract self-affectation of the imagination by means of language. 
And if we can talk about the “primitive” experience of man (regard-
ing Hughes’s “shamanistic” inspirations), this is where we find it. In 
John Berger’s words: “Animals came from over the horizon. They be-
longed there and here. Likewise they were mortal and immortal. An 
animal’s blood flowed like human blood, but its species was undying 
and each lion was Lion, each ox was Ox. This […] was reflected in 
the treatment of animals. They were subjected and worshipped, bred 
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and sacrificed.”8 Perhaps we no longer perceive animals in this way, 
but there is nothing good about that – when ox ceases to be Ox, it 
becomes a commodity.
Is it, therefore, possible for reason to go beyond itself? 
Paradoxically, this is, in a sense, what Singer suggests in Animal 
Liberation, but only for the greater glory of reason. Taking as self-
evident the Other’s right to respect, he founds men’s equality in 
their physical, non-rational aspect. This allows him to draw a ra-
tional conclusion that because animals appreciate relief from pain 
as much as men, the right to “physical” respect must also apply to 
them.9 This exclusion of the founding aspect from reason does not 
make Singer’s philosophy irrational, but in fact allows for its hyper-
rationality, exemplified by the way it treats “scientific research” as 
absolute authority: “How can anyone who has not made a thorough 
study of the topic [animal suffering] possibly know that the problem 
is less serious than problems of human suffering?”10 A purely ideo-
logical question (what is important in order to act well?) is reduced 
here to the outcome of scientific research, that is, to measurements 
by means of instruments (even if we put aside the question of how 
pain can be measured). This approach leads to absurd problems, 
exemplified for instance by Singer’s remark that because oysters do 
not have a central nervous system up to a point, he ate them, but 
then he stopped, because perhaps they feel pain after all, or when 
he says that hens probably do not have anything against their eggs 
being taken away (perhaps one should try to measure this?). This 
way, truth is made equal to knowledge (or, in fact, to instrumental 
reason), which allows Singer to keep repeating that “we have the 
capacity to reason about what it is best to do,” and “almost every-
one is prepared to listen to reason.”11
How much reason, however, is in this reason? Another defini-
tion of reason should therefore be proposed – the instrument not of 
cogitation, but of fidelity to truth. Thus, apart from the dualism pre-
sented by Costello, which opposes reason (rationalism: cogitation and 
knowledge) and heart (irrationalism beyond reason), one has also to 
consider “irrational” reason (although it sounds like an oxymoron, 
this is only because of the long history of identifying thinking with 
knowledge), which is not determined by “scientific facts.” One can il-
 8 John Berger, “Why Look at Animals?” in: About Looking (London: Bloomsbury, 
2009), 6–7.
 9 Singer, Animal Liberation, 238.
 10 Singer, Animal Liberation, 219.
 11 Singer, Animal Liberation, 225, 243
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lustrate the way it works with the following example. Some time ago 
the world press reported on the results of a study conducted in the 
U.S., which was said to show that black Americans were statistically 
less able intellectually than representatives of other races. Putting 
aside here doubts pertaining to the instruments of such research and 
the accepted standards of “scientificity” (on which Costello has a lot 
to say), it is the postulate of reason that the ideal of equality of all 
men is maintained, even if the abovementioned data turn out to be 
empirically true.
I have not provided the above example randomly, but to juxtapose 
its truth with the truth of the way Singer’s “rationality” protests 
against speciesism: “But pain is pain, and the importance of prevent-
ing unnecessary pain and suffering does not diminish because the 
being that suffers is not a member of our species. What would we 
think of someone who said that “whites come first” and that there-
fore poverty in Africa does not pose as serious a problem as poverty 
in Europe?”12 Perhaps nobody (no politician especially) would be sin-
cere enough to formulate it like that in the media, but in the above 
words Singer formulated a pragmatic conviction of the rich West (or 
North, if you wish), undoubtedly based on “scientific” accounting, 
that is, a conviction according to which the West behaves and which 
it rationally believes.
One can therefore propose, although it may look absurd at first 
sight, that – as in the case of an apparent paradox that in a time 
when there reigns an ideology of respect for the Other, everybody in 
the West firmly believes that poverty in Africa (not to mention the 
AIDS epidemic) is a less serious problem than poverty in Europe 
or the U.S. – although almost everybody eats meat, the reigning 
ideology in the West is animal liberation. If we acknowledge that 
the foundation of our ethics is the right not to feel pain (the philo-
sophic version) and the right to happiness, that is, to consumption 
(the market version), reason (even more than compassion) makes it 
imperative that we expand this right to include animals, as Singer 
rightly argues. Thus, however, the ideology of the respect for the 
Other begins to appear unsettling – the real Altogether Other, the 
one with whom, according to Levinas, we can never identify, turns 
out not to be another man created in God’s image, but the animal 
Other. And here perhaps lies the reason for the “repression” in eve-
ryday life of rational (vegetarian) conclusions that should follow from 
the dominant ideology – the image of the Other is the image of the 
 12 Singer, Animal Liberation, 220
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animal (also the human animal) with which we neither can nor want 
to identify.
From this point of view, although Costello and Singer fight for 
the same cause, their “brotherhood in arms” can be treated as rather 
accidental. Looking at it from Costello’s angle, Singer is only another 
example of a rationalist, which actually means a pragmatic, that is, 
somebody who translates superstitions (in the sense of common opin-
ion) into rational thought. But precisely because of that Singer is un-
doubtedly right, when he calls the philosophical arguments against 
his position, which are based on the absolutisation of the difference 
between man and animal, (irrational) subterfuges of people who do 
not really think, but look for pretexts to eat meat.
Singer’s remark about poverty is a good illustration of the main 
problem with his idea of animal liberation. Contrary to Singer’s 
claims that it is a political movement and that vegetarianism and 
veganism are ways of boycotting the highest power these days, that 
is, the power of the market, animal liberation is the ideology, which, 
trying to change our eating habits, leaves everything else as it is. 
A good example of this is one of Singer’s apparently humanitarian 
arguments for not eating meat: breeding animals for meat means 
wasting food, because in order to produce a pound of animal proteins 
we have to provide an animal with many more pounds of plant pro-
teins.13 And because the animals kept in feedlots do not eat grass but 
soy, corn, millet and other cereals, which could be eaten by people, 
the problem of hunger in the world could be solved if plant food 
were not wasted on the mass raising of animals.14 Yet the problem 
of hunger in the world is not primarily a problem of the shortage of 
food but of property and profit. As Alain Badiou bitingly claims in 
an interview, “what is needed for running water, schools, hospitals, 
and food enough for all humanity is a sum that corresponds to the 
amount spent by wealthy Western countries on perfume in a year.”15 
Animals are treated like things not primarily because people have 
stupid (irrational) habits, but because they are private property 
 13 “So most estimates conclude that plant foods yield about ten times as much 
protein per acre as meat does, although estimates vary, and the ratio sometimes 
goes as high as twenty to one” (Singer, Animal Liberation, 165).
 14 The shortage of food in the world is, in fact, a veritable mantra in discussions 
of this type. O’Hearne argues against Costello that animal rights activists “want all 
animals to lead […] a utopian life in which everyone is miraculously fed and no one 
preys on anyone else” (64).
 15 Christoph Cox, Molly Whalen, and Alain Badiou, “On Evil: An Interview with 
Alain Badiou,” Cabinet, Issue 5, Winter 2001/02. 29 Jan. 2018, <http://www.cabinet-
magazine.org/issues/5/alainbadiou.php>.
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(which is sacred), and because the highest form of rationality under 
capitalism is profit, and this is the rationality (the “scientific” laws 
of the market) which causes people to die of hunger in underde-
veloped countries. Therefore, it is probably not an accident that for 
Singer consumption (a change of menu) replaces politics – we are 
dealing here with a movement which has in advance submitted to 
the reason of the market, for which consumption is the end and the 
highest duty because “there is no alternative.” In fact, we are not 
speaking here about a counterculture, which aims at reformulating 
the laws in which it feels imprisoned, but about another subculture, 
whose needs the market is happy to satisfy, providing it with tofu 
and almond milk.
Thus, what we are describing is a variety of paralysis in the face 
of the dominant ideology: we have to change technologies of food 
production in order to eradicate hunger in the world, while, from 
the technical point, the problem does not exist, because it is pos-
sible to produce the needed amount without changes in technology. 
In the context of Costello’s crusade, Norma says, “Respect for every-
one’s worldview, the cow’s worldview, the squirrel’s worldview, and 
so forth. In the end it leads to total intellectual paralysis. You spend 
so much time respecting that you haven’t time left to think” (47). 
One should, of course, note that Norma is a philosopher, so for her 
thinking means doing. But one should also ask oneself what she 
expresses with her statement. She does not even try to present the 
problem “objectively,” but simply spits venom, because she cannot 
stand her mother-in-law and we even learn why: “I would have more 
respect for her if she didn’t try to undermine me behind my back, 
with her stories to the children about the poor little veal calves and 
what the bad men do to them” (68). Therefore, the truth of Norma’s 
charge concerning paralysis is able to appear not because truth has 
the habit of objectively surfacing, but because Norma is engaged in 
an “ideological” struggle with her mother-in-law and all her “reason-
able” objections are the stuff of the struggle itself. In other words, 
contrary to what Singer claims (“[Coetzee] has this character, Norma, 
Costello’s daughter-in-law, who makes all the obvious [philosophical] 
objections to what Costello is saying”), Norma touches the truth of 
Costello’s position not when she criticises her ideas in a rationalistic 
way (in fact, her arguments boil down to what other philosophers 
say in the text: animals are, in a sense, machines), that is, when she 
chases her philosophical tail, but when she engages in a struggle for 
domination:
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And maybe […] the whole notion of cleanness versus unclean-
ness has a completely different function, namely, to enable certain 
groups to self-define themselves, negatively, as elite, as elected. We 
are the people who abstain from a or b or c, and by that power of 
abstinence we mark ourselves off as superior: as a superior caste 
within society, for instance. Like the Brahmins. […] The ban on 
meat that you get in vegetarianism is only an extreme form of di-
etary ban […] and a dietary ban is a quick, simple way for an elite 
group to define itself. (42)
Costello has to defend herself and, as is her habit, she comes up 
with a Big Name (though it has to be a lesser one this time, because 
the biggest of them all, Auschwitz, has already been used by her):
Gandhi was sent off to England as a young man to study law. 
England, of course, prided itself as a great meat-eating country. 
But his mother made him promise not to eat meat. She packed 
a trunk full of food for him to take along. During the sea voyage 
he scavenged a little bread from the ship’s table and for the rest 
ate out of his trunk. In London he faced a long search for lodgings 
and eating-houses that served his kind of food. Social relations with 
the English were difficult because he could not accept or return 
hospitality. It wasn’t until he fell in with certain fringe elements 
of English society – Fabians, theosophists, and so forth – that he 
began to feel at home. Until then he was just a lonely little law 
student. (42–43)
This story is supposed to show that “Gandhi’s vegetarianism can 
hardly be conceived as the exercise of power. It condemned him to 
the margins of society” (43), but of course the conviction of remain-
ing faithful to oneself (one’s principles) against the cruel world is 
one of the basic forms of creating the feeling of one’s superiority, es-
pecially among the marginalised. This mechanism involves a double 
identification: firstly, we identify with a certain image of ourselves 
(particular values), and, secondly, with the image of faithfulness to 
oneself (how great it is to be faithful to oneself when others are not). 
Empathy works in a similar way. As we have already noted, the 
“embodying” of an animal (“entering” into its senses) is impossible, 
and its “fullness” is accessible to us only negatively as an abstract 
idea. Therefore, what happens when we “open our hearts” to ani-
mals, war victims, etc.? We identify with the image of suffering we 
see or imagine and simultaneously with the image of ourselves as 
compassionate (it is so humanitarian to feel compassion). In other 
words, we are dealing here with a phenomenon that is, in the final 
~ 249  ~
analysis, narcissistic (which, of course, does not mean that it is nec-
essarily bad).
Isn’t this one of the psychic mechanisms (not the only one, to 
be sure) behind the animal rights discourse? Animal rights are not, 
strictly speaking, animal rights, because animals cannot originate 
them – a right appears ex nihilo when somebody starts to demand 
it. Therefore, because animal rights are demanded by men, they are, 
in fact, human rights. Human rights to what, however? As we have 
already mentioned, in our rich contemporary world there is only one 
right which is generally accepted: the right to feel good. What does 
“good” mean, however, in this context? As we have already noted, the 
natural state of feeling good (“fullness”) does not exist, because our 
desire always prompts us to think that there must surely be some 
“better good,” and therefore our state of happiness is permanently 
deferred, that is, spoiled. In other words, the absolute measure of 
satisfaction does not exist. Instead, there are ersatz, secondary sat-
isfactions, determined relatively – I feel good when I am better off 
than others, when I am richer, more beautiful, more compassionate 
than they are. In other words, the right to happiness, to feel good, 
is the right to feel superior.
However, Costello’s compassion does not make her happy at all. 
On the contrary, as has been mentioned already, her characteristic 
“tone” is one of despair, which is almost absolute and which she does 
not seem to understand herself (“Everyone else comes to terms with 
it, why can’t you? Why can’t you?”). Where does is come from, then? 
What is the origin of her emotionally “irrational” wish to make ani-
mals and humans equal, which is criticised even by Singer? When 
Costello speaks about empathy, claiming that “there is no limit to 
the extent to which we can think ourselves into the being of an-
other,” she comes up with a strange (and absurd, if taken literally) 
example: “For instants at a time, […] I know what it is like to be 
a corpse. The knowledge repels me. It fills me with terror; I shy 
away from it, refuse to entertain it” (32). Perhaps, however, we do 
not encounter here an example of the infinite capabilities of a per-
son to think him- or herself into otherness, but quite a realistic de-
scription of Costello’s own situation. Does her obsession with animal 
death not come from her feeling (even if not fully conscious) that 
she herself is, in a sense, already regarded as dead? Because it is 
in her figure that we can realise the reverse side of the civilisation 
which places the right to enjoy at its centre, of the symbolic order 
that represses death, which considers it a new taboo. Although death 
is omnipresent in our media (prime time television is dominated by 
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films in which people die and death is investigated an infinite num-
ber of times), it is this compulsion to repeat which shows that our 
culture is unable to create a place of inscription for death, to find 
meaning for it.16 Therefore, although its images proliferate, death 
remains, in a sense, repressed, and with it also the people whom 
death visibly marks. In a culture founded on the right to enjoyment, 
whose imaginary is strictly connected with youth, aged people are not 
only perceived by others as worthless, they also consider themselves 
worthless, because in our symbolic universe there is no place from 
which an aged person could see him- or herself as worthy of love. 
This is probably even more acute in case of aged women than men 
– perhaps the only “good” symbolic role assigned to them is the role 
of a grandmother who sacrifices herself to someone else’s happiness, 
the happiness of her grandson or granddaughter. Therefore Costello 
can quite realistically feel herself to be a (symbolic) “corpse” and one 
can understand her appeal to (the infinite capabilities of) empathy 
as simply a cry of despair. Thus, Costello’s reference to Auschwitz is 
perhaps not so unethical as Stern might think, if animal death and 
suffering, which nobody wants to notice, are, in the final analysis, 
a hyperbole of her own life, which is regarded as worthless. We can 
even say that, in this respect, the last page of Coetzee’s work offers 
a wry kind of happy ending – the call to empathy for a (human) 
animal is answered by Costello’s son John, when on the way to the 
airport his mother dissolves into tears. Although all the stress of 
the visit, caused by the reaction to the views propagated by her and 
the struggle for domination with her daughter-in-law, had already 
ended the previous day, and what Costello can expect is only a quiet 
flight home where her cats await her, John whispers in his mother’s 
ear, “There, there. It will soon be over” (69), as if he simply had her 
death in mind.
 16 Darian Leader, The New Black: Mourning and Melancholia (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 2008), 74.
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Sławomir Masłoń
Père-wersje prawdy: powieści J.M. Coetzeego
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Autor stawia sobie za zadanie ujęcie twórczości powieściowej J.M. Coetzeego od innej 
strony niż większość krytyków ma w zwyczaju. Zwykłą praktyką, do której zresztą 
pisarstwo to zachęca, jest jego ogląd z pozycji „humanistycznej”, krytykującej naduży-
cia kolonializmu i konfrontującej przemoc z problemami egzystencjalnymi Człowieka 
na drodze do Prawdy i samorealizacji.
Mimo że w dzisiejszym świecie autorytet uniwersaliów, takich jak Człowiek 
i Prawda, został mocno nadszarpnięty, gdyż może być postrzegany jako zawsze 
służący czyimś interesom, wydaje się że Coetzee stworzył na swój użytek metodę 
pisarską, w której podstawowe cechy powieści humanistycznej mogą być zachowane, 
a która jednak stara się bronić przed zarzutami uwikłania w grę przemocy i intere-
sów, pragnąc okazać levinasowski szacunek dla Innego.
Narracja powieści Coetzeego zwykle oscyluje wokół pustego miejsca stworzonego 
przez autora w jej wnętrzu, wokół zagadki, którą powieść będzie się starała rozwiązać, 
ale przez którą w końcu zostanie pokonana. W jego wczesnych utworach spotkanie 
pomiędzy zagadką a objaśniającą narracją rozgrywa się jako konfrontacja ofiary 
kolonializmu z przedstawicielem liberalnej („humanistycznej”) części społeczeństwa 
kolonizatorów, przeciwnym używaniu przemocy. W późniejszych powieściach kon-
frontacja przenosi się coraz bardziej do wewnątrz dyskursu dominującego, jednak 
centralna „niewyjaśnialna” zagadka, jak i tematyka władzy i przemocy w stosun-
kach międzyludzkich, pozostają w ich centrum. (Wyjątkiem jest tu ostatnia powieść 
Powolny człowiek, która rozgrywa się w bezpiecznej Australii, jednak i ta narracja 
koncentruje się wokół swego rodzaju zagadki). Tego rodzaju konstrukcja pozwala na 
stworzenie innego rodzaju uniwersalium zwanego Innym, a posiadającego sprzeczne 
cechy. Jest On bowiem dla nas „pusty” (jego „życioświat” jest dla nas niedostępny), 
a zarazem niesamowicie „pełny” (niedostępna dla nas „etniczna substancja” stanowi 
o jego prawdzie). W ten oto sposób Prawda zostaje zrelatywizowana (jest inna dla 
każdej substancji etnicznej), to owa substancja staje się najwyższym dobrem, a więc 
Sprawiedliwością jako taką.
Analizie poddano kolejne powieści Coetzeego (z wyjątkiem dwóch pierwszych, 
w których wspomniany wyżej mechanizm nie jest jeszcze dostatecznie wypracowany), 
a  zawarte w nich przesłanki dyskursu humanistycznego są konfrontowane z wybra-
nymi koncepcjami teorii psychoanalitycznej, w szczególności Jacques’a Lacana, oraz 
ich polityczną aplikacją dokonywaną przez Slavoja Žižka. W ten sposób autor stara 
się pokazać polityczne, narracyjne i egzystencjalne konsekwencje postaw przyjętych 
przez bohaterów tego rodzaju uwspółcześnionej wersji powieści humanistycznej. Mimo 
że motywują oni swe poczynania bezwzględnym posłuszeństwem Sprawiedliwości 
wyższej od każdego prawa (objawiającej się na różne cząstkowe sposoby jako szacu-
nek dla Innego, honor itp.), w rzeczywistości czerpią narcystyczną rozkosz z takiego 
stosunku, jako że to uniwersalium stanowi eksternalizację ich obrazu samego siebie 
w modalności „transcendentalnej” – obrazu „pustego” tylko dlatego, że przekracza on 
wszelkie pojęcie, czyli właściwie będącego obrazem pełni (tu kryje się tajemnica pełni 
Innego), która unieważnia wszelkie granice i dlatego dostarcza najwyższej rozkoszy, 
nawet jeśli jest ona bolesna.
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Père-Versionen der Wahrheit: J. M. Coetzees Romane
Z u s a m m e n f a s s u n g
Der Verfasser setzt sich ein Ziel, J. M. Coetzees Romane von anderer Seite als das 
die meisten Literaturkritiker tun, zu erforschen. Diese Werke waren meistens aus 
„humanistischer“ Sicht betrachtet, es wurden kolonialistische Missbräuche kritisiert 
und die Gewalt mit existentiellen Problemen des Menschen auf seinem Wege nach 
Wahrheit und Selbstverwirklichung konfrontiert.
In der heutigen Welt haben solche Universalien wie Mensch und Wahrheit stark 
an Bedeutung verloren, denn sie können als solche betrachtet werden, die jemandes 
Interessen dienen sollten. Trotzdem scheint Coetzee seine eigene schriftstellerische 
Methode entwickeln zu haben, die die wichtigsten Eigenschaften des humanistischen 
Romans erkennen lässt, doch in ein Gewalt­ und Interessenspiel nicht hineingezogen 
werden und vor dem Anderen die dem Levinas ähnliche Achtung haben wollte.
Die von Coetzee in seinem Roman angewandte Erzählung schwankt meist rund-
um den darin geschaffenen freien Platz, rundum ein gewisses Rätsel, das der Roman 
zwar zu lösen versucht, doch von dem er schließlich überwunden werden muss. In 
seinen frühen Romanen ist das Zusammentreffen des Rätsels und der es erklären-
den Erzählung eine gewisse Konfrontation des kolonialistischen Opfers mit dem 
Vertreter des liberalen („humanistischen“) Teils der Gesellschaft der Kolonisatoren, 
der sich gegen Gewalt erklärt. In den nächsten Romanen findet diese Konfrontation 
schon viel mehr innerhalb des vorherrschenden Diskurses statt, doch das „uner-
klärbare“ Haupträtsel und die die Macht und die Gewalt in zwischenmenschlichen 
Beziehungen betreffenden Themen stehen nach wie vor im Mittelpunkt der Romane. 
Eine Abweichung davon ist der letzte Roman Ein träger Mensch, dessen Handlung 
sich im ungefährdeten Australien abspielt, obwohl auch diese Erzählung auf ein ge-
wisses Rätsel gerichtet ist. Solch eine Werkstruktur erlaubt, eine weitere Universalie 
zu schaffen, nämlich das „Andere“, das über kontradiktorische Eigenschaften verfügt. 
Das Andere erscheint uns zwar „leer“ (seine Lebenswelt ist für uns nicht erreichbar) 
und „voll“ zugleich (seine für uns unerreichbare „ethnische Substanz“ entscheidet 
über dessen Wahrheit). Auf diese Weise obwohl die Wahrheit zwar gewissermaßen 
relativiert wird (jeder ethnischen Substanz entspricht eine andere Wahrheit), wird 
diese Substanz als solche zum höchsten Guten also zur Gerechtigkeit als solcher.
In vorliegender Monografie werden der Reihe nach alle Coetzees Romane (mit 
Ausnahme von den zwei ersten Romanen, in denen der oben genannte Mechanismus 
noch nicht ausreichend herausgearbeitet worden ist) analysiert: alle darin enthal-
tenen Voraussetzungen des humanistischen Diskurses werden den ausgewählten 
Konzeptionen der psychoanalytischen Theorie, vor allem den des Jacques Lacans 
und deren politischen Applikation von Slavoj Žižek gegenübergestellt. Auf diese 
Weise versucht der Verfasser, politische, narrative und existentielle Folgen der 
Entscheidungen zu zeigen, die von den Helden der aktualisierten Version des 
humanistischen Romans getroffen wurden. Obwohl ihre Entscheidungen mit bedin-
gungslosem Gehorsam der jeden Rechtes höheren Gerechtigkeit begründet werden, 
ziehen die Helden einen narzisstischen Genuss aus solch einer Beziehung, denn diese 
Universalie externalisiert ihr eigenes Bild in transzendentaler Modalität, das als 
ein „leeres“ Bild nur deswegen gilt, dass es jedes Vorstellungsvermögen übersteigt, 
also in Wirklichkeit ein volles Bild ist (hier kommt das Geheimnis der ganzen Fülle 
des Anderen zum Ausdruck), das alle Grenzen übersteigen zu können, den größten 
Vergnügen bereitet, selbst wenn es auch schmerzlich sein sollte.
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